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Introduction
These days we are witnessing a rapid advancement in reproductive tech-
nologies, not only in the post-industrial societies of Western Europe,
North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, but also in societies
dealing with nation-building, such as China and India. This book fo-
cuses on the issue of selective abortion, meaning the abortion of a foe-
tus with an anomaly1 with the help of technologies that look for a dis-
ability and an anomaly in foetuses.
In Japan, amniocentesis was first introduced in 1968.2 In 1983, in vi-
tro fertilisation was practised for the first time. In the spring of 1996,
maternal serum screening (MSS)3 or the ‘triple marker test’ was made
available on the medical market, enabling individual medical doctors to
have the test at their disposal (Sakai 1999: chapter 2).4
Ethically, selective abortion can be a highly problematic issue, and in
Japan there has been an active debate about the practice, starting in the
1970s, between the movements of disabled people and of women.
Whenever there was an attempt to revise the law to limit women’s ac-
cess to abortion, the women’s movement has used such phrases as ‘wo-
men’s right to abortion’, ‘women decide to give birth or not to’, and
‘women’s right to self-determination’. Countering these phrases, the
disabled people’s movement claims: ‘women should not argue from the
concept of ‘right’ because people use the term ‘right’ to justify aborting
foetuses with an anomaly’. This disagreement first came to the fore in
1972 between the Women’s Liberation Movement (hereafter the WLM)
in Japan and the Aoi shiba no kai, a group of people with cerebral palsy,
when anti-abortion activists attempted to revise the law for legal abor-
tion to limit access to abortion and to introduce a selective abortion
clause. A similar disagreement surfaced again in 1982, when there was
another attempt to limit women’s access to abortion. During the 1990s
and thus far in the 2000s there have been no attempts to limit wo-
men’s access to abortion. The Eugenic Protection Law was repealed in
1996 (Appendix 2), and currently there is no law explicitly discriminat-
ing against disabled people. But the debate continues because reproduc-
tive technologies to discover anomalies are increasingly sophisticated
and are becoming more and more accessible. The central question in-
herent in the debate is: Do ‘women’s rights to abortion’ include the ab-
solute right to abort a foetus with an anomaly?
The WLM of the 1970s and the women’s movement group called
Soshiren (which has been active since 1982) have indeed been hesitant
to use the term ‘right’ in abortion debates when it concerns the abor-
tion of foetuses with anomalies. The main reason for this hesitation is
that the term ‘right’ cannot express factors inherent in the experiences
of abortion, such as ‘pain’ felt by women. Instead, according to the wo-
men’s movement arguments, the concept of ‘rights’ tends to rationalise
the painful experiences of abortion and the ethical problems of aborting
foetuses with anomalies, reducing the issue to legal access to abortion.
‘Right’ also tends to reduce the issue of abortion to the relationship be-
tween a pregnant woman and a foetus, since the term ‘women’s rights’
triggers the concept of ‘the foetus’s right to life’ as its counterpoint.
Moreover, when it comes to ‘a foetus with an anomaly’, ‘the right to
abortion’, practised mostly by disability-free women, appears to ignore
the issue of discrimination against disabled people. And because the
nature of the act of abortion is to ‘terminate the development of a life’,
the rights argument eventually portrayed the pregnant women as ‘self-
ish’, ‘aggressive’, and ‘egoistic’.
Given these problems, the WLM during the 1970s sometimes inten-
tionally avoided the use of the term ‘right’, and instead tried to make
up alternative phrases, so that problems surrounding the issue of abor-
tion could be expressed. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, a new voca-
bulary appeared more frequently in the argument of the women’s
movements, in the form of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ and
‘reproductive rights’. However, the problem that inheres in the concept
of ‘having a right’ in itself, that is, ‘do women’s rights include a right to
selective abortion?’ remained in the debates within the movements of
both disabled people and women.
Despite the fact that the concept of ‘rights’ has the aforementioned
problems, women in the movement never did away with the term
‘right’ entirely. There are too many justifiable reasons for women to use
‘right’ – oppression of women is visible in daily lives and is deeply
rooted in history. The concept, a political instrument to criticise oppres-
sion, cannot be removed from the vocabulary of the women’s move-
ment, because saying ‘women do not have rights’ is almost equivalent
to a public admission of defeat by the women’s movement. Women in
the movement have been aware of this point from the 1970s until today,
and thus there has been a dilemma: whether or not to use it. And if it
is to be used, how? This book aims to discuss the dilemma and its
transformation through time, analysing the meaning of ‘rights’ in the
Japanese women’s movement.
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Problems of rights: The issue of rights in an international context
Not only in Japan are problems of the concept of ‘rights’ formulated
and discussed, but attempts to enrich the concept of ‘rights’ are also
being constructed by many contemporary thinkers. For example, the
US philosopher Rebecca Cook looks at criticisms of ‘rights’ raised in
many parts of the world (Cook 1994b). The main criticism discussed by
Cook is that the concept of ‘rights’ was born in the West (at least the
term ‘right’ itself), and does not fit well within indigenous cultures in
non-Western regions. To introduce the critical argument, Adetoun Ilu-
moka, a legal practitioner from Lagos, Nigeria, says
The rights discourse in Africa is not meaningful, because the se-
verity of socio-economic problems faced by women in countries
undergoing structural adjustment may require a basic needs
strategy rather than a rights strategy (Cook 1994b: 4-5).
Ilumoka’s statement shows a distance between people and the term
‘rights’. Because rights are not indigenous, rights discourse does not
sound relevant for those who are living under severe conditions. In-
stead, the vocabulary of needs (needing something) sounds more con-
crete and appealing to those living in such a context.
Radhika Coomaraswamy, of the International Centre for Ethic Stu-
dies in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the UN rapporteur on the trafficking
of women, who has been working on the issue of rights for more than
20 years, argues:
In South Asia, the institution of law is generally viewed with
deep suspicion and often hatred because it is seen as the central
instrument employed by colonising powers to replace indigenous
cultural, religious, and social traditions with the mechanisms of
the modern Western nation state. When the law of women’s hu-
man rights is associated with an impersonal and homogenising
Western state, such rights are discredited (Cook 1994b: 7-8).
Thus, stating the problematic implications of rights, she continues to
say that
In Asia, the rights discourse is weak, in part because it privileges
free, independent women, whereas Asian women tend to be at-
tracted to their communities, castes, or ethnic groups (Cook
1994b: 4-5).
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In addition to rights being alien, she adds that the idea of individual
‘practitioners’ of rights within South Asia is different from the West.
In the international arena, the concept of human rights has been de-
veloped and extended in many treaties and conventions; In the UN De-
claration of Human Rights in 1948, the concept of ‘rights’ was intended
to be applied to everybody regardless of any differences in backgrounds,
not only to so-called ‘white, middle-class European men’. In the declara-
tion, not only rights to freedom from interference of various kinds, but
also to positive benefits such as education, a decent standard of living,
and health care were brought into the scope. Under the concept of hu-
man rights, a person with rights has no reason to be grateful to bene-
factors; they are inherent in the person. Human rights have become ca-
nons by which social, economic, and political arrangements can be criti-
cised and are politically significant as grounds of protest and
justification for reforming policies. On the one hand, the concept of hu-
man rights is actually used by political activists in so-called non-Western
areas, too, such as in Sri Lanka against army and police violence, for in-
stance.
However, on the other hand, the concept of ‘rights’ is not always ea-
sily employed in every non-Western society, because the concept of
‘rights’ in itself does not automatically fit in every society; it can be an
‘alien concept’. In Japan, for example, it can be observed that the notion
of ‘rights’ does not always appeal to the most oppressed people, e.g. dis-
abled people, whose social position should be most enhanced and pro-
tected by the concept of ‘rights’. This is because the term ‘right’ is initi-
ally imported from ‘the West’, often through academic documents and
books, originally in one of the European languages, to which mainly so-
cially higher class people have access. Moreover, since the ‘rights’ voca-
bulary is often closely connected to the law and the policies of the state,
rights are highly political, philosophical, abstract, and intellectual con-
cepts, which cannot always express the agonies of those who are most
oppressed.
A number of thinkers and people in social movement organisations,
both in ‘non-western areas’ and in ‘the West’ are aware of these pro-
blems, and they have produced huge debates criticising the concept of
‘universality of the concept of human rights’, saying ‘human rights are
not absolutely universal’. Examples of this are the arguments of Ilumo-
ka and Coomaraswamy as shown above.
These criticisms have to do with the implications of the Western phi-
losophical tradition about the nature of the individual, who is held to be
a strong, rational, autonomous, utilitarian, enlightened, liberated ‘self’,
the practitioner of right. This concept of the individual, or ‘self’, is pos-
sible to observe in certain currents in the development of ‘western’ poli-
tical philosophy. The problem is that, although the philosophy has de-
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veloped locally in ‘the West’, reflecting local historical and social situa-
tions, the nature of the individual and meaning of the term ‘rights’ are
often attached to the notion of universality, whether implicitly or expli-
citly. Moreover, criticism has also been directed at the ‘self’ as used in
the context of the concept of the ‘right to self-determination’. This criti-
cism suggest that women who are engaging on issues of reproductive
health should not use the term ‘right to self-determination’ because the
concept of ‘self’ is western, i.e., enlightened, isolated and ignorant of re-
lationality, characteristics which do not always fit with non-western so-
cieties.5
These observations do not mean that there have been no concepts
like ‘rights’ in non-Western areas. Obviously, criticisms of women’s
rights discourse in Japan also have to do with the implications of the
term ‘rights’, which seem to be in conflict with so-called indigenous
ideas, including ideas equivalent to the Western concept of ‘rights’.
Even so, the penetration of Western culture has been so strong that
‘rights’, with its Western philosophical implications, has become an al-
most ‘global’ or common term. This situation is not ideal, in the sense
that the term, which emerged from a specific social, historical, and geo-
graphical background, implies that it can represent all situations around
the world. However, there is no way back; rather than doing away with
the Western concept, there is a need to de-Westernise the notion of
‘rights’.
In addition to the critique of the ‘Western bias’, there is also a cri-
tique that rights, as well as international treaties and laws, were devel-
oped mainly by men in a male-oriented world. Feminists both in ‘non-
Western areas’ and in ‘the West’ have pointed out this problem (e.g.
Cook 1994a, 1994b; Pateman 1988). Rights have not been interpreted
in a gender-sensitive way that is responsive to women’s experiences of
injustice (Cook 1994b: 10; see also Pateman 1988).
In these respects, the notion of ‘rights’ needs to be even further de-
veloped. Given these facts, the major purpose of this book is to address
these problems in the context of a specific debate in Japan. Firstly, the
genealogy of rights needs to be examined. The Western concept of
rights seems to imply ideas involving secularism, materialism, individu-
alism, and indifference to other people or social communities. Yet the
tendency is that the meaning of ‘rights’ is often unevaluated, because it
is so widely used, not only in debates by philosophers and political thin-
kers, but also by the public in general. Despite any ongoing debates,
‘rights” has become the kind of term that tends to be treated as abso-
lute, beyond challenge.
In such a situation, in which every user of ‘rights’ might have his/
her own idea of ‘rights’, an examination of the genealogy of rights can
be valuable. When the theoretical meaning of the concept of ‘rights’ is
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clarified by tracing its genealogy in the context where rights emerged,
the significance of Enlightenment individualism may well come to the
fore. There might be useful points in Western individualism, when its
message is accurately grasped, to be employed in non-Western areas by
adjusting the messages in accordance with local conditions, instead of
doing away with rights and calling them an alien concept from the
West.
Secondly, the concept might need de-Westernising in order to be
more easily adopted in different cultures, so that it can work effectively
to empower women. It cannot be denied that in many of the non-Wes-
tern regions, what it means to be Western, including how an individual
should be, is often uncritically proposed as the ideal model. Accord-
ingly, the term ‘right’ is often understood in terms of Western ideas
about how individuals should interact with each other. But under this
condition it is no wonder that there is a tension between indigenous va-
lues and rights, and this makes users of rights vulnerable to attacks in
non-Western areas. To de-Westernise the concept of ‘rights’ means to
make ‘rights’ more gender-sensitive, too, because Western philosophical
ideas related to the concept of ‘rights’, such as utilitarianism, liberalism,
or the autonomous self, are highly masculine in origin (see chapter 3).
Thus, tracing the genealogy of ‘rights’ can help in de-Westernising
‘rights’, as well as in making the term more gender-sensitive. Clarifying
its theoretical content can illuminate what is Western and masculine
and is therefore problematic about ‘rights’.
Coomaraswamy rightly also argues that
For human rights to be effective, they have to become a re-
spected part of the culture and traditions of a given society. [...]
Unless human rights values take root in civil society and unless
civil institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
take up the cause, then women’s rights as human rights will
have no resonance in the social institutions concerned. [...]
Rights discourse will have more resonance, and therefore, more
effectiveness, to the extent to which it can be plugged into many
of the dynamic social movements taking place in South Asia’
(1994: 39-57).
According to her, ‘Asian women activists argue that legal strategies to
emancipate women need to allow women to touch base with their tradi-
tional sources of empowerment’ (ibid).
My use of the category ‘the West’ is not intended to polarise the
world into two areas of ‘the West’ and ‘non-West’. The term ‘the West’
is not used to refer to a specific country, nor to generalise about charac-
teristics of societies which belong to the so-called ‘West’. The term ‘the
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West’ is used to indicate a certain ‘canonical’ pattern of the way in
which the meaning of the concept of ‘rights’ is conceived, as in the
form of ‘the right to self-determination’, for example. The actual prac-
tice of ‘rights’ differs in different areas of the world, of course, but the
original meaning of ‘rights’ is attributed to certain patterns of way of
thinking, which developed from the 16th century on, mainly in Western
Europe and North America (see chapter 3). Although I do not agree
with the oversimplified categories ‘the West’ versus ‘non-West’, the cate-
gory ‘the West’ needs to be employed here, as a pool of knowledge and
values that enjoys more power in representing political philosophy in
the contemporary world. Accordingly, ‘non-West’ is a category, contain-
ing what is not ‘the West’ in this specific term of political philosophy
and its representative power. I employ the category ‘the West’, because
power exists between what is called ‘the West’ and non-west, and because
power is operative in making the distinction between what is called ‘the
West’ and ‘non-West’, and the justifiability of this hierarchal power relation
is then open for reconsideration. Thus, the category ‘the West’ is used in
order to challenge the power imbalance among ‘the West’ and the rest
of the world. A necessity of having a category in relation to issues of
power and representativeness, is discussed in chapter 7.
By saying ‘non-West’, this writer also does not intend to represent
non-Western values in this book; needless to say, values within the
‘non-West’ are diverse. Nor is this a work to advocate the superiority of
non-Western values; by looking at a specific debate in one non-Western
society, Japan, this book intends to show that a non-Western value sys-
tem and philosophy are not only not inferior, but also important to lis-
ten to. This book aims to enrich such universally used, but originally
Western terms as ‘rights’, of which the intrinsic worth is unfortunately
hardly challenged (Mahbubani 2002: 59).6 The era is over in which
only the West has a monopoly on wisdom or virtue on philosophical va-
lues. Having this ambition in mind, this book is aimed at providing
one non-Western case study.
At the risk of becoming repetitive, it has to be emphasised that the
aim of this book is not to produce ‘absolute universalism’ to be im-
posed on other areas of the world, or ‘academic nationalism’7 claiming
uniqueness and superiority of what is discovered by one research study
about Japan. The aim of this book is to offer one case study, i.e. analysis
of arguments about the term ‘rights’ made by some social movement
organisations (SMOs hereafter) in Japan, which might contribute to en-
riching the concept ‘rights’. It also has to be noted that ‘ways of think-
ing’ detected in arguments of SMOs presented in this book, are not re-
presentative of Japan, either: Arguments put forth by SMOs are not ne-
cessarily widely shared by the general public in Japan; they have been
chosen because of the weight of their political presence and their signif-
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icance – so significant that it should not be overlooked – in constructing
the philosophy of social position of women and disabled people. The se-
lection of target groups including SMOs for this research will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter.
Proposing that ‘de-Westernisation of the concept of rights means to
de-masculinise the concept’, it is not intended to imply that non-Wes-
tern philosophy, including that of Japan, is gender-sensitive. Tradition-
ally, Japanese political philosophy is also masculine, excluding women
or people with disabilities. But in this book, Western philosophy will be
questioned because it tends to represent ‘political philosophy’. Thus,
challenging two powers – of ‘the West’ and the ‘masculine’ – is possible
by bringing non-Western case studies and the philosophy of political
minorities such as women and disabled people into the scope of politi-
cal philosophical analysis at the same time.
The aims of this book with regard to the concept of ‘rights’
This research will analyse the meaning of the notion of ‘rights’ as sup-
ported, used, understood, and felt in the Japanese women’s movement.
As should be clear so far, ‘rights’ needs to be de-Westernised and made
gender-sensitive. I believe that the most effective strategy to achieve
these aims is that women from various backgrounds make an effort to
integrate their experiences into the theory of rights, as well as into the
society’s treaties and laws. The task of de-Westernising and localising
the concept can best be done locally by women, including those from
both academia and social movements, because local women are the
main actors in the struggles against the social values in their own socie-
ties. Given this situation, it is both worth discussing and necessary to
examine the way in which Japanese women in women’s movements
use the concept of ‘rights’. The product of the discussion can contribute
to the task of enriching the concept of ‘rights’, going beyond the con-
ventional ideas of rights that are linked to the Western philosophical tra-
dition.
The meaning of ‘rights’ in a women’s movement in one geographical
area might differ from the meaning in other areas. This should not be
a problem, because ‘rights’ needs localising anyway, and for women in
the world to unite together it is important to share experiences about
the practice of rights in their activities. I believe that this is the only
way to enrich and de-Westernise the concept of ‘rights’ on a theoretical
level. To be informed about struggles and achievements regarding the
practice of rights by women in other areas will serve to encourage wo-
men in another area of the world, who are also confronted by problems
in the concept of rights. I also believe that it is important for Western
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women to gain a broader insight into the concept of ‘rights’, which can
be provided by women in non-Western areas.
There is no unanimous agreement about the meaning of the concept
of ‘rights’ within one geographical area or a society. This also should
not be a problem, because the meaning of ‘rights’ is never static; the
process of seeking its meaning is more important, I believe, than NOT
challenging the conventional and static meaning of the term ‘right’.
It has to be noted that the concept of rights is sometimes critiqued
by some conservative governments as a way to dismiss women’s groups
and activities, saying, ‘women are misguided by “aping” Western con-
cepts’ (Cook 1994b: 18). It is not the intention of this book to discuss
this type of criticism, which aims at discouraging women’s empower-
ment. My aim is to enrich the theoretical meaning of rights, for the
sake of women in both the Western and non-Western worlds, by dis-
cussing the way in which the concept of rights is used in non-Western
areas (or more specifically, in Japan). If ‘right’ becomes a local term in
various non-Western areas of the world, such criticisms as: ‘women
who are using rights, are being fooled by Western invaders’, will lose
their potency.
This book also aims to introduce the recent history of the Japanese
abortion debate in the English language, which is hardly known in
other countries, mainly because of the language barrier. In fact, tracing
the history of the Japanese debate itself will provide a number of rich
insights into how to conceptualise the issue of abortion, which, in some
critical ways, differs from concepts held in the West. Abortion debates
conducted around the term ‘right’ in Japan are analysed from the 1970s
on, because in 1972 disagreements about the concept of ‘rights’ be-
tween women and disabled people surfaced for the first time. These
abortion debates will demonstrate the stark contradictions around the
term ‘right’ that Japanese women confront. This task includes consid-
eration of how the usage of the concept of ‘rights’ has been transformed
and the reasons for this, in the light of changes in the social, political,
and international backgrounds where debates took place. Finally, the
meaning of ‘rights’ as used by the Japanese women’s movement is
theorised. So this book is a theoretical discussion as well as a historical
analysis.
In addition to these theoretical challenges, the research will also ex-
amine the relationship between the Japanese women’s reproductive
movement and the disabled people’s movement. The term ‘right’ has
been one of the critical points of the disagreement between the two
movements. By examining the concept of ‘rights’ theoretically, and by
considering the causes for the disagreement in the light of the charac-
teristics of the concept of ‘rights’, I hope to contribute to fostering more
mutual understanding between the movements of disabled people and
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of women. Moreover, clarification of the theoretical concept of rights
may well offer the Japanese women’s movement insights as to how to
use the term ‘right’ more effectively.
The Japanese history of the practice of abortion and eugenics is also
examined, so that arguments put forth by today’s women’s and disabled
people’s movements can be properly understood in their context. The
history is traced from 1868, because this year was the beginning of the
period when Japan embarked on ‘modernisation’, building a nation-
state with state policies and laws, including those on abortion and eu-
genics. The term ‘right’ was brought into Japan during this period,
through On Liberty by John Stuart Mill in 1875 (Jiyuˆ-no-kotowari in the
Japanese title) and Du Contrat Social by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1882
(Minyaku-yakkai). However, the concept of ‘rights’, translated into the
term kenri, did not seamlessly fit into the Japanese social context, be-
cause as its social condition differed from the context where the term
‘right’ was born. During this period, the notion of ‘rights’ went through
a series of interpretative attempts by thinkers of the day so that it could
fit in the Japanese context, interacting with the pre-existing concept,
such as ‘ri’, which is equivalent to what is called a ‘right’ (see chapter 3).
Then, questions arise as to why the concept of ‘rights’ did not fit
smoothly within the Japanese social context, what the concept of ‘rights’
is, and how the Japanese social context was.
To achieve these goals, the genealogy of the concept of ‘rights’ will be
traced as it emerged in the specific local and historical context of Wes-
tern Europe. At the same time, the Japanese indigenous political philo-
sophy about what is called a ‘right’ in the West, as well as the way the
concept of ‘rights’ was introduced from the West and was received in Ja-
pan, will be traced in order to understand why the term is contested.
Related research
Several other scholars have also written about selective abortion in Ja-
pan. They deal with key concepts related to this issue, such as ‘self-de-
termination’, ‘the right to self-determination’, and ‘ethics in practices of
reproductive technology’. Many of them have made considerable contri-
butions to constructing debates around ‘selective abortion’ in Japan.
The Japanese sociologist Shinya Tateiwa has provided a highly refined
analysis of the concept of self-determination (1997). He examines the
genealogy of the concept of self-determination, and argues against the
validity of principles attached to the notion of self-determination’. His
work is accurate, challenging conventional values attached to the term
self-determination, ambitiously trying to further develop a meaning of
its concept. Unfortunately, his work has not been translated into Eng-
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lish, but in Japan his work has influenced the way that self-determina-
tion has been conceived by those who are concerned about the term, in-
cluding those in academia and social movements.
According to Tateiwa, the meaning of the term ‘self-determination’
has not been precisely examined and the term is often used vaguely as
‘to decide about one’s affairs on one’s own’. As the expressions of
‘one’s affairs’ and ‘on one’s own’ show, self-determination is based on
the principle of private property, that ‘one can do whatever one likes to
one’s belongings’. Tateiwa shows that this idea can be traced back to lib-
eralist ideas in Western philosophy, such as those of John Stuart Mill.
The logic developed by Mill is that ‘one’s will’ generates ‘one’s labour
to produce something’. Then, ‘the thing produced by the person be-
longs to the person’. Finally, ‘the person can dispose of the thing in a
way the person wants, as long as the act does not harm others’. Tateiwa
argues that the concept of self-determination based on the liberalist
principle of private property is not actually grounded at the fundamental
level (1997: 25-26). On the one hand, most of the natural resources are
not produced by human beings, nor are our physical bodies, but human
beings still insist on ‘self-determination’ in these matters. On the other
hand, there are ideas that trading one’s internal organs, or surrogate
motherhood, to cite two examples, are in some ways problematic, even
if these acts might be based on the informed consent of the parties in-
volved, as in the ‘liberalist free market’ principle. Therefore, when
thinking of the practice of self-determination, there is something more
at stake than the principle of the free market or private property.
After developing various related arguments, Tateiwa concludes that
‘there are some affairs in which we do not want to intervene, or make
decisions about’ (1997: 105-106). ‘The affairs’, in which we do not want
to intervene, are often intimately related to the meaning of the subject.
Defining ‘other’ to mean what is not to be controlled, he concludes that
‘self-determination is a principle based on an acknowledgement of
“otherness” in something (ibid)’. Based on this logical reasoning, he
concludes that women have rights to abortion not because of their ‘pos-
sessing’ a foetus, but because of their bodily experiences and conditions
in pregnancy. However, Tateiwa concludes that women do not have
rights to decide on the quality of the would-be child (ibid; 1998b).
Because he challenges conventional vocabularies such as ‘an indivi-
dual’s right to possess’ attached to ‘self-determination’, and since he ex-
tends his arguments to how related individuals interact with each other
in the practice of self-determination, his argument is remarkable and
worthy of attention. His argument is philosophically highly refined, de-
veloped through his experiences in the disabled people’s movement.
‘Self-determination’ is the supreme principle for some disabled people:
for those who need other people’s assistance for daily activities such as
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eating and personal care, ‘to decide on their own’ is the ultimate aim to
realising ‘self-dependence’.
However, when women in the women’s movement use ‘self-determi-
nation’, this raises political questions. In this book, the focus is on
‘rights’, and when women use the term ‘self-determination’ it is mostly
in the form of the ‘right to self-determination’, while Tateiwa’s consid-
eration is often ‘self-determination’, without ‘right’. Given that the con-
cept of ‘rights’ is a political instrument to criticise oppression, the
meanings of ‘self-determination’ as used by the women’s movement
and by the disabled people’s movement do not always overlap. Tateiwa’s
consideration of self-determination is profound, but it cannot be applied
totally to the principle of self-determination as used in the women’s po-
litical movement. This book takes a perspective different from Tateiwa’s
analysis, as it focuses on the women’s movement and its concept of the
right to self-determination, which encompasses questions about power
relations.
Another well-known sociologist, Shûichi Katô, also deals with the is-
sue of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ in Japanese abortion de-
bates (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998). Developing an argument against the
‘foetus’s right to life’, he vindicates women’s rights to self-determina-
tion in abortion. As an argument to reconsider relations between a foe-
tus and a pregnant woman, his argument is highly detailed and convin-
cing. His final suggestion is that abortion debates need to transcend the
issue of weighing the rights of a woman and a foetus, and to acknowl-
edge that women’s rights to self-determination are oriented towards pa-
triarchy, a male-dominated social institution which oppresses women.
Because he attempts to go beyond the conventional concepts of rights,
which imply ideas of ‘conflict’ and ‘possession (or control) of the one
over the other’, his work is noteworthy. As a work considering the rela-
tionship between a foetus and a pregnant woman, it can be said that
his is one of the best in Japan for its accuracy and originality.
However, more questions arise as to why ‘rights’ imply conflicts, why
the abortion debate tends to be reduced to weighing the ethical status
between a foetus and a woman, and what power functions in the con-
text of these phenomena. Although the right to self-determination is de-
fined by Katô as oriented towards ‘the state and men’s oppression’, the
concept of ‘rights’ also appears in discussions of the ethical status of
the relationship between a foetus with an anomaly and a pregnant wo-
man. The discussion of ‘rights’ would not be adequate if it is reduced
only to weighing the ethical status of the relationship between a foetus
and a pregnant woman, nor is it adequate if a rights discourse is re-
duced to an issue of the-state-and-men’s-oppression-versus-women.
‘Rights’ in abortion debates need to be considered comprehensively
with relation to a foetus, a woman, and powerful oppression, because
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this is what the women’s movement is actually fighting in the real
world.
Yumiko Ehara, one of the most prominent sociologists in women’s
studies in Japan, introduces and analyses debates in Japanese women’s
movements (1985, 1990). Her work is valuable as she examines the
ideas put forth by the Japanese WLM in an academic way and is note-
worthy, as the nature of movement arguments differs somewhat from
academic debates. Operating in the political sphere often required
quick-fire responses from the WLM, with little opportunity to formulate
ideas in an analytical way. Ehara’s work provides some re-dress, docu-
menting the development of movement arguments and analysing the
political significance of the arguments in the context of the political set-
tings of the day. She also analyses the political significance of the lin-
guistic style of the rhetoric of the WLM; women in the WLM were
aware that masculine power attached to ‘language’ and they refused to
use it (1985: 109-125; 166-170). Consequently, the WLM’s arguments
were often chaotic at first glance and sometimes hard to follow. The
WLM was a common phenomenon in many of the capitalist societies
from the late 1960s toward the 1970s, but not many movements went
so far as to challenge masculinity attached to their own languages.
France is another case, for example. Ehara is the first one who has ana-
lysed the issue of ‘power and language’ in the WLM’s rhetoric used by
women’s movements in Japan in Japanese from a feminist perspective
and her work is noteworthy in this regard.
However, her analyses of feminist issues, which appeared after the
1980s, are thematic. She looks at issues of surrogate motherhood, re-
productive technology, labour, and law. She discusses these issues in an
interdisciplinary way, combining political science, women’s studies, so-
ciology, and philosophy. Currently, her focus is not solely on abortion
debates between the women’s movement and other SMOs. Generally in
Japanese academia it can be concluded that women’s reproductive
health movements’ arguments after the 1980s have hardly been theore-
tically examined in women’s studies in Japan, or in other fields of scho-
larship.
Another work, Seimeigaku-ni-nanigadekiruka (2001), by bio-ethicist
Masahiro Morioka, analyses and introduces the three issues of euthana-
sia, feminism, and the disabled people’s movement. Given the fact that
the study of bioethics is often constructed on Anglo-American values,
his attempt to introduce a ‘Japanese view’ about life is valuable. The is-
sue of selective abortion is the central topic in his discussion of Japa-
nese feminism and the disabled people’s movement. He also discusses
the way to ‘view life’ (or so-called bioethics) by looking at the history of
Japanese abortion and euthanasia debates. His introduction of the politi-
cal activities of Japanese feminism and of the disabled people’s move-
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ment provides detailed information, using original political materials as
sources. This work is useful for those interested in the history of
bioethics in Japan, as it pertains to the issue of selective abortion.
Reportage: Shusshoˆzen-shindan (1999), by journalist Ritsuko Sakai, is
a report about the practice of prenatal screening and selective abortion.
Based on interviews with individual doctors as well as women, both in
Japan and the UK, she illustrates the problems inherent in the current
practices of prenatal screening and selective abortion in both countries.
In her work she also aims to expose the commercial aims behind the
practices of pharmaceutical companies.
Thus there are a number of significant works from various perspec-
tives about prenatal screening and selective abortion, as well as on the
movements of women and disabled people. However, until now, there
has been no theoretical analysis of women’s movements of the 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s in Japan with a particular focus on abortion and the
concept of ‘rights’. Concerning the actual movements and abortion de-
bates after the 1980s, the literature is written by people in social move-
ments, and is more movement material than scholarly analysis.
Other research on abortion has often focused on technical matters,
such as analysis of high abortion rates, the history of contraceptive
methods, medical/ cultural analysis of the practice of reproductive tech-
nology, and legal analysis of the Eugenic Protection Law. Some of this
research has been presented in English, but most of it has not been
translated, and most of it has not been introduced abroad,8 although it
is deliberative, detailed, and well researched. There has been no theore-
tical analysis in Japan of the disagreement between the movements of
disabled people and women, with a particular focus on the concept of
‘rights’.
Research done about Japan in foreign languages, mostly by non-Japa-
nese in English, has also mainly focused on technical issues, such as
high abortion rates, comparative analysis with other countries, psycholo-
gical research on women with experiences of abortion, or businesses
created to comfort the soul of aborted foetuses (mizuko-kuyoˆ).9 The
amount of research done by foreign scholars about Japan in this area is
astonishingly small when compared to that about Western countries or
even other parts of the world. The women’s movements’ arguments are
sometimes touched upon in the context of the birth control movement,
eugenics, abortion policies, and laws,10 but nothing about disabled peo-
ple’s movements could be located. So far, no research has been found
that is written by foreign scholars in English about the interaction be-
tween movements of women and disabled people, nor analysis of the
term ‘right’ in Japanese abortion debates.11 If ‘right’ and ‘women’s right
to abortion’ are related, the terms are often used uncritically, without ex-
amining their content or mentioning the Japanese women’s struggle.12
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On the debate about selective abortion between the disabled people’s
and the women’s movements, no research has been done.
There is also no research to be found by foreign scholars about Japa-
nese disabled women’s movements. Even in Japan, academic research
about the disabled women’s movement was presented for the first time
in the year 2000 by the Japanese women’s studies scholar Noriko Seya-
ma. The main obstacle for foreign researchers is the barrier of the Japa-
nese language.
In addition to the limited quantity of research about Japan, it should
be noted that there is a lack of interaction between Anglophone scholars
and Japanese speaking scholars. I talk about Anglophone scholars be-
cause English is the most widely spoken and read language in the con-
temporary world. When an issue is analysed by internationally and cul-
turally diverse scholars, consideration of the issue is certainly enriched.
But at the same time, cultural and linguistic differences may well pro-
duce misunderstanding and bias about the issue. When scholars dis-
agree with the analysis of others, they can react them. However, in Ja-
pan, unfortunately, reactions to arguments originally put forth in Eng-
lish may well be done in Japanese by a Japanese scholar, which many
English speaking people would not be able to read, and vice versa.
Therefore, when it comes to research on Japan, scholars are not enga-
ging with each other across borders or cross-culturally as much as else-
where.
One example of this lack of academic debate between Anglophone
and Japanese scholars is on the issue of abortion. A major problematic
assertion often made by foreign researchers is that ‘abortion is the most
important means of contraception for Japanese women’, which implies
that Japanese women choose abortion as the almost exclusive means of
contraception.13 Often, explanations are that ‘abortion is a contraceptive
method for Japanese women’ because of certain ways of understanding
lives under Buddhism or Shintô, which are, for Western scholars, the
‘mysterious Other’. Religions are often excessively emphasised by non-
Japanese researchers, seeing that in fact only a small number of women
believe in, or practise, these religions.14 The Japanese female anthropol-
ogist Mariko Sanekawa reports that Japanese women use Mizuko-kuyoˆ
(the business that offers a service to console the souls of aborted foe-
tuses) as self-therapy to heal themselves after abortion experiences,
rather than because women believe in Buddhism and Shintô teachings
(see chapter 5).15
Research in English is more widely read in the international world
than work done by Japanese scholars in Japanese. A problem with the
dominance of the English language in today’s world is that it tends to
erase the diversity of non-Anglo-American cultures, which perhaps can-
not be properly expressed in the English language because languages
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reflect local cultural values, which differ from one another. So, ironi-
cally, in order to challenge the dominance of the English language as
well as of Anglo-American values, messages need to be sent in English
in order for non-Anglo-American voices to be heard. This book intends
to do just that: it introduces arguments made both in Japanese and Eng-
lish, and can be a bridge to open a dialogue among Japanese-speaking
and English-speaking scholars.
On target groups: Social movement organisations of women,
disabled people, and anti-abortion activists
Central to the analysis presented in this book is the women’s move-
ment group Soshiren, as it is the only group since the 1970s WLM that
has consistently participated in and contributed to the Japanese debates
on abortion rights.
The WLM was based at the Lib Shinjuku Centre in Tokyo. Practically,
the WLM consisted of only a few active women’s groups. But their ar-
guments on abortion rights and selective abortion spread widely in the
country, influencing other women’s groups. At crucial moments, for ex-
ample when there were attempts to limit women’s access to abortion,
women’s groups from throughout the country came together to share
political ideas and rally opposition. The WLM was national, but a loose
social movement in which many individuals and different organisations
participated. Towards the end of the 1970s, the WLM was dissolved,
however when the government and anti-abortion activists again at-
tempted to limit womens’ access to abortion in 1982, former partici-
pants in the WLM came together with younger women that year to es-
tablish Soshiren.
Soshiren is an abbreviation; its official name is ’82 Yuseihogohoˆ-kaia-
ku-soshi-renrakukai, or ‘82 Eugenic Protection Act Revision Prevention
Liaison Committee. From its communication centre in Tokyo, Soshiren
played a role in liaising with women’s groups all over the country to op-
pose the attempt of anti-abortion activists to outlaw abortion and to
abolish the Eugenic Protection Law. As the WLM had done in the
1970s, in the 1980s Soshiren organised nation-wide activities to oppose
attempts to limit women’s access to abortion. The positions held by the
WLM and Soshiren on abortion issues were not held by a small number
of women, but were shared by many; they both were main players in or-
ganising demonstrations and lobbying to prevent the attempt by the
government and anti-abortion activists to limit women’s access to abor-
tion and to introduce the selective abortion clause.16
In 1996, the Eugenic Protection Law was revised and as a result
there was no longer a written law that allowed for reproductive practices
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that discriminated against disabled people. However, up to the present,
a danger remains that a selective abortion clause could be introduced.
The introduction of the clause would be viewed as problematic from
the perspectives of both the womens’ movement and the disabled peo-
ple’s movement. In the view of the womens’ movement such a clause
would encourage women to have selective abortions in event of an
anomaly in a foetus; in the view of the disabled peoples’ movement,
such a clause would constitute the denial of the existence of disabled
people. In 1999, in the absence of the Eugenic Protection Law, Soshiren
introduced its aims as follows:
It opposes that women’s bodies be used as instruments for popu-
lation policies and eugenic policies; it has strongly fought for re-
peal of the Eugenic Protection Law and deletion of the abortion
articles from the Criminal Code, in order to establish women’s
right to self-determination. What we need is not to select chil-
dren based on whether or not they have a disability, but to decide
on one’s own whether to become a parent or not. Thus, we
strongly oppose the selective abortion clause. Until the discrimi-
nation against women without children or the assumption that a
disability is unhappiness is gone, there will be no women’s right
to self-determination.17
Currently, members of Soshiren actively participate in debates on repro-
ductive technologies and women’s reproductive rights, in alliance with
disabled people’s groups and other women’s organisations (chapter 6).
As of August 2008, Soshiren has some 171 subscribers to its newsletter
all over Japan and abroad (both individuals and organisations), who sup-
port the organisation’s activities both financially and morally. There are
eight permanent staff, who edit monthly newsletters. All are voluntary.
There was a group called Chuˆpiren during the 1970s, led by Misako
Enoki, who majored in pharmacy at Kyoto University,18 which separated
from the WLM in order to pursue its own activities.19 Because Enoki
appeared on TV shows, and also because women in Chuˆpiren acted ec-
centrically, for example wearing hard face-covering pink helmets during
demonstrations, their activities drew public attention. Therefore, the
mass media portrayed Chuˆpiren as being representative of the entire Ja-
panese WLM, and many Japanese people still regard Chuˆpiren as actu-
ally being the WLM. Chuˆpiren also wanted to use the term ‘right’ more
actively in the abortion debate, and the group promoted the use of con-
traceptive pills without asking the questions which were raised by the
rest of the women in the movement. Nevertheless, like most feminists
or researchers in women’s studies in Japan, I do not consider Chuˆpiren
as credibly representing the entire WLM, as Chuˆpiren was only a tem-
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porary phenomenon with comparatively little impact on most Japanese
women, whose debates were not taken over by the women’s movements
after the 1980s. The group was dissolved at the end of the 1970s, and
Enoki’s whereabouts are since unknown. The questions and arguments
of Chuˆpiren are introduced in chapter 2. Conversely, other questions
raised by the WLM were taken over by women in a later period, and to
this day are still being debated. For this reason, I have chosen to analyse
the arguments made by the WLM and Soshiren.
It is possible to trace the line of argumentation held amongst Japa-
nese women by analysing arguments put forth by both the WLM and
Soshiren, including an analysis of how certain ways of thinking either
changed or remained while social settings changed.
Soshiren was also chosen for analysis as it is the only women’s repro-
ductive movement group which holds the point of view that women’s
‘real’ self-determination in reproduction, given reproductive technolo-
gies to discover anomalies, is possible only in collaboration with the dis-
abled people’s movement, in order to oppose discrimination against dis-
abled people. This point was also forcefully made by the WLM during
the 1970s, but only Soshiren carried this viewpoint into the 1980s.
Other women’s groups, such as Nihon fujin kaigi (Japan Women’s Con-
gress) and Fujin minshu club (Women’s Democratic Club), do not disre-
gard the importance of interaction between the two problems of women
and disabled people, yet these women’s groups are either saying ‘simul-
taneously having these two problems is too demanding’, or are silent
on the issue.20 As Soshiren did confront the issue of discrimination, it
came into serious conflict with the disabled people’s movement.
For the disabled people’s movement, I chose to focus on Aoi shiba no
kai, a group of people with cerebral palsy, because it was the strongest
group to object to the women’s movement’s phrase of ‘rights to abor-
tion’, and ‘right to self-determination’. Literally, Aoi shina stands for
‘green grass’, where an intention is expressed that ‘people with CP
should stay strong despite any difficulties, as green grass stays strong
although it is stepped on by people wearing shoes’.21 Aoi shiba no kai
was the only disabled people’s group that questioned the assumption
that ‘to be disabled is negative’. It asserted that ‘there is nothing wrong
with being disabled’, and argued that ‘disability-free people should ex-
amine themselves for discrimination against disabled people interna-
lised within themselves’. Hiroshi Yokota, one of the leading activists in
Aoi shiba no kai, explains that these attitudes developed because cere-
bral palsy is different from other kinds of disability. Those with CP can
hardly work, while people with many other kinds of disabilities can
work, earn their own money, and take care of themselves in daily activ-
ities with less assistance.22
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Aoi shba no kai pointed out the way ‘a life with a disability’ is re-
garded in general – the way of thinking, ‘it is unhappy to live with a dis-
ability’, or eugenic thinking. In the sense that Aoi shiba no kai pointed
out eugenic thinking inherent in what we regard as ‘normal’, it was dif-
ferent from other disabled people’s groups (Ichinokawa & Tateiwa
1998: 265). Their argument was not easy to understand even among
disabled people, and actually, even among those in Aoi shiba no kai. A
strong argument about eugenics was raised first in 1972 by Yokota,
where he asked ‘why the penalty for a murder of children by their
mothers is mitigated when the children are disabled?’ His position
came to be gradually shared by other activists. In terms of numbers,
Aoi shiba no kai never became a huge organisation, failing to mobilise
even 1 per cent of people with disabilities throughout Japan at its peak
(ibid: 269). As Tateiwa and the Japanese sociologist Yôichi Ichinokawa
argue, it is therefore wrong to conclude that the Japanese disabled peo-
ple’s movement groups are all discussing eugenics. This fact also im-
plies that Japan is not the only country in which disabled people’s
movement groups discussed eugenics; Just as Aoi shiba no kai is not re-
presentative of all disabled people in Japan, in other countries, there are
strict arguments against eugenics put forth by disabled people, as well
(ibid).23
However, at the same time, the history of the Japanese disabled peo-
ple’s movement cannot be properly understood without considering Aoi
shiba no kai. The contribution which Aoi shiba no kai has made to the
development of today’s ethical argument about selective abortion, is one
of the most important of all the arguments put forth by disabled peo-
ple’s groups. If one tries to learn the history of Japanese disabled peo-
ple’s movement, he or she will find that the majority of the books on
the topic discuss Aoi shiba no kai. The weight of its political presence in
preventing a number of legal clauses and guidelines cannot be over-
looked, either. Moreover, Aoi shiba no kai is the only disabled people’s
group that straightforwardly confronted women’s rights vocabulary. For
these reasons, I chose to focus on this group.
For the anti-abortion movement, the arguments of Seichoˆ no ie
(House of Growth), a right-wing religious group founded in 1929, are
examined. During the Second World War, the group became aligned
with the state religion, Shintoˆism, and also with militarism. Since the
war, the teachings of this group have been a mixture of pieces from
many different religions, including parts of Christianity and Buddhism.
Since its foundation, Seichoˆ no ie has consistently emphasised the im-
portance of national power, on which they base their anti-abortion argu-
ments. This group is the only anti-abortion group in Japan that went so
far as to attempt to outlaw abortion in 1972, 1973, 1982, and 1983. It
was active during the whole period to be examined.
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Methodologically, this research is based on the analysis of materials
from the selected groups about the abortion debates and on the analysis
of policy or legal documents from the government. Studies about the
above-mentioned movements and the Japanese abortion debates by
scholars and researchers are also used to formulate the arguments in
this book. Materials on theories about political terms, such as ‘right’
and ‘self-determination’, in both Japanese and English, have also been
drawn upon.
As a member of Soshiren since 1998 I have also participated in the
activities of such social alliances as karada-to-sei-no-hoˆritsu-o-tsukuru-
onna-no-kai (Women for an alternative law for contraception and abor-
tion), Botaihogohoˆ-kaitei-network (The network to examine the revision
of the law to protect mothers’ bodies), and original materials from these
alliances are referred to for the analysis of this research. These alliances
consist of various women’s groups organised around problems such as
infertility, women with disabilities, as well as groups of parents with
disabled children.
I also interviewed key individuals who are/were in the women’s, dis-
abled people’s (both male and female), and anti-abortion movements in
order to ask questions, to discuss, and to confirm my understanding of
their arguments. These individuals have been cited extensively to con-
struct the arguments I put forth in this book. In the same way, informal
conversations with members of movement groups have also contributed
to my understanding, although the conversations themselves are not al-
ways referred to in connection with the arguments I present in this re-
search.
On the structure
The time span of this analysis is from the beginning of the 1970s, the
period when a number of social movements emerged in Japan, i.e. the
Women’s Liberation Movement, disabled people’s movements, and also
anti-abortion activities to limit women’s access to abortion, up to the
present. The beginning of the 1970s was a time when the disabled peo-
ple’s movement first clearly criticised women for using the term ‘right’
in connection with the issue of abortion.
This book’s chapters are arranged according to the main abortion de-
bates triggered by anti-abortion activists’ attempts to revise the laws in
order to limit women’s access to abortion and/or to introduce the selec-
tive abortion clause as a condition for legal abortion.
Chapter 1 introduces the historical background, describing abortion
and eugenic policies and the economic and political background, begin-
ning in 1868, when Japan began to be modernised.
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Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the debate around the anti-abortion acti-
vists’ attempt to outlaw abortion in 1972, and chapters 4 and 5 focus on
the attempt to outlaw abortion in 1982. The critiques of the phrase, ‘wo-
men’s right to abortion’, both by anti-abortion activists and the Aoi shiba
no kai group, as well as reactions from the Women’s Liberation Move-
ment, are introduced, in order to show the disagreements around the
concept of ‘rights’ in the 1970s’ abortion debates.
In chapter 3, the genealogy of ‘rights’ is traced, and following this,
the reasons for the criticisms against ‘women’s rights to abortion’ are
considered.
In chapter 4, the abortion debates in the 1980s are introduced, focus-
ing on the way the concept of rights was used in this period, and on
the changes in the usage of ‘right’ since the 1970s. During the 1980s,
the term ‘right’ was used more frequently than during the 1970s. Chap-
ter 5 discusses the reasons for the frequent usage of ‘rights’. Addition-
ally characteristics of ‘rights’ will be discussed, taking account of the
changes in the background of the abortion debates. Problems to be con-
sidered about ‘rights’, with the goal being its eventual de-Westernisa-
tion, are brought to the fore by tracing the theoretical genealogy of
rights. Hence chapters 4 and 5 also discuss the strategies of the Japa-
nese women’s movement to enable the use of the concept of ‘rights’ in
the Japanese political and social context.
Chapters 6 and 7 take a look at the abortion debates after 1996, fo-
cusing on the usage of ‘rights’ by medical associations, women’s
groups, and disabled people’s movements in reproductive technology
practices. In 1996, the Eugenic Protection Law was repealed. Because
the Eugenic Protection Law stipulated ‘legal procedures for the sterilisa-
tion of disabled people’, the law’s deletion means that there is no longer
any written form of discrimination against disabled people at the state
policy level. However, reproductive technologies are becoming increas-
ingly accessible, it is becoming more and more possible to discover
anomalies in foetuses, and this sometimes leads to abortion. Medical
associations use ‘women’s reproductive rights’ to mean that individual
women should be entitled to have access to reproductive technology on
demand. The movements of both women and disabled people argue
that discrimination against disabled people is practised by individual
women, and the meaning of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ is
distorted by the medical associations.
Then, questions arise: why do medical associations take the meaning
of the term ‘right’ in the way they do? Where do their ideas come from?
If women’s reproductive groups do not agree with the way medical as-
sociations use the concept of ‘rights’, then what is it that the groups do
want to express with the term ‘right’? Chapter 7 considers these ques-
tions and meanings of ‘rights’, as understood and used by parties in-
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volved in the debate. It is proposed that the idea of ‘rights’ used in the
women’s reproductive movement can enrich the concept of ‘rights’ by
broadening its meaning.
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1 Historical Background
Laws on abortion between the Meiji period and the end of the
Second World War
There are no known official regulations about abortion and infanticide
that date back to before the Meiji period (1868-1912).1 There was no
strong opposition to abortion before 1868. Before the Meiji period there
were records of recommendations of abortion by the local communities,
in times of famine, to reduce birth rates and keep the population ba-
lanced with levels of agricultural production. Thus, before the Meiji per-
iod, abortion and infanticide were employed as means to survive pov-
erty, according to the decisions made by households and communities.
In 1868, the Meiji government prohibited midwives from providing
abortion services. However, abortion by a pregnant woman herself was
not prohibited under this regulation. In 1880, the penal code was chan-
ged to criminalise abortion, and this went into effect in 1882. According
to this law, medicinal or surgical abortion incurred a penalty of one to
six months imprisonment. Whether the abortion was carried out by a
pregnant woman herself or by a third person it carried the same crim-
inal weight. The law differentiated the severity of penalties according to
the means of abortion, for example, abortion by violence, such as batter-
ing, was to be punished more severely than abortion by medicine. If
the batterer did not mean to abort the foetus, the batterer was punished
with between two and five years imprisonment. Under this law, there
were no grounds for legal abortion.2
In 1907, the law was revised with heavier penalties for abortion; this
law went into effect in 1908. The main difference between this law and
the 1882 law was that the newer law punished abortions carried out by
a third person more severely than abortions carried out by the pregnant
woman herself. Abortion without the woman’s consent was also pun-
ished more severely than an abortion carried out with her consent. This
law did not create different penalties according to the means of abor-
tion, and, as a whole, the penalties were more severe than those found
in the 1882 law. Hence, until conditions for legal abortion were intro-
duced with the Eugenic Protection Law in 1948, abortion was prohib-
ited in all circumstances under the Meiji Constitution.3 Under the abor-
tion articles in the Criminal Code, 10,617 women were convicted and
sentenced for violations between 1905 and 1942.4 Men who impreg-
nated the women were not charged.
The purpose of the regulation of abortion was to secure military man-
power and labour. The policy was called Fukoku-kyoˆhei, or ‘to maintain
and increase productivity and military power for national prosperity.’
Because of the law on abortion, a number of women’s lives were ruined
because of forced delivery and unhygienic illegal abortion.5 Even rape
was not acknowledged as a justifiable reason for women to have an
abortion.6 At the same time, women who had illegal abortions were la-
belled as disorderly or deviant.7
The Ie household system and women’s position during the Meiji
period
The Meiji Civil Code of 1898 was based on the notion of the Ie house-
hold system. Ie stands for ‘the stem-family household (Sugiyama-Lebra
1984: 336),’ defined as a ‘vertically composite form of nuclear families,
one from each generation (ibid: 20).’ Under this system, in principle,
the first son should inherit all the family assets. The Ie is thus about
the perpetuation of the family bloodline through first sons. On some
occasions, younger sons and daughters inherited the family line. Typi-
cally, marriage required women to move into the groom’s household,
but when there was no son in the family, a groom was adopted as a
son-in-law. The adopted son-in-law was called muko-yoˆshi.
This Ie household system has its origin around the 13th century as a
custom of the warrior class. Until the end of the Edo period, this style
of managing a household was practised only by the warrior class, which
amounted to some 6 per cent of the population. But the Meiji govern-
ment now applied this system to all of the population under the Civil
Code, and this remained in effect until the end of 1945.
The Civil Code gave the household head the absolute right to manage
the household, including decision-making power regarding: rights to in-
herit the surname; whether to settle or to leave the household’s resi-
dence; whether to remove a family member from family registration;
approval or cancellation of the marriage of a family member, including
muko-yoˆshi; whether to hold family household meetings; and so on. The
only duty given to the household head was to provide for the material
well-being of the household members. Rights of household members
included having the surname, to be nurtured by the household head,
and to use the household’s assets. A primary duty of all the household
members was to follow the instructions of the household head (Taka-
mune 1972 2: 125-126).
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Under the Civil Code, women were defined to be ‘incompetent’ (ibid:
129). The Code articulated that a woman reached the age of majority at
the age of 20, but once she married, her position was again minor un-
der the new household where she took up residence. Women had to
ask the head of the household for permission on all civil matters, such
as to loan money or property, to take any actions related to the family’s
real estate or personal property, to bring a lawsuit, to make contracts, to
inherit or to refuse inheritance, and to make contracts that influence
personal well-being (ibid: 128-129).8 Women’s only rights were to be
nurtured by the head of the household, following from the acknowl-
edgement that women were incompetent and should be protected. In
the public sphere, women were not entitled to any rights, for example
to vote, to be elected, to be a lawyer, or to become a member of a politi-
cal group (ibid: 131).
Under these circumstances, giving birth to children, especially male
children, in order to perpetuate the family line was the only crucial role
for women. Otherwise a woman was not acknowledged as a complete
person. There was even a form of provisional marriage called naien.
Naien is a test marriage to check if she is infertile or not, and if she did
not give birth after a certain period, the household had the right to can-
cel the marriage. Infertile women were called umazume, which literally
means a ‘stone woman.’ Girls were discriminated against from birth,
because they could not perpetuate the family line, surname, or receive
family burial privileges.9
Since women were expected to be obedient to their husbands, it was
out of the question for a woman to have a sexual relationship out of
wedlock. When a woman committed adultery, her husband had the
right to divorce her, while the woman did not have the same right. Vir-
ginity was important because it was the sign of a woman devoting her
life to one man. When a woman was not a virgin before marriage, she
was called kizumono, literally, a flawed object.10
This household system was used to maintain the ‘family-state sys-
tem,’ where the emperor was defined to be God as well as the father of
the nation in the Meiji Constitution. In order to build the nation-state,
the Meiji government felt it needed to control the order of society by
purging social deviants.11 The status of the emperor was enhanced and
his political function was also strengthened in the Meiji period for this
purpose. But because the government could not intervene and control
every citizen’s life, the household was used as a tool for governing the
nation. To this end, the Civil Code gave all authority to the household
head or husband/father, who represented the emperor in administering
his household. The head of a household was thus made a bridge be-
tween the government and the nation. The women and children of a
household were to follow the household head absolutely. As some fem-
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inist historians say, ‘the Meiji period was the most oppressive time for
women in Japanese history’ (Takamune 1972a: 292-293).
Towards the growing militarism of the 1930s
During the Meiji period the fertility rate grew each year until it reached
a peak in 1925 with an increase of one million births over the previous
year. Women and households had difficulties with the absence of birth
control devices and abortion. During this period, a birth control move-
ment started in the context of the socialist movement. In 1922 the US
birth control activist Margaret Sanger came to Japan. A sexologist Senji
Yamamoto (1889-1929) and Shizue Katô (1897-2001), eulogized today
as the ‘grande dame of birth control’ (Frühstück, 2003: 13), were active
in the promotion of contraception, insisting that contraceptives were for
the purpose of mitigating the poverty of the have-nots. They argued that
the government should not only be concerned with population quantity,
but also its quality.12 In 1927, a research group on population and food
problems was established by the cabinet. The group investigated the is-
sues of emigration and birth control, in order to tackle poverty and over-
population. Overpopulation was an important aspect of the justification
to acquire colonies for surplus population.
Following the financial panic of 1927 and the great economic depres-
sion of 1929, militarism started growing rapidly, its goal being to
strengthen the nation-state. Accordingly, the government stopped pro-
moting birth control, and instead started a strict pronatal policy in order
to secure military manpower and labour. Yamamoto was assassinated
by a right wing figure in 1929, and Katô was imprisoned in 1934 for
her political activities.
In 1938 the Ministry of Health and Welfare was renewed. Its purpose
was to enhance the physical condition of the nation. In 1941 the minis-
try formulated the national population policy, that set as its aim to ‘in-
crease the population of the nation rapidly and continuously, and to en-
hance its quality’ (Ishii 1982: 124-125), and to reach 100 million people
by the year 1965. The policy lowered the legal marriage age by three
years, that is, for men from 17 to 14, and for women from 15 to 12. It
prohibited any contraceptives or abortion, and sought to secure a target
of five children from each couple on average.
In the lead up to the Second World War, the regulation of abortion
became more severe. In this political climate, justification for the prona-
tal policy was explained by means of the absolute sacredness of the em-
peror. For instance, a woman critic/essayist Teruko Yoshitake recalls,
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My mother had a kidney disease, but became pregnant. Her life
was threatened, therefore she called on a number of doctors but
her efforts were in vain. One doctor told her that it would be
wonderful if she gave birth to a child of the emperor. I cannot
forget the sight of my mother crying in the night, repeatedly ask-
ing herself what the meaning was of being a woman (cited by Ta-
niai 1983b: 57-58).
Babies were called Sekishi or ‘red-child.’ This is partly because a baby’s
skin is red or pink, but also because red is a symbol of ‘sincerity’ in
Chinese and Japanese traditions. Thus, having children was considered
to be a sign of sincere commitment to the emperor state (Kanô 1991:
65). During the Japanese imperialist drive, the role of women to perpe-
tuate the family emperor state by giving birth to the ‘children of the em-
peror’ was emphasised more and more. In this way, women were
forced to give birth.
The dream of racial improvement: Yûsei-gaku (eugenics)13
Jinshu-kanryoˆ-ron or ‘theories on racial improvement’ started being de-
veloped just after the beginning of the Meiji era, and gradually took on
scientific forms, being called Yuˆsei-gaku or ‘eugenics,’ based on statis-
tics, biology, and theories of social hygiene. This was also in the context
of strengthening the nation, but the initiative for eugenics came from
scientists. The development of Jinshu-kairyoˆ-ron between the Meiji era
and the end of the Second World War can be divided into three periods.
Between 1868 and the beginning of the 20th century, theories on ra-
cial improvement in this period were marked by the idea of the ‘Wes-
tern body as beautiful and strong.’ In this period, the criterion of bodily
health was in terms of its beauty and strength, rather than its genes.
Theories were contributed by such thinkers as Yukichi Fukuzawa14 and
Yoshio Takahashi. Takahashi’s views were oriented toward a Westernisa-
tion of physical bodies, or large-built bodily structures, in terms of ap-
pearance rather than health/sickness. This led him to suggest the pro-
motion of ‘mixed marriage.’15 In this period, theorists did not use the
term ‘eugenics,’ but instead referred to their ideas as those of ‘racial im-
provement.’
Between the beginning of the 20th century and the early 1920s, eu-
genic theories from the UK and the US reached Japan16 and racial im-
provement theories were developed in a number of scientific fields at
Japanese universities and research institutes. The link was made be-
tween a superior body and mind, and scholars tried to utilise statistical
information in search of genes for not only biological problems, but
also social ones, such as committing crimes and juvenile delinquency.
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Lectures on eugenics began to be held at universities in such depart-
ments as biology, psychology, and medicine.17 This period is defined as
the beginning of the academic systematisation of genetic studies.18
It also has to be noted that a sense of superiority among the Japanese
nation emerged during this period, as Japan had won the war against
China in 1885 and against Russia in 1905. Racial superiority was ex-
plained in terms of the God emperor and the nation’s loyalty to the em-
peror. Eugenics is also discussed in terms of nationalism in this period
in Japan.19
The period between the late 1920s and 1945 is marked by the system-
atisation of eugenic research and attempts to popularise eugenics.
Scientists tried to establish genetic research centres and counselling
centres for ‘good marriage,’ 20 to systematise the education system to
raise strong children,21 and to publish articles on eugenics in the mass
media,22 as well as trying to introduce eugenic laws at the national level.
Being influenced by the legislation on sterilisation in 1933 in Ger-
many, medical doctor Hisomu Nagai made an effort to promote a eu-
genics law in Japan.23 Emphasising the importance of improving the
quality of the nation, he claimed that the state should introduce eugenic
policies, namely the establishment of marriage counselling centres and
the introduction of an education system that emphasised ‘racial hy-
giene’. But his idea met with opposition, mainly from the socialist party.
Drafts of the sterilisation law were proposed by Nagai and other scien-
tists in 1934 and 1937, but neither was passed in the Diet, the Japanese
Parliament.
However, with the persistent emphasis on the importance of ‘racial
hygiene’ by scientists, as well as the pro-German atmosphere which
emerged in Japan following the military pact with Germany and Italy in
1937, the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Diet finally agreed to
introduce the National Eugenic Law in 1940, and this took effect in
1941. The law formulated the legal procedure of yuˆsei-shujutsu (eugenic
sterilisation surgery) for people with certain social problems that were
believed to be hereditary. Eugenic surgery under this law was sterilisa-
tion that undoes reproductive capacity without removing the sexual go-
nad; it did not influence the sexual life of sterilised people, thus differ-
ing from castration. One characteristic of the 1940 law was to target
those with purely genetic diseases, while the Eugenic Protection Law,
which was introduced in 1948, also targeted non-genetic conditions
such as mental disease and Hansen’s disease (leprosy). The concern in
1940 was to raise the quality of the gene pool, while the concern in
1948 was to eradicate social evils during the re-construction of society
following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. In the 1940 law, be-
haviours such as alcoholism, rape, narcotic use, and robbery were also
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listed as grounds for sterilisation, because scientists of the day believed
that such behaviours were hereditary.
Thus, the 1940 law was introduced as an initiative of scientists, not
the state. The government, or the Ministry of Health and Welfare, was
reluctant to introduce a law relating to the sterilisation of disabled peo-
ple. In the Diet doubts were raised, such as whether the diseases listed
in the law were truly genetic; where a line was to be drawn between
genius and madness; whether the practice of sterilisation violated hu-
man ethics; and whether there were possibilities for abusing the law
(Ôta 1967: 153).24 In order to further the goal of militarism, the concern
of the ministry and the Diet was more about serious malnutrition dur-
ing the economic crisis of 1929 than scientific considerations.25
Scientists, however, were not in favour of wars initiated by the mili-
tary government, because military acts mobilise the strongest bodies
with the strongest minds, while relatively weaker men could not be
used as soldiers but would remain and survive in society. The dream of
genetic scientists was to improve the gene pool, and considering their
racial improvement theories, it was contrary to their theory to lose the
strongest bodies during wartime. Thus, although the scientists and the
militarists shared a common interest, namely ‘strengthening the na-
tion,’ its meaning differed for these two groups. The government’s con-
cern was military expansion with the emperor as the father of the state,
while scientists’ concern was to improve the quality of the gene pool
with scientific methods.
The birth control movement in this period also argued for the quality
of the nation, in order to promote family planning. However, scientists
were not necessarily aligned with the birth control movement: they in-
sisted that people with good genes should be encouraged to produce
offspring, while people with inferior genes should be discouraged from
doing so.26
Thus, ‘strengthening the nation,’ and ‘enhancing the quality of the
nation,’ meant different things to the military government, scientists,
and the birth control movement.
Implications of abortion and eugenics for women between the Meiji period
and the end of the Second World War
What were the implications of eugenics, motherhood, and abortion for
women before and during the Second World War?
First of all, for the purpose of securing military and labour power,
women were forced to give birth. The state’s aim was an intervention in
women’s bodies. The abortion articles functioned in the context of the
Ie household system, where womanhood was motherhood itself and
marriage was parenthood itself. Thus, at the individual level, giving
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birth was the proof that a woman was not defective; marriage was the
only way of life for women. Women’s infertility was even a justification
for men to have mistresses. At the state level, for women the purpose
of giving birth was to maintain the emperor state system and male fa-
mily lines.
Second important reality for women of these policies during this per-
iod was, for the act of abortion, that only women were stigmatised. As
motherhood was the supreme mission of women, abortion was the act
of denying the meaning of the existence of women. At the state level,
abortion was an act of betrayal of the military state.
During the attempts to achieve racial improvement before the Second
World War, abortion could not be used as a means, as it was criminal.
There was no technology to find defects in foetuses either.27 The prac-
tice of eugenics during this period was by means of sterilisation of both
men and women, as legalised by the state law.
However, eugenic theories and practices before the Second World
War focused more on women’s bodies. First, more women were tar-
geted for eugenic surgery than men.28 This was because it is women
who give birth. Secondly, motherhood was also a crucial discourse
for racial improvement. Eugenic scientists claimed that women, as
mothers, were responsible for choosing good fathers for their children
in good time, and also for taking good care of themselves during preg-
nancy in order to raise healthy children. The military government also
expected women to be wise enough to choose a good man to be her
husband while she was young, and to be a good mother for nurturing
the next generation.
The combination of the National Eugenic Law and the abortion article
in the Penal Code meant a double standard about women giving birth.
In other words, healthy, strong women were forced to give birth to chil-
dren, while disabled women, women with disabled partners, or women
with a suspicion of defective genes, were all prohibited from giving
birth. There was a women’s movement during this period, in which wo-
men talked about abortion. I will come back to this later.
After the Second World War
Japan surrendered unconditionally to the US and its allies on 15 August
1945. As a result of the defeat in the war, Japan was occupied by Allied
– mainly US – forces. In January 1946, the emperor declared that he
was a human being, denying imperial divinity.29 On 3 November 1946,
under the occupation, a new Constitution of Japan was promulgated, in
which three principles are singled out as fundamental values – the so-
vereignty of the people, pacifism, and respect for human rights. Party
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government was revived, and various social movements became increas-
ingly active. In 1947 the Civil Code was revised and the Ie household
system was abolished; men and women were entitled to equal rights.
Abortion was legalised conditionally in 1948 under a new law called the
Eugenic Protection Law. Legal conditions for eugenic surgery remained
intact. Certain abortion articles in the Criminal Code also remained in-
tact.
With the intensification of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Kor-
ean War (1950-1953), the US changed its occupation policy, adopting a
policy of using Japan against the communist bloc. Japan regained its in-
dependence at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, but the sta-
tioning of US military forces in Japan continued under the US-Japan
Mutual Co-operation and Security Treaty (Ampo), and US forces remain
in Japan to this day. Extra procurements during the Korean War
brought about the recovery of the Japanese economy. Conservative gov-
ernments pursued policies of cooperation with the US and an increase
in Japan’s military strength, but in 1960 a popular campaign on an un-
precedented scale, called Ampo-toˆsoˆ, opposed revision of the Security
Treaty.
From the 1960s onward, Japan achieved a high rate of economic
growth.30 Male employees were required to work hard full-time, while
female employees were seen as reproductive workers in domestic areas
and auxiliary breadwinners providing part-time cheap labour. Even so,
despite the growth of the gross national product (GNP), the nation’s liv-
ing conditions did not improve. Meanwhile, questions such as pollu-
tion, urban overcrowding, and the depopulation of rural areas became
increasingly urgent. With the oil shocks of the 1970s, Japan switched to
‘stable’ growth. Internationally, Japan remained in alliance with the US.
The defence budget increased year by year.
Under such contradictory circumstances, the student movement, or
daigaku funsoˆ, emerged during the late 1960s. Students formed a group
called Zenkyoˆtoˆ, in which a number of women also participated, and
this provided a basis for the emergence of the Women’s Liberation
Movement in 1970. Around this time, some disabled people’s organisa-
tions, such as Aoi shiba no kai, composed of people with cerebral palsy
(CP), became prominent and politically active.
The Eugenic Protection Law: What did the law mean to for women?
After the war, Japan witnessed overpopulation and its first baby boom,31
while food and material resources were in absolute short supply. Under
these conditions, former activists in the birth control movement re-
sumed their activities, fighting for the availability of birth control and
legal abortion. The main actors were the aforementioned Katô, who be-
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came a Diet member after the war, and Tenrei Ôta, a male obstetrician.
At the same time, there was also pressure on the Ministry of Health
and Welfare by medical doctors to legalise abortion, because of the diffi-
culties in providing abortion.32
The Ministry was not enthusiastic about legalising abortion or the
promotion of birth control, because the ministry feared the loss of ‘high
quality’ people.33 Immediately following the Second World War, the ‘re-
vival of the nation’34 was the most urgent target of the post-war welfare
administration.35 In this situation, Katô and Ôta had to use eugenic rea-
sons to persuade the Diet and the Ministry to legalise abortion, stating
that the ‘protection of mothers’ health would enhance the health of chil-
dren, because if the number of children is small, parents could better
concentrate on raising them’.36 Accordingly, the importance of eugenics
was emphasised in their draft of the new law for legalising abortion.
The draft of the Eugenic Protection Law which was submitted by
Katô and Ôta was voted on in the Diet in 1948.37 With the occupying
US forces pressurising the Ministry to adopt the law, the Ministry could
not deny the necessity for birth control, and in 1948 the government
agreed to legalise abortion and at the same time to enlarge the range of
application of eugenic surgery sterilisation. In their view, this was the
strategy to promote birth control and legalise abortion without losing re-
latively better quality people. Hence in the new law, non-genetic dis-
eases, such as Hansen’s disease and mental diseases, were also in-
cluded as a target for applying ‘eugenic surgery.’ Doctors were obliged
to report any people afflicted with these diseases to the authorities; the
procedure for eugenic surgery was also simplified (Matsubara 1998a).
The conditions for legal abortion stipulated in this law were ‘pregnancy
as a result of sexual assault and the physical/mental condition of the
pregnant woman’.
Hence, abortion was legalised in the context of eugenics, or actually
eugenic thought was the prerequisite for legalising abortion. Abortion
was legalised in order to have smaller families and to have ‘good chil-
dren’, under the new, stronger eugenics policies. Women’s health and
women’s needs were not the main concerns. Medical doctors who put
pressure on the health ministry to legalise abortion were also concerned
about their medical practices, in terms of both legal and hygienic condi-
tions of abortion.
A clause stipulating economic grounds for legal abortion was added
to the Eugenic Protection Law in 1952, because of the shortage of re-
sources as well as the poor living conditions faced by most women.
This clause, introduced later than the other clauses, did meet most wo-
men’s needs in terms of access to abortion. The government’s top prior-
ity was reducing poverty; women’s interests came second.
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Points of critique raised by the later women’s movement groups and
feminist researchers after the 1970s lie here: The legalisation of abor-
tion was part of the state’s strategy to control population levels. Eugenic
surgery was seen as a tool in population quality control.38 Abortion was
not legalised with the aim of meeting women’s needs. Moreover, the
abortion articles in the Criminal Code remained intact, which meant
that abortion was basically prohibited by the state, and women were
only permitted to have an abortion under the conditions stipulated by
the state in the Eugenic Protection Law. Ideologically, the existence of
the articles serves to justify the state’s intervention in women’s repro-
ductive practices, and shows that conditions could be changed to limit
women’s access to abortion by revising the abortion articles in the
Criminal Code according to the state’s interests. Indeed, attempts to
limit women’s access to abortion did occur in later periods.
Given this background, women in the movement today still continue
to argue that access to abortion does not mean that women have the
right to self-determination (Matsubara 1998a: 116).
Revival of pronatal arguments
In contrast to the 1950s, during the 1960s the total fertility rate
dropped and so did the abortion rate. However, the rate of abortion was
still relatively high compared to other economically developed countries:
around 11 cases per 1,000 women per year during the 1960s.39 Given
the high rate, coupled with the reality that an abortion was almost al-
ways accessible if a woman wanted to have the procedure, Japan was
nicknamed ‘the abortion paradise.’
An incident contributing to anti-abortion arguments occurred in
1963. Parents of a Thalidomide baby, or an infant affected by prenatal
exposure to the drug Thalidomide, conducted an experiment to investi-
gate the effect of the medicine on the foetus. The father of the Thalido-
mide baby gave his wife a large quantity of Thalidomide during the next
pregnancy, and his wife aborted the foetus at five months to see the ef-
fects of the medicine. It turned out that the foetus did not seem to be
defective. The experiment was reported on in a magazine. Not surpris-
ingly, public opinion turned against the medical doctor as well as the
parents, and a revision of the Eugenic Protection Law to limit women’s
access to abortion was demanded (Ôta 1967: 275). In this atmosphere,
anti-abortion arguments were made mainly for humanistic reasons, cri-
ticising easy access to abortion. Eventually, Kobayashi, the minister of
health and welfare, announced a desire to wipe out the disgrace of ‘the
abortion paradise’ in 1964.
At the same time, a new anti-abortion argument emerged. In 1967, a
right wing religious group called Seichoˆ no ie, or ‘House of Growth,’ es-
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tablished the Yuˆseihogohoˆ-kaihai-kisei-doˆmei (League for the Abolition of
the Eugenic Protection Law). Two years later, in 1969, the League chan-
ged its name to Seichoˆ no ie seiji-rengoˆ-kokkai-gi’in-renmei (The political
union of the House of Growth and Diet members; Seiseiren hereafter,
which is the abbreviation used in Japan). Some of the Diet members in
Seiseiren followed religious teachings, and others shared the anti-abor-
tion activists’ purpose to delete the economic reasons clause from the
conditions for legal abortion. Since 99 percent of abortion cases were
(and still are) allowable under the economic reasons clause, to delete it
actually meant outlawing abortion. Seichoˆ no ie and Seiseiren played a
major role in attempts to limit women’s access to abortion until the
mid-1980s. Between the mid-1980s and the 1990s, a Diet member
from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Masakuni Murakami, was ac-
tive in attempting to restrict abortion. But since he was arrested for
bribery on 1 March 2001, and also since the LDP’s one party dominance
of Japanese politics ended in 1993, the LDP has not been the central
player in limiting women’s access to abortion.40 I will return to the
transformation of the anti-abortion arguments later.
Seichoˆ no ie, ‘the House of Growth’41
Seichoˆ no ie was founded in 1929 by Masaharu Taniguchi with the reli-
gious motto, ‘Know the Truth of Life’. He insisted that ‘truth’ was uni-
versal and transcended the differences between sects, and his teachings
are indeed a mixture of ideas from many different religions, including
Christianity and Buddhism. During the Second World War, the group
became aligned with the state religion, Shintô, and also with militarism.
It accrued remarkable power and influence at that time by propagating
the notion of the emperor’s divine ancestry. After the war, with the
emergence of the LDP’s political power base, Seichoˆ no ie was well
placed to serve as a mouthpiece for the right.42 The doctrine of the
teachings was fundamentally quite nationalist, and Seichoˆ no ie set as its
goal the purification not only of Japan but of the whole universe, start-
ing with Japan. The group’s political activities after the war included in-
troducing a ‘legitimate constitution’ by removing the post-war constitu-
tion installed by the US, and deleting the economic condition clause
from the Eugenic Protection Law, in order to increase the Japanese po-
pulation which they believed would lead to national prosperity. In 1972,
1973, 1982, and 1983 attempts were made to delete the clause from the
Eugenic Protection Law’s lists of conditions for legal abortion, and all
these attempts were initiated by this religious group. No attempts were
successful.
The Seichoˆ no ie teaching explains that all matter, including indivi-
duals’ bodies, is a shadow of life. Accordingly, pain and pleasure, in-
cluding sickness in physical bodies, are illusions. Taking an absolute
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spiritualist position, Taniguchi taught that all the problems of life would
be solved by correcting living conditions, to be achieved by reading his
books. According to the belief that the body is subordinate to the spirit,
it is understandable that Taniguchi’s anti-abortion rhetoric uses such lo-
gic as the view that sexual pleasure is a disorder, especially in women,
and abortion is the result of an irresponsible act of sexual pleasure as
well as ignorance of life. Street petition campaigns to outlaw abortion
and anti-abortion exhibitions at school festivals, both at universities and
high schools, were held during the 1970s and 1980s mainly by young
members of Seichoˆ no ie. The anti-abortion argument in the abortion
debate will be covered in the following chapters.
The state welfare policies for disabled people and policies for eugenics
Before the Second World War, there were no specific governmental poli-
cies for disabled people. In 1949, a law for the welfare of physically dis-
abled people was enacted. However, it was aimed only at rehabilitating
former soldiers who were wounded in the war so that they could work
again. In 1959, a law for national pensions for disabled people was en-
acted for the first time. However, the target group was limited to people
with severe disabilities, and the pension was very small, namely 1,500
yen (about 12 euro) per month during the first year of the subsidy,
which was, insufficient to cover a person’s basic needs.43 There were in-
stitutes for disabled people, but these were meant to rehabilitate people
and only those who were likely to return to work were admitted for
short-term stays until deemed recovered and ready to resume working.
There were no other care facilities for those disabled and unlikely to
work again. They had to rely on their families’ care and support. There
were insufficient residential facilities for disabled people but disabled
people also received little or no financial support from the government
during this period (Tateiwa 1995: 168).
In the 1960s, the necessity for institutes for disabled people who
could not work began to be discussed. This was due to the claims of
parents who were taking care of their disabled children at home and
their worries about what would happen after their death. Thus, in 1965,
a committee was established at the Ministry of Health and Welfare for
the purpose of promoting institutes for mentally disabled people. In
1972, a law for the welfare of disabled people was introduced, and resi-
dential institutes were established where disabled people could receive
ongoing long-term care.
The aim of the 1972 welfare policy for disabled people was self-de-
pendence, which was, more concretely speaking, economic indepen-
dence, or economic integration into society. And those who could not
be integrated into the economic system were integrated by political
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means, that is, through pension supplements and institutionalisation,
or they were simply left with their parents or other family members
(ibid: 179).
During the 1960s, after the first case of the birth of a Thalidomide
baby in 1963 and births of children with defects because of environ-
mental problems such as Minamata disease, 44 government became in-
creasingly concerned about the birth of disabled children. Moreover,
prenatal screening became possible during this period when amniocent-
esis was introduced for the first time in Japan in 1968.
Triggered by those events, the Ministry of Health and Welfare con-
ducted research into the practice of eugenic surgery as allowed under
the Eugenic Protection Law. Attempts to prevent anomalies caused dur-
ing pregnancy and delivery were made by some local governments.
These were called Fukoˆ-na-kodomo-o-umanai-undoˆ, or ‘movements to
prevent unhappy births.’ The best known project was initiated in the re-
gion of Hyôgo prefecture, and was launched in 1966.45
According to the guidelines of the movement to promote measures
to prevent ‘unhappiness’ in the birth of a child issued on 13 June 1966,
the main activities of the movement were to establish children’s hospi-
tals, where lectures were given to provide guidance to expectant parents
on how to prevent ‘unhappiness’ in the birth of a child. In 1972, the
prefecture decided to pay 25,000 Japanese yen (some 170 euro) per
pregnant woman in order to have their amniotic fluid checked. Family
planning was actively promoted by giving information and instruction
about contraceptive methods and the distribution of contraceptive in-
struments to households with lower incomes. Checking for sexually
transmitted diseases was promoted because syphilis, for example, could
be the cause of a foetus with an anomaly. Lectures were held at the
health council, providing instruction on the proper usage of medicines,
the prevention of infection, nourishment, and guidance for delivery. In
addition to lectures, television, radio, newsletters, and newspapers were
used for the actual dissemination of information and for instruction.
Thus on the one hand the Hyôgo prefecture project was aimed at pre-
venting the causes of anomalies, both in the process of pregnancy and
during deliveries, and on the other hand also aimed to promote prenatal
screening and selective abortion.
Aoi shiba no kai, in Osaka, protested against the project on the
grounds that it uncritically defined a disability as being synonymous
with unhappiness, based on the assumption that a sound mind and
body are conditions for happiness. The group began its protests against
the project in 1974.46 By lobbying the department of hygiene, Aoi shiba
no kai succeeded in having the content and the name of the prefecture’s
movement changed.
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After the Second World War and until the emergence of the disabled
peoples’ movement in the early 1970s, the main demands made by dis-
abled people’s advocates were that disabled people should be treated ac-
cording to the standard of disability-free people, such as that pertaining
to job opportunities, and that the government should establish more re-
sidential care facilities for disabled people. Activities to push for these
demands during the 1960s were mainly carried out by those participat-
ing in the parents’ movement, a movement in which the actual opi-
nions of disabled people themselves were not extensively considered.
The goal of these demands was the adjustment of disabled people to
the norms of non-disabled people. During this period the idea was ta-
ken for granted by policymakers and disabled people, that ‘the more
disabled people are adjusted to conform to the norms of non-disabled
people, the more successful the policy is’. Concerns of parents were the
same. It could be said that the disabled people’s movement before the
1970s was more liberal than radical.
Towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s proble-
matic aspects of these policies started to be criticised by disabled peo-
ple. Living conditions inside the institutes, the way disabilities were de-
fined, and even the management of the welfare policies were all criti-
cised. Criticism of the management of institutes was advanced by the
Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre-iten-toˆsoˆ (The issue of the Fuchû disabled people’s
institute), while the movement to challenge the values that were used to
construct the definition of ‘disability’ was advanced by Aoi shiba no kai.
Through the efforts to critique the management of disabled people’s in-
stitutes arose the position that it was not necessary to categorise people,
put them in special places, and give treatment; instead disabled people
should have a place to live outside the institutes, in a local community
or in society in general. The movement of Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre-iten-toˆsoˆ
led to the Independent Living Movement in the 1970s and 1980s.
Since the arguments put forth by Aoi shiba no kai to challenge the va-
lues used to construct the term ‘disability (shoˆgai)’ interacted with the
post-1970s women’s movement’s position on abortion, the focus here is
on introducing Aoi shiba no kai.47
Aoi shiba no kai
Aoi shiba no kai, a group composed exclusively of people with cerebral
palsy (CP), was established in 1957. It was originally formed as an
alumni association of a school for disabled children in Tokyo, named
Koˆmei-yoˆgo-gakkoˆ, and it functioned as an informal social group. Aoi shi-
ba no kai published a literary magazine called Shinonome, in which a
number of the members had their poems and essays published. From
the beginning there was a strong tendency for the magazine to raise so-
cial and political questions and to express opinions. Thus, the group’s
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 49
activities were not limited to the ‘development of mutual friendship (koˆ-
sei, shinboku: cited in Tateiwa, 1998c: 220)’, but instead grew to include
social and political activities. In 1962, a department of social activity
was established within the group, and from then on, the department be-
gan negotiations with the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This was un-
precedented for a group composed exclusively of people with disabil-
ities. Aoi shiba no kai’s demands to the Ministry in the 1960s were to
raise pensions for disabled people, to secure housing for the disabled,
as well as the promotion of early medical screening and treatment of
birth defects, and the establishment of long-term residential care. Be-
cause their demands were for better opportunities for disabled people
within the existing system, Aoi shiba no kai’s position in the 1960s was
more liberal than radical.
Turning points of the activities
On 29 May 1970, there was an incident in Yokohama in which a
mother murdered her two-year old daughter who had CP. Following the
murder there was a public campaign to ask for a mitigated penalty for
the woman out of sympathy. This campaign was led by local people as
well as by groups of parents with disabled children. Aoi shiba no kai
started to criticise the campaign, asking, ‘why should the penalty be
lighter when a disabled child is killed?’ Their argument pointed out that
the campaign was based on the idea that a disabled child was of less va-
lue, and they fundamentally criticised the taken-for-granted notion
about disability equalling unhappiness. Their criticism was also geared
to the attitudes of local people, who had cast contemptuous looks at the
mother and the child when the child was alive, but when the child died,
they became sympathetic to the mother.
In the Diet, in May 1972, when there was an attempt to revise the Eu-
genic Protection Law by adding the condition of the selective abortion
clause, Aoi shiba no kai asserted that the attempt assumed that disabled
people were not supposed to be in society, and that they were a target
for eradication. After these events, Aoi shiba no kai became a politically
radical group questioning the system itself, and the organisation grew
and became nationally recognised.
The core beliefs of the Aoi shiba no kai movement
In October 1973, the group held its first national general meeting. The
participants agreed upon the following points:
(1) We are aware of the fact that we have CP. We acknowledge
that we are forced into the position that we are not supposed to
be in society. We base the point of all the activities of the move-
ment on this acknowledgement.
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(2) We assert ourselves strongly. When we become aware that we
have CP, a self-preservation instinct emerges to protect ourselves.
We believe that asserting ourselves is the only way to protect our-
selves, and we take actions consistent with this belief.
(3) We deny love and justice. We acutely reject (hitei suru) egoism
in love and justice, and we believe that the mutual understanding
that emerges from gazing straightforwardly at human beings,
that follows denying the egoism of love and justice, is true wel-
fare. We believe this and we act upon this belief.
(4) We do not choose to solve problems. We have experienced
how dangerous it is to look for easy solutions. The search for a
solution is the beginning of compromise. We believe that the
only possible way of proceeding in the movement is to expose
one problem after another (Aoi shiba no kai 1973: 6-7).
In some other documents, a fifth point is added to these four points,
namely,
(5) We reject disability-free people’s civilisation (Suda 1998: 125).
Explanations of those principles were added by Aoi shiba no kai:
(With regard to point 1) Those with CP have tried to be inte-
grated into the social system. However, the illusion of entering
the social system would end up isolating ourselves from the sys-
tem further and further. First, we need to acknowledge the fact
that we have CP. Unless we establish ourselves based on this ac-
knowledgement, we cannot achieve a change of consciousness
inside ourselves, and the movement would be ambiguous.
(With regard to point 2) We assert ourselves strongly. In our at-
tempt to establish our own selves, we have to clarify our attitude
against the enemies that try to eliminate, isolate, and erase us
from existence. In these opportunities, we sometimes have to
take actions which might be referred to as the ‘egoism of CP’.
However, we believe that we can take the path of liberation only
via the clash between the egoism of disability-free people and
those with CP.
(With regard to point 3) Our subjectivity has been robbed in the
name of love. Many of our parents have oppressed our subjectiv-
ity in the name of love, justice, and power. In the society of
authority, only those who possess power have ‘justice’ and those
who have dropped out have ‘injustice.’ For us, healthy bodies, or
people without a disability, are power. Thus, we deny ‘justice,’
which is the ‘power’ of social authority. We also deny ‘love’ that
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is a product of the ‘egoism of disability-free people,’ and we be-
lieve that this denial itself is the path toward the establishment
of a society of mutual understanding.
(With regard to point 4) We do not choose to solve problems be-
cause we have experienced that this is the dangerous beginning
of compromise. To expose problems with the society of disability-
free people is a movement that we can develop (Aoi shiba no kai
1973: 7).
Thus, Aoi shiba no kai holds that, in the name of ‘love’, disabled people
are confined to limited realms such as home and institutes, with par-
ents or working staff who ‘take care of’ them by deciding what is good
for disabled people. In this way, Aoi shiba no kai believes that the sub-
jectivity of disabled people is taken away, even their ability to decide the
smallest, most trivial affairs of daily life. This, they believed, was the
reality of welfare in the 1970s. On even basic matters of life, disabled
people have been made to compromise, and not to make demands.
Therefore, the group then claims that they do not search for solutions
which, in the end they believe, would lead to a loss of subjectivity: Pro-
posing a solution to a problem would involve a compromise because
disabled people are not able to put forth their true ideas because they
are in a dependent position. Because of the dependent position of dis-
abled people, Aoi shiba no kai believe that disabled people have been
prevented from expressing their emotions. Even their most basic emo-
tions have been taken away. Instead, the disabled people participating
in Aoi shiba no kai declared that if they are called egoists they will affir-
matively raise one problem after another concerning the disability-free
people’s society. Thus, Aoi shiba no kai proposed that people without
disabilities should be aware that they support discrimination against
people with disabilities, either consciously or unconsciously.
It is important to note that people within Aoi shiba no kai looked in-
side themselves (jiko hihan) for the internalised idea that ‘disability is
negative’ through strict self-reflection. The fact is that they also had
been denying themselves because of their disability. Now they tried to
deconstruct the ‘discrimination of disability’ internalised within them-
selves, and eventually formulated the argument ‘what is wrong with
being disabled?’ by positively redefining their disability.
The self-affirmation of being disabled is different from the idea of
‘even though one is disabled, he or she can do much’ or ‘despite the dis-
ability, he or she is capable’. Their claim was, the bodies of disabled
people are different, and therefore, the space they occupy and the time
they spend are different – to affirm a disability means to acknowledge
this difference as it is, being equal to those of disability-free people.
Here, the important point was to see through the mechanisms that ar-
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ticulate their existence and by doing so, and by protesting against it,
they sought to establish a ‘self’.
Aoi shiba no kai also took the view that the value that defined ‘a dis-
ability’ as ‘a disability’ is ‘the ethics of productivity’; society is domi-
nated by the norm of disability-free people, and the concept of health is
determined by the civilisation of disability-free people. The life-style of
disabled people was also determined according to this norm; one
should be rehabilitated in the first place, because productivity is a cru-
cial criterion of ‘independence’. Otherwise, one is isolated at home with
parents, and disabled people’s institutions are provided to take over the
function of the family’s home. The insight of Aoi shiba no kai’s argu-
ment revealed that the function of home and institutions was to isolate
disabled people from society, so that they would not disturb activities in
other areas of society.
On the point of how to regard productivity and how disabled people
locate themselves in society, the Japanese disabled people’s movement
in the 1970s shows a crucial difference when compared to that in the
United States, for example. In the 1970s’ movement in the United
States, independence was considered to be ‘vocational independence’
and ‘paying taxes’. The argument is that because an individual pays
taxes, he or she has the right to be a full member of the society. So the
target of the US independent living movement was to diminish depen-
dency by becoming as much as possible like disability-free people. Con-
versely, the Japanese disabled people’s independent living movement
fundamentally criticised pre-existing social, political, and economic sys-
tems, regarding them as disability-free people’s values that disregarded
the values of disabled people (Tateiwa 1998c: 225-226; 1999).48 This
criticism was aimed at the belief that placed value on the payment of
taxes as a sign of independence. Such a belief would call into question
the worth of those who cannot work or pay taxes due to their disabil-
ities. The case of the US is raised here, because Tateiwa reports that
there is a misunderstanding that the concept of independent living was
imported into Japan from the US after 1981, the UN International Year
of Disabled People (Tateiwa 1999: 85-91). Tateiwa holds that this misun-
derstanding is because professionals at rehabilitation centres and aca-
demics at universities in Japan, who have a greater voice in society than
disabled people (for example due to their ability to publish their views),
were not a part of the movement of disabled people in Japan in the
1960s and 1970s, either unintentionally or intentionally. Professionals
and academics sometimes intentionally took distance from disabled
people’s movement, because the movement was highly political and ra-
dical, sometimes tied to the new left student movement. People in the
disabled people’s movement were sceptical about professionals and aca-
demics, too, because they represented authority. In other instances, pro-
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fessionals and academics were simply not aware of the disabled peo-
ple’s movement.
Aoi shiba no kai’s criticism of selective abortion and ‘women’s right
to abortion’ is also based on this idea about a disability. They claimed
that women should confront discrimination of disabilities internalised
within themselves.
People in Aoi shiba no kai, furthermore, rejected beliefs regarding de-
pendence and independence. They posed the question ‘what is wrong
with dependence?’ which eventually led them to declare: ‘by letting
others take care of our shit, we let them participate in social activities’
(Yokotsuka 1975: 74). Here, they define ‘society’ to be composed of both
disabled and non-disabled people, both being equal and necessary to
each other’s existence, instead of regarding disabled people as second-
ary and less visible citizens. In this way, Aoi shiba no kai gave positive
value to what is called ‘dependency’, including a life that requires the
assistance of others, declaring dependency to be an ‘essential part of
the whole society’, and a form of ‘independent living’.
In addition to activities opposing the introduction of the selective
abortion clause, Aoi shiba no kai was active in raising public awareness
of a number of issues that involved discrimination against disabled peo-
ple, for example by hijacking a bus that refused passengers with wheel-
chairs, and also by developing a campaign of co-education for children
with and without disabilities in 1979. Since the 1980s, its activities have
focused more on the independent living movement. The group has be-
come less radical, because the group realised that independent living re-
quired getting along with disability-free people, instead of only accusing
disability-free people of internalised discrimination. Today, independent
living has become more of a reality for disabled people, although there
are still outstanding issues, such as insufficient levels of governmental
financial support.
The 1960s student movement (daigaku funsô): Zenkyôtô
The student movement in the 1960s was provoked by the international
political and economic context in Japan, and by questions amongst the
students about the meaning of education and why universities exist.
The movement started in the early 1960s, initially at Tokyo and Waseda
universities. The spirit of the movement spread to other universities
around the country with Toˆdai-toˆsoˆ, or the Tokyo university riot against
the university administration in 1968, marking the movement’s peak.
By 1969, the student movement was established in 86 of the 109 na-
tional universities, and 79 of the 270 private universities.
Students’ criticism was focused on Japan’s position and role in the
international community: its alliance with the US as well as Japan’s ben-
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eficiary position in Asia, which was the movement deemed to be ‘neo-
imperialism’ (Onna tachi no ima o tou kai 1996). To analyse Japan it-
self, the students drew upon Marxist analysis of the relations of produc-
tion, dividing society into workers and the bourgeoisie. Amongst the
students, there was also a fear that they would, in the end, become just
another cog in the mechanism of society, that is, ‘alienation of the char-
acter of labourers’, according to Marxism. At the same time, a common
belief within the student movement was that university students were
actually beneficiaries of the current political and economic system, and
therefore they should ‘question themselves’ about being at universities.
This questioning eventually led to jiko-hitei, or ‘self-denial’, which would
become a key concept in the movements.49
The principle of jiko-hitei was a tool in drawing student’s attention to
issues of discrimination against certain social groups, such as disabled
people and Chinese and Korean people living in Japan. This principle
required students to become aware of the discriminatory tendencies
that they had internalised and to deconstruct them. This principle was
because of the dialectical idea that social elites, such as university stu-
dents, can only exist through the existence of the socially powerless:
those in the student movement were convinced that social reforms
could not be realised without self-reflection and ‘internal revolution’,
that is, within the person. A number of people participating in the
1960s student movement reported that the movement provided them
with opportunities to clearly realise that what they had been vaguely
questioning was indeed problematic.50 However, there was also a criti-
cal shortcoming in the movement – the role of women.
Women in Zenkyôtô
Women in the student movement were generally objects of sexual dis-
crimination, expected to cook and clean for male students, or to protect
the luggage of male students while men participated in street activ-
ities.51 It was also taken for granted that men should take initiatives,
such as constructing theories and arguments. A number of women also
reported that during discussions generally men would state their opi-
nions, while women remained silent. The women participants tried to
challenge this, but they were sometimes prevented from speaking or
taking leadership roles. Women were thus subordinated and prevented
from taking leadership in the student movement. 52 This reflected the
conventional norm at the time that women should be behind men, sup-
porting men, but not arguing against men. For women to be acknowl-
edged as capable, they must be ‘like men’, such as being able to make
free use of jargon from Marxist theories.
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Women in the student movement soon realised shortcomings of the
student movement. Setsuko Mori, a participant in the student move-
ment, experienced this firsthand: During the student movement she
wrote handbills and took the initiative to organise actions. One day she
was told by a male leader of the movement that she did not have to
wash dishes because she was doing ‘as well as men’. She says
I was categorised as ‘an exceptional woman’ by a man. For a wo-
man to be ‘an exceptional woman’ would require ‘non-excep-
tional women’. I now realise the paradox that I, as a woman,
need to insult other women (to be acknowledged to be as capable
as men). [...] I have to move forward to my ‘being a woman,’
without denying myself as a woman, but affirming that I am a
woman (Ôta 1996: 78-79).
The theory of ‘self-denial’ – a theoretical tool to question the self who is
enjoying the privilege and to fight for dismantling the system that pro-
duces privilege – could not be applied to women as it was to men in
the student movement; womens’ free expression of their intellectual,
productive or creative abilities were frowned upon by mainstream so-
ciety. Some women in the student movement argued that the theory of
‘self-denial’ was in the end that of the privileged, who still had some-
thing to be denied (Tanaka 1972b: 28-29). Instead, women needed to af-
firm themselves by denying values internalised within themselves which de-
nied women. This process of self-affirmation through ‘double-denial’ is,
by the way, also found in the arguments of Aoi shiba no kai, namely, in-
ternal revolution to overturn internalised oppression within themselves. Self-
questioning was a characteristic of social movements in this period.
Physical insults and abuse by male students were also practised in
the movement. Open sex including sex in public and open relation-
ships, was one trend. Some men and women in the student movement
had sexual intercourse when they were not each other’s partners. How-
ever, the consequences were often that women became pregnant and
the men would not take any responsibility but merely cry or quote the
movement’s theories on social revolution. There were some rapes in
the name of the movement’s theories to make excuses, but women
would remain silent because of their sense of responsibility to protect
‘comrades’, or from a sense of shame about the experience.53
Thus, the student movement did not acknowledge women’s libera-
tion as a necessary or worthwhile goal, although the attitude of ‘ques-
tioning the self’ was an important springboard for women to transform
their internalised oppression to affirm themselves. The fact that the stu-
dent movement did not liberate women meant that the student move-
ment did not take discrimination against women seriously, while simul-
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taneously tackling other kinds of discrimination with sensitivity. When
women criticised this point, male students would say, ‘first comes the
revolution, and women will be liberated after that’. Women became fed
up with this claim, and they formulated their own ideas, trying to sense,
feel, and express themselves on their own, without borrowing from the
male vocabulary.
The emergence of the Women’s Liberation Movement
Toward the end of the 1960s, new women’s organisations began to be
established. In meetings, women exchanged views on their frustration
about their position in the workplace, the sexual division of labour, rela-
tionships with husbands, in addition to sexuality and bodily problems.54
Their difference from previous women’s movements was that they
talked openly about sexuality, even making it the core of women’s lib-
eration.
On 21 October 1971, the International Anti-War Day, Group Tatakau
Onna, or ‘Group of Fighting Women,’ 55 demonstrated against war, re-
presenting themselves as ‘the Women’s Liberation Movement’. This
group was initiated by only three women, but 50 women joined the de-
monstration, holding flags with the name Group Tatakau Onna. The
Asahi Shimbun, one of the biggest newspapers in Japan, reported on
this demonstration, and after that, ‘the Women’s Liberation Movement’
became a familiar term in public. After this demonstration, women in
the women’s movement started calling themselves ‘lib’ or ‘woman lib’
as an abbreviation.56 An accumulation of frustration in society drove a
wide range of women, for example, female students, housewives, and
factory workers to participate in the WLM. In practice, the WLM con-
sisted of only a few active women’s groups. But their arguments spread
widely throughout the country, influencing other women’s groups. At
crucial moments, for example when there were attempts to limit wo-
men’s access to abortion, women’s groups through the country collabo-
rated together sharing political ideas and rallying opposition. The WLM
was national, but a loose social movement in which many individuals
and different organisations participated.
In May, 1972, in the 68th Diet, a draft to revise the Eugenic Protec-
tion Law was proposed by the Diet members from Seiseiren. The con-
tent of the draft was to remove the economic reasons clause from the
Eugenic Protection Law, to add a selective abortion clause, and to set up
a guidance system for women about the proper age to have their first
child.
Women said, ‘women’s access to abortion will be limited and women
will be controlled in marriage!’ The draft thus triggered women and wo-
men’s groups around the country to set up activities together with the
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WLM. The Lib Shinjuku Centre was opened by Group Tatakau Onna, in
collaboration with other women’s organisations.57 The opening of the
centre intended to provide a common meeting space for women’s
groups, in order to facilitate further collaboration in the WLM. Mem-
bers from Group Tatakau Onna, and Shisoˆ-shuˆdan S. E. X., or ‘thought
group S. E. X.’, took the initiative and even lived communally in the
centre. Groups such as Tokyo komu-unu, Hi-monji, and Tataku-josei-doˆ-
mei were located within the centre as well, but did not live there.58 The
centre represented an experiment to establish a women’s commune, in-
cluding sharing the task of child rearing, because there was a shortage
of day nurseries for mothers who worked to earn. In the 1970s, theories
of the Japanese WLM were actively developed within this centre. At the
same time, a number of women’s organisations were established, and
the centre played the role of communication centre.
Opposing the attempt to limit women’s access to abortion was the
most crucial goal of the movement in the 1970s. ‘Women decide to give
birth or not to’ – this is ‘canonical’ rhetoric of the women’s movement,
but women could not easily keep using this rhetoric, because they were
being confronted by the question from disabled people about women’s
right to abortion – whether a woman is entitled to abort a disabled foe-
tus. The next chapter recounts the abortion debate in the 1970s.
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2 Abortion Debates in the 1970s
The attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law: The draft
proposal and those behind it
On 25 May 1972, in the 68th Diet, a revised Eugenic Protection Law
was proposed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.1 The proposal con-
sisted of three points: to remove the economic reasons clause, to intro-
duce a selective abortion clause, and to set up a eugenic guidance sys-
tem for women regarding the proper age to have a first child. This at-
tempt to revise the law was not successful.
The first point, to delete the economic reasons clause, was aimed at
regulating access to abortion. The main people promoting this point in
the draft belonged to a right-wing religious group, Seichoˆ no ie (for
more background on this group, see chapter 1). In 1960 and 1961 the
group submitted letters to the Ministry of Health and Welfare and to
the Diet, emphasising that ‘abortion is an act of murdering children
and human beings,’ and the duty of the government was ‘to let every-
one in the nation be aware that abortion is bad, fearful and shameful’
(Ôta 1967: 270-273; Taniai 1983b: 86). Seichoˆ no ie united Diet mem-
bers from the Liberal Democratic Party, and formed a league in 1969,
called Seiseiren, with the goal of limiting legal access to abortion.
In promoting the deletion of the economic reasons clause, Seiseiren
emphasised the fact that Japan was known internationally as an ‘abor-
tion paradise’, which, according to Seiseiren, implied that Japan was
ignoring human rights, or that Japan was an uncivilised country (Yûsei-
hogohô kaihai kisei dômei 1969: 37, YKKD hereafter). This ‘abortion
paradise’ nickname reflects the fact that abortion was almost totally ac-
cessible to women who wanted to undergo the procedure, due to the va-
gueness of the economic reasons clause, as well as the fact that few
other countries at that time legally permitted abortion and that foreign-
ers even travelled to Japan to have abortions. (Later, in 1967 abortion
was legalised in England, in 1973 in the US, and in 1974 in France.)
Hence, the abortion rate was relatively high in Japan in comparison
with other industrialised countries. Being pressured by Seiseiren on this
point, the Ministry decided to regulate abortion by deleting the econom-
ic reasons clause. Kuniyoshi Saitô, the Minister of Welfare and Health,
explained that the reason for proposing the change was that ‘there is no
need for an economic reasons clause, because Japan is so well-off, com-
pared to the period of devastation after the war,’ as well as that ‘the
loophole in the law which murders foetuses should be removed’ (from
the minutes of the budget committee in the House of Councillors on 4
April 1972, cited in Morioka 2001: 443-446).
The second point, the introduction of a selective abortion clause, was
a reaction to the birth of deformed babies in the 1960s, due to Thalido-
mide and Minamata disease, and also related to the possibility of
screening foetuses for deformities by checking the amniotic fluid (such
checks being introduced in Japan in 1968). With regard to this point,
Minister Saitô explained that, ‘because deformity and disability would
be the cause for “unhappiness for the entire life” of the children, and
because there is a recently emerged possibility to discover disabilities,
there must be a legal procedure for aborting disabled children, also
called selective abortion’ (ibid). The 1948 law did not make explicit
mention of a foetus with anomalies, and so, formally speaking, abortion
because of an anomaly was performed under the economic reasons
clause, as the clause was, and still is, a loophole of the law. Under this
condition of the law, abortion of a foetus with anomalies under the eco-
nomic reasons clause is, precisely speaking, illegal. Yet, under the re-
vised law, the procedure would be legalised because the technology to
detect an anomaly in the foetus is available. An explanation from the
Ministry said that the attempt to introduce the selective abortion clause
was actually designed to broaden the range of choice for women to in-
clude prenatal screening and selective abortion. In this way the Ministry
held that the introduction of the selective abortion clause was for the
sake of women (Aoi shiba no kai 1973: 39; the House of Councillors, ci-
ted in Morioka ibid).
The introduction of the selective abortion clause was actually justified
as a replacement for the economic reasons clause, in order to adapt the
law to the current economic and social context in Japan. The economy
was now sufficiently strong and therefore the economic reasons clause
was no longer necessary. But because of technological developments,
the selective abortion clause was necessary (The House of Councillors,
cited in Morioka ibid).
This second point reflected the interests of the Ministry. As Saitô’s
statement shows, a disability was believed to be a cause of unhappiness,
and preventing unhappy births was believed to be a good welfare policy.
The ministry also regarded the introduction of the selective abortion
clause as part of the reactive policies to tackle the Thalidomide and
Minamata issues. Seichoˆ no ie meanwhile was non-committal on this
second point. Its most pressing concern was to delete the economic rea-
sons clause; from an anti-abortion point of view, the selective abortion
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clause was not so welcome. But in order to maintain their alliance with
Saitô, the promoter of the revised law, there was no sign that Seichoˆ no
ie opposed the idea.2
The third point, to establish a counselling system to advise women
on the proper age for marriage and having a first child, was a reaction
to the trend that marriage was no longer women’s only interest, and
that an increasing number of women were seeking careers.3 The aver-
age ages when women married and when they gave birth to their first
child were increasing. ‘For women to raise their children well, the first
child should be born while the mother is still healthy and strong,’ said
Saitô, explaining this part of the proposal. ‘Women should be advised to
establish an ideal family without having an abortion’ (Morioka 2001:
147-148).
This third part of the proposal matched Seichoˆ no ie’s anti-abortion ar-
gument. In its arguments it focused mainly on women’s behaviour, that
is, the absence of motherhood, excessive materialism causing a loss of
self-control and spirituality, having sex without responsibility, and even-
tually having abortions without proper consideration.
Each of the three parts of the proposal to revise the Eugenic Protec-
tion Law was supported by diverse parties with different interests, and
these parties did not always agree with each other. The attitude of the
medical associations was a good indication of this. Nihon-boseihogo-kyoˆ-
kai (Japan Association for Maternal Welfare: Nichibo, currently Japan
Association of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists or Nihon sanfujinka
ikai),4 for example, was not consistent in its opinions about the draft.
The association was against the deletion of the economic reasons clause
because it would make their medical practice illegal. Doctors did not
want to lose their exclusive authority, determined by their medical skill,
to decide whether or not to perform abortions on women.5 With regard
to the introduction of the selective abortion clause, medical associations
did not even share a consensus among themselves. On the one hand,
introducing the clause meant broadening the range of their medical
practice, enabling doctors to legally use new technology, on demand,
but on the other hand some thought that ethically the introduction of
the selective abortion clause was highly problematic.
Among the Ministry, the Diet, and Seichoˆ no ie there were different
points of view about the three parts of the proposal. All parties agreed
on the first and the third points, but Seichoˆ no ie was not enthusiastic
about the second part.
All in all, we can conclude that the content of the proposal best re-
flected the Ministry’s interests, but it was Seichoˆ no ie that first pushed
the Diet and the Ministry to take action, using their anti-abortion argu-
ment about the problems of women’s behaviour and abortion.
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The image of women in the anti-abortion argument
According to Seichoˆ no ie and the promoters of the proposal to delete
the economic reasons clause, ‘a foetus is a person after the moment of
conception, therefore abortion is an act of murder’ (YKKD 1970: 18-20;
Seichoˆ no ie 1974: 2-3). They argued that the clause in effect had lega-
lised murder, and that these legal murders were being committed be-
cause of women’s degraded morality following the Second World War.
Firstly, they noted, women were having sexual intercourse out of wed-
lock, influenced by the ‘free love’ trend, to have sex without any sense
of responsibility, taking for granted that they could easily have an abor-
tion if they became pregnant (Seigakuren-chûô-rironkyoku and Seigaku-
ren-joshi-gakusei-taisaku-kyoku [SCR & SJGTK hereafter] 1970: 21;
YKKD 1970: 2, 7). Secondly, women were forgetting the ‘supreme mis-
sion’ of their lives: motherhood.6 The Ie household system, under the
Meiji Constitution, was, in their view, the most beautiful virtue of Ja-
pan; a system in which women could be fully engaged in motherhood
and maintaining the household (Seichô no ie 1974: 42-43; see also the
explanation of Ie, chapter 1). However, the post-war Constitution abol-
ished the Ie household system in order to give men and women equal
civil rights, and therefore women left their great mission behind in
search of careers and social opportunities similar to those pursued by
men (SCR & SJGTK 1970: 22). Thirdly, they argued, a woman’s moral-
ity had become so degraded that she dares to kill her own child for eco-
nomic reasons, even though giving birth to the child would probably
not destroy the woman’s life. Seichoˆ no ie’s arguments suggested that it
was the ultimate selfishness and egoism of women that pitted the life
of a child against having the economic means to buy ‘another electric
product’ (ibid: 32).
Thus, women’s behaviour and spiritual degradation were put forth as
the causes of legal murder. Men appeared in their argument only in the
context that ‘men do not take responsibility because abortion is legal
and women are too quick to have sexual intercourse’ (YKKD 1970: 23).
In this light, the claim for ‘the right to abortion’ by the women’s move-
ment was not only linked to a decline in morality, but also to ‘a barrier
for other women to be truly liberated’, because if abortion was out-
lawed, men would be more serious about practising contraception
(ibid).
The anti-abortion argument was based on nationalism and nostalgia
for pre-war Japan. First of all, those opposed to abortion were concerned
that the lower fertility rate would invite invasion from other countries,
making the Japanese race a minority in their own country.7 Also,
although Japan was now the second largest per capita economy in the
world, they argued that Japan’s growth would stop in the future because
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of a lack of productive workers.8 Secondly, the post-war Democratic
Constitution was seen as the cause of women’s reluctance to become
mothers, because Article 24 of the Constitution stipulated equality be-
tween men and women.9 According to the anti-abortion argument, this
aspect of the Constitution was an attempt by the US to weaken the
power of the Japanese nation, as was the legalisation on abortion in
1948. Therefore another strategy of groups opposing abortion was to in-
troduce a new Japanese Constitution based on the Meiji Constitution,
abolishing the post-war Democratic Constitution (SCR & SJGTK 1970:
22).10 They argued that the rhetoric of ‘women’s rights’ by the women’s
movement was a negative influence from the US, saying that ‘women
were thoughtlessly following the trend of rights brought by women in
the US’.
It is noteworthy that Seichoˆ no ie’s anti-abortion arguments were
based on nostalgia for the pre-war household system, where women
were treated as minors and as incompetents. It shows their view that
women ought to be controlled and guided by the household head. Their
reasoning about the relationship between abortion and the degradation
of women’s morality can be explained in this light. Since women do not
have the capacity to think logically about the consequences of their acts,
and because they are easily tempted by temporary pleasures without
due consideration, women need to be controlled and guided by the law,
just as a minor would be.
In constructing their anti-abortion argument, Seichoˆ no ie and Diet
members from Seiseiren used terminology such as rei, which stands for
dead people’s souls or spirits. Contrary to usual parliamentary customs,
in the political arena, such as the Diet, some religious doctrines were
promoted to support the anti-abortion argument, in addition to the ‘wip-
ing out the disgrace of the abortion paradise’ and the ‘free love’ argu-
ments. For example, it was argued that the student movement in the
1960s was a collective explosion of anger by all of the foetuses mur-
dered because of post-war materialism and moral decay (SCR & SJGTK
1970: 2-3). Seichoˆ no ie also argued that bed-wetting by a child is a mani-
festation of an aborted foetus’s tears, as well as amniotic fluid, because
the foetus still thinks it is inside its mother, without being able to get
out (Seichô no ie 1974: 39). They argued that children’s cancer was a re-
sult of the Constitution introduced by the US and the abolition of the Ie
household system (ibid: 42-43). Leukaemia, in their view, was a result
of ignorance about the importance of perpetuating the family bloodline
(ibid: 44). They further argued that suicide by adults is an expression of
the desire to meet an aborted child (UKKD 1969: 42-43).
Such social problems as juvenile delinquency, robbery, and murder
were also explained as the consequences of legal abortion (SCR &
SJGTK 1970: 22; Seichô no ie 1974: 3, 42-43). Seichoˆ no ie argued that
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in view of the current overriding materialism as well as the lack of re-
spect for life, the birth of a human being was degraded to being merely
the consequence of the pleasure of parents, based on an artificial choice
made by parents, rather than being born out of mystic nature. In this
reality, human beings are degraded to being trivial and meaningless.
Therefore a number of young people lose their life’s purpose, not know-
ing why they have been born at all. Abortion is thus the cause of all bad
phenomena in society, as well as in nature, because it is an act against
the principle of nature. This argument continued until the 1990s.
Although the anti-abortion argument is biased toward a specific reli-
gious doctrine, and not all of it was accepted by the general public, the
concepts of rei and the anger of the soul of the aborted foetus were not
so far removed from people’s minds. There is a belief about the exis-
tence of a soul, or spirit, after death, which was, and still is, widely ac-
cepted in Japan, and it is plausible that this belief, when combined with
the strong experience of pain and guilt after abortion, would touch the
emotions of people, especially women. Seichoˆ no ie, as well as others
supporting the proposal, understood the resonance of these beliefs and
consciously applied this reasoning to their arguments to place limita-
tions on women’s access to abortion. The boom of Mizuko-kuyoˆ in tem-
ples, or the business of watering the souls of aborted foetus by women
in the 1980s, is an expression of this psychological mechanism, linking
problems in life with the experiences of abortion, in action. Conse-
quently, by 2 June 1969, Seichoˆ no ie was able to collect 330,000 signa-
tures against abortion in support of the proposed legal changes outlined
above, and by 1974 their women’s division had collected 2.5 million sig-
natures against abortion. Their campaign was called ‘a foetus is a hu-
man being’ (YKKD 1969: prologue; Seichô no ie 1974: 39), and submis-
sion of these signatures led the Diet and the Ministry to consider the
limitation of abortion.
Seichoˆ no ie also opposed contraception, as in its view conception is
due to the desire of the soul to appear in the human world, in order to
develop itself. And therefore contraception placed unnatural restrictions
on the soul. In this light, Seichoˆ no ie was also against the practice of fa-
mily planning, because in their view all the rei should be given the
chance to develop themselves. However, the group chose not to bring
the agenda of prohibiting contraceptives to the fore in the public arena
because, being generally unpopular, it would have made their argument
appear too extreme.
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Reaction of women to the proposed revisions to the Eugenic
Protection Law
When the proposal to delete the economic reasons clause was about to
be introduced in the Diet in 1972, women from all over Japan started
activities in their local communities to prevent the revisions from being
made. With Lib Shinjuku Centre as a communication centre, women
carried out activities such as teach-in meetings to raise consciousness
amongst women, sit-in strikes, and other demonstrations to provide op-
portunities for women to express and exchange thoughts on the issue
of abortion and other issues related to the life of women, including
sexuality and marriage.
When the revisions were officially proposed, the WLM analysed the
three points as follows (Group tatakau onna, Himonji, Tatakau josei dô-
mei, S. E. X. 1973). To remove the economic reasons clause from the
Eugenic Protection Law would not only limit women’s access to abor-
tion, but would also criminalise abortion, as more than 99 percent of
abortions were being performed under the economic reasons clause.
The combination of deleting the economic reasons clause and introdu-
cing the selective abortion clause, in the WLM’s view, showed the inten-
tion of the promoters: to control the quality and the quantity of the po-
pulation with legal intervention into women’s reproductive capacities.
Setting up a guidance system for women regarding the proper age to
give birth was seen as an attempt to force women to give birth while
they were still young, when the chances of having children with a dis-
ability were lower. The movement saw this an imposition of a particular
lifestyle on women, a norm that women must be married by a certain
age, and a norm for the kind of children they may give birth to. It was
also seen as an attempt to use women as cheap productive labour: if wo-
men have children at a young age, they can be freed from full time
child-rearing at a still relatively young age and be able to return to the
paid labour market. But with children to care for, she cannot be en-
gaged in full-time work. A woman thus becomes a cheap part-time
worker.
The first point, criminalising abortion, received most of the move-
ment’s attention. Women in the movement named the proposed legal
revision Chuˆkin-hoˆ, or ‘the law to criminalise abortion’. In their protests
against the proposal they linked the issue of criminalisation of abortion
to such topics as the discourse of motherhood, the sexual/gender divi-
sion of labour, the meaning of the monogamous marriage system, and
the problems inherent in the ways in which the economy is managed.
This attitude reflected the radical climate of the Zenkyoˆtoˆ movement, be-
cause many of the women in the WLM were Zenkyoˆtoˆ members.
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According to the women’s movement, the monogamous marriage
system was used as the central tool to sustain economic productivity
and secure male productive labour for the duties of economic manage-
ment, while women supported households by doing reproductive work.
The Ie household was the basic unit of governance for the rulers, in
which women were absolutely subordinate to men. Women in the
movement analysed that in the monogamous Ie married life, women
are divided into two types: ‘gentle mother’ and ‘toilet’, as a place for
men’s excretion (sperm), where the prerequisite is that a wife sleeps
only with her husband, while he might not necessarily be sleeping only
with his wife (ibid: 4-5; Tanaka 1972a; Tanaka 1972b). In this context,
outlawing abortion was necessary, not only for securing labour power,
but also for strengthening women’s loyalties to their husbands and to
the household, because if a woman committed adultery, and became
pregnant by another man, she could not have an abortion. Therefore
she would not sleep with another man (Group-tatakau-onna, Himonji,
Tatakau-josei-domei, S. E. X.; Tanaka 1972a; Tanaka 1972b; Aki Shobô
Henshûbu 1971: 134-137, 160-168).
Given this argument, women maintained that the liberation of sexu-
ality was itself the liberation of women, because the oppressive view of
sexuality was the barrier to dissolving the marriage system and the sex-
ual division of labour. And since the marriage system was based on the
gendered division of labour, it was also an obstacle to women’s econom-
ic independence.11
For women in the movement, the crucial point was that the content
of the proposal constituted state intervention in the workings of a wo-
man’s body, using and controlling it for the sake of the national inter-
est. Both men and women would be part of the same problematic sys-
tem, but men would enjoy more privileges. Women were to become
slaves in the system, while men would be ‘the head slaves’ (Tanaka
1972a; Tanaka 1972b).Women did not want their way of life to be dic-
tated by state interests or dominant conservative values, so they de-
clared, ‘abortion is women’s basic right’.12
The encounter between the movements of women and disabled
people
When the proposal to revise the Eugenic Protection Law was made in
1972, women in the movement tried to collaborate with the disabled
people’s movement in opposing the revision. There was scope for this
collaboration because both the disabled people’s movement and the wo-
men’s movement shared a similar self-image, based on the view that
pregnant women, women with children, and disabled people were ‘devi-
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ants’ from society’s dominant norm, which was based on being male,
productive, and disability-free. Public infrastructure was also con-
structed with able-bodied adult men as the standard, and this standard
did not reckon with pregnant women, women with children, or disabled
people. The main active disabled people’s group to oppose the proposed
changes was Aoi shiba no kai. In the 1970s groups of people with other
disabilities did not engage in noteworthy activities in relation to the at-
tempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law. This is partially because the
proposed revision to the law was for the purpose of increasing econom-
ic productivity, according to the way people in Aoi shiba no kai analysed
it. CP is a disability with which one can hardly work, while people with
other kinds of disabilities could work. For this reason, Aoi shiba no kai
reacted sensitively to the ethics of productivity, which determine the va-
lue of a person according to his/her economic productivity (for more
on the ethics of productivity, see chapter 1). They were also the only dis-
abled people’s groups that raised the radical question of ‘what is wrong
with having a disability?’ Instead, those outside Aoi shiba no kai felt that
life with a disability was unhappier.13
Aoi shiba no kai did not unite with the women’s movement easily. It
criticised the ‘women’s rights’ rhetoric, saying that decision-making
about an abortion should not be totally entrusted to women, because eu-
genic thoughts, or the idea that disabilities are negative, are internalised
in women in general, as well as in women in the WLM. Aoi shiba no
kai claimed, instead, that women’s access to abortion should be limited
to some extent because women would chose to abort a foetus with
anomalies. As the guidelines of Aoi shiba no kai show, the group also
expressed strong scepticism about disability-free people (see chapter 1).
On 29 March 1973, when the Lib Shinjuku Centre held its first gener-
al meeting, the disabled people’s movement officially criticised the wo-
men’s movement’s rhetoric that spoke of ‘women’s right to abortion’.
So, the disabled people’s movement assumed that it would be in the
woman’s best interest not to have a child with a disability. So, the group
criticised ‘women’s rights’ as being an expression of women’s egoism:
In the name of women’s rights, women would abort foetuses with an
anomaly (Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki 1992: 168, 171, 174). Up to this time,
women had been using the term ‘right’ in connection with access to
abortion, but after the attempt to collaborate with the disabled people’s
movement in 1972, serious consideration began about the nature of the
act of ‘abortion’ and the rhetoric of ‘rights’. During this first general
meeting women made an official appeal to the government requesting
free abortion, free medical care at the time of delivery, as well as subsi-
dies for contraceptives. However, the disabled people’s movement criti-
cised these ideas, saying that ‘the women’s movement’s view was nar-
row, because the proposal made in the draft to revise the Eugenic Pro-
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tection Law was not only about criminalising abortion, but also about
introducing the selective abortion clause’ (ibid). From then on, women
named their political struggle ‘Yuˆseihogohoˆ-kaiaku-hantai’ (opposition to
the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law), instead of ‘Chuˆkinhoˆ-han-
tai’ (opposition to the draft to criminalise abortion), giving the same
weight to the opposition to selective abortion as to the criminalisation
of abortion.
Disabled people’s arguments against the proposal
On the attempt to introduce the selective abortion clause
Aoi shiba no kai argued that the attempt to introduce the selective abor-
tion clause was an attempt to eliminate disabled people, based on the
beliefs that ‘a disability is more negative than positive’, ‘a life with a dis-
ability is unhappy’, and ‘a society without disabled people would be hap-
pier’.14 These ideas are based on the ethics of productivity. In other
words, disabled people, especially those with CP, were made out to be a
social nuisance because they could not be productive.
Aoi shiba no kai also pointed out that Thalidomide babies were a re-
sponsibility of the Ministry because it had failed to investigate the safety
of Thalidomide pills, just as the management of the company was re-
sponsible for the Minamata disease because it let mercury flow into the
sea. By eradicating foetuses with an anomaly before birth, the Ministry
was evading its responsibilities – this was how Aoi shiba no kai con-
structed their argument against the introduction of the selective abor-
tion clause (Aoi shiba no kai 1973).15
On women’s arguments
As mentioned previously, Aoi shiba no kai opposed the ‘women’s right’
argument in connection with abortion, pointing to the bias against dis-
abilities internalised in women. People from Aoi shiba no kai asked in-
dividual women in the movement whether they would want to give
birth if they learned that the foetus was deformed, and this sometimes
overwhelmed women in the movement. Often women could not answer
either ‘yes’ or ‘no’; indeed, there were deep-rooted feelings that it would
be more convenient to have a disability-free child. Women also felt that
internalised discrimination should be wiped out. It is possible to ob-
serve that the debate between the two movements was a delicate bal-
ance, and ‘the right to abortion’ case rested upon a fragile base. Some
women even went so far as to say that they would ‘choose to give birth
if the foetus was deformed, but would have an abortion if the foetus
was not disabled’ (Yonezu 1998: 235). To fully understand these strug-
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gles, the dynamics of the power relations at work within the disabled
people’s movement, which was mainly male, and in relation to the
WLM, which consisted mainly of disability free women, must be con-
sidered. We need to look at the interaction of the concepts of ‘disability-
free women in the WLM’, who are ‘potential mothers’, as well as the
concepts of ‘male disabled people’ and ‘sons of mothers’. Male domi-
nance within the disabled people’s movement in those days will be re-
counted in chapter 3 and 5 and the myth of motherhood in Japanese
culture is recounted later in this chapter and chapter 3.
Women in the movement tried to emphasise that women with de-
formed foetuses felt compelled to have an abortion because of the poor
social settings in which they had to raise children. Using this argument,
the women tried to find a bridge for collaboration between the two
movements, and to stand together against the ‘common enemy’. For ex-
ample, with regard to the disabled child murder case in Yokohama in
1972 (see chapter 1), women in the liberation movement argued that
the incident was a result of the ideology of motherhood, which regards
mothering as women’s natural job and eventually isolates a mother and
her children from society, even when her male partner does cooperate
in raising children. The murder of a child with a disability was thus the
last resort for the mother, who was totally isolated and without support
from others. Hence, any woman in a similar situation is a potential
child-murderer (Lib Shinjuku Centre, Kogoroshi wa anatada! [It is you
who have murdered the child!] 1973: 68; Tanaka 1973).
Aoi shiba no kai did not totally agree with this argument. Although it
acknowledged that social support was indeed insufficient for raising
disabled children, it was still a woman, or a mother, who actually killed
the disabled child. Aoi shiba no kai declared that, ‘disabled people have
been killed by women’s egoism’.16
This contrast between the two movements’ arguments regarding the
matter of a disabled child also showed the structure of their disagree-
ment on the issue of abortion. Women from the WLM often empha-
sised the problems in the context of womens’ lives which drive them to
abort deformed foetuses, since they have few other options. On this
point, the women’s movement tried to collaborate with the disabled
people. However, Aoi shiba no kai pushed individual women to reflect
upon their attitudes, questioning internalised discrimination.
Although both groups opposed the proposed revisions to the law, the
two movements could not agree with each other completely. Instead,
there was a fundamental contradiction as to whether it was up to wo-
men to decide whether to abort deformed foetuses or not. Women in
the movement now had to consider their rhetoric, that is, ‘the right to
have an abortion’, including whether they should stop using the word
‘right’ or not.
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In search of movement rhetoric
Within the WLM a tendency emerged not to use the term ‘right’. The
criticism they had received about the term raised doubts among the wo-
men involved in the movement. Even before encountering criticism
from the disabled people’s movement, there had already been a feeling
that ‘right’ could not fully explain a woman’s relationship to abortion.
The term ‘right’ described entitlement to access to abortion, but it could
not explain why the situations that created womens’ need for abortion,
either the causes of unplanned or unwanted pregnancies, or the pain
experienced by women who undergo abortions. As the WLM ques-
tioned the basis of society by refusing conventional values, such as
motherhood and the sexual division of labour, it shared with the dis-
abled people’s movement a sense that ‘right’ was not the proper term to
use in making arguments for changes that would affect society.17 More-
over, the term ‘right’, when linked to the issue of abortion, had the con-
notation that ‘abortion is positively chosen by women’. Because ‘a right’
is something that is to be ‘enjoyed’; in view of women within the WLM
who were having doubts about the term, ‘the right to abortion’ implied
that women were having abortions without qualms, and this also sug-
gested that women were selfish and egotistical. Women in the move-
ment believed that if using a rights-based rhetoric to argue for access to
abortion conjured up these kinds of images for women, it was not a
good strategy to use such rhetoric.
In this context, when a debate on abortion took place between repre-
sentatives of women’s groups and disabled people’s groups, the WLM
speakers would be jeered at with such words as ‘nonsense!’ when the
term ‘right’ was used. This term became more and more difficult and
sensitive for both movements.18 As a result, the women’s movement
tried to construct arguments that went beyond the conventional associa-
tions that the term ‘right’ conveys. This attempt by women to construct
an argument by removing or redefining ‘right’ was in order to refute
the anti-abortion argument as well as to find a meeting point with the
disabled people’s movement in order to do movement activities together
to question the implications of abortion in the social context of the day.
As a result of their engagement with the disabled people’s movement
women within the liberation movement became more reflexive on is-
sues such as the meaning of abortion, as well as the relationship be-
tween a woman, foetus, abortion, and giving birth.
‘Abortion is murder, and a woman is a murderer’
The concept of an individual political ‘right’ connotes a person’s entitle-
ment to commit a certain action, or to legitimately claim something. Ac-
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cording to the anti-abortion argument, women are not entitled to kill a
foetus, because they define a foetus as a person. Women in the WLM
did not undertake to define a foetus as a person; however, they could
not deny that there was an intuitive feeling that a foetus was a living
being. This feeling was certainly one that was shared by women in the
WLM in general:
There is something in the experience of abortion which cannot
be wiped out by reasoning that ‘a foetus is not a human being,’
or ‘I abort a foetus because of the difficult social condition.’ [...]
Nobody knows if it is a human being or a person, but it is some-
thing with life. [...] The sense that there is an unsolved problem
comes from the fact that a foetus is a living being.
This is a citation from an argument titled, ‘Aete-teikisuru = Chuˆzesu-wa-
kitoku-no-kenri-ka?’ (I dare to propose, ‘is abortion a vested right?’; ap-
pendix 5). 19 This argument was made by Mitsu Tanaka on three sheets
of paper, and was distributed in May 1973 at the general meeting of the
WLM. Probably this was the first public attempt by the WLM to chal-
lenge ‘women’s right to abortion’. Acknowledging that a foetus is a
being with life, Tanaka stated that ‘by aborting, women kill foetuses’,
and ‘women are murderers’ (Tanaka 1973).
This feeling was not held only by Tanaka, but was held generally by
women in the WLM at that time. Setsuko Murakami, for example, an-
other woman in the WLM at that time, said that ‘when looking into
one’s self, you will find the reality that the self survived by killing chil-
dren at one time, but at other times you gave birth. To live a “life”
means to keep looking into such a self.’20 Thus, women in the move-
ment did not pretend or try to justify abortion by giving an artificial
ethical definition to a foetus and weighing that ethical status against
that of a woman. To define a foetus to be a person, a human being, a
life, or ‘nothing’ – all are given artificially according to the values of the
society of the day. As values change, the definition of a foetus changes.
Nobody can actually define what a foetus is. Women in the WLM did
not try to justify abortion by saying that ‘abortion is not morally proble-
matic because a foetus is not a human’. Instead, they argued that wo-
men need to ‘confront the fact that abortion is an act of killing’ (Tanaka
1973). Thus, the Japanese WLM constructed their abortion debate based
on the notion that an abortion is ‘an act of killing a life’.
To define abortion as murder is a perilous act for a women’s move-
ment, but behind this argument was an honest and sincere desire to
tackle the issue of the act of having an abortion. This definition of abor-
tion also did not mean that the women’s movement had to retract their
proclamation, that ‘it is women who determine whether to have an
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abortion’. How did they develop a plausible argument in favour of abor-
tion to deal with the implications of abortion being murder? The state-
ment ‘to give birth is egoism, not to give birth is egoism’ was one clue
to the construction of their argument.
‘Umu-mo-ego, umanu-mo-ego’ (To give birth is egoism, not to give birth
is egoism): ‘We all are in an egoistic society’ 21
Abortion is an egoistic act of killing according to general values in so-
ciety in Japan. But on second thought, giving birth, according to the
WLM argument, is also an expression of egoism. Some women, they
noted, gave birth just because others chose to do so, or because other-
wise they might be seen as deviant from the normal course of life.
Hence, on many occasions, women used ‘giving birth’ in order to be ac-
knowledged as ‘complete’ women, or in order to prove their woman-
hood and justify their existence. With regard to child-rearing, too, there
were cases in which children were used by mothers as a means of self-
realisation, as when some mothers, for example, drove their children to
study very hard with an expectation that the children would become
highly prestigious members of society. However, despite these acts of
egoism the acts of giving birth and having children had hardly ever
been called ‘egoism’; in the Japan of the 1970s these acts uncondition-
ally won admiration. Giving birth was simply taken for granted, in the
course of life, for ‘normal’, ‘healthy’, heterosexual women, while not
giving birth was questioned and considered to be abnormal. At the
same time, a tendency was that women’s reproductive health cam-
paigns at the time in general in Japan focused almost exclusively on the
issue of abortion. Therefore there is a gap in what had come under
scrutiny by the women’s liberation movement at that time. In this situa-
tion, the message of the rhetoric that the WLM began to put forth was,
‘abortion is spoken of in only negative terms, but let’s not take giving
birth for granted. Instead let’s have a closer look at the meaning of giv-
ing birth, too. There might be problems in that action’ – this was the
message of the rhetoric that the WLM began to put forth.
‘Not to give birth is egoism’ – this rhetoric declared that women in
the Women’s Liberation Movement thought that abortion was an egois-
tic act of eradicating a life. The movement developed the argument even
further:
In history, abortion was either prohibited or legalised, according
to the particular state’s interest. Under militarism, healthy wo-
men were forced to give birth. Abortion was legalised after the
war as part of the state’s policy of poverty mitigation. In 1973,
the draft to revise the Eugenic Protection Law was an attempt to
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control the population in both quality and quantity, using wo-
men’s bodies. Medical associations opposed the attempt, but this
was with a view that abortion should be performed only under
the judgement of a medical professional, and also because abor-
tion was a huge source of income for them. Hence, both actions,
giving birth and not giving birth, were based on the interests of
others, not of women. In this situation, if a woman gives birth, it
is as if she is contributing another worker to the state, and if a
woman has an abortion, it is as if she is helping a medical doctor
earn money by practising medicine (ibid).
Thus, women in the movement claimed that ‘women have been made
to give birth, and have been made to abort’, and that ‘actually women
have never enjoyed the right to abortion’ (Tanaka 1973). Even the cur-
rent accessibility to abortion was provided by the state under the Eu-
genic Protection Law, in which to a great extent the state’s interest was
reflected. Hence, although the critiques put forth both by anti-abortion
movement and the disabled people’s movement argued that women’s
rights to abortion are egoistic claims, the WLM argued that the present
accessibility to abortion is actually not relevant to, or based on women’s
rights. Instead, it is based on the state’s interests as abortion was initi-
ally legalised after the Second World War for the purpose of poverty mi-
tigation and enhancing the quality of the nation (see chapter 1).22
Even before modern times, the WLM claimed, abortion historically
was a means to balance households and communities in terms of re-
sources and labour power. Thus, social stability was brought about, and
history has been constructed, on ‘foetuses cut into pieces’, or ‘cutting
off helpless beings’ (Tanaka 1972a; Tanaka 1972b). Women often had to
choose abortion because it was necessary for the well-being of the whole
society, the community, or their household – abortion and infanticide
were used as a means to strike a balance between cost and benefit. In
this light, unwanted or unplanned pregnancy was unavoidable not only
for women, but for the whole social system.
In an interview reflecting upon the 1970s movement, Tanaka noted:
We all are living with these facts. Anti-abortionists are blaming
women having abortions, but anti-abortionists are also benefiting
from the fact that social prosperity is established at the cost of
weaker, more helpless beings. Thus, when it is necessary, society
will endeavour to eliminate another helpless social group (Tanaka
1983: 188-195).
Concerning the function of abortion within society as a whole, she con-
tinues:
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So, in the end, such a society would not let women, whom you
are blaming right now, even live (and it is all of you, you are all
involved in this system). This principle is true for the case of ra-
pid economic growth in post-war Japan, because the Eugenic
Protection Law contained the idea of sterilising ‘inferior off-
spring’. We women question this system fundamentally (ibid).
Thus, women in the WLM consistently emphasised the social settings
and norms where abortion has been practised, and claimed that women
have been ‘made to abort a foetus’. Here, pain experienced by women
from abortion is also emphasised to refute charges of ‘women’s ego-
ism’:
Behind the murder, women have been bleeding, and men have
certainly been involved, by benefiting from abortion. [...] Actually,
no woman wants to have an abortion, lying on a cold bed, open-
ing her legs, exposing her vagina, and with a knife penetrating
her Omanko, or “cunt”’ (Tanaka 1973).
I interpret Tanaka’s statement as being a challenge from the WLM’s
aimed at those who blame women for having an abortion. ‘Yes,’ they
are saying ‘abortion is an egoistic act, but it is also painful. You – think
about why women have abortions despite all the pain. Think about how
you are involved in their actions!’
Another movement phrase: ‘Umeru-shakai-o, umitai-shakai-o’ (We
demand a society where we can give birth, where we want to give
birth), and establishment of women’s subjectivity
In another leaflet, women in the liberation movement continued to ar-
gue,
I dream of a society where we women can give birth to as many
children as we like. ... But the fact is, even though women want
to give birth, there is a difficult social reality which does not al-
low women to do so – the cost of living is high, men do not co-
operate in the childrearing, and there is a shortage of childcare
centres.23
This leaflet was an example of the emerging rhetoric of Umeru-shakai-o,
umitai-shakai-o, or ‘We demand a society where we can give birth; we
want to give birth.’24 This rhetoric proclaims that the improvement of
social conditions is necessary to make it possible for women to give
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birth, and women want to give birth. Men are inside the egoistic sys-
tem, so they also have to make an effort to improve the conditions of
the system.
At the same time, however, although the Women’s Liberation Move-
ment claimed that women were made to abort because of poor social
surroundings, they also argued that women should not rationalise the
experiences of abortion simply by pointing to an unsatisfactory social si-
tuation, because in doing so they are attempting to blunt the pain of
abortion experiences, which would mean eventually accepting the social
status quo. To cite Tanaka:
Of course women have to keep fighting such a social system,
and striving for ever improving conditions. Yet, if women say ‘be-
cause it is difficult, we will just have an abortion’, aren’t we wo-
men having a pointless, unreflective attitude toward what we are
doing? [...] If we affirmatively accept the society, which exists at
the cost of women’s wombs, we would not lose the ability to ac-
cuse society. [...] Without confronting the fact that abortion is an
act of killing, we would not be able to fight against even the fake
humanism component of the pro-life argument proposed by Sei-
choˆ no ie.25
By arguing that women should not forget the pain of the abortion ex-
perience, the women’s movement spreads a message towards women
in general, saying ‘think about yourself, think about the meaning of
what you are doing, instead of taking it for granted!’ (Onnatachi no ima
o tou kai 1996: 48). It was a call to women to live life as a subject; to
consider the self.
By choosing to have an abortion on my own, in a situation where
women are ‘made to’ have an abortion, I affirmatively call myself
‘a murderer’. Indeed, the child (a foetus) dies (by an abortion). I
also dare to call women who had an abortion ‘murderers’. De-
claring that I am a murderer, and staring at a foetus cut to
pieces, now I demand an answer from a society that makes wo-
men have an abortion, with no way of escape. A society that
makes women commit a murder does not let women live either.
Only those aware of the fact that they might be killed at the next
moment, and those who live with despair and anger about this
fact, can argue forcibly against their surroundings with hateful
determination and preparedness (Tanaka 1973).
Thus, the women’s movement argued that only when women ask them-
selves about the meaning of life and the meaning of killing a life will
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they be able to confront the essence of the anti-abortion debate. This at-
titude was also based on the awareness of the need to establish subjec-
tivity, or truly independent self (shutaisei), which had been taken away
as a result of a number of oppressive norms and which spells out what
is ‘natural’ for women’s lives.
Based on the conviction that we are confronting the meaning of
one life and enduring the sense of fear and severity flowing from
the need to make a choice with regard to our own lives, now let’s
cry, ‘We demand a society where we can give birth! Where we
want to give birth!’ (Yûseihogohô kaiakusoshi jikkô iinkai 1973,
in Mizoguchi, Saeiki & Miki 1992).
The Women’s Liberation Movement thus argued that women now
needed to ask themselves, ‘why am I, a woman, deciding to have an
abortion?’ and at the same time demand that ‘social surroundings must
change to support women’s giving birth to, and rearing, children’. The
WLM argued the necessity of having social reform and a personal inter-
nal revolution at the same time. When women confront the self with
the question of why they need to end a life, women develop a subjectiv-
ity, or truly independent self (shutaisei), to earn and use rights. Then
abortion becomes an issue of ‘rights’ in a true sense, because:
Given women’s subjectivities, whether a woman is choosing to
have an abortion is the question that she has to ask herself, and
it is not the business of the law, or of others, to impose such a
choice. Actually, to dare to define an abortion as murder is also
based on women’s critical feelings toward the artificial aspect of
the man-made law on abortion: ‘why is it a crime when an infant
is killed, but not when an unborn foetus is killed? Then what is
a foetus?’26
Here, the argument goes:
The law is articulated by men, who arrogantly pretend to under-
stand the matter. The law is made for the convenience of those
who are entitled to make it. But actually men with slimy faces
are not entitled to define that a foetus is a human being, or a per-
son or whatever. Nor do they have any right to decide what is
women’s natural job, nor the natural function of the womb, with-
out knowing even a bit of the pain of the womb. Abortion is a
matter for women to decide (Jôkyô, Feb: 29, cited in Morioka,
op. cit: 161).
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Instead of leaving the task of defining the ethical status of women and
the foetus to men, women in the WLM said they were now taking the
initiative to discuss the issue, calling abortion ‘murder’ and ‘egoism’ on
their own. This was for the purpose of opposing men and authority, ur-
ging them to realise how ignorantly they think and speak about abor-
tion. Moreover, statements such as ‘a foetus is a being with life’, and
‘women are egoistic murderers’, could destroy the discourse of mother-
hood, which was one of the WLM’s goals. ‘Women are egoists’ ex-
presses the idea that the ego of a foetus and the ego of a woman are se-
parate beings, instead of one. ‘Oneness of a mother and child’ and ‘wo-
men should always be protective toward their child’ are the powerful
discourse that is often alluded to in order to accuse women who have
had an abortion and have ended childrearing by killing their children.
Hence the phrase ‘Umu-mo-ego, umanu-mo-ego’ declared that a woman
is not always protective of her foetus/child, and that women have their
own strong subjectivities to assist in making choices, instead of sacrifi-
cing themselves to ‘the mother’s instinct to care, protect, and give away’
(Ehara 1985: 131).
By bringing women’s ego to the fore, the WLM believed that they re-
vealed the fragile basis of the anti-abortion argument. This claim was
also oriented towards the charge by the disabled people’s movement
that ‘it is women’s egoism to murder a disabled child’, although it was
more difficult to refute this argument with disabled people than it was
with others more generally opposed to abortion. This is because another
power relation (the attributes of ‘disability’ and ‘non-disability’) was in-
volved, instead of only the ‘mother-child’ relationship.
Philosophical contribution of the Women’s Liberation Movement
Philosophically speaking, the fact that the Japanese WLM intentionally
avoided weighing the ethical status of a woman and a foetus, without
defining the ethical status of a foetus, suggests two important points.
First, the act of avoidance of naming something, not giving it a static
definition, suggests a mitigation of the conflicted relationship between
foetus and pregnant woman. Nobody can deny that the attempt to de-
fine the ethical status of a foetus, in order to weigh it against ‘a wo-
men’s right’ is a constructed and artificial exercise, as the definition of
a foetus changes according to the development of science and reproduc-
tive technologies, and science is not an independent source of authority.
The borders of construction are also informed by social and personal
norms. Science in itself cannot offer any universal boundary in the pro-
cess of pregnancy. The status of a foetus is, in the end, a political pro-
blem. The acts of naming and defining the nature of something that is
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actually unknown to anyone are sometimes excessively rational, artifi-
cial, and even arrogant acts, because the act of ‘representing the other’
– and the unknown can be considered an ‘other’ – is often performed
by the powerful side, hardly giving the weaker side power to discuss the
issue. It can be said that the temptation to weigh the ethical status of
women and the foetus, in order to justify women’s right to abortion, is
a trap set by the powerful who are not aware of the complex dilemmas
of abortion. This is firstly because the issue of abortion is reduced to
the relationship between women and the foetus, where discrimination
against women in society is made invisible. Secondly, given the fact that
the definition of a foetus changes according to technology, to try to look
for a definition for something that has an ambiguous nature, like life,
makes it dependent on science. I do not think that science, which is
never value-neutral, has sufficient legitimacy to define ‘life’, or to give it
a ‘universal name’.
Women in the WLM were aware of these arguments as well, and
their standpoint on abortion intentionally avoided defining in order to
accept and explore ambiguous dynamism; the sentence, ‘let’s not ratio-
nalise life, let’s not rationalise pain’ was often repeated within the
movement in the 1970s.
Secondly, by choosing not to view abortion as a question of conflict
between woman and foetus, the movement also deconstructed a num-
ber of dualisms contained within the abortion debate, such as: a foetus
– a woman, act of giving birth – abortion. What was suggested here was
the idea that one was trying to include the other, instead of one in con-
flict with and trying to dominate the other. As will be discussed in the
following section, some within the women’s movement believed that
the term ‘right’ should be used more freely, without questioning the act
of abortion, the issue of discrimination against disability internalised
within women, or the complicated matter of selectively aborting a foe-
tus with an anomaly. However, the decision not to rationalise the pain
of abortion, and to question the meaning of ‘rights’ is consistently pre-
sent in the arguments made in later periods, forming a current in the
development of Japanese women’s reproductive health movements as
well as in the disabled people’s movement. It can thus be said that this
philosophy represents the core of the philosophy of the Japanese wo-
men’s reproductive health movement up till today.
Debate inside the Women’s Liberation Movement about the
concept of an individual political ‘right’
Because the concept of a ‘right’ in a conventional sense does not imply
these inclusive, relational ideas, the WLM expressed these ideas by giv-
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ing rather redundant explanations and arguments, which were not ne-
cessarily practical or strategic within the movement debate. Given the
ambivalent nature of abortion (women should have access to abortion,
despite the fact that they don’t like the experience), those in the WLM
refused to rationalise experiences of abortion, and instead mapped out
the co-existence of two apparent contradictions. Although the rhetoric
produced important insights about abortion, the rhetoric itself was too
fragile to attract wide support. For example, ‘think about why women
decide to have an abortion’ contains two messages. One is oriented to
women critically: ‘know that you are killing a life’; the other is to society:
‘women are made to abort. Know that you are involved.’ The former cri-
tical message to women was difficult for women in general to share, in
a social climate where experiences of abortion were seldom shared, be-
cause of abortion’s highly personal nature and the negative values at-
tached to abortion, such as promiscuity, irresponsibility, and the loss of
motherhood. The message from women in the movement, such as ‘en-
during the sense of fear and severity flowing from the need to make a
choice with regard to our own lives’, and also their self-critical attitude,
were too complicated and indirect to be easily communicated to and ac-
cepted by women in general.
The other demand, that ‘social surroundings must change to support
women’s giving birth to and rearing, children’, could sound as if wo-
men were merely complaining about social conditions. The coexistence
of these two apparently contradictory propositions also made it even
more difficult for the message to be widely accepted by women in gen-
eral.
Thus, because of the complexity of the structure of the argumenta-
tion, there were also women in the movement who thought that ‘right’
should be used in the abortion debate, in spite of other people’s criti-
cisms of the term. What were some of the main arguments in support
of the usage of ‘right’ in the abortion debate?
1. ‘I think that abortion is a woman’s right, given the situation
that there are no perfect contraceptives’
We demand a society where ‘we can give birth, where we want to
give birth,’ is too abstract for me. ‘Abortion is a woman’s right’
is much more concrete. When there is an attempt by the govern-
ment to limit women’s access to abortion, it is clearer and more
concrete to say, ‘abortion is a woman’s right’. In society, both
when we do not want to give birth and when we do want to give
birth, unwanted pregnancies happen, and therefore, abortion can
become necessary. To claim abortion as a right does not mean to
affirm or accept the situation where we cannot give birth. There
are only two alternatives, namely, either to give birth or not to
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give birth, and when we cannot give birth, the only alternative is
abortion.
Abortion is the last resort for many women. Women do not really
want to be on the operating table to have an abortion. Sexuality
is not only for reproduction, and therefore a woman does not ne-
cessarily have to give birth because she has become pregnant.
This is not an issue in which another woman, or the state,
should intervene. [...] Women have mixed feelings about
abortion, and abortion is a decision as a result of all of those feel-
ings (Anonymous, in the column of readers’ opinion, in Onna-ta-
chi-kara-onna-tachi-e (From women to women), June/July 1973:
13-14).
This statement points out the complexity and ambiguity of the argu-
ment, ‘we demand a society where we can give birth; we want to give
birth.’ It also tries to clarify the claim that requests for access to abor-
tion are oriented towards the powerful.
2. ‘On the confusion about the right to abortion’
If some inside the movement say, ‘you say that you oppose the
revision of the Eugenic Protection Law, but do you know that the
act of abortion is a crime?’, then we absolutely have to fight
against these people. It seems that people who display an allergic
attitude towards the term ‘right’ do not understand the origins of
the term ‘right.’ [...] There is no fixed definition of ‘right’, but
‘right’ is used according to each unique situation. Now, we la-
bourers use ‘right’ in protesting against the state authority and
bourgeoisie. [...] What is most important, facing us now, is the
fact that there is an attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law.
Are we to be for or against this fact? If we are against, then what
do we think about it? Problems should be defined absolutely
clearly. To mix up personal questions and the fight against state
authority confuses the essence of the problem. We do not let the
state intervene in our lives by telling us to give birth or not to
give birth. This means a ‘right to abortion’. To start the argument
by asking if abortion is ethically right or wrong is itself confus-
ing. Therefore, we absolutely require the abolition of the abortion
articles in the Criminal Code.
We should not develop our argument in the framework of the is-
sue of whether abortion is ethically problematic or not. The point
is that we are against the state regulating or punishing women
who want to have, or who cannot avoid having, an abortion. This
is a very simple fact taken for granted by women of the working
class. If there is still an argument, we’ll add one more comment:
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The life of those who are already alive is more important than
that of a foetus (Fujin tsûshin henshû iinkai, reprinted in Mizo-
guchi, Saeki & Miki op cit 1992: 377-378).
This argument was made by women with a background in the labour
union movement. Hence the idea is to liberate working class women,
in particular, from exploitation by the state, by stating that the concept
of a ‘right’ is oriented against the state laws that regulate women’s deci-
sion-making. In other words, this statement is a call not to argue the is-
sue of abortion in a broad sense, but instead to focus on the relation-
ship between the state and women.
3. ‘“Abortion is a woman’s right” is not discrimination against
disabled people!’
There are arguments from disabled people. [...] However, what
does it mean to women, in the current social situation, to say, ‘I
will give birth even if the foetus is deformed’? It is another death
sentence for women. It is evident that nurturing children is im-
posed on women (although not only in the case of giving birth to
a disabled child), and women are being killed by this fact. There-
fore, the choice between giving or not giving birth to a disabled
child is the question between death or living for a woman. [...]
To urge women to give birth to a disabled child, in the current
social situation, is due to the egoism of people with disabilities.
At the same time, for a woman to say that she will not give birth
because the foetus is deformed is also the woman’s egoism,
which she cannot compromise for her own survival. So this issue
is a conflict between the two egos at the ultimate level. It is just
an obstacle for the movement to argue that abortion is not wo-
men’s right. Whether the foetus be disabled or not, it is up to
women to decide whether to give birth or not to give birth. We
clearly state this point. The problems for disabled people, or the
problems of a society where we cannot raise disabled children,
are issues of social welfare and social reform. Therefore, the wo-
men’s movement requesting women’s right to abortion must not
conflict with the disabled people’s movement (Chûpiren, Neo lib,
No. 28, August 1973, reprinted in Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki, ibid
1992: 247-248).
This was proposed by Chûzetsukinshihô-ni-hantaishi-pill-kaikin-o-yô-
kyû-suru-josei-kaihô-rengô, or ‘the Women’s Liberation League to op-
pose the law to prohibit abortion and to demand lifting the ban on the
contraceptive pill’ (Chûpiren is the abbreviation used in Japan). This ar-
gument clearly defines a disability as an issue of welfare, and abortion
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as an issue of women. In other words, Chûpiren argues that, if a wo-
man aborts a deformed foetus because of the disability, it is for the wel-
fare of the woman, and she is not to be blamed for her ethical decision.
This argument partially underlies the statement, ‘we demand a society
where we can give birth, and we want to give birth.’ But the crucial dif-
ference is that it does not raise questions about the meaning of abortion
or women’s subjectivity.
Some women were attracted to this argument by Chuˆpiren. The main
reason is the clarity of the argument. As mentioned, the co-existence of
self-criticism and protesting against the state was not easy for an indivi-
dual woman to maintain. Further, the act of self-criticism, to confront
internalised discrimination, is also a difficult process for a woman and
for any person. Rather, for an individual woman, it is more clear-cut to
declare that abortion is a woman’s right, separating the issue of discri-
mination from the innate value of an individual. Eventually Chuˆpiren
split from the other groups of the Women’s Liberation Movement, and
formed Neo-lib. A difference of opinion about the right to abortion was
one of the reasons, but the immediate reason for its separation lay in
other ethical matters. Misako Enoki, the leader of Chuˆpiren, distributed
a brochure with her own opinion about the contraceptive pill in the
name of the WLM without consulting the other members.27 Soon after
the split, women who had joined Chuˆpiren left the group, disagreeing
with the way Enoki had managed the group. This group eventually
disbanded.
In the Women’s Liberation Movement, except for the separation of
Chuˆpiren, no further splits or polarisations occurred that destroyed the
women’s unity. One woman in the movement, Yôko Akiyama, recalls
that there was enough trust among members to allow for disagreement
and discussions.28 Akiyama also states that it is more accurate to say
that struggles around the pros and cons of using a rights-based argu-
ment in the abortion debate were inherent to each individual woman
and to the movement as a whole, rather than there being a polarisation
which created conflicts between the different opinions about the con-
cept of ‘rights’ within the women’s movement (Akiyama 1993: 123-124).
On a personal level, everyone within the women’s movement was, to
some extent, experiencing a dilemma about whether to use the term
‘right’ or not. Differences in opinions were based on how to express
this in a public, political debate.
All in all, the argument that justified abortion by separating it from
the issue of disability and internalised discrimination did not find fa-
vour with a majority of women in the movement. A reluctance to use
the concept of rights was shared by most of the women in the move-
ment. As Tanaka’s ‘let’s not rationalise the pain of abortion by making
it an issue of ‘‘right’’’ statement shows, the use of the term ‘right’ in
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abortion debates reduced the experience of abortion to a legal entitle-
ment. Instead, women wanted to highlight issues critically relevant to
the experience of abortion, such as a foetus, the social system, gender
power relationships, the meaning of the act of giving birth, and the im-
plications of the selective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly. The
rhetoric of ‘a woman’s right to abortion’ did not create space for these
questions because it is focused on ‘women’ as the practitioners of
rights, ‘legal opportunity’ as accessibility to abortion, and ‘abortion’ as
the act of not giving birth. Hence the refusal to use the term ‘right’
came from the sincere desire to highlight the dilemmas connected to
abortion, to face up to them, and to reconcile these concerns with those
of the disabled people’s movement.
Because of obstinate opposition from groups of women and disabled
people as well as from medical associations, the Ministry could not help
but withdraw the proposition to revise the Eugenic Protection Law. The
movements’ activities were successful in this respect, but some crucial
questions about the abortion debate remained. The arguments made in
this period continued to be discussed by the women’s movements of la-
ter periods.
Women’s right to abortion was criticised by both disabled people and
the anti-abortion camp in terms of women’s egoism – this implied that
women lacked consideration for others, pursuing their interests at the
cost of others or the life of a foetus. What theoretical characteristics of
the concept of an individual political ‘right’ invited such an image in
abortion debates? And what characteristics can be deduced from these
debates about the term? The next chapter considers the genealogy of
these problems surrounding the notion of a ‘right’ in order to analyse
the 1970s Japanese abortion debate.
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3 On women’s selfishness and
the right to abortion
Women’s claim that they had a right to abortion was called ‘women’s
selfishness’ by opponents of the Women’s Liberation Movement (the
WLM) in Japan in the 1970s. According to these opponents, this is be-
cause the term ‘right’ eliminates the social context in which the deci-
sion-making to have an abortion takes place, such as women’s partners,
foetuses, and disabled people. The idea of ‘elimination’ sometimes also
carries the connotation of ‘breaking harmony in human relationships’
and ‘aggression,’ which was also part of the vocabulary used by oppo-
nents of the WLM.
This chapter considers why the concept of ‘rights’ implies these ideas,
and what is problematic about the implied ideas. In order to show the
characteristics of the concept of ‘rights’ the genealogy of rights in Wes-
tern political history will be traced, because a ‘right’ as the term is used
in the contemporary world, has its origin in the Western political tradi-
tion. Also considered is how the term ‘right’ was introduced into Japan
in the 19th century, and how it was used in Japanese political debates
after it was introduced. The link with indigenous Japanese political/phi-
losophical thought will also be considered.
After these theoretical considerations, this chapter will examine why
women’s right to abortion was deemed to be ‘women’s selfishness’ in
the context of the Japanese abortion debates, and where the common
reluctance to use the concept of rights within the WLM originated.
Genealogy of the concept of rights
Put most simply, we generally associate the concept of rights with the
concept of ‘entitlement to take a certain action’. Actually, the first ap-
pearance of the concept of rights was in the Magna Carta in England on
15 June 1215.1 The Religious Reformation in 16th century Europe was
also one of the origins of the concept of ‘individual rights’, in that the
Reformation was based on the trust in an individual’s conscience,
which ought not to be forced by any religious authority.2
Here the genealogy of ‘rights’ is dealt with as a political question of
‘who authorises whom to do what’ – a question of power in society.
Since the most common style of institution authorised to entitle rights
in many societies is the ‘state’, it is proper to start there, tracing the
genealogy of rights, and considering the relationship between the state
and its citizens.
Defining rights in this way, today’s meaning of rights can be traced
back to the theories of innate individual rights set out by Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) in England. In earlier
medieval society, before Hobbes’s time, a man was bound by ties asso-
ciated with his status, and by duties prescribed for him by the church.
Tradition was the main form of social control. But with the rise of social
mobility that accompanied the rise of individualism and capitalism,
men shook off the ties of their guilds and local communities. England
was then poised precariously on the brink of anarchy and civil disorder.
Being sceptical about the powerful, including the church, Hobbes
viewed the life of individuals as a restless competition destined to lead
to bellum omnium contra omnes, or the war of all against all. Given these
conditions, in his work Hobbes tried to order the relationship between
the state and individuals as well as among individuals themselves.
To protect natural men from continual fear and danger of death in
the state of nature, he argued that every man has an innate natural right
not to be violated in his life, and this he defined as the ‘right to life’.
Then, in order to avoid war, natural law must be practised as the princi-
ple of peace, which can be enacted only by the use of the reason of each
individual.
Yet Hobbes considered that even natural law was not sufficient to pro-
tect one’s right to life. For the law to function properly, there ought to be
a public authority to punish those who violate others’ natural rights. A
state is thus established according to a covenant of the people. The cove-
nant includes nomination of the sovereign, authorised by the covenant,
and the state is represented by the sovereign. According to Hobbes, the
sovereign is entitled to absolute authority without citizens’ right to re-
sist, so that the state can function to prevent the state of nature.
Locke argued natural rights somewhat differently. His state of nature
is more peaceful than that of Hobbes, because if each man uses reason,
everybody can come to acknowledge natural law, namely the principle
not to violate other people’s right to live. But because there will always
be some people who cannot use reason to refrain from violating others,
there is always a chance of reverting to the natural state of the war of all
against all. In order to avoid war, a contract is to be enacted by indivi-
duals to establish a government, which is then based on trust from the
individuals. The government is thus entitled to political authority. Its
authority is for the purpose of protecting the natural rights of indivi-
duals, that is, ‘life, freedom, and property’. According to Locke, but un-
like Hobbes, people are entitled to revolt (Uchida et al. 1993: 36-37).
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For both Hobbes and Locke, the only way to prevent the limitless war
of all against all is the use of reason by each individual. What was not
considered to be part of reason, such as men’s conscience and tradi-
tional ties, was subordinated to reason. The wisdom to avoid war is the
product of reason, which alone acknowledges ‘general, eternal, and im-
mutable truths’ (Edwards 1967, 3, 4: 33). This optimistic universal idea
stems from the absolute belief in natural science; both Hobbes and
Locke believed that civil society could be reconstructed on naturalistic
principles.3 The nature or essence of men was identified tout court (to-
tally) with the possession of reason, and natural law was held to be
whatever is found acceptable by recta ratio or sana ratio. At this stage,
the logical and epistemological aspects of the theory come together to-
tally – natural law was what reason discovers, and natural law was dis-
covered by reason.4
Thus, in the 17th and 18th centuries, the older tradition of natural
law based on Christianity gave way to notions of ‘an Englishman’s
birthright’ or, even more personal and universal, ‘natural rights’. Man’s
nature, as well as Christian natural law, was distrusted by political thin-
kers, but reason came to the fore as the concept to realise social order,
as is symbolised by Hugo Grotius’s saying, ‘ratio is given by God, but
ratio is possible to access without God’ (Hamabayashi 1999: 18).
Coupled with the Protestant Reformation and the emergence of the
concept of individual religious freedom, the idea of innate natural rights
was an instrument to liberate individuals from conservative authorities.
The ideas of Hobbes and Locke developed in this context. After them,
arguments about critical, conscious individual citizens and an ideal de-
mocratic form of governance were developed further by other promi-
nent thinkers in the West. However, it should be noted that in Hobbe-
sian and Lockean political theory, individuals, who are holders of natur-
al innate rights, are assumed to be competitive and conflicting
individuals. One should be mindful to limit one’s pursuit of interests,
otherwise the interests will violate another’s right to pursue his inter-
ests; individual holders of rights are destined to conflict with each other
if a right is practiced excessively.
Hobbes discussed the importance of ‘harmony,’ but he based this on
the idea of ‘interest and harm’, in other words, one should not practise
rights excessively, in order to protect the self. He regarded ‘interest and
harm’ as the essential factors in linking individuals (Hobbes 1946: 12,
146).
Locke had a more optimistic view of human nature. In the second vo-
lume of his Second Treatise of Government he recommended that
‘men should support others, and men can do so by order of reason’
(Locke, 1995: 12-13). However, this idea was also based upon the fear
that a man’s natural right would be infringed upon by others.
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This way of conceiving relations among individuals is due to the so-
cial situation of the time – chaos and fear – and worry about the scarcity
of natural resources in northwestern Europe.5 Classical liberalist
thought, which is traced back to Hobbes and Locke, was also concerned
about a lack of natural resources, and how to secure these without lag-
ging behind others in the competition. Thus, the function of the politi-
cal order was to satisfy particular claims by protecting each man from
his peers (Wolin 1960: 274). Coupled with the emergence of natural
science in this period, nature became the object ‘to be conquered by
men for their survival’.6
Civil revolutions and the declaration of men’s rights
Natural rights, natural law, and social contract theories were inherited
by thinkers in France, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and
by Thomas Paine (1737-1809) in England and the United States, where
civil revolutions were to occur. Rights was the key term and concept in
the United States’ Declaration of Independence and in the French De-
claration of the Rights of Man.7
While the United States’ Declaration of Independence was consider-
ably influenced by Locke’s thought, the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man owes much to the philosophy of Rousseau.
Rousseau argues that ‘a particularly serious feature of modern society
is the prevalence of an unnatural inequality, based on power and wealth’
(Edwards 1967, 7, 8: 219). According to him, in ‘nature’, the stage be-
fore society, men were happy because a man
knew how to live in accordance with his own innate needs; living
in limited interactions and leading an isolated existence in the
forests, the savage could satisfy his basic appetite for food and
sex without difficulty, untouched by modern man’s anxiety (ibid).
The nature of the ‘natural man’ in the state of nature was also good, ac-
cording to Rousseau. However, when men started interacting on a lar-
ger scale than ‘family’ or ‘kinship’, and when ‘men started working to-
gether and asking others for help’, property was introduced, and even-
tually, ‘social disorder and inequality emerged’.8 Now, at that stage of
society, men’s nature was also wicked. As Rousseau criticised ‘civilisa-
tion’, in his early works he regarded the ‘state’ as a vicious mechanism
to make social inequality permanent through the institution of laws and
political organisations (Edwards op. cit.: 220; see also the Discours sur
l’origine de l’ine´galite´). The ‘state’, according to him, was ‘the large mon-
archies of Europe, which had travelled furthest on the road to perdition’
(Edwards ibid.).
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However, in Rousseau’s later works, realising that a man, having
once left the primitive state, could never return to it, he discusses the
way to use the ‘state’ mechanism primarily to protect men’s rights to
life, freedom, and property. In his social contract theory, he uses the
concept of ‘general will’ as ‘a real force, superior to the action of any
particular will’ (ibid: 222). In Rousseau’s social contract theory, a right
to revolt is not admitted, because ‘the general will is always directed to-
ward the general good’ (ibid). True freedom, according to him, is to
obey a law that a man has prescribed for himself. Education is impor-
tant for developing a citizen who can prioritise the general will or na-
tional interest above one individual’s interest; the importance of sociali-
sation for him is different from that of social co-existence.
Rousseau’s political theory is sometimes described as the forerunner
of totalitarianism. Following the French Revolution, recalling the reign
of terror by Robespierre (1758-1794) who self-identified as a ‘disciple’ of
Rousseau, Rousseau’s theory might have had an influence to drive poli-
tics to what is now called totalitarianism. However, rather than arguing
whether Rousseau’s theory is either democratic or totalitarian, it would
be more important to acknowledge the fact that this contradiction in
Rousseau’s theory is exactly what we are confronted with today in the
concept and practice of ‘democracy’. Questions such as ‘does the major-
ity vote always bring about the best decision for all the members of the
community’ or ‘where does the legitimacy come from to force members
to follow the decision’ are still being posed and considered to this day.
In this sense, Rousseau’s theory anticipated the fundamental problems
that ‘democracy’ would confront in the future.
In terms of ‘rights’, Rousseau in his earlier works used the concept
as an individual’s shield against the intervention of the state. But in his
social contract theories (actually, Du Contrat Social is subtitled Principes
du droit politique), a ‘right’ is used rather to secure freedom from those
who disturb the sovereignty of the state, because ‘the general will’ of
the state must represent ‘the general interest’ of each citizen. Law, as
the act of the general will and the expression of sovereignty in his theo-
ry, is of vital importance, as the establishment of sound laws can deter-
mine the whole destiny of the state.
Thus, a ‘right,’ according to Rousseau, emerges from state law, and
its practice is primarily for the purpose of protecting an individual from
those who break the state’s order by not abiding by ‘the general will’.
This idea of his is also well expressed in the 1789 French Declaration of
the Rights of Man, that ‘socially different treatment is possible only
when it is based on the common interest’ (Hamabayashi, op. cit.).
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Civil revolutions and characteristics of the issue of rights
The Declaration of Independence in the United States and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man are noteworthy in Western political
history because of their clear expression of the equality and liberty of ci-
tizens to the monarchy. Until then, authority belonged to a handful of
the privileged in a hereditary, social class system.9 Demands for social
fairness are based on the concept of men’s natural rights, inherent in
all men, and these were not to be violated by any authority.
As well as being a shield to protect oneself from others’ attack, rights
were seen by Western thinkers in the 18th century as instruments to
protest and request the improvement of living conditions of a person;
revolutions occur when there is dissatisfaction with living conditions
because of an ‘unfair’ system. Hence, rights are the concept and tools
to be used by those who are, or are expected to be, confronted by a vio-
lation, exploitation, or infringement of what they inherently hold. The
concept under which the oppressor can legitimately take certain actions
towards the oppressed is by ‘authority’, not due to rights. Thus, rights
emerge from a person, and are used to demand fair treatment.
Therefore I believe that it can be said that the grounds to justify the
claim for fair treatment in terms of rights are explained with the con-
cepts of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and ‘fraternity’ (liberte´, e´galite´, and fraternite´).
These are sub-concepts of rights. When there is a statement that ‘some-
body has a right to make a claim’ the right is assumed to be based upon
‘equality’ between those who already enjoy the privilege and those who
are not. Hence, the practice of rights also has to do with how society va-
lues people with different backgrounds. For instance, a huge number of
Africans were traded into North America for agricultural labour in the
18th century as commodities, but the immorality of this activity was
hardly discussed in terms of rights.10 This shows that African people
were not entitled to the same rights because they were devalued in rela-
tion to white people. Africans and whites were not viewed as equal; they
were not brothers. Hence, if the societal norm about who is equal
changes, the range of entitlement to rights also changes. So, ‘liberty’
comes to the fore, being justified by equality among brothers, the view
that somebody ought to be free instead of being oppressed by the op-
pressor, because entitlement to rights requires, as a prerequisite, being
innately equal to others who enjoy the rights. The feminist implication
of ‘brothers’ or ‘fraternity’ in conventional political theories will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter.
It also has to be noted that because the hereditary social class system
and the monarchy were abolished under the civil revolutions in the
West, constitutionalism has come to the fore as the main principle of
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state governance and of rules amongst citizens. Rights have become a
highly legal concept, as rights are elaborated by laws.
English utilitarianism
In England, after the Glorious Revolution of 1688,11 enthusiasm for
contractual arguments became unpopular amongst intellectuals, and
therefore utilitarian arguments replaced them, developed mainly by Jer-
emy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Utilitarian-
ism can generally be described as the doctrine that views the rightness
or wrongness of actions as determined by the goodness or wrongness
of their consequences. This general definition can be refined in differ-
ent ways, leading to various types of utilitarianism.12 Utilitarianism re-
acted to the fictitious and hypothetical nature of the social contract. In-
stead, in utilitarianism the criterion of good governance is thought to
be the sum of goodness in society. While Bentham argued the ‘good so-
ciety’ in terms of the sum of hedonistic pleasure of social citizens, Mill
argued in terms of spiritual satisfaction. Bentham argued that nature
gave men two masters, ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’, and that an individual
should act in pursuit of ‘pleasure’. ‘The best society,’ according to him,
has ‘the greatest happiness’, which is the sum of all individual citizens’
pleasure calculated by a strict scientific method. Bentham considered
‘reason’ and ‘law’ to be essential for individuals to maximise their plea-
sure in society. Mill discussed ‘pleasure’ in terms of social and political
satisfaction, defining these as a number of social freedoms, such as
freedom of speech, thought, and publication, and as the necessary con-
ditions for enhancing the sum of the satisfaction of members of society
(Uchida et al. 1993: 40-41; Edwards 1967, 1: 280-285; 5: 314-323).
The emergence of utilitarian thoughts was also strengthened by fears
regarding the scarcity of natural resources in Northwest Europe, which
saw its peak during the 18th and 19th centuries, fuelled in part by the
increasing population.13 Bentham stated that the desire to acquire natur-
al resources is equal to the desire to maintain life. ‘Pleasure’ for him
was to be able to be economically and politically active without interven-
tion from others, because competition for resources was, according to
him, the biggest source of ‘pain’. Hence, nobody should intervene in
another’s decision-making, because ‘an individual self best knows what
he wants’ and ‘the smaller the state is, the better it is for the political,
economic activities of individuals’ (Wolin 1960: 331; Wolin, 1975, 4:
104). A ‘strong, autonomous, and rational individual self’ and ‘rights’
were more clearly pronounced in the 18th and 19th centuries than they
had been in the previous period.
Fear of limited resources was also expressed by Mill. On nature, he
wrote:
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… Her powers are often towards man in the position of enemies,
from whom he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he
can for his own use… Nature impales men, breaks them as if on
the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them
to death… and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve,
such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never sur-
passed (Wolin 1960: 317)14
This statement is an expression of anxiety created by the conflict be-
tween ‘the belief that moral and intellectual progress depended upon
unceasing material advance’ (Wolin 1960: 321) and the fact that natural
resources are limited. Small wonder that by the middle of the 19th cen-
tury Mill counselled Englishmen and Americans ‘to moderate the ar-
dour of their devotion to the pursuit of wealth’ (ibid: 325). This recom-
mendation came about because he believed that with a scarcity of natur-
al resources, too many people in society would fail to attain ‘pleasure’
both intellectually and morally, resulting in endless competition among
people.
Today’s ideas about the ‘right to self-determination’ and ‘informed
consent,’ usually understood in terms of the principle of ‘non-interven-
tion’, contain this philosophy of utilitarianism to a considerable degree.
Position of women in rights theories
Views on the state of nature and the stories of the social contract in the
18th and 19th century all suggest that politics are a stage created by a
contract entered into by rational decision, designed to ensure protection
and safety for men from the state of nature. However, neither in rights
theories, nor in utilitarianism, were women mentioned in connection
to the entitlement to rights.
In Hobbes’s state of nature, both sexes are pictured as naturally free
and equal ‘individuals’ that have rights. This is partly because his view
of the state of nature was extremely individualistic and was one in
which any ascriptive conditions, for example, male or female, did not
matter. However, women are given only ‘mother’s rights’, that is, the
right to have dominion over her child. Also mentioned is that the child
ought to obey her, but not the father. About Hobbes’s ‘mother’s right’
in the state of nature, political theorist Pateman argues:
Hobbes insists that all examples of political right are conven-
tional and that, in the state of nature, political right is maternal
not paternal. An infant, necessarily, has two parents (‘as to the
generation, God hath ordained to man a helper’), but both par-
ents cannot have dominion over the child because no one can
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obey two masters. In the natural condition the mother, not the
father, has political right over child; ‘every woman that bears chil-
dren, becomes both a mother and a lord.’ At birth, the infant is
in the mother’s power. She makes the decision whether to ex-
pose or to nourish the child. If she decides to ‘breed him,’ the
condition on which she does so is that ‘being grown to full age
he becomes not her enemy’; that is to say, the infant must con-
tract to obey her (Pateman 1988: 44). 15
Another reason for both sexes being free and equal, is that in Hobbes’s
state of nature individuals are not considered to be rational beings, so
that men as well as women are devoid of reason. In Locke’s and Rous-
seau’s theories, women are totally excluded from the concept of ‘indivi-
dual’, even in the state of nature. As mentioned, according to any of
these thinkers, the social contract is a device to impose order on the
state of nature, and to create a society.
Pateman argues, in her book entitled The Sexual Contract, that con-
tract theories contain two elements: the social contract and the sexual
(or marriage) contract. She argues that the original contract is a patriar-
chal social order, and in entering the social contract, men simulta-
neously ensure access to women, and promise not to violate another
man’s right to access to his woman (Pateman 1988). This is because a
woman is nature, just like other natural resources, and therefore is an
object for men to subdue. The sexual contract was necessary for men to
maintain social order, because women were lacking in self-control. This
is why families were usually managed by men, as was the state. To cite
Pateman,
Hobbes assumes that, in civil society, the subjection of women
to men is secured through a contract; not an enforced ‘contract’
this time, but a marriage contract. Men have no need forcibly to
overpower women when the civil law upholds their patriarchal
political right through the marriage contract. Hobbes states that
in civil society the husband has dominion ‘because for the most
part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the
mothers of the families’ (1988: 48).16
Not only Hobbes, but also political thinkers following him, basically
share the same view of women as having less self-control than men.
Locke argued that
Subjection [wives] should ordinarily be in to their Husbands,
because generally the Laws of mankind and customs of Nations
have ordered it so; and there is, I grant, a Foundation in Nature
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for it. The foundation in nature meant by him is that the hus-
band is ‘the abler and the stronger’ (cited in Pateman 1988:
52-53).
Rousseau also argues that civil order depends on the right of husbands
over their wives, which, he argues, arises from nature, from the very
different natural attributes of the sexes (Pateman: 53-54). Rousseau has
much more to say than the other classic social contract theorists about
what it is in women’s natures that necessitates that they must be ex-
cluded from civil life (ibid). He elaborates at some length on the rea-
sons why women ‘never cease to be subjected either to a man or to the
judgments of men, and why a husband must be a ‘master for the whole
life’.17
In Hobbes, the product of reason, the state, is likened to ‘a man’s
body’ called Leviathan:
By art is created that great Leviathan called a commonwealth, or
state, in Latin civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of
greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protec-
tion and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is
an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the
magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artifi-
cial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat
of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform
his duty, are the nerves that do the same in the body natural; and
wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength;
salus populi, the people's safety, its business; counsellors, by whom
all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the
memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord,
health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly the pacts and
covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first
made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or let us make
man, pronounced by God in the creation (1968: 81-82).
Hobbes claimed that the motivation behind the creation of the artificial
man was to protect and defend natural men from continual fear and
danger of violent death in the state of nature. Natural men become
civilised men by the use of reason, and natural condition becomes so-
ciety. Yet, in the absence of a female Leviathan, natural women are not
only unprotected or undefended, but in fact women themselves remain
nature. Women are necessary to the functioning of cultural life, and
they are the very grounded, which makes cultural life possible; because
of women’s nature, men need to use reason to maintain the order of
society.
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I would conclude therefore, that in the civil revolutions of the 18th cen-
tury, women were also excluded from the principle of liberty, equality,
and fraternity. While mothers and daughters were born to be subjects
to fathers, father and son became subject to the same higher authority
(liberty and equality), and hence they become ‘brothers’ (fraternity).18
Attempts by women in the US and in Western Europe to take advan-
tage of the considerable social unrest in the 18th century were often
quashed. For example, one of the main petitions put before the revolu-
tionary government in Paris between 1792 and 1794 demanded that wo-
men be given ‘a voice’ in the newly formed politics. This was rejected:
If we take account of the fact that the political education of men
is still at its very beginnings, that all the principles are not yet de-
veloped, and that we still stammer over the word ‘liberty’, then
how much less enlightened are women, whose moral education
has been practically non-existent. Their presence in the socie´te´ po-
pulaire, then, would give an active part in government to persons
exposed to error and seduction even more than are men. And let
us add that women, by their constitution, are open to exaltation
which could be ominous in public life. The interests of the state
would soon be sacrificed to all the kinds of disruption and disor-
der that hysteria can produce (cited in Gatens 1996: 54).
Women were the object of regulation, but not part of political manage-
ment. This division between nature and culture, between the reproduc-
tion of mere biological life as compared to the production and regula-
tion of social life, is reflected in the distinction between the private and
the public spheres, and between the family and the state.
The way to conceive women’s ontology explains the conditions for a
practitioner of rights. Someone who practises rights must be a rational,
independent self, knowing what the best is for the self, being able to
weigh cost and benefit: the self must be enlightened. Women, being irra-
tional and hysterical, remain in the state of nature, and are not entitled
to practise rights. ‘Rights’ in their origins, were a masculine invention
for masculine politics. Also, a practitioner of civil rights, the ‘indivi-
dual’, was defined to be a masculine being, excluding women.
The first women’s rights movement in northwestern Europe emerged
in the latter part of the 19th century. Today, the range of applications of
‘rights’ has been broadened, for example to include ethnic minority
groups, various religious groups, and others. What is to be deduced
here is that the history of ‘rights’ is thus about incessant attempts to
broaden the range of involvement to more varieties of ‘self’ as the prac-
titioners of ‘rights’. A ‘right’ is a concept about which there has always
been the question ‘who is entitled to practice it?’ According to this,
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there is a dichotomous idea about ‘right and duty’, that ‘only those who
perform certain duties are entitled to enjoy rights’. Rights are thus actu-
ally not unconditionally practised, and there are always those who feel
excluded from their application.
Characteristics of the concept of ‘rights’ as deduced from its genealogy
So far, a characteristic of the concept of ‘rights’ deduced from its gen-
ealogy is that ‘rights’ are an instrument to liberate human beings from
any authoritative power. This, on the one hand, helps to establish a criti-
cal and conscious citizen, which is important for building a democratic
society. ‘Rights’ is also a concept used by those who are, or are expected
to be, in an oppressed situation, and is a tool for requesting better treat-
ment because of a belief that he/she deserves it, because of innate nat-
ural rights.
However, on the other hand, practising and applying, or implementa-
tion of rights in the real world still runs into many problems in differ-
ent areas of the world. For example, under the concept of natural rights,
individuals tend to be regarded as being in competition with each other.
This way of conceiving human relations is not always shared by all cul-
tures around the world. The idea of the ‘strong and autonomous indivi-
dual self’ was developed during the 18th and 19th centuries under Eng-
lish utilitarianism.
Another characteristic of ‘rights’ is that they are not unconditionally
applied to all, as is seen from the fact that the history of the concept of
‘rights’ has been the struggle to broaden the concept of ‘who is entitled
to practise rights’ (or, again, the question of who are the ‘brothers’).
Historically, those in non-Western areas were absent from rights dis-
course. There are still certain groups of people who enjoy fewer rights.
The concept, thus, implies the exclusion of certain groups of people
from its practice, according to their particular qualities.
The idea of ‘human rights’ after the Second World War improved the
situation, in that ‘rights’ broadened the scope of applicability to more
groups of people in more areas of the world, because ‘human rights’ ex-
presses the notion that human beings, as humans, and regardless of any
particular condition, are assumed to be entitled to a particular benefit.19
Political philosophy in Japan before the concept of ‘rights’ was
introduced
During the Meiji Restoration (1866-1869),20 many Western political
philosophical theories were translated into Japanese and read by intel-
lectuals.21 The Western concept of rights was understood through read-
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ing those writings, and the concept was translated into a Japanese term,
kenri, composed of two Chinese characters, ken and ri.
Looking up the meaning of the term kenri in a dictionary, it is ex-
plained as an ‘entitlement to do or not to do something. An authority to
claim or enjoy a certain interest guaranteed by the law’ (Nishio et al.
1995: 350). Looking up each Chinese character, ken stands for ‘authority
to rule over others, entitlement to make a claim to others, and force’. Ri
stands for ‘usefulness, effect, convenience, interest, and benefit’ (ibid:
361, 1220-1221). Accordingly, rights can be translated into ‘entitled
authority to make a claim from others for one’s benefit guaranteed by
the law’. These meanings indeed represent the characteristics of rights
observed in its genealogy in the West.
However, defining rights as a concept to articulate the political and le-
gal relationship between the ruler and the ruled as well as amongst so-
ciety’s members, there actually was also a concept similar to ‘rights’ in
Japanese political philosophy prior to the Meiji period that came from
China. For this reason, ‘rights’, after being introduced in Japan from
the West, was not conceptualised or practised as it is/was in the West,
but merged with indigenous political philosophical ideas. In order to
understand the image of the practice of rights in Japan, political philo-
sophy prior to the Meiji period will be reviewed here.
Political philosophy in Japan prior to the Meiji period
During the Edo period (1600-1868), an instrument for ‘stable’ politics
was a rigid rank system. All people in Japan were divided into four social
ranks: the warrior, the farmer, the craftsman, and the merchant. These
ranks were hereditary. Farmers were the majority and they had to pay a
land tax, in the form of rice, to the warriors. During the 300-year Edo per-
iod, there were a number of riots by farmers, but the bakufu, or govern-
ment, suppressed them. One of the policies was not to give education
to farmers or to women so that they could not know, think, or criticise.
Given this social system as backdrop, a number of intellectuals
thought about the dignity of individuals and the ideal human relation-
ship, which are possible to observe in the theory of the relationship be-
tween the rulers and the ruled. In general, the theories were developed
around Ju-gaku (Confucianism),22 and also Shushi-gaku (the Zhu Xi or
Chu Hsi school),23 either using or criticising the ideas of Ju-gaku.
Characteristic of ideas on this issue from major thinkers of the Edo
period was that thoughts about relationships between the ruler and the
ruled were based on ethical and moral principles of how to treat other
human beings.24 Such emotional factors as sympathy, love, trust, and
appreciation were at the centre of these ideas (Joˆ, Ai, Koˆ, Shin and
On).25 Chinese and Japanese political philosophy talked about both the
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ruled and the ruler, focusing on morality as human beings and how to
satisfy the conditions of life of both the ruled and the ruler.
With the ideas of ethics and morality as a prerequisite, the equality of
all human beings (mainly men) was argued, and eventually most of the
thinkers in the Edo period criticised the rank system inherent to the
feudal and emperor systems. The equality of human beings and anti-
monarchism were discussed. Rulers owe their well-being to the farm-
ers, and therefore there is no reason for one to overpower the other, as
they are interdependent. Theories of equality were not based on the
concept of individuals as a natural antagonist or egoist. Political ethics
were focused on how to enhance the morally good aspects of all human
beings, both rulers and ruled.
What was the position of women in Japanese indigenous political
philosophy? In political thought during the Edo period, ningen or hito
are used consistently, without specifically referring to men. Unlike
some Western European languages such as French, Italian, Spanish,
and English, in the Japanese language, ‘men’ does not represent univer-
sal human kind, but the words ningen and hito mean both a man and a
woman. Therefore, at a glance, the question of gender is not easily
manifest in reading the texts of Japanese political philosophy. However,
from some historical facts, it is certain that women were not considered
to be entitled to the same socio-economic opportunities as men. Accord-
ing to some educational writings for (upper-class) women during the
Edo period, for example, women were supposed to be obedient to men,
and this was a pre-condition for peace within a family.
Probably it should be put in this way: gender issues in the history of
conventional Japanese political philosophy have actually not yet been
sufficiently explored. Moreover, power relations between men and wo-
men in Japanese history have never been monolithic; it differs accord-
ing to historical periods as well as social classes. The Japanese anthro-
pologist Itsue Takamune argues that women’s subordination was
strengthened after the Muromachi period, when the warrior system and
household marriage system emerged in the 14th century. From the
Muromachi to the Edo and the Meiji periods, women were increasingly
subordinated. According to social classes, subordination of women was
more severe among higher social classes from the 8th century onwards,
while among farmers until the end of the Edo period, sexual and gen-
der division of labour was not strongly articulated. During the Edo peri-
od both male and female farmers, who made up 90 per cent of the en-
tire population, shared productive duties as well as domestic chores, in-
cluding care of children and the elderly. Neither male nor female
farmers had formal education. In the households of warriors, women
experienced more discrimination, both in terms of labour and educa-
tion (Takamune 1972a: chapters 3, 4 and 5). Given the fact that thinkers
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in the Edo period were from higher social classes, it is very likely that
their ideas included only men.
These ‘indigenous’ political philosophies were marginalised after the
Meiji period. One reason is that theories from the West were actively
imported into Japan, and what was from the West was valued exces-
sively as progressive. Another reason, which is more ideological, is that
in order to maintain its unity, the Meiji state based itself on the emper-
or system. Most of the political philosophers prior to the Meiji period,
however, had criticised the emperor system and/or the social rank sys-
tem. There was no room for these philosophies to survive under the
strengthened emperor system. Rather, theories from the West that as-
sume the existence of a central government fitted better with the Ja-
pan’s new political situation.
Introduction of Kenri, or ‘rights’ into Japan
During the Meiji period, Japanese thinkers of the day tried to develop
egalitarian thought based on individualism. The political thinkers’ goal
was to establish a ‘civilised’26 country with mature social citizens, and
therefore they all attacked the feudal system.
Yukichi Fukuzawa (1834-1901),27 Japan’s most prominent educator
and philosopher of the Enlightenment (Frühstück 2003: 18), was one of
the most influential thinkers in Japan who worked on ‘civilising’ the
country through his scholarly works on individualism. His arguments
range from Japan’s international position to women’s issues. Individual-
ism and egalitarianism were discussed in order to develop people’s con-
sciousness, which was bound to the social rank system during the Edo
period, limiting people in using their talents fully for social mobility.
The importance of self-respect, self-effort, and self-confidence for an in-
dividual, regardless of social class or background, was emphasised. Fu-
kuzawa thought that each individual’s self-dependence was the only way
to develop a civilisation in Japan. His major work, Gakumon-no-susume
(Encouragement of Learning; 1872) clearly displays this standpoint:
everyone has equal talents, which can be developed only by self-effort,
making it possible for individuals to achieve social ascendancy, breaking
the ceiling imposed by social conditions. Learning and spiritual inde-
pendence were to be encouraged, because ‘having capacities to think
and criticise eventually leads to the establishment of a subjective self
within an individual’ (Fukuzawa1872). ‘Innate right’ was a convenient
notion upon which to construct this logic, because it assures the value
and capability of each individual. ‘Right’ was translated by Fukuzawa into
kenri, the combination of the aforementioned two Chinese characters.
Enhancement of women’s position in society was also discussed by
Fukuzawa in the context of self-respect and self-dependence. As his goal
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was to civilise Japan, his theory on women’s well-being was for the pur-
pose of enhancing the quality of children as future citizens, since wo-
men are the bearers and mothers of these citizens.
Thus, self-dependence, self-confidence, and self-ascendance were the
crucial concepts in Japanese modernisation, and the modernisation pro-
cess in the late 19th century is called the ‘enlightenmentalism’ of Japan.
In promoting spiritual independence, thinkers such as Fukuzawa at-
tacked the feudalist tradition that had flourished during the Edo peri-
od.28 The philosophers’ abandonment of earlier indigenous political
theory, and overt attachment to Western philosophy, are due to their re-
jection of any thoughts linked to feudalism, such as Confucianism.
However, because of differences in backgrounds between the West and
Japan, it was not so that the concept of ‘rights’ was taken up in philoso-
phical thought in Japan in the same way as it had been in the West. It
was also understood in the light of indigenous philosophies from the
previous era (Nakamura 1999: 242).29
The practice of Kenri in the Popular Rights Movement
Successive reforms during the Meiji period changed people’s living con-
ditions drastically. Amongst those hardest hit by the Restoration were
the former samurai, or the warriors, now called the shizoku. Their sti-
pends as samurai were replaced by family stipends, they lost their for-
mer privileged social status, and many of them became unemployed.
In 1874, finding themselves outside the corridors of power, the for-
mer samurai began a campaign of criticism of the government. Taisuke
Itagaki (1837-1919) and Shôjirô Gotô (1838-1897), with the aid of intel-
lectuals from England, established the Aikoku-koˆtoˆ (Public Party of Patri-
ots), which presented a petition to the Diet that stressed the evils result-
ing from unchecked government power and the importance of the es-
tablishment of a popularly elected assembly. The petition was published
in the press and had a great effect upon public opinion, touching off
what was to become jiyuˆ-minken-undoˆ or the Popular Rights Movement.
This was the first political movement using the rhetoric of ‘rights’, or
kenri, in Japan.
Although the aim of the movement was limited to regaining the pri-
vileges of the samurai, it can be observed that the rhetoric of the move-
ment was consistent with their definition of rights, that is, ‘rights ap-
pear when there is an injustice’ and that ‘a right is an instrument to
make a claim, by the oppressed towards the oppressor, demanding bet-
ter treatment’.
With the Popular Rights Movement, women also started to become
politically active. These activities were the first women’s movement in
the modern history of Japan. Kita Kusunose (1836-1920), Eiko Fukuda
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(1865-1927), and Toshiko Kishida (1864-1901) were the most active in
this period, arguing for the equality of men and women, and criticising
women’s subordination in the light of the biological, physical, and psy-
chological differences between men and women (Kanô 1990: 61-62).
They went so far as to establish a women’s political party, called Joshi-
jiyuˆ-toˆ, or the Women’s Freedom Party. In September 1880, a women’s
political group was established in Kanda, Tokyo, where there were lec-
tures on equality between women and men. Everyday local women at-
tended the meetings. In 1882, Kishida gave lectures in Okayama prefec-
ture and Kagoshima prefecture. It was reported that the meetings were
well-attended by women. In 1883, the three women established the Wo-
men’s Freedom Party in Sendai. In 1884, they established Aikô Wo-
men’s Association in Kanagawa. Thus, their activity was not limited to
the capital city of Tokyo, but was widespread throughout the country.30
After the introduction of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, the Popular
Rights and women’s rights movements faded away. Under the Ie sys-
tem, women had been prohibited from engaging in any political activ-
ities and were confined to the household.
In the 1920s, the Taishô era saw a short period of democracy called
Taishoˆ-democracy. Civil movements, requesting political participation,
revived. As a result, universal male suffrage was achieved in 1925.31
There was also again a women’s movement that emerged in this peri-
od. Apart from the birth control movement, there was the famous
‘motherhood debate’ in 1918. The debate was between Akiko Yosano
(1878-1942), who promoted women’s consciousness throughout her
work, and Raichô Hiratsuka (1887-1971), who was the first woman in
the history of Japan to publicly champion women’s rights and highlight
the oppressive nature of the feudal social system for Japanese women.
(Takamune 1972b: 268). In the debate, Yosano criticised the demand
for the state’s financial support for pregnancy and delivery for women,
calling it ‘dependency’, while Hiratsuka requested the state’s support
for women, based on the recognition that motherhood is one of the
core functions of women. She referred to motherhood as a ‘taken-for-
granted right’. Hiratsuka’s view was based on a criticism of modernism
that
liberation of women is not only to free women from external op-
pression, giving them education, job opportunities, voting rights,
and independence from husbands; ... Instead, the purpose of wo-
men’s liberation is to establish a woman as a self, doing away
with a mere equality between men and women. The real libera-
tion of women is not to become like a man, but liberation as a
person being a woman (Kanô op. cit.: 63).
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What is noteworthy about this debate is that, in Hiratsuka’s criticism of
modernism, rights are being used for the first time, in a sense going
beyond political participation in a given social system, as a tool to attack
the modern masculine social values. This notion of equality between
men and women in the criticism of modernism was inherited by the
1970s Women’s Liberation Movement, which refused to aim only to se-
cure the same social opportunities for women that men enjoyed in the
current male-centred society.32 However, the term ‘right’ itself remained
strongly connected to liberalism.
After the short Taishoˆ-democracy, Japan entered the Shoˆwa emperor’s
military rule. Since the state police were given stronger powers to limit
any kind of freedom, the rights debate became silent and inactive. After
the Second World War, the new democratic constitution was adopted,
where sovereignty was vested with the people. Japan signed the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
The concept of ‘rights’ in Japan: Unsuccessful integration of the term ‘right’
Many Japanese people, since the term ‘right’ reached Japan up to the
present, both the general public and political scientists in particular, feel
that the tradition of Western political philosophy, including how rights
are practised, is aggressive and conflicted. This perception also includes
the belief that Western political philosophy is based on the assumption
of isolated individuals. This is felt not only in Japan, but in many other
non-Western regions as well (see introduction).
So far, the genealogy of the concept of ‘rights’ in Western political
philosophy shows that the aggressive connotations connected to the
concept of ‘rights’ come from the assumption that individuals are com-
peting against one another, primarily for natural resources. ‘Rights’ are
seen as a shield to protect the individual in this competition, because
others are potential attackers of another’s well-being. This competitive
image is well described in Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and was ta-
ken up by thinkers during Western Europe’s civil revolutions and utili-
tarianism in the 18th century.
Two important comments are in order here on the genealogy of
rights and the implications of the concept of rights. One is that ignor-
ing the context in which a theory was made sometimes gives rise to
misunderstandings, not only in non-Western areas, but also in the
West, in reading Western political philosophy (Wolin 1975, 3: 151; 171).
For example, Hobbes is often described as a promoter of total individu-
alism and distrust in others. However, to understand the message of
his theories correctly, it is necessary to take into account the social and
historical context in which he lived, the life-threatening situation of the
civil war (Saxonhouse 1993; Wolin ibid). His advocacy of individualism
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is intended to defend against unreasonable authority overriding an indi-
vidual’s life.
The same goes for Locke: his advocacy of individualism is based on
his belief that an individual’s conscience should be maintained by the
individual’s consciousness, instead of being imposed by any authority
(Wolin ibid: 118-119). The important and original message of the con-
cept of ‘rights’ in the Western political philosophical tradition has been
to establish a conscious and critical individual self, as a precondition to
liberating human beings from any coercion, be it political or religious.
This point is what Japan learned from Western philosophy in her peri-
od of modernisation. Messages from thinkers cannot be accurately un-
derstood without the context in which theories are made. Without tak-
ing account of the context in which political theories are developed, the
message is not correctly conveyed to the public.
The other comment is to note that there are certain patterns in con-
structing the canon of Western political philosophy and explaining poli-
tical vocabularies. In many of the textbooks on political science, there is
a ‘mainstream’ pattern in talking about rights, following Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, Mill, and Bentham. This way of establishing the concept of
rights creates the image of total individualism, misogyny, elimination,
and utilitarian enlightenmentalism. They are indeed major thinkers in
the tradition of Western political philosophy, but there were also other
philosophers, whose thoughts are not necessarily aggressive or indivi-
dualistic, but were even critical of these characteristics in Western philo-
sophy.33 So the idea of Western philosophy as individualistic and aggres-
sive is, in one respect, also a product of construction.
However, despite these explanations for the problems connected to
Western political philosophy, it still holds that for many non-Wester-
ners, including Japanese, Western philosophies seem to be excessively
individualistic, not doing justice to the interrelationship between indivi-
duals. This is not a coincidence. In the West there is a basis on which
such an aggressive implication can be understood. Therefore, I have
traced the ‘mainstream’ pattern in which political canons have been
constructed. Tracing the ‘mainstream’ pattern also includes the task of
tracing the background of Western philosophy.
René Descartes (1596-1650), for example, is also one of the most stu-
died Western philosophers in Japan. The message of Cogito34 by Des-
cartes also fosters a critical, conscious, and outspoken self, in order to
establish space not dominated by theology, the Church, and the authori-
ties. Je pense, donc je suis – this can be read as his declaration to certify
the absoluteness of the existence of ‘self’ as what cannot be destroyed
by any unreasonable authority. However, in the process of removing
what is unreasonable, ‘other beings related to Cogito’ were also elimi-
nated; for oneself, the existence of ‘others’ is an object of doubt, be-
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cause ‘others’ fail to be absolute for Cogito. The other side of ‘I think,
therefore I am’ is ‘I do not know what, or whether others are thinking’,
therefore, the existence of others is not absolute. On its introduction to
Japan, Descartes’s way of thinking could not avoid inviting the criticism
that the philosophy is based on distrust of one individual toward others,
eliminating the surroundings, something that can hardly be fitted into
the Japanese philosophical context.
The Japanese philosopher Yamamoto maintains that
the era of European modernity is an era in which the idea of co-
existence was killed by excessive desire to pursue interests. There
was a distrust in all ‘others’ – including other individuals and
nature. Modern rationalism is based on a trust in reason, but it
has at the same time distrust in how human beings are (Yama-
moto 1992: 211).
Examining how a canonical pattern is constructed in Western philoso-
phy and what it signifies, one may well conclude that a strong message
of modern European philosophy is as described above by Yamamoto.
A human being is not just reason, but a being who also contains irra-
tional and immoral aspects. Therefore, subordination of irrational as-
pects, coupled with the emphatic argument for ‘reason’, appears to be a
denial of how human beings actually are. Critics may argue that Rous-
seau shows trust in the nature of a man. However, he admits that his
concept of ‘nature’ and ‘natural man’ before ‘society’ is ‘a purely hy-
pothetical and imaginative reconstruction that deliberately ignores facts’
(Edwards 1967: 220). Actually, the ‘natural’ man, whom he admired
and trusted, does not exist in the real world. Conversely, in his theory,
the ‘real man’ in ‘real society’ in front of him is regarded with eyes al-
most of despair.
On this point, Yamamoto also explains that the Western absolute uni-
versalism that emphasises only the ‘good part’ of human beings, and
the act of denying a human being because it has immoral aspects, is
partially due to Christianity (Yamamoto op. cit.: 176). To put it another
way, Yamamoto wants to argue that as the self of one human being can-
not be constructed without interaction with other human beings, a hu-
man being cannot be a human being without his/her irrational and
sometimes immoral aspects. A human being comprehends both good
and evil parts.
Then, where does the juncture come from, and why does Western
philosophy, when compared to Japanese philosophy, appear to some to
be aggressive? There are several explanations for this. To begin with,
there were and are fundamental differences in social, economic, and
natural conditions between Japan and Hobbes’s notion of the state of
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nature, which was his theorisation of the English social disorder of his
day. The leading post-war Japanese political scientist35 Masao Maruyama
(1914-1996) argues that
Hobbes saw the drastic change of society and values, while in Ja-
pan during the Meiji period, pre-existing society did not see so
drastic a change as in Hobbes’s day, and people still could live
within the pre-existing community […] Therefore, it is difficult to
imagine an individual’s absolute isolation in Japan, unlike in
England of the day (Maruyama 1998-2000, 7: 30; 71-72).
Quite a few contemporary Japanese social scientists observe that human
beings’ relations with nature in Japan are also very different from that
of people in the West. In any of the major traditional as well as contem-
porary philosophies in Japan, the notion of human beings fighting
against nature is marginal. Tracing the tradition of the development of
rights in Western political philosophy, it is possible to observe that the
inherent message is to theorise how to allocate limited natural re-
sources amongst individuals. Nature has become horror, an object to be
conquered and to be mastered, and other individuals appear as potential
attackers of the self. Conversely, in Japan, human beings’ relationship
with nature is described as ‘interdependent’, ‘gentle’, and ‘stable’,
where ‘individuals competing with each other for natural resources’, as
found in Western philosophy, was not a dominant line of thought.36
Moreover, traditionally most parts of Japan were based on agricultural
management, which led to a community-based lifestyle. As Japanese
anthropologist Takamune explains, an ‘individual’ develops in ‘com-
merce’, as was observed in Europe. Asia was ‘agriculture’, where it was
not possible for individuals to survive without being dependent upon
each other (Takamune 1972b: 500).
Given different conditions in nature and ways of living, nature is
viewed as an object to be mastered in the West, while in Japanese indi-
genous political philosophy nature is considered to be in harmony with
humans. Accordingly, in Western political philosophy, other individuals
are targets of distrust, because individuals must fight each other for the
allocation of natural resources (Maruyama op. cit.; Hasegawa op. cit).
The situation in Japan has now changed, in the sense that the social
climate has also become more individualistic as Japan became indus-
trialised and embraced capitalism. Especially after the Meiji period in
the lead up to the Second World War, the ‘socially unfit’, such as dis-
abled people, was treated harshly, and care of disabled people were not
a concern of a community any more. But generally, in comparison to
many contemporary Western societies, interdependence among indivi-
duals is stronger in Japan than in the West both positively and nega-
ON WOMEN’S SELFISHNESS AND THE RIGHT TO ABORTION 105
tively. Given such differences, there is little prospect of the concept of
‘rights’, which developed under certain social and historical circum-
stances, being easily accepted in Japan and used as it has been in the
West.37
It also has to be added that in the non-Western world rights some-
times cannot represent the socially weak, who actually are most in need
of rights. This is because the term ‘right’ is not an indigenous term in
the non-Western world, but was introduced from the West, mainly
through academic books. Rights thus spread from top to bottom in
these societies. For this reason, the term ‘right’ does not appeal to the
powerless, but appears to be a term belonging to intellectuals. In addi-
tion to this fact, as was reviewed in the genealogy of the concept of
rights, the concept initially applies to those who are equal brothers of
each other, who are privileged. This is a serious paradox, in light of the
original political aim of the concept of rights, namely to enhance the liv-
ing conditions of the socially oppressed.
What is important here is to acknowledge that political philosophies
in the West, as well as the concept of ‘rights’, are ‘local’ in northwestern
Europe, but are not ‘universal’ in their origins. Therefore, it can be no
surprise that the concept of ‘rights’ conflicts with indigenous philoso-
phies in other parts of the world.
A rights analysis of the Japanese abortion debate during the 1970s
In the selective abortion debate, which arose during the 1970s between
disabled people and women in the Women’s Liberation Movement (the
WLM), the roots of the conflict can be found in the conceptualisation of
the concept of ‘mother’. Mothers represent both disability-free people
and care-takers. Women in the WLM were composed primarily of dis-
ability-free women, mothers and potential mothers. The reasons that
disabled people attacked ‘women’s egoism’, with as focal point the con-
cept of ‘mother’, will now be considered.
Mother as an enemy
Aoi shiba no kai, a group of people with cerebral palsy (see introduction
and chapter 1), argued that
parents are the closest representatives of people without disabil-
ities. They practise the egoism and selfishness of disability-free
people, and hence parents are the nearest oppressor (Tanaka
1973: 1).
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This statement points to the way parents act paternalistically towards
their disabled children because of their children’s disability, sometimes
making decisions on their behalf. Of the parents, mothers are even clo-
ser than fathers, because when disabled people stay at home, not able
to go to school or work, in the Japanese context mothers are the pri-
mary caregivers. It is understandable that mothers act protectively to-
ward their disabled children, including making decisions for them, or
limiting their independence, even as they grow older.38 Taking this into
account, Aoi shiba no kai pronounced that ‘women are like enemies’.39
This phrase was used by Aoi shiba no kai, although there were women
with cerebral palsy in the movement. This was possible for two reasons:
first because the movement was represented by male disabled people,
and second because within this movement, male disabled people put
forth the movement’s arguments from their own position as sons of
mothers, or disability-free women.
Mothers taking care of their disabled children were usually not dis-
abled. Disabled people viewed the relationship between mother and dis-
abled child in terms of power, not only according to the hierarchy of the
parent/child relationship, for example, but also of the disability/disabil-
ity-free relationship. Given this analysis, disabled people could not ac-
cept women’s demand for rights, because to them a right was something
to be demanded by those without power, that is, the oppressed against
the oppressor. Being disability-free was seen as being socially more
powerful than being disabled, in terms of access to social resources.
From the disabled people’s perspective, a demand for rights from a
more powerful social group (disability-free women) sounded egoistic.
Mother as a caregiver
At the same time, although mothers are the closest oppressors of dis-
abled people, it is also a fact that disabled people could not survive with-
out the care of mothers. In child murder or selective abortion cases, the
phrase ‘haha-yo! Korosuna’ (Mothers! Don’t kill) emerged, but fathers
were not questioned.40 The role of fathers, whether in abortion or the
murder of children, was not considered by the disabled people’s move-
ment. This implies that disabled people think of women as ‘natural’
mothers, giving unconditional care. There was also a myth of mother-
hood internalised in disabled people; for women to give up the job of
mothering is a deviation from their expectations and norms. Women’s
claim that they had a right to access to abortion was seen as egoistic, be-
cause an abortion contradicted disabled people’s image of women.
Hence, in criticising women’s rights, disabled people were ambivalent:
‘we are worse off than women (without disability)’, as well as ‘women
should be unconditional caregivers’.
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Mother as a woman
In addition to the issue of power between disability/disability-free peo-
ple and the myth of motherhood, there were also issues of male domi-
nance and discrimination within the disabled people’s movement. The
disabled people’s movement was represented by men, and sex discrimi-
nation can be noted in their arguments. For example, there is a movie
called Sayonara CP, or ‘Farewell to CP’, produced by people in Aoi shiba
no kai who have CP. This movie describes the life of people with CP,
and aims to challenge the biases that the general public had about CP.
In this movie, there is one segment in which men with CP are talking
about their first sexual experiences. This segment is for the purpose of
showing that disabled people are not asexual. During this segment, one
man confesses that his first sexual experience was raping a woman
from his neighbourhood. Whether it is true or a lie, this statement is
striking. First of all, he is not ashamed of saying that he raped a wo-
man. If it is true, it is a crime. Moreover, there is no consideration of
how a raped woman would feel about the experience. Secondly, the at-
mosphere is that he is even proud of saying that he raped a woman, be-
cause he apparently believes that it shows how powerful and competent
he is. He does not express any regrets. In this man’s view, when a man
is physically strong enough to dominate a woman, he is a brave and real
man.
Another example of sex discrimination in the disabled people’s move-
ment was that the wife of one disabled man, named Yokota, is consis-
tently referred to as Yokota-san-no-okusan, or ‘Mr. Yokota’s wife’, in the
movie. She remains anonymous, never being called by her own name.
She is a mere appendage to her husband. This problem is not only
about anonymity. The term oku originally means, ‘a room in which mar-
ried women were locked so that they could not see any men but their
husbands’ (Takamune 1972a: 284-285).41 The term okusan has come to
mean wife, and it is widely used in today’s Japan, without implying an
insult, because most people do not know the original source of the
term. However, it takes only a little imagination to notice that the term
is problematic, even without knowing its original meaning, as it con-
notes somebody inside the house, or ‘indoors’ (Pateman op. cit: 130). It
implies ideas about conventional social roles of men and women, in-
cluding the sexual division of labour. The term shujin is coupled with
okusan meaning husband or household head. Literally, shujin itself
means ‘master’, a meaning that every Japanese person knows. For ex-
ample, the term is used in a manner such as, ‘the dog’s shujin is Ms.
Tanaka’. Feminists would never use the terms okusan or shujin to refer
to husband and wife. Feelings about this movie among women in the
WLM are well expressed in the following statement:
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It is very difficult for discriminated groups to encounter each
other in the structure where various discriminations are crossing
over one another in complicated ways. As is clear from the movie
Sayonara CP, those with CP also have sex discrimination interna-
lised within themselves. I want to say, loudly, that this movie it-
self is absolutely masculinist, no matter what. Yokota-san’s oku-
san (wife) is nothing but ‘okusan’. Toshiko Yokota is not treated
as a woman with CP at all. Men with CP in the movie, to begin
with Yokota-san, are trying to ‘lock women’ inside the house, and
they obviously share a belief that men stand above women.42
The WLM was represented by disability-free women as potential
mothers, and the disabled people’s movement was represented by men.
Disabled women were not prominent. Noriko Seyama, a scholar in wo-
men’s studies, states that the concerns of disabled women could not be
shared by the WLM, because their concern was mainly ‘to live like
others in the local area, and to deliver and rear children like others’
(Seyama 2000: 36). In this period, disabled women were not potential
mothers, and a right to abortion was not the primary concern of dis-
abled women. The claim to a right to abortion sounded like a luxury,
and this was also felt by disabled men, for whom it was difficult to en-
joy love and marriage in the same way as others did in society. This
was also a reason for their criticism of women’s rights, calling these
‘women’s egoism’.
Thus, there were a number of social relations at play in the relation-
ship between the disabled people and the women’s movement, includ-
ing mother/child, disability-free/disability, and men/women. Domi-
nance and subordination cut across the two groups, where their as-
sumptions about men’s lives and women’s lives played a role.
As becomes clear from the discussion of the genealogy of rights, de-
mands for rights emerge when there is oppression, and a claim based
on rights can be used by the oppressed to empower themselves.
According to anti-abortion organisations which were opposed to abor-
tion in the 1970s, between a foetus and a woman, it is the foetus that is
powerless and dependent on the woman. If an unwanted pregnancy
can be called ‘an invasion by a foetus within a woman’s body’ at all, the
woman is the decision-makers, while a foetus is completely at her
mercy. For a woman, it is her physical well-being, standard of living, or
her economic condition that is to be sacrificed for of the birth of a
child, while for a foetus, it is its life which is to be ended by of the abor-
tion. Therefore, it would appear that in most cases a foetus is exposed
to a more serious danger than a woman is.
Moreover, the introduction of the foetus into her own body, i.e. preg-
nancy, is the result of her own act. In the view of anti-abortion argu-
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ments, entitlement to access to abortion means to accept that women
receive benefits at the cost of another’s life. What is smaller and is to
be protected is the life of a foetus, rather than that of a woman. In this
situation, i.e. when a woman is pregnant, it might not be correct to as-
sume that there is oppression of women, and therefore, according to
those who criticise the ‘women’s right’ argument in favour of access to
abortion, it would not appear to be proper to grant these rights to wo-
men. Because, in their view, the foetus does not oppress a woman, isn’t
women’s demand for rights just a request for the entitlement to domi-
nate foetuses, and therefore isn’t their demand ‘egoism’? Life is indeed
precious. Nobody is able to deny the dignity of life. And it is cruel that
the life of a foetus must be taken away so that a woman can avoid sacri-
ficing her plans or standard of life.
Men (representing the attempt to limit women’s 
 access to abortion, policies and laws) 
Women (disability-free)  
How can these women 
unite each other?  
Disabled people  
 
 
  
 
Discrimination
 
Disabled men 
Disabled women  
Discrimination: Women are powerless, 
motivates women to use Rights  
Discrimination: Disabled people have 
less power than women without a 
disability. Therefore, disabled people do
not want to accept disability-free women’s
claim to ‘right.’
Diagram 1 Pyramid of power relations amongst women and disabled
people
Rights, women, and selfishness in the thinking of the anti-abortion movement and
the disabled people’s movement
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But taking a closer look at the issue raises a question: why is the is-
sue of abortion so often reduced to a foetus-woman only relationship?
Why does the issue of abortion only focus on women’s act of killing?
Where are the social, economic, and political contexts of women’s un-
wanted pregnancies? Men’s responsibilities for the consequences of sex-
ual acts are not questioned, while women’s are. Questions about the
context surrounding women and foetuses are absent, although they all
are intimately related to the issue of abortion. So, in my view, the real
problem is that the abortion debate was reduced to a foetus-woman rela-
tionship. The absence of a debate about the broader context in which
abortion takes place, meant that discrimination against women, was not
questioned.
Opponents to abortion in Japan stated that, ‘although women’s
bodies have been injured during back-alley abortions after abortion be-
came outlawed, if the lives of thousands of foetuses are saved, it is bet-
ter’ (Yûseihogohô kaihaikisei dômei 1969: 24). Disabled men say wo-
men are selfish when they have an abortion, scarcely questioning the
conditions in which women have to raise children. This means that wo-
men are expected to give birth and let the foetus live under any circum-
stances. Here, the discrimination against women, that is, the social and
political reasons why a woman sometimes becomes pregnant when she
does not want to, and the sacrifices women make, are accepted without
being questioned. Men’s dominance is ‘natural’ and the state is a ‘nat-
ural’ intervener in women’s bodies. The oppressed are entitled to rights
when there is oppression. Women’s claim that they have rights is con-
sidered to be egoistic because there is no acknowledgement of the op-
pression of women.
In addition to failing to acknowledge discrimination against woman,
there was also the problem of the practitioner of rights. In the Western
tradition of rights, women were initially excluded from rights theory, be-
cause they were considered ‘natural’, ‘emotional’, and ‘irrational’, and
thus unfit for the world of politics. Therefore women should be ruled
by men. Natural rights applied only to male individuals, not to females.
Rights were, in their origin, a masculine construction for masculine
politics. Women were thus disqualified as bearers of rights and unable
to use them to make a claim for better treatment. According to this
masculine bias in conventional philosophy, women were unfit to exer-
cise a claim to rights because of a lack of so-called male qualities. When
a woman used the term ‘right’ she was called selfish.
This lack of acknowledgement of the oppression of women, by view-
ing women as ‘the natural self-sacrificers’ also holds for the disabled
people’s movement, which in the 1970s was led by men. The disabled
people’s movement’s view of the relationship between a foetus with an
anomaly and a woman did not include taking into consideration wo-
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men’s social conditions. While women’s responsibility for ‘murdering
the child’ when aborting a foetus is taken into account, men’s responsi-
bility is not; if a woman refused to become a mother, she was called
selfish.
Women’s dilemma in using ‘rights’: What ‘rights’ could not express
The acts of pregnancy and abortion involve a number of complex rela-
tions. Some women in the WLM, who consciously chose to make use
of the concept of rights, argued that ‘rights to abortion’ addressed the
oppression of women by men and the state, not of foetuses or disabled
people. This position held that rights clearly applied to the oppressive
relationship; expressing rights was not oriented toward the foetus. Yet
there were also women in the movement who were reluctant to assert
that their concern in the abortion debate was oriented solely toward
men’s and the state’s oppression of women. For them, reducing the
abortion debate to a state/men-women relation could not fully express
why women need to have an abortion, or a woman’s feelings towards a
foetus. Without women confronting the issue of how they view foetuses
when having an abortion, it would not be possible to counteract the
charge that ‘a woman dominates a foetus’. Without expressing the nega-
tive feelings they experience when having an abortion, it would not be
possible for women to counter the argument that they are irresponsible
and egoistic for having an abortion. Removing the foetus-woman rela-
tionship from the debate would provide openings for those opposed to
abortion to criticise women for having abortions.
With regard to the disabled people’s movement, a foetus-women rela-
tionship is not the only issue to consider, as there is also a power rela-
tion between the disabled and the disability-free. Women in the WLM
did not want to ignore this power relation, nor the bias against disabil-
ities internalised within women. Removing the foetus-women relation-
ship from the abortion debate would also remove the opportunity for
women to consider what it is like to conceive and raise a disabled child.
Now women were in a dilemma. Using the concept of rights to justi-
fy access to abortion, the WLM’s arguments in support of access to
abortion sounded as if women did not care about foetuses when hav-
ing abortions. This is partially because the concept of ‘rights’ tends to
be reduced to a question of access to something. Also, the ‘right to
abortion’ sounded as if women were ignorant of discrimination against
people with disabilities. At the same time, a ‘right’ implied that wo-
men’s concerns are more about access to social resources in a given
society. The concept did not convey their intention to question the so-
cial system, which is constructed by the norms of able-bodied males.
Women wanted to avoid these implications; when talking about abor-
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tion, they did not mean only ‘access’ to having an abortion. When
speaking of abortion the WLM also wanted to problematise the values
internalised in society, namely values based upon males and people
without disabilities. Despite the shortcomings of relying on the concept
of rights, it was also perilous to withdraw ‘rights’ from the debate be-
cause it was a key concept for the political movement to build its argu-
ments upon.
The fundamental problem lies in the fact that rights unnecessarily
generate dualisms, such as a woman versus a foetus, or giving birth ver-
sus abortion. For example, there was a debate inside the women’s
movement about whether to use rights, targeting the criticism toward
the state, or to replace rights with another concept. Actually both posi-
tions shared the refusal to apply rights to a foetus-woman relationship.
Both arguments originated in the refusal to position woman as ‘rulers’
over a foetus. Hence, the problem is that rights are not able to express
a symbiosis of two apparently contradictory matters. Instead the usage
of rights appears to bring them into conflict with each other.
Strategies for the women’s movement to deal with the concept of rights
There were three strategies concerning rights open to the WLM. First
one could stop using the concept of rights in connection with the de-
mand for access to abortion, replacing it with other concepts when
making the demand for access to abortion. Such phrases as ‘we de-
mand a society where we can give birth, where we want to give birth’
are one example of replacing the rights-based demand with the samely
focused demand. By ceasing to use the concept of ‘rights to abortion’,
conventional implications and biases about ‘rights’ would not haunt the
claims made by the women’s movement when demanding access to
abortion. One could use a term that does not imply that women are
egoistic or aggressive, without reducing the abortion debate to the foe-
tus-women relationship. Yet the crucial disadvantage of ceasing to use
the concept of ‘rights’ is that it is so familiar and so powerful a tool in
political struggles, that to declare that women do not have rights when
it comes to abortion would actually mean surrender.
The second way out of the dilemma was to declare that women’s
right to abortion is not connected to the women-foetus relationship, but
only to state laws and policies. This strategy was raised because of ethi-
cal questions around the practice of selective abortion of deformed foe-
tuses. Actually, this strategy was intended to leave it as a matter of state
welfare. Chuˆpiren took this standpoint, and so did women in the labour
union movement (see chapter 2). If women assert their rights only in
specific situations, excluding issues of selective abortion, then the pur-
pose of the WLM in the abortion debate would become clear, namely
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that the women’s movement should oppose the state’s attempt to limit
women’s access to abortion. There were, however, also disadvantages to
this approach. Women would always have to provide a point of refer-
ence to which their assertion of rights is oriented. Since political debate
often requires swift action, it is not strategic for women to have to ex-
plain the meaning of rights every time they use the term. Another dis-
advantage is that limiting the target of the rhetoric of rights would even-
tually reduce the scope of the debate about abortion.
The third solution was to develop the meaning of rights itself in a
more comprehensive way – even broadening it to include the idea of re-
forming male-centred society – and then continuing to use the term
rights. This attempt was not made in the 1970s. Since the term right it-
self was thought to have a number of problematic implications – it is a
masculine invention, it connotes aggression and egoism, and so on – in
the long run, it is valuable to develop the meaning of rights into a more
relational concept corresponding to contradictory realities. However, po-
litical debate and struggle do not wait for theoretical insight. The move-
ment could not wait for the concept of rights to change. It would take
time and effort to develop richer ideas of rights and to have them ac-
cepted by society at large.
Towards the 1980s: The 1975 UN Women’s Conference and the
solidarity of Japanese women
After the attempt to eliminate the economic reasons clause was success-
fully blocked by the WLM in 1973, the movement became involved in
various other issues. The Lib Shinjuku Centre was closed down in 1977.
In addition to the activities of the WLM, a women’s liaison group was
formed in 1974 by two female Diet members to bring women together
to participate at the UN Women's Conference in Mexico City in 1975.
The group was called ‘kokusai-fujin-nen-o-kikkake-to-shite-koˆdoˆ-o-okosu-on-
natachi-no-kai’ (An active women’s liaison group for the International
Women’s Year). This group, now known as Koˆdoˆ-suru-onnatachi-no-kai,
or Women in Action, still remains active.43 The majority of women in
this organisation were in their thirties and forties, and they had perma-
nent and often professional jobs, in contrast to most of the women in
the 1970s WLM, which consisted mainly of women in their early twen-
ties. A number of women from the WLM also joined in the activities of
Women in Action. Because Women in Action was composed mostly of
older women, they nicknamed themselves Chuˆnen-lib, or the Middle-
Aged Women’s Liberation Movement. Women in Action played an im-
portant role in pushing the government to sign the Convention on the
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
in 1979, since the government was quite reluctant to do so.
Later on, in 1982, when an attempt was again made by anti-abortion-
ists to eliminate the economic reasons clause, Women in Action was
one of the organisations that helped to form Soshiren, which consisted
of many women from the WLM of the 1970s, as well as new younger
people, including students. The movement in the 1980s was therefore
composed of a more diverse group of women in comparison to the
movement of the 1970s. The United Nations Women’s Conference, and
the International Women’s Year of 1975, contributed toward the emer-
gence of these new organisations.
Although the Japanese government signed CEDAW, the political and
economic situation did not improve much for women. In the neo-liberal
climate, the government tended to restrict its welfare budget, expecting
women to be engaged in the domestic domain, taking over the state’s
responsibility for welfare. The labour law was revised so that women
and men could be ‘equal’. ‘Equality’ in this case meant, for example,
the abolition of menstruation leave from paid work or of limitations on
women working after midnight in the name of protection of women.
Therefore, ‘equal’ working conditions between men and women meant
limiting job opportunities for women, because under the gendered divi-
sion of labour, women were not able to have work under the same con-
ditions as men. A fear about the ageing of society also started to be dis-
cussed, coupled with the lower fertility rate. This brought about political
debates about how to encourage women to give birth. Anti-abortion
Diet members, with the help of Seichoˆ no ie, initiated debates, and in
1982 a new proposal to limit access to abortion by eliminating the eco-
nomic reasons clause was made.
Given all these transformations, both internationally and domesti-
cally, how did the abortion debate and the debate around ‘women’s
rights’ evolve in the 1980s? This is taken up in chapter 4.
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4 Abortion Debates in the 1980s
Although Women in Action was successful in making the Japanese gov-
ernment sign the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discri-
mination against Women (CEDAW), daily life for women did not im-
prove. In 1978, the Ôhira administration, which was led by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), proposed to revise the Basic Labour Law, in or-
der to delete the special articles that it included for women. In the
name of ‘equality’ between men and women, working conditions for
women were ‘equalised’ with those of men, and this eventually made it
more difficult for women, especially those who were wives and
mothers, to have paid jobs.1 The next year, the cabinet proposed a policy
called Katei-kiban-juˆjitsu-seisaku (policy to consolidate the ‘home base’)
to transfer the state’s responsibility for the household to women. Wo-
men involved in political movement activities opposed these measures.
In November 1982, a new cabinet, under Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone, was inaugurated. In his inauguration speech he announced
that his administration would promote policies of ‘welfare centred on
the home’, ‘self-dependence and self-help of the nation’, and a ‘high
quality defence force.’ Thus the 1980s saw a tendency towards ‘small
government’, similar to that experienced in other capitalist countries in
Europe and North America.
The administration’s legislative proposals took the form of a series of
drafts which represented an attempt to consolidate the traditional
household system. The purpose was to restrict the budget for welfare,
and to improve the birth rate, since it had started to decrease during
the 1980s.2 In this political atmosphere, there was another attempt in
1982 to eliminate the economic reasons clause for an abortion.
The 1982 attempt to repeal the economic reasons clause and the
anti-abortion argument
Masakuni Murakami,3 who became an LDP Diet member in 1980 sup-
ported by Seichoˆ no ie, started his statement to the ministers by reciting
this poem in the house of councillors of the Diet on 15 March 1982:
‘The 212 article in the Criminal Code’4
Mama! Mama! I am a child that failed to be born / With pu-
pils able to see / With ears able to hear / Dropped into the dark
world / I am a child not able to become a human-being
Mama! Mama! Do you hear my voice? My body being weak /
My figure ugly / I was detached from Mama / I am a child that
failed to be born
Mama! Mama! / I am a child that failed to be born / Not
knowing tasty milk / Not knowing a warm breast / I was thrown
away alone / I am a child not able to become a human being
Mama! Mama! Is my voice reaching you? / Here it is very cold
/ I am scared to be alone/ I want to be close to Mama / I am a
child that failed to be born
Showing pictures of aborted five-month foetuses, Murakami stated,
Five-month foetuses are sometimes aborted despite being alive.
Do you know how medical doctors kill them? [...] After the foetus
is outside the women’s body, doctors either inject a deadly poi-
son, leave them for a long time, drown them in water, or suffo-
cate them with cotton gauze. All are such cruel ways. Isn’t it
murder? Such acts are legalised in our country. This is what
‘abortion paradise’ means.5
He finished his statement, successfully securing the Prime Minister’s
and the Minister of Health and Welfare’s promise to delete the econom-
ic reasons clause from the Eugenic Protection Law in order to limit wo-
men’s access to abortion. This time, the introduction of a selective abor-
tion clause was not part of the proposal. Twelve days after the Diet
meeting, the Ministry of Health and Welfare started to examine the is-
sue of the eliminating the economic reasons clause. In addition, Chuoˆ-
yuˆseihogo-shinsa-kai (The central examination committee for eugenic
protection) was also formed in the Diet to conduct research into abor-
tion practices. It should be noted that in March 1982 the proposal was
not officially submitted to the Diet. If a proposal is to be officially sub-
mitted in the Diet, it must be done within one year after it was pro-
posed in an official Diet committee. Therefore, the idea proposed by
Murakami, to eliminate the economic reasons clause, had to officially
be received by the Diet by 15 March 1983. The struggle of the women’s
movement was to prevent the official proposal of the draft from being
introduced in the Diet.
The leaders and members of anti-abortion movement had not chan-
ged significantly since the 1970s, when Seiseiren led the initiative with
the help of the religious group Seichoˆ no ie, in alliance with Diet mem-
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bers from the LDP. The most active Diet member, as in the 1970s, was
Murakami. But in the 1980s more members joined, such as Yasuhiro
Nakasone, Toshio Yamaguchi, and Susumu Nikaidô. Nakasone became
the Prime Minister of Japan in 1982.
As in the 1970s, the anti-abortion position was focused on changing
the law that legalised abortion and on changing women’s behaviour.
However, the strategy of the anti-abortion side changed, reflecting the
failure of their attempt in the 1970s. This time they tried to gain public
support for their proposals. Young people from the Seichoˆ no ie reli-
gious group organised a signature campaign in the streets throughout
the country and collected approximately one million signatures (Soshi-
ren Kinkyuˆ news 1983 (6): 3). They also organised anti-abortion exhibi-
tions and lectures at universities and high schools. Their activities were
oriented to the grass-roots level; 130 local governments in the whole of
Japan concluded that they would support the idea of limiting women’s
access to abortion by deleting the economic reasons clause (Soshiren
1983: 3).
The position of the anti-abortion forces
Consciousness raising
Because in the 1980s personal experiences of abortion were still hardly
ever discussed openly in daily conversations, those opposed to abortion
appealed to people by sharing their depiction of what abortion was like.
During signature-gathering campaigns in the streets, exhibitions at
school festivals, and at discussions in the Diet, pictures of foetuses with
the umbilical cord attached, and/or pictures of aborted foetuses soaked
in formalin in a transparent glass jar, always accompanied their presen-
tation of the issue. One of the pictures often used was of a full-size 21-
week-old foetus, where it was possible to see that the foetus had eyes,
ears, downy hair and one could even see that the foetus was a girl (Mur-
akami 1982: 7). These pictures were accompanied with the explanation
that:
A foetus of two-months has small eyes, a mouth, legs and is des-
perately trying to live. Termination of pregnancy is a cruel act,
dragging out the foetus with force and killing it. We have to lis-
ten to the crying voices of the foetuses – they are killed without
being able to resist or say one word at all, but are extracted forci-
bly, then smashed with cold metallic tools and thrown away with
the garbage. [...] They are killed by being injected with deadly poi-
son, frozen, drowned, or suffocated. [...] They cannot resist the
decision of adults with even one word, but silently they are killed
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and thrown away. We need to listen to their voiceless cry (Mura-
kami 1982: 6; 18-19).
Thus, by explaining the development of the sensory capacity of a foetus,
as well as ways of killing it, the powerlessness of the ‘victim’ is con-
structed, functioning to draw sympathy from their audience.
It is cruel to cut a foetus into pieces. Anyone would feel this way.
Then those opposed to abortion would follow up this visual presenta-
tion by posing questions about the fundamental cause for such cruel ac-
tions. They would lead their audience to the conclusion that it was the
law that made these acts legal. However, because the majority of people
did not know the content of the law, or even its name (the Eugenic Pro-
tection Law), the anti-abortion activists would always explain the law,
stressing:
The economic condition is the criterion to kill or not to kill a foe-
tus and that is how people choose to have an abortion. Japan is
famous for its relatively high rate of abortion amongst economic-
ally developed countries. You, I, and all of us are living in a so-
ciety where a number of foetuses are killed every day. [...] Let’s
change the law, let’s stand up! (Murakami 1982: 31-33)
Women’s selfishness, moral degradation, and loss of motherhood
After describing the powerlessness of the ‘victim’ of abortion, anti-abor-
tion activists would emphasise the selfishness of women who had abor-
tions or supported access to abortions. This way of constructing their ar-
gument had the effect that those receiving the message tended to orient
their anger toward women and women’s right to abortion.
Anti-abortion activists argued that ‘women should be able to protect
and cherish their own children when it comes to their own children’s
lives. However, post-war Japanese women have lost motherhood, the su-
preme mission of their lives’ (Murakami 1982: prologue).
For example, Ayako Sono, a female anti-abortion activist, explained
‘real motherhood’ in order to criticise Japanese women as follows:
I visited a midwife’s clinic on the island of Madagascar, in Afri-
ca, the other day. They have nothing, no soap to wash babies,
no equipment to sterilise spoons, no milk, no medicine, no
nothing. Mothers come there to the clinic to deliver babies.
They give birth, truly using everything they can give. One of
them said it was her 15th child and she was 42 years old. In
Madagascar, it is a custom to give sugar water to a mother after
delivery. A Sister told a three-year-old child to give sugar water
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to her mother, but she said there was no sugar. They are that
poor. We might well wonder, then, why they give birth to an-
other baby in such poverty, but on the contrary, both the mother
and the child were really pleased with the arrival of the new
baby. The small child was saying, ‘Sister, I thank you very much
for the baby.’ I could not help but realise that this is mother-
hood. [...] Compared to this, Japanese women are spoiled. [...]
Japanese women are not exposed to life-threatening poverty. If
women give birth to more children, hardly any of them will die.
And suppose they leave the child in the street; the child would
not die either. This country is so rich that somebody would save
the baby. [...] Japanese women should learn the spirit of mother-
hood from women in Madagascar, instead of pretending they
are the protagonists in a tragedy. Real motherhood is a desire to
have children so unconditionally that there is no room for eco-
nomic reasons to have an abortion. No motherhood is found in
the act of weighing economic conditions against life (quoted in
Seiseiren 1983: 22).6
‘Abortion is women’s egoism’ and ‘women’s right to abortion is a claim
for the right to commit murder’ are repeated in a number of places in
the arguments put forth by anti-abortion activists in Japan in the
1980s’.7 Displeasure with the law is oriented towards the women who
use the law. When rights emerge from a law, the hostility of the audi-
ence is turned against the rhetoric of ‘women’s rights to abortion’.
The anti-abortion side’s criticism of Japanese women was also ex-
tended to women’s sexual behaviour, in particular sexual intercourse be-
fore marriage. They argued that teenagers’ having sexual intercourse
was a cause of high abortion rates, although statistics at the time
showed that women in their 30s were the biggest group of people hav-
ing abortions.8 The anti-abortion activists argued that teenagers tended
to have abortions because they were not married.9 Therefore, their logic
was that if a pregnant woman was not in a position where she could
give birth, that is, she was unmarried, then she should not have sexual
intercourse (statement by Seichô no ie, cited in Miyako 1983: 135).
Meanwhile, anti-abortion activists believed that men’s desire for sex-
ual activity was natural and always in need of fulfilment. Murakami sta-
ted that ‘girls must be virgins before marriage. [...] So, visiting prosti-
tutes is a necessary resort for teenage boys’ (statement by Murakami, ci-
ted in Miyako: 136). This statement means that, because men are
naturally more sexually active, they cannot help but act on sexual im-
pulse. Anti-abortion activists promoted a view that
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Ideal women would be able to refuse men’s impulses, but under
legal abortion, women are also so weak that they are swayed by
men. This fact makes men’s sexual impulse even stronger. [...]
Hence, if abortion is outlawed, women will be responsible again,
and so will men.10
Outlawing abortion would therefore regulate women’s sexual behaviour,
which would lead to responsible sexual behaviour in men and to a low-
er abortion rate.
Women’s abortion experiences
Anti-abortion activists used stories that they said were women’s actual
abortion experiences to strengthen their arguments. These stories em-
phasized two points. One was that abortion experiences were followed
by negative feelings in women, and therefore abortion should be pro-
hibited. The other point was that having an abortion caused misfortune
for women and their families.
With regard to the first point, a number of women do suffer from
physical and/or mental problems after having an abortion (Murakami
1982: 20). ‘I felt I did a bad thing’, ‘I felt sorry for my child’, ‘I thought
I might not be able to have children any more’ – these are the feelings
that anti-abortion activists in the 1980s said that a majority of Japanese
women had after having an abortion (Murakami 1982: 20).11 Anti-abor-
tion activists said that women realise the seriousness of abortion only
after they have had an abortion. Anti-abortion activists in the 1980s in-
sisted that their mission was to have women meet other women who
have suffered the experience of abortion. Exhibitions and lectures at
school festivals were focused on the theme: ‘because abortion is a nega-
tive experience, let’s give birth’.
To show the regret of women who have had an abortion, Murakami
cites a story in his work, entitled ‘I am sorry, my baby’ written by an
anonymous female university student, aged 21:
I believed that abortion was the only solution. Yet, when I was
finished with the operation, I started to feel strongly that I
should have given birth. After leaving the hospital, I had a fever,
and I kept crying. I would get up right in the middle of the
night, rushing outside, screaming, ‘I want to see my baby! I will
apologise to the baby!’ My boyfriend, who happened to be beside
me, stopped me desperately: ‘Where are you going?’ ‘To my baby!
My baby is calling me!’ ‘Where is the baby?’ ‘In the hospital!’
‘The baby is not there any more.’ ‘Why?’ I broke down crying on
his chest. I hate myself for being alive after killing my own child.
The baby was killed without being able to say it was hurting or
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suffering. There is no grave or name. When I recover, we will to-
gether hold a memorial service for the baby. I am really sorry
(Murakami 1982: 20-21).
Murakami then argues:
Abortion takes away the life of a foetus for 100 percent, and at
the same time, leaves a huge scar on women’s bodies and hearts,
and sometimes even takes away the life of a woman. Immedi-
ately after fertilisation, the mother’s body mobilises all organs to
make an effort to develop her foetus. Abortion is an act which
stops all the movement suddenly. It is just like a traffic accident,
when a car running at full speed crashes into a huge obstacle.
However advanced medical technologies are for abortion, there
will always be scars left on women. Therefore, to prohibit an
abortion is to support women (Murakami 1982: 7-8).
This story of the 21-year-old student was introduced by anti-abortion ac-
tivists with the intention of ‘raising consciousness’ amongst women
who were on the verge of making a decision about whether to have an
abortion, and amongst women who have never had an abortion. Note
that those opposing abortion did not advocate birth control as a way to
avoid the need for abortion. The anti-abortion rhetoric was, at best, to
recommend that women avoid having sexual intercourse.
The second point that the anti-abortion activists tried to stress in their
awareness raising was that abortion causes misfortune in the lives of
women and their families. To advance this point, in his brochure, Mura-
kami cited a statement attributed to a judge specialising in juvenile de-
linquency:
‘I am an unnecessary person born by mistake. The babies before
and after me, for whom I was yearning, were both killed inside
Mama’s body! I happened to listen to the story through the wall
while Mama and Dad were talking with laughter!’ – This girl,
who was arrested as a juvenile delinquent, shouted at her mother
in court. Her face was dreadful, as if she was accusing her
mother of being haunted by the souls of the killed foetuses. This
girl has a pure and kind heart, and originally was obedient to her
parents. However, she started going wrong upon learning about
her parents’ killing her sisters and brothers. The phrase used by
her mother, ‘Why don’t you understand me?’, is actually the
same phrase that this girl wanted to shout back at her mother.12
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This quote was followed by a statement from Murakami that, ‘in any
case, the influence of abortion is too deep and dark for us even to ima-
gine’. The message is that abortion caused the girl to become a juvenile
delinquent. This judge is introduced as a person experienced with juve-
nile delinquents, which a number of parents may have experienced.
Since such an experienced professional judge believes in the link be-
tween abortion and family problems in daily life, this might be convin-
cing to people who are having problems with their children. Murakami
adds a sentence that ‘teenage girls’ prostitution for money also stems
from legal abortion’ (Katsuta, in Senseiren 1983: 17; Murakami 1982:
21-22).
Not only problems with pubescent children, but also friction between
husbands and wives, and sickness of family members, were all pre-
sented as problems caused by abortion. Anti-abortion activists explained
that this came about due to the friction that emerged when a woman
had an abortion despite her husband’s desire to have another child, or
despite the desire of her children to have another sister or brother.
The anti-abortion argument also often included presenting a causal
link between abortion and socially tragic incidents. Murders, domestic
violence, drug addiction – all these acts in their view were caused by
the devaluation of life, having roots in legal abortion (Murakami 1982:
8-9; statements by Murakami, in the House of Councillors ibid 1982:
5). One example they gave was the murder of children. Obviously, most
people would find these incidents to be cruel and tragic. Everywhere,
the anti-abortion activists said, since time immemorial, there have been
cases of mothers murdering newly born babies or small children. Mura-
kami argued that, because abortion was legal, women were also careless
about their ‘born’ babies. To show the loss of respect for life, Murakami
cited a statement made in court by a woman who had left her baby in a
coin-locker: ‘what is the difference between killing a child before or
after its birth?’ (Katsuta, in Seiseiren 1983: 17; Murakami 1982: 8-9).
Since the anti-abortion argument was often constructed in such a
way that an audience would focus its attention on the degradation of
women’s morality, women who had experienced abortion may well won-
der if they are immoral, or whether their acts contributed to miserable
incidents in society.
This way of reasoning appealed to the ‘guilt’ of women who had ex-
perienced abortion. Actually, Seichoˆ no ie opened a business, known as
Mizuko-kuyoˆ, to ‘console the souls of aborted foetuses’. Out of guilt, a
number of women resorted to these services. More details of Mizuko-
kuyoˆ will be given in chapter 5.
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Strategies to limit women’s access to abortion
Secular, sympathetic terminology
During the 1980s, the anti-abortion argument used more general, or
‘secular’ vocabulary and concepts, whereas during the 1970s they had
made use of more concepts and terminology that drew upon their reli-
gious and spiritual beliefs, such as rei. Their strategy in the 1980s was
to appeal to the sympathy and anger of the general public. In doing so,
‘biological facts’ were often used to describe a foetus’ senses using pic-
tures, displaying downy hair, and the umbilical cord. Biological descrip-
tions were used in order to argue that a foetus is a being independent
from a woman.
In describing abortion, a foetus is often called Aka-chan, ‘little baby’
in English. Although they are still unborn, they referred to them as if
they were already born. Abortion is given dismal names, such as ‘clean-
ing up a mess after random sex’ (Seiseiren 1983: 62), ‘traffic accidents’
(Murakami 1982: 7), and ‘Nazi genocide’ (Seiseiren 1983: 9; Murakami
1982: 8), and it was chosen by women with ‘an excessive sense of
rights’ (Murakami 1982: prologue), who regard a foetus to be an ‘appen-
dix, infection, or a mass of meat’ (Murakami 1982: 8). The poem re-
cited by Murakami in the Diet is typical: putting forth a humanist air to
draw sympathy from the listeners, while blaming women for abortion,
he states that women are ignorant and thoughtless.
In order to convince their audience and to consolidate their position,
anti-abortion activists in the 1980s used statements from people who in
general were held in high regard, such as university professors, lawyers,
novelists, ministers, and actors.13 Also, women were often cited to back
up their argument, such as the aforementioned Sono. Mother Teresa
was invited to Tokyo by Seiseiren. She had a breakfast meeting with
Diet members at the Hilton Hotel in Tokyo on 23 April 1982, arranged
by Murakami. 230 Diet members, from across party lines, attended the
breakfast meeting. A picture of Mother Teresa and Murakami, smiling
at each other and shaking hands, is on the first page of Murakami’s
book.14
Appealing to people’s sense of justice and using gentle phrases like ‘a
small life must be protected’, and ‘the life of a human being is more
important than the earth’,15 anti-abortion activists were successful in at-
tracting a broader range of support than during the 1970s. The new
emphasis was on the vulnerability of a small life, in stark contrast to
women’s movement expressions, such as ‘women decide whether to
have an abortion or not’ and ‘it is women’s freedom to decide whether
to give birth or not’. Members of the women’s movement in the 1980s
commented that, ‘it is difficult to gather signatures to oppose the dele-
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tion of the economic reasons clause. While the proponents can gather
signatures without any explanation save for the phrase ‘respect for life’,
it takes us around half an hour to explain why we oppose the attempt’
(Taniai 1983c: 205). Anti-abortion rhetoric was much more acceptable,
appealing more to the sympathy of the general public than women’s
rights issues.
Target groups
(a) Housewives
The biggest group that anti-abortion activists targeted with their rhetoric
was women in their 30s and 40s, many of whom have ever considered
abortion. Most of the women were housewives, their pregnancy was
usually unplanned, and they usually already had one or more children.
Many housewives who had already had an abortion felt what could be
called a sense of guilt, or ‘apology to the foetus’ (Taniai, 1983b). These
women usually felt that abortion should be avoided. Moreover, their
children were often in their adolescence and some of their parents were
having difficulties. In this situation, the anti-abortion propaganda link-
ing abortion to family problems resonated with the guilt the women
were feeling (ibid).
It should be noted that those who signed their names to the anti-
abortion petitions were not always subscribing to anti-abortion ideas.
Anti-abortion activists were able to appeal to people’s belief that they
should ‘protect small lives’. Suppose one is asked to answer if he/she
supports killing. Almost everyone would answer that they are ‘against
killing’. Although women’s demand to secure access to abortion is not
a recommendation for abortion itself, a majority of people seem to be
confused on this point. For example, the idea that abortion should be
avoided as much as possible and the anti-abortion idea of outlawing
abortion, are often lumped together. Thus, in attracting a mass audi-
ence, anti-abortion activists did not require people to think deeply about
the issue of pregnancy and abortion. They also avoided contact with
people who were actively engaged in the issue of women’s reproductive
rights. Female writer and former Diet member, Noriko Taniai, who was
also active in the women’s reproductive health movement, tells of her
experience in this respect:
I approached Seichoˆ no ie to interview them, but I was refused
because they did not have time. I said I just wanted to listen to
their position. Then they accepted my request, and a young wo-
man agreed to speak to me. [...] I was told that I might neither
take notes nor cite any of the discussion in my writing at all. My
face and name were known to their Tokyo headquarters, so later
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I phoned the Saitama headquarters, on the outskirts of Tokyo.
When I said that I was interested in ‘repeal of the economic rea-
sons clause,’ they thought that I shared their opinions, and they
kindly sent me a lot of printed materials. [...] This was the only
way I could obtain materials from them, because if I approached
them straightforwardly, I would be refused right away. Citing
their argument from the printed materials, I wrote an article in a
journal.
More than three months later, the Seichoˆ no ie Saitama head-
quarters telephoned me three times to accuse me –‘You are un-
fair. You cheated us. You are not a housewife!’ I had not intro-
duced myself as a housewife, nor did I say I was not a house-
wife. I was doing household chores at home as well as working
outside the home. – They can talk to housewives, but not to a
writer; they can send materials to housewives, but not to a writer
– What does it mean? I said to them, ‘If you have a claim, please
criticise the content of my article. If this is not satisfactory, why
don’t you write an article yourself, to the same journal, debating
my position?’ I hung up the phone.
More than two weeks have passed now, but I have heard noth-
ing since then. I do not know if they are now concocting a strat-
egy for revenge, or if they are writing an article, but anyway, it is
clear to me whom they are targeting (Taniai 1983a: 173-174).
(b) Teenagers
Not only in the arguments posed by anti-abortion activists, but also gen-
erally in Japan in the 1980s, the idea that sexual intercourse should oc-
cur only within marriage was shared as an ethical principle, especially
among those who believed that everyone would eventually be married
someday, marriage being a normal rite of passage. In reality, however, it
was taken for granted that couples were having sexual intercourse be-
fore marriage, people simply did not talk about it very loudly. Appearing
to stick to ethical principles implied that one behaved responsibly.
This position against pre-marital sex was applied even more strongly
in the case of teenagers. Since teenagers’ duty was seen to be studying
at school, having sexual intercourse would be interpreted as a sign that
the teen no longer fit the ideal image of a Japanese teenager. Seichoˆ no
ie mobilised high school students more than volunteers of other ages to
organise signature campaigns, lectures, and festivals. Taniai says,
‘young high school students with a full sense of justice, seemed to mix
up their own criterion of self-control and others’ ways of living. Accord-
ingly, the students strongly insisted that the Eugenic Protection Law
should be revised to limit women’s access to abortion.’16 Students were
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the major force in collecting signatures for the anti-abortion movement
in the 1980s. In 1982, more than ten high schools in Saitama prefec-
ture had ‘respect for life’ exhibitions and lectures (Taniai 1983c: 199-
202). These were set up with the support of Seichoˆ no ie. Both female
and male students were active; for boys, taking an attitude against abor-
tion was comparable to being responsible for their partners. The teen-
age activists’ attitude of innocent seriousness appealed to a mass audi-
ence as well as to their own classmates. The anti-abortion movement in
the 1970s had not mobilised teens as volunteers to this extent, so mobi-
lisation of high school students during the 1980s was their strategy
after the evaluation of the 1970 activities
The response from the women’s reproductive health movement
Establishment of the movement liaison committee ‘Soshiren’
Immediately after the proposal to eliminate the economic reasons
clause was made by Murakami in 1982, women all over Japan got to-
gether, taking action to prevent the proposal from being submitted to
the Diet. In April 1983, women from Women in Action formed Yuˆseiho-
gohoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai (A women’s group organisation to
fight against the attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law); women
not affiliated with Women in Action also joined in. They organised ac-
tivities, including study meetings, to analyse the situation and to deepen
their understanding of the issues, as not all the women had participated
in earlier activities during the 1970s. Through the study meetings, it
was agreed that Murakami’s proposal represented the state’s interests,
using women’s bodies in order to increase the birth rate, to make wo-
men take on the welfare role at home, and to also provide cheap labour
(Kôdôsuru kai kirokushi henshû iinkai 1999: 178). To fight against the
revision of the Eugenic Protection Law, a special committee called Yuˆsei-
hogohoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai (women’s alliance to fight against
the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law) was established by Women
in Action.
In July the women’s alliance held a meeting under the slogan ‘Hitler-
no-kamen-o-kabutta-Mother-Teresa’ (Hitler masquerading as ‘Mother Ter-
esa’). In August an audience of various women’s organisations, ‘82 Yuˆ-
seihogohoˆ-kaiaku-soshi-renrakukai’ (82 Eugenic Protection Act Revision
Prevention Liaison Committee; Soshiren) was established as a national
movement, so that women in remote areas could also raise their voices
against the proposal. Before this period, most movement activities
tended to be in Tokyo.
In its initial declaration, Soshiren summarised its views about the pro-
posal to eliminate the economic reasons clause under two points.17 The
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first point was that, although there was no proposal to introduce the se-
lective abortion clause, they believed that deleting the economic reasons
clause would eventually lead to a selective abortion clause, because once
access to abortion was limited, other criteria would be necessary to al-
low for abortion. The introduction of a selective abortion clause would
quietly pressure women into giving birth to disability-free children.
Both women and disabled people agreed on this point.
The other point raised by Soshiren was that without the economic rea-
sons clause pressure on women to stick to traditional norms and gen-
der roles would be increased. Soshiren argued that the entire anti-abor-
tion argument was based on two images of women (1) mothers and wi-
ves, who have sexual intercourse only with their husbands and only for
reproduction (as ‘a child-producing machine’) (Yûseihogohôkaiaku =
kenpô-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai 1982: 25-29), or (2) prostitutes who
tend to men’s sexual needs.18 The group also argued that underlying
the attempt to repeal the clause was the assumption that women needed
to be guided by men, who would serve as women’s guardians.19
No one can refute the ‘respect for life’ argument, as was indicated in
the anti-abortion side’s position. However, another argument was:
How to perceive life, and how to respect life, is up to the judg-
ment of an individual woman and her way of living. The state, or
a specific religious group, cannot impose ideas about life on indi-
vidual women. It is fascism. [...] So, ‘respect for life’ by a pro-life
group is a ‘Hitler masquerading as Mother Teresa’.20
Therefore, during the 1980s, the focal points of the women’s reproduc-
tive health movement were to ‘say NO to oppressive norms for women
inherent in the proposed revision of the law’ and to demand that ‘wo-
men decide about reproduction’. Hence, the central rhetoric was ‘umu-
umanai-wa-onna-ga-kimeru’ (women decide to give birth or not), ‘onna-
no-jikokettei-ken’ (women’s right to self-determination), and ‘umu-uma-
nai-no-sentaku-no-jiyuˆ-wa-onna-no-kihontekijinken’ (the freedom to give
birth or not is women’s fundamental human right).21
On 5 January 1983, students’ organisations were also established
within Soshiren to bring the issue to the universities. They were called
‘Yuˆseihogohoˆ-kaiaku-o-soshi-suru-gakusei-no-kai’ (Student group to pre-
vent the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law) and there were groups
at ten universities.22 Like many of the women within Women in Action,
women from various backgrounds, mostly in their thirties or forties,
participated in Soshiren activities. A considerable number of women
who had been in the Women’s Liberation Movement in the 1970s also
participated in this struggle, and many of them were, by this time, in
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their thirties. The variety in background and age was greater than had
been the case during the 1970s.
In early 1983, when the tension about whether or not the proposal to
eliminate the economic reasons clause would be officially proposed to
the Diet came to a peak, other groups also expressed their opposition to
the revision of the law. These included the Family Planning Federation
of Japan, the Japan Association for Lawyers, the Japan Association for
Nurses, and the Japan Medical Association. Female Diet members,
some of whom were from the Liberal Democratic Party, also formed
their own cross-party alliance to oppose the change. The motivation for
opposing the revision of the law differed from one group to another,
but their combined actions helped to stop the change.
In the end, the anti-abortion attempt to repeal the clause was pre-
vented. Women collected 1,499,652 signatures from people opposing
the proposal, while anti-abortion activists were able to collect only one
million signatures. 264 local governments said ‘no’ to the idea of delet-
ing the economic reasons clause, while only 130 supported the propo-
sal.23 Although the anti-abortion rhetoric was viewed as sympathetic,
and easy to accept, if women’s movement organisations took the time
to appeal to other women as well as men on the basis of the arguments
outlined above, people agreed that it would be a problem if abortion
were to be outlawed.24
The vocabulary of the women’s reproductive health movement in the 1980s:
reproductive rights, a right to self-determination, and human rights
The new term jiko-kettei, or self-determination, helped the 1980s wo-
men’s reproductive health movement to attract a wider range of women
than during the 1970s, because of the phrase’s directness and clarity.
The term points to the fact that so far women’s lives had been deter-
mined by others, and that women were being oppressed. In using the
term, the movement could also declare that their argument regarding
rights was oriented towards the oppressor, or towards the state and
men, and not towards the foetus. Moreover, by speaking of a ‘right to
self-determination’, the demand from the women’s movement was clar-
ified: women do not want others to intervene in the issues pertaining to
their bodies; they want to decide these issues for themselves.
‘Freedom to choose to give birth or not is a women’s fundamental
human right’ was another central argument (Yûseihogohôkaiaku = ken-
pô-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai 1982). This rhetoric also made it easier
for women’s movement activists to use the term ‘right’, claiming that
women are ‘human beings’ with full personhood and character, not a
mere koumi-kikai or ‘a machine to produce children’. The rhetoric of
‘abortion is a women’s basic human right’ also implies that access to
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abortion should be a basic resource, not a luxury, to which all women
should be entitled. Linking abortion to human rights also meant that an
abortion became an event that could happen in any female human life,
not necessarily only when a woman was promiscuous or ‘abnormal’.
Thus, by combining ‘self-determination’ and ‘human rights’ those
supporting access to abortion could claim that the absence of legal abor-
tion was a violation of women’s basic well-being, and that there were
two situations in which women sometimes have to give birth although
they do not want to, and where women sometimes have an abortion
although they do not want to. The directness and clarity of this message
attracted support from women more easily than had been the case dur-
ing the 1970s, and as a result, more disabled women were involved in
Soshiren’s activities during the 1980s (Kôdô-suru-onnatachi-no-kai-kiro-
kushû-henshû-iinkai 1999: 182).
People within the women’s reproductive health movement could use
‘rights’ more confidently than they did during the 1970s, also because
by the 1980s ‘women’s right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive
rights’ were supported at the international level. There was the UN Wo-
men’s Conference in 1975, CEDAW (1979), and the International Wo-
men and Health Conference in 1984, where women from all over the
world clearly declared ‘no’ to state population (quantity) control, bring-
ing the issues of the ‘right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive
rights’ to the fore.25 These events provided support to Japanese women
using these phrases, providing them with a sense of solidarity with wo-
men in other regions.26 At the same time, the international acknowl-
edgement of ‘women’s reproductive rights’ made it difficult for anti-
abortion activists to attack the rhetoric straightforwardly. The issue of
the legitimate power of international treaties and the usage of ‘rights’ in
Japan will be analysed in chapter 5.
The reaction of the disabled people’s movement
Since there was no overt attempt to introduce the selective abortion
clause, and disabled people were more involved in the independent liv-
ing movement during the 1980s, the debate was not as heated as it had
been during the 1970s.
The independent living movement
The aim of the independent living movement was that disabled people
live in local communities with assistance, instead of spending their
lives being taken care of in institutes or parents’ homes, having their af-
fairs decided by others. Hence, the disabled people’s movement was
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now occupied in securing assistance and negotiating with the govern-
ment about the social security system.27 Disabled people were moti-
vated to become active in the movement, since 1981 was the Interna-
tional Year of Disabled People.28 After 1981, the Japanese government
started improving the living conditions of disabled people. Since the
central aim of the independent living movement was that disabled peo-
ple should have the opportunity to decide themselves about how they
live, and then be able implement that decision with assistance, ‘self-de-
termination’ also became a key element to the rhetoric in this move-
ment.29
However, some disabled people did oppose the attempt to revise the
Eugenic Protection Law, and they debated this issue with the women’s
reproductive health movement.
The disabled people’s movements’ position on the attempt by anti-abortion
activists to delete the economic reasons clause
People within the disabled people’s movement suspected that the rea-
son that there was no attempt to introduce a selective abortion clause
was due to a coordinated effort designed to undermine the solidarity of
the disabled people’s movement and the women’s reproductive health
movement in their combined opposition to the Eugenic Protection Law
(Araki 1983: 36-37; Hori 1983: 83). They also argued that the draft pro-
posal was an attempt to create a humanist image appealing to the pub-
lic by saying all lives were equal, in order to gain popularity from a
mass audience (Hori 1983: 83). Moreover, the disabled people’s organi-
zations believed that anti-abortion activists wanted to project a positive
image for the upcoming general election in the autumn of 1983. People
within the disabled people’s movement therefore suspected that the
anti-abortion strategy would be to first try to limit women’s access to
abortion and then introduce a selective abortion clause (Araki 1983: 36).
The women’s movement also suspected this.
In refuting the anti-abortion arguments, the disabled people’s move-
ment focused on the anti-abortion activists’ emphasis on the decline of
the Japanese nation in terms of productivity. Toshikazu Hori, a repre-
sentative of a group of people with visual disabilities, stated: ‘When the
vitality of a nation is mentioned by anti-abortionists in terms of a de-
crease in the birth rate, this statement is often associated with the eco-
nomic power of the country’ (Hori 1983: 86). ‘The ethics of productiv-
ity’ – the very criterion for defining ‘disability’, according to the analysis
by the disabled people’s movement, had consistently been a target of
criticism within their movement since the 1970s. Hori continues;
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Murakami talks about the dignity of the life of a foetus, showing
pictures of its eyes, mouth, and ears. But if there are deformities
in those parts, would he talk about ‘respect for life’ in the same
manner? Murakami talks about the voiceless cry of an aborted
foetus, but does he hear our voice, the voice of disabled people
struggling to survive in society? (1983: 86-87)
Thus, disabled people concluded that the ‘life’ portion of ‘pro-life’ was
exclusively that of disability-free people, and that disabled people were
to be eliminated. The disabled people’s groups argued that the attempt
to delete the economic reasons clause would not stop at limiting wo-
men’s access to abortion, but that it would lead to quality control of the
nation, and the introduction of a selective abortion clause (Hori 1983:
87-88). The disabled people’s movement also defined the attempt as a
politically right-wing move; on this point both women’s reproductive
health movement and disabled people’s movement activists agreed.30
The response of the disabled people’s movement also included criti-
cism of a number of policies that aimed at strengthening the sexual di-
vision of labour. As mentioned earlier, toward the end of the 1970s the
LDP issued drafts of policies to ‘consolidate the home base’. This trend
continued, and when Nakasone became Prime Minister in 1982, he em-
phasised the ‘self-effort of individuals in the field of welfare’ and ‘wel-
fare policies based on the home’ during his inauguration speech. Peo-
ple within the disabled people’s movement suspected that this was in
effect a preparation for re-armament by cutting the welfare budget.
Therefore, these policies would serve primarily to hinder the promotion
of independent living, because maintaining financial support was essen-
tial for independent living. So, ‘welfare policies based on the home’
would mean going back to their parents’ home, with parents providing
care.
Women in the reproductive health movement analysed the effect of
the policy on women in the same way, because obviously the state was
expecting that with a reduction in the welfare budget women would
take on the responsibilities for welfare, taking care of children, the el-
derly, and sick people. So women did not welcome this trend either.
Therefore, on this point, the disabled people’s movement and the wo-
men’s reproductive health movement shared a common interest. In re-
futing the proposal, the disabled people’s groups also attacked the retro-
gressive trend in the gendered division of labour. Disabled people de-
manded the creation of an environment where mothers could take care
of disabled children more easily. On the point of the idealised image of
womanhood, the disabled people’s movement also changed their argu-
ment, moving a step closer to the position held by the women’s repro-
ductive health movement.
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In this way, the disabled people’s movement viewed the attempt to re-
vise the Eugenic Protection Law as the beginning of population control,
both in terms of quality and quantity, undoubtedly leading to a selective
abortion clause. During the 1970s, their position on the attempt to limit
women’s access to abortion was not as strongly positive or negative as it
had been strongly negative against the attempt to introduce a selective
abortion clause. It is therefore remarkable that the movement’s argu-
ment shifted in the 1980s to include criticism of the attempt to limit
women’s access to abortion. The hesitation in attacking the attempt to
limit women’s access to abortion in the 1970s had been due to doubts
held by the disabled people about women’s internalised discrimination
against people with disabilities. But now, disabled people were also try-
ing to cooperate with the women’s reproductive health movement.
However, this proved not to be easy at all.
The disabled people’s movement’s criticism of the women’s reproductive
health movement
Compared to the 1970s, there was now more understanding and colla-
boration between the two movements. This was partly due to the fact
that during the 1970s people in the women’s liberation movement sin-
cerely debated issues about ‘discrimination against disability’ and
‘rights’. As a result, out of this 1970s debate grew the basis of respect
and understanding and therefore more scope for collaboration in the
1980s. The WLM’s activists’ earnest attitude in confronting the abortion
debate led to a degree of trust from disabled people which became evi-
dent in the 1980s. People in the disabled people’s movement could not
help but accept such terms as ‘reproductive rights’ and ‘women decide
about abortion’ because of the new international recognition of these
concepts and terms.
Moreover, during the ten-year period since the original challenge to
the Eugenic Protection Law, disabled men had experienced their female
partners giving birth, and sometimes their partners having an abortion.
Statements were made by disabled men that ‘during the 1970s, we only
accused women, without paying attention to the situation in which
mothers experience hardship in rearing disabled children’ (Araki 1983:
43) or ‘(after witnessing what happened to my partner, I now realise
that) women are not having abortions because they like it’.31 By the
1980s many of them realised the pain of abortion, and understood that
women do not choose abortion for trivial reasons.
The other critical factor was that disabled women finally came to the
fore in the disabled people’s movement, as more and more of these wo-
men had started living independently, sometimes giving birth to chil-
dren themselves. In 1985, disabled women in Japan established a group
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called Disabled People International (DPI) Network of Women with Dis-
abilities. Its aim was to create space for disabled women’s voices to be
heard within the disabled people’s movement, which was still repre-
sented mainly by disabled men. Toward the end of the 1980s there was
a critical change in the consciousness of disabled women. Yûho Asaka,
one of the most active disabled women, went to the US to learn co-
counselling. Through this counselling, disabled women activists started
affirming themselves, loving and linking themselves to others, instead
of attacking or hating others, which was a trend before, coming from
frustration in life due to their discriminated position in society. Yonezu
reports that ‘during this period, disabled women started expressing
themselves gently and openly with a huge confidence. Because of this
change, disabled women came to the fore, instead of being subordi-
nated by male disabled people in the disabled people’s movement’
(1998: 237-238).
Consequently, there were more wheelchairs to be found in demon-
strations initiated by Soshiren against the proposal to delete the econom-
ic reasons clause during the 1980s. As a result, this period saw a
change in the meaning of ‘women’ within the women’s reproductive
health movement, originally from being exclusively disability-free wo-
men to include more disabled women.
With regard to reproduction, during the 1970s, it was unlikely that
disabled women had thought of Datai-no-kenri, or ‘women’s right to
abortion’, as their most urgent issue, because for these women it was
more plausible to dream of having a lover, getting married, becoming
pregnant, giving birth, and raising a child, to try to conform to domi-
nant norms of being a wife and mother. Now during the 1980s, preg-
nancy, delivery, and even abortion was within the reach of disabled
women. The new rhetoric in the women’s reproductive health move-
ment, ‘women decide to give birth or not to’ and ‘women’s right to self-
determination’, left both options open: birth or abortion.
But there were still crucial disagreements between the two move-
ments. The first was about rights. For example, Chizuko Kawakami, a
disabled woman, stated that, ‘giving birth or not giving birth is not an
issue of rights or duty, and it is not proper to use rights for the issue of
reproduction’ (Fukushiroˆdoˆ 1983: 28-29). Yoshiaki Araki, who had CP
and was the father of two children, wrote, ‘“A right to give birth or not
to” is confining reproductive issues to women, eliminating foetuses and
male partners from the discussion, while dialogue between the couple
is crucial’ (Araki 1983: 41). The statement from Kawakami stems from
the difference in the meaning of giving birth for women with and with-
out disabilities based on the fact that women without disabilities have
been expected or sometimes even forced to give birth, while disabled
women have been expected not to give birth. Therefore, giving birth is,
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instead of a right, rather a blessing or good luck in the lives of disabled
women, as are choices about reproduction. Araki’s statement stems
from the fact that, according to the prevailing social norms at that time,
disabled men were also expected not to father children. Moreover, a be-
lief was still shared amongst disabled men that, ‘being disabled is a
more urgent problem than being a woman’. Therefore, as a man with a
disability, he could not accept women monopolising the issue of repro-
duction, by labelling it a ‘woman’s right’ which sounds as if women are
eliminating men from the decision-making process surrounding repro-
duction.
Moreover, the argument by disabled people held that difficult condi-
tions should not provide an excuse for mothers to kill or abort disabled
children. ‘Disabled women give birth to children even in highly difficult
conditions. It is too easy for disability-free women to say that they can-
not give birth because the conditions are difficult’ – this was a state-
ment made by a man in a wheelchair during a debate between disabil-
ity-free women and disabled people (Soshiren 1983: 5). Here the diffi-
culties between women with and without disabilities are being weighed,
and it is assumed that the difficulties of disabled women are heavier.
Therefore, disabled activists believe the term ‘right’ should not be used
by women arguing for access to abortion. Further, there were
comments from disabled women about the rhetoric of ‘right to self--
determination’ being espoused by disability-free women, in which they
noted ‘you can decide, but I cannot’ (Yonezu 1998: 236). So the term
‘self-determination’ was just the beginning of the possibility of colla-
boration between disability-free and disabled women.
Disabled people’s reluctance to consider the rights of women was not
only based on the ‘hierarchy of oppression’ – that is, the idea that dis-
abled people were more oppressed than women (see the diagram ‘Pyra-
mid of power relations amongst women and disabled people’ in chapter
3) – but also on a general lack of familiarity with the concept of rights
amongst disabled people. Rights do indeed have strongly intellectual
and abstract aspects. Moreover, there was a feeling among disabled peo-
ple that ‘rights’, which are founded in the law, are applicable to citizens
protected by the law. At that time, however, disabled people viewed
themselves as falling outside the protection of the law.32 For example,
during the 1970s and 1980s, even apparently trivial matters such as the
time to go to the toilet or how long one’s hair should be, were regulated
in disabled people’s residential care in order to lessen the workload of
staff who worked there. Disabled people simply had no say, even in
such personal matters. This contrasts sharply with the decision-making
rights and powers of disability-free people.
From my interactions with women (both with and without disabil-
ities), and taking into account the abovementioned arguments made by
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disabled women, it’s clear that disability free women within the wo-
men’s rights movement were confronting questions such as: Do (wo-
men’s) rights apply to disabled people – people in residential care
homes whose daily lives have been totally controlled by others? Do dis-
abled people have a right to express their emotions regarding their ex-
periences of being oppressed? At that time, many disabled people did
not have access to the same educational opportunities as disability-free
people. Questions were also raised about whether a political concept
such as ‘rights’ was effective terminology in the context of disability, gi-
ven that ‘rights’ was a term used, on the whole, by citizens who did not
experience discrimination. A disabled woman activist, Mitsui, says that
when she moved from a disabled people’s residential institute into so-
ciety at large, the first emotion she had to confront was ‘anger’. But this
was not due to her understanding of the concept of ‘rights’, simply that
she realised how oppressed she had been inside the institute.
The suitability of the term ‘rights’ is worthy of elaboration: On the
face of it, one might think that disabled women’s objection to the termi-
nology was rooted in anger about and awareness of discrimination and
oppression in comparison to their non-disabled peers. However, the de-
bates which took place between non-disabled and disabled women sug-
gest otherwise. The objection to the term ‘rights’ was based on legal no-
tions. Stories such Mitsui’s, highlight the fact that the concept of hu-
man rights did not appear to apply to disabled women in Japan. They
were outside of the framework of the law’s application. The point
should be made, however, that it wasn’t just a struggle for recognition
within the framework of the law and human rights. Disabled women
also wanted recognition that their needs were sometimes different from
those of non-disabled women. It wasn’t simply a question of becoming
equal and ‘the same’.
Questions of rights were extended to the question ‘who are women
in “women’s rights”?’, too. Do rights represent women with disabilities
at all? Does the concept of rights appeal to disabled women? This ques-
tion of who is included in the term ‘women’ is not confined to disabled
women; does ‘women’ represent women in general, also those who do
not question the politics of reproduction? (The question about who is
represented by ‘women’ in the phrase ‘women’s rights’ and who feels
that ‘rights’ is their ‘own’ concept and term, will be discussed in chap-
ter 7.)
Another criticism from the disabled people’s movement was that wo-
men in the reproductive health movement in the 1980s were focusing
excessively on the acts of ‘giving birth and not giving birth’. The dis-
abled people’s movement maintained that the fundamental problem
was the Eugenic Protection Law itself, and that its abolition should
eventually be the aim. But both movements argued:
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Confining the argument to whether to revise or maintain the law
about the conditions for legal abortion, and letting the articles on
eugenic surgery stand, just as happened during the 1970s, will
not solve disagreements between the movements of women and
disabled people. [...] The law should be repealed in order to abol-
ish discrimination against disabled people, and to secure self-de-
termination in women’s reproduction, because under the Eu-
genic Protection Law disabled people were made the target of
sterilisation legally, and women’s sexuality and reproduction
were controlled in accordance with the national interests (Kawa-
kami 1983: 34-35).
The situation was that the women’s reproductive movement concen-
trated completely on preventing the revision of the Eugenic Protection
Law, and this meant maintaining the law in order to keep the economic
reasons clause. Realistically, the best that women in the movement
could do was to prevent the deletion of the economic reasons clause.
However, the discovery of this point was crucial for the future of the
disabled peoples’ movement and the women’s movement, and towards
the 1990s the women’s reproductive health movement started becom-
ing more and more concerned about the ‘total abolishment of the law’
and ‘making a new law’.
Although disabled people and women in women’s reproductive
health movement moved a step closer to each other, there was still criti-
cism from the disabled people’s movement, that women without dis-
abilities did not really understand the reality of the discrimination faced
by disabled people. Disabled people remained sceptical about the ser-
iousness of women inside the reproductive health movement, not to
mention women outside the movement.
Rights in the 1980s
In the 1980s, because of the use of the concepts ‘women’s right to self-
determination’ and ‘reproductive rights’, the movement’s message be-
came clearer than it had been during the 1970s, when it focused on ‘op-
position to state intervention in women’s bodies’. As a result, women
with more varied backgrounds joined in the movement’s activities. The
emergence of the use of these phrases was partly due to international
public opinion. By the early 1980s, ‘reproductive rights’ and ‘self-deter-
mination’ became a common vocabulary not only inside women’s
movements, but also among the Japanese general public when discuss-
ing reproductive issues. Given this situation, Japanese women could
use international treaties and arguments to oppose the state’s attempt
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to outlaw abortion. Anti-abortion activists could not call women’s rights
‘women’s selfishness’ any more.
In the 1980s, more disabled women participated in women’s repro-
ductive health movement activities, not only because of the increased
inclusiveness of the movement’s message, but also because they be-
came more prominent within the disabled people’s movement. Their
participation helped to broaden the meaning of ‘women’ but at the
same time led to a new question of ‘who are “women” in the rhetoric
of “women’s rights”?’ To some women, such as some disabled women,
the term ‘right’ remained inappropriate in their efforts to enhance their
social positions.
Moreover, the 1980s saw a rapid advancement and increasing avail-
ability of reproductive technologies to detect deformities in foetuses. Be-
cause abortion includes selective abortion, disabled women did not feel
totally comfortable with the ‘women’s rights’ rhetoric. Therefore the
tension between the movements of women and disabled people did not
decrease, but the debate continued about whether women’s right to
self-determination included the abortion of deformed foetuses. The
question about who ‘women’ and ‘self’ in ‘women’s right to self-deter-
mination’ were, in the practice of reproductive technology, is introduced
in chapters 6 and 7.
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5 Analysis of the Discourse on the Concept of
Individual, Political Rights in the 1980s
The notion of rights was more freely and frequently used during the
1980s than it was during the 1970s because of the way the term ‘right’
was used in the phrases ‘women’s right to self-determination’ and ‘re-
productive rights’. So it can be concluded that the way the term ‘right’
is used in political struggles matters. However, where does the legiti-
macy for these phrases come from? In addition to the way ‘rights’ was
used, there were more factors that provided women with the confidence
to use this term.
One factor was that these phrases were used and were legitimised in
international conferences between the 1970s and 1980s, such as the
UN Women’s Conference in 1975, and in the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
adopted by the UN General Security Assembly in 1979. Indeed, Japa-
nese women in the 1980s quoted from CEDAW in order to strengthen
their political arguments, and this worked well. So why and how did in-
ternational conferences and treaties play a role in helping to strengthen
arguments in support of women’s rights in Japan? How did an interna-
tional debate back up political movements’ use of ‘rights’? This ques-
tion can be put in another form: ‘where do rights come from, and how
is their use justified?’ This chapter primarily seeks to answer this ques-
tion, in order to discuss the characteristics of rights and the source of
legitimacy for the usage of rights.
Another major factor for the more frequent use of ‘rights’ in the
1980s was the participation of younger people in the women’s move-
ment, who had not been a part of the 1970s student movement or
WLM. The participation of new people influenced the way in which the
1980s women’s movement developed its aims, strategies, political lob-
bying, and public campaigning. How and why these differences affected
the construction of the abortion debate in the 1980s, including the way
in which ‘rights’ was used and how discrimination was viewed, is taken
up in this chapter.
In the second part of this chapter, a debate amongst women in repro-
ductive movements about the possibility and effectiveness of rights in
1980s Japan is analysed. Partly because of the success of the business
of consoling the souls of aborted foetuses, or mizuko-kuyoˆ, initiated by
anti-abortion activists, there was a public debate among Japanese wo-
men in the reproductive health movement about whether or not ‘rights’
should be used in public Japanese abortion debates. The mizuko-kuyoˆ
businesses peaked during the 1980s, when there was an attempt to out-
law abortion. The discussion in the debate on mizuko-kuyoˆ among wo-
men in the reproductive health movement contends that the phenom-
enon of mizuko-kuyoˆ means that the political rhetoric of ‘reproductive
rights’ or ‘women’s right to self-determination’ did not alleviate wo-
men’s ambivalent feelings about having had an abortion. Hence, in the
context of this debate, the use of the concept of ‘rights’ is questioned,
as ‘rights’ did not appear to fully empower women who had experi-
enced abortions.
On the frequent use of the term ‘right’ in the 1980s
The first factor for the usage of rights: The power of international conferences
and treaties
From where do rights emerge?
When we use the term ‘right’ on what do we base the claim and how
do we justify it? To begin with, we assume that there is a more compre-
hensive and legitimate set of values that covers the parties involved, as
a tool of justification for making a certain claim, such as a legal rule, a
political system, a rule for economic management, or ethical values,
and they may be either formal or informal. For example, employees are
covered by company rules. If one employee acts against another em-
ployee by breaking a rule, the wronged employee can raise a demand,
which is justified by the existence of the rule. The employee can say, ‘I
have a right to make the claim because the rule justifies it.’ Likewise,
when a citizen in a nation state makes a claim, assuming that the claim
is in accordance with state law, the claim is considered valid and justi-
fied by the state law.
According to legal theories, a set of rules ought to be created in accor-
dance with the values shared by the members of the community, being
acknowledged as shared common sense or, ‘existing customs’
(Vinogradoff 1972: 50).1 The actual legitimacy of the rule emerges from
agreement among the involved parties. When members of the commu-
nity abide by a rule they are therefore not simply following arbitrary de-
cisions made by others, but are following conditions they have agreed
upon. The legitimacy of the rule lies in the fact that those who are party
to the rule are obliged to follow the rule, because it is shared by
members of the community as a basis for reconciliation within the
community.
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Some sets of values remain as norms or customs and are unwritten,
while others become a law, usually in a written form. All of these values
are supposed to cover the members within the community with certain
legitimacy; the members of the community are expected to abide by
these values. The purpose of the rule is to balance the interests of the
members of the community, articulating what is right and what is
wrong. Thus it can be said that a law is a collective form of rights, de-
claring what it is right to do. Here the intimacy between a law and a
right is revealed. Rights are activated and justified by a law, or a set of
rules. This is why, in many European languages, the law and a right are
often expressed using the same vocabulary, for example, jus, le droit, het
recht, diritto, derecho, pravo. The English language has two words – a
law and rights, and so do French, le loi and le droit, and Dutch, de wet
and het recht. However, the principle is true for the relationship be-
tween a law and rights as well – by contrasting right and wrong, the
ethical aspect of ‘a right’ or ‘what is right’, is emphasised in a law. For
example, not to pay a salary due to an employee would in many socie-
ties most probably be considered to be unfair. Thus, it is not right in
view of the law, and consequently the employee has a right to make a
claim (ibid: 24-25). Thus, in the genealogy of rights, the principle of law
is traditionally examined in ethics about what is right, and a right is
analysed with regard to the principle of justice. This is true for Aristo-
tle’s, Socrates’s, or Plato’s theories on the functions of law and the state
(ibid: 24).
In this way, the justification of a claim is established using the con-
cept of ‘rights’ and ‘what is right’, which emerges from rules or laws,
and which covers the involved parties with an authenticity based on the
principle of assumed agreement.
International human rights law, treaties, and the domestic law of a nation
state
In terms of legitimacy there are often hierarchies among sets of values.
This is to say that one set of values is covered by a more comprehensive
set of values, which is entitled to more authenticity. For example, a
company’s set of rules must be in accordance with the law in the state
where the company is located. If the company’s rule breaks the state
law, then an employee’s claim to change the company’s rule, for the im-
provement of the employee’s working conditions, for example, is justi-
fied by the state’s law. The claim is justifiable in the name of rights,
and this emerges from the state’s law.
The fact that a nation state signs an international treaty means that
the state agrees to abide by the treaty’s rules. Today, according to Cook,
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International law of state responsibility requires governments to
respect, ensure, and protect women’s international human
rights; when they fail to do so, sanctions can be enforced. Inter-
national law doctrine now goes beyond the classical state duty
not to interfere with individual human rights, to hold states ac-
countable for not acting positively to ensure rights. Moreover, [...]
international law now obligates states to use due diligence to pre-
vent, investigate, and punish systemic and egregious human
rights violations between private parties (Cook 1994: 6-7).
Also, she continues, because ‘the international law of state responsibil-
ity makes a state legally accountable for breaches of international obliga-
tions that are attributable or imputable to the state’ (ibid), the use of in-
ternational human rights law and treaties functions positively for wo-
men’s – and other – movement goals. This principle holds true for
such cases as Japan, where the women’s and the disabled people’s
movements targeted the state law and policies. These effects are due to
the fact that, in principle, the international laws/treaties are more legiti-
mate than the state’s domestic laws, according to the norm in today’s
international society. An individual is entitled to make a claim against
the state on the grounds of a ‘right’ which is guaranteed by an interna-
tional treaty. In this way, a right emerges from a set of values, which
was created as a result of agreement between the involved parties,
whether the disagreement be directly or indirectly represented by the
parties.2
By now, some of the characteristics of ‘rights’ have been revealed.
One of the characteristics is that the concept of a right has a close inti-
macy with ‘law,’ or a set of rules and norms, and these hold legitimacy
over the involved parties to compel them to follow the values. A ‘right’
is activated by what is articulated in the law as valid; without the justifi-
cation of a law, a right often cannot be activated.
Another characteristic of a ‘right’ is that it is raised when a claim is
supported by an authentic set of values; the claim could be more justifi-
ably made using ‘rights’ or right as in the opposite of wrong, more fre-
quently; the claims are right, not wrong, because the basic set of values
assures the claim. The concept of rights has a sacred image; once a
claim is linked with the concept of right in the sense of being correct,
the claim is not to be questioned.
Two facts can be deduced from this. One fact is, because a claim is
assured by the set of values that covers the parties involved, it is crucial
to strive for the improvement and reform of the set of values involving
the parties. Whether a claim is ethically right or wrong depends upon
the set of values upon which the claim bases its justification. Therefore,
women in the reproductive health movement diligently prevented the
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revision of the national law that would have limited access to abortion.
The revision would have legally nullified women’s rights and justified
the foetus’s rights. Because law is a sacred voice to judge what is right
and wrong, it is crucial for the women’s movement to monitor the con-
tent of the law and criticise and lobby for changes to unjust laws.
Another fact deduced from the characteristics of ‘right’ is that, in to-
day’s international world, there is an acknowledgement that an interna-
tional treaty has greater legitimacy than the domestic laws of a particu-
lar nation state, as long as the state has ratified the treaty. Therefore, a
social movement can make a claim for a certain resource, using ‘rights’
as a justification, even if the national law where they are operating does
not recognise the claim. Hence it is a crucial political aim for a given
social movement to lobby their government to sign an international
treaty in order to promote the movement’s goals, and to make the best
use of the international treaty, in order to persuade those in power to re-
form the national law and to abide by the international principles con-
tained in the treaty. In contrast to the 1970s, the Japanese women’s
movement during the 1980s could draw legitimacy from international
conventions, and this strengthened the justification of their claims.
Thus the movement could insist, against the state, that a claim was
‘right’, i.e., justifiable, in light of a convention, not ‘wrong’. One of the
reasons for the hesitation to use ‘rights’ during the 1970s was the lack
of an international conceptual argument, which would have had greater
legitimacy than the arguments that were then available within the do-
mestic arena. During the 1980s, the Japanese women’s movement
could use CEDAW and other international arguments to oppose the re-
vision of national law. Hence they could use the concept of ‘rights’ be-
cause their claim was justified by international treaties and arguments.
Source of power in international treaties
Why are international treaties entitled to such an influential function?
This question is answered by taking into account the Japanese social cli-
mate.
To begin with, the definition of the characteristics of a nation state is
raised. One real aspect of international relations shows that nation
states always have the potential to clash with other nation states because
of their pursuit of national interests. History has seen a series of tragic
acts and wars among nation states. As a consequence of people’s desire
for peace, the idea of making international leagues emerged, which pro-
vide rules for nation states, in order to maintain order and harmony.
The League of Nations, the United Nations, and a number of treaties all
embody attempts to restrict excessive acts by individual nation states.
In post-war Japan, to act against international agreements is likely to
invite severe public criticism, along the lines that ‘Japan is behind inter-
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national trends, Japan is old-fashioned.’ The Japanese government’s atti-
tude often changes according to arguments made in the international
realm, including in the field of disabled people, women, children, and
other important social fields.
Because an international treaty is international, it implies the idea
that its content goes beyond cultural or regional differences, being con-
structed by the consensus of the most up-to-date, professional thinkers.
This image implies that the content is ‘fundamental’ and ‘universal’
and must be applied to all human beings. As a matter of course, this is
not often the case. That is to say, there are often criticisms that the va-
lues in the treaties are primarily developed by ‘the West’ and that in fact
the standard of ‘international’ and ‘global’ is often the same as that of
the West. This is problematic, but social movements can make use of
this nature of an international treaty strategically. No matter how ‘Wes-
tern’ an international treaty may be, the moment that a state signs a
treaty, the state is regarded as having agreed to be under the umbrella
of the values the treaty embodies, as if these were their own values. If
the content of a treaty is useful for the progress of a movement in
achieving the movement’s targets in reforming states’ politics, why not
make the best use of it? Since the distance in positions between the
state and people within social groups differs from country to country,
international treaties and laws need improving and/or further interpre-
tation to be applicable to as many diverse cultures as possible. The ef-
fort to improve international treaties is more important than criticism
of, or a refusal to abide by, the treaties. Moreover, in the cases of such
countries as Japan, which has a deeply rooted idea that what is from the
West is more ‘advanced’ or ‘civilised’, the treaties function effectively to
persuade the government to accept certain points of view. It can even
be said that because ‘international’ is quite synonymous with ‘the West’
for many in Japan, international arguments and treaties can be signifi-
cant catalysts for change within the Japanese government.
This is the ideological explanation for the sources of the power of in-
ternational treaties and laws in Japan. Greater legitimacy is given to in-
ternational treaties and law than to a nation state because of a state’s ty-
pical obligation to make a report about its domestic situation to interna-
tional bodies. In principle, all major human rights treaties provide for a
system of reporting. Representatives of the states are required to make
regular reports to the responsible supervisory bodies about the steps
they have taken to implement their obligations, and the difficulties they
have experienced in doing so. Reports are examined by the relevant
treaty bodies in the presence of representatives from the states con-
cerned. All committees receive information from NGOs informally, and
the committees use this in their arguments. The examination process
can provide an opportunity to exert pressure on states (Byrnes, cited in
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Cook 1994: 23). The UN Commission on the Status of Women also has
the authority to review communications received from individuals and
organisations in order to identify follow up on information that appears
to reveal ‘a consistent pattern of reliably attested injustice and discrimi-
natory practices against women’ (Cook 1994).
For the women’s movement, the series of international conferences
and treaties represented not only the justification for the movement’s
claims of ‘women’s reproductive rights’, but they also provided a sense
of ‘solidarity’ with other women in the world. The trend of the 1980s
amongst women in the international arena was to say ‘“no” to popula-
tion control’ and ‘“yes” to individual women’s reproductive rights and
women’s right to self-determination’. Aware of this trend, Japanese wo-
men could use those terms in their political struggles. The trend also
confirmed that what they were feeling, hoping, and claiming was ‘right’
and that this was shared by other women.
The second factor for the usage of rights: Participation of younger and older
people in the Women’s Reproductive Health Movement
The shift from ‘accusing an individual’s values’ to ‘standing up together’
Another major change in the context of the abortion debate in Japan in
the 1980s was the participation of younger people within the women’s
movement. Part of the movement was now organised by people who
had not been in the earlier student movement or WLM. These younger
people brought different perspectives to the movement. As explained
earlier, in the 1960s student movement there was a strong atmosphere
of self-questioning, trying to examine and deconstruct senses of privi-
lege and discrimination internalised within oneself. It was believed
amongst the participants in the movement at that time that the real re-
volution would start from within the individual. This belief was also ta-
ken up by people in the social movements of the 1970s, including the
women’s and the disabled people’s movements. In that context indivi-
dual women had questioned themselves about whether or not they
would consider giving birth to a child with a disability. Tomoko Yonezu,
currently a Soshiren member, who was in the student movement and
the WLM, describes the atmosphere at that time:
In the 1970s, everyone seriously believed that there could be no
real liberation without also destroying the internalised senses of
eugenics, imperialism, and petit-bourgeoisie. In order to affirm
the self, one had first to question and deny the self which was
constructed by conventional values. This is a mixture of self-de-
nial and self-affirmation. In this context, we did not feel that it
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was unfair to be questioned about whether we wanted to give
birth to a disabled child or not. There was indeed a strong atmo-
sphere whereby each of us felt that we had to say ‘yes, we would
give birth to disabled children’. However, as a movement, we
could not have the standpoint of affirming that women would, or
should, give birth to disabled children. At the same time, we
could not affirm that women should not give birth if a child had
a disability. Therefore, we claimed ‘let’s stand up to the common
enemy, state power, together!’ (Yonezu 1998: 236)
Yonezu explains, the 1970s movement was ‘ethical’: one individual was
required to confront herself and examine her constructed self in order
to re-construct the self. This attitude was inherited from the student
movement. In the 1980s, women focused upon the fact that there were
social mechanisms, whereby women made certain choices in relation to
reproduction. Women in the movement were even clearer in arguing
that they wanted to stand together with disabled people, in order to op-
pose specific social mechanisms, including laws or norms, than they
had been during the 1970s.
The fact that there was no official attempt made to introduce a selec-
tive abortion clause in 1982 should also have made a difference in the
atmosphere of the debate between the women’s movement and the dis-
abled people’s movement during the 1980s. However, during the 1980s
there was a feeling that it was pointless to accuse every single woman
of a failure to criticise herself. To begin with, it is not proper to ask a
woman, who is not pregnant at that moment, whether she would or
would not give birth.
Discrimination against women among other types of discrimination: The
hierarchy of oppression
During the 1970s, when the New Left student movement was still active
in Japan, there was a trend among social movements to regard discrimi-
nation against women as less serious than that against disabled people.
As was mentioned earlier, women in the 1970s movement tried to ex-
amine their own privilege in comparison to that of other people suffer-
ing discrimination, such as disabled people. Indeed, there was aware-
ness that the actual situation of some disabled people, ‘who might
starve if there were no helpers the next day, or who had no freedom be-
cause they were living in a disabled people’s institute’ (Yonezu 1998:
235) was severely underprivileged.
However, at the same time, women were fed up with being told that
their discrimination was less important or less severe. Women in the
Women’s Liberation Movement had to struggle to justify working on
the issue of discrimination against women, and they desperately tried
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to strike a balance between other discriminations and discrimination
against women. In this 1970s atmosphere, women in the Women’s Lib-
eration Movement tried to appeal to disabled people to join forces
against the state authority in abortion matters, but this did not happen
easily.3
As mentioned in chapter 3, the idea that the discrimination suffered
by disabled people was more severe than that of (disability-free) women,
was one of the causes for the reluctance to use ‘rights’, both among dis-
ability-free women and disabled people. Yet at the same time women in
the movement never gave up attacking ‘the hierarchy of oppression’
that position discrimination against women as less important. Due to
these efforts, by the 1980s there was growing recognition of the ser-
iousness of discrimination against women among Social Movement Or-
ganisations (SMOs, hereafter) in Japan. Yonezu describes how women
are often told, ‘your problem can be solved later. There are people in
more critical situations’ (1998: 240). According to Yonezu, this itself is
discrimination against women, because ‘this is exactly the imposition of
the ideal image of womanhood, that women should withdraw their
claim, to give in for the sake of others; women could not simply accept
this claim from the disabled people’s movement’ (Yonezu 2002: 235).
She continues:
A hierarchical order of importance must not be given to discrimina-
tions. Discriminations are related to one another in complex ways, and
therefore, even if discrimination against women is put into the back-
ground, other issues of discrimination cannot be solved any sooner. The
problem lies in the way of thinking that discrimination against women
is less serious, and that discrimination against disabled people is more
serious. And in this struggle, ‘men’ [the discriminators] are absent [in
the debate about the hierarchy of oppression] (Yonezu, 1998: 240).
Motherhood
Another key concept for women in dissolving the hierarchy of oppres-
sion was ‘motherhood’. Motherhood was held to be a crucial reason that
women in the movement were reluctant to use ‘rights’ during the
1970s, and was also a reason that disabled people were reluctant to hear
women using the concept of ‘rights’. For disabled people, ‘mother’ is
sometimes the primary caregiver, and other times the primary oppres-
sor. On reflection, this is based on a conventional value of women’s so-
cial roles as internalised in disabled men, that mothers should not give
up the job of mothering. If they stop mothering, it means that they are
discriminating against disabled children, according to people in the dis-
abled people’s movement, and are ‘egoistic’.
But the WLM did not simply attack the disabled people as conven-
tional, or try to completely do away with the term motherhood. During
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the 1960s to 1970s, there were a number of environmental and medical
problems, such as Minamata disease and births of Thalidomide babies.
Given these problems, women in the WLM refused to be, in their view,
like men and assert their ‘modernity’, as it was called. As the basis of
their critique, women in the movement said they appreciated having
bodies that menstruated, bodies with wombs that had the function of
giving birth. Women in the WLM also shared a critical vision of the
dominant values inherent in modernity that take advantage of, and
make use of, more helpless beings for one’s own benefit. Women in
the 1970s tried to approach relationships with a sense of care, attention,
concern, and inclusiveness, and this shows, for example in their argu-
ment about the relationship between a pregnant woman who termi-
nates a pregnancy and the foetus which is ‘cut into pieces’. It was not
that women in the 1970’s movement believed that providing care was
one of women’s essential roles. On the contrary, they criticised the so-
cial role imposed on women, but women in the WLM tried to affirm va-
lues attached to women in society where values attached to men were
more dominant. By acknowledging the importance of providing care
and by refusing to support the easy elimination of helpless beings for
the sake of efficiency (as they believed men would), women in the
WLM believed that they were drawing attention to the shortcomings of
the existing male-dominated society. Their view was that they did not
want women to have a leadership role in a society (the existing society)
that participated in the exclusion of powerless beings. Again, women in
the WLM did not easily do away with motherhood because they wanted
to criticise societal values in a fundamental way, not because they be-
lieved motherhood was women’s nature. So women in the WLM as-
signed values attached to motherhood to the whole society, including
both men and women.
Women’s hesitation in criticising disabled people was because wo-
men wanted to consider sincerely why an individual woman would
commit the murder of a disabled child. They also hesitate to criticism
the position of the disabled people’s movement because they believed
that a disabled child should indeed be protected. The same considera-
tion was given to the act of selective abortion of a foetus with an anom-
aly. All these events were happening according to efficiency and cost-
benefit calculations. This consideration of the WLM was valuable, be-
cause it intended to let women in the movement and in society ques-
tion what they take for granted in life, and to let them think of the
meaning of every act in life, including marriage and giving birth. But at
the same time it also complicated the arguments.
In the 1980s women in the WLM chose to analyse and deconstruct
the oppressive aspect of motherhood, in order to counter the dominant
female norm in Japan at the time that was imposed on women. The
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myths themselves were hindering women’s right to self-determination,
that is, disability-free women were expected to give birth, while disabled
women were not supposed to give birth because they were perceived as
deviant from the image of womanhood. Moreover, the concept of
motherhood denied diverse ways of living, for example, remaining sin-
gle for one’s whole life, single motherhood, heterosexual cohabitation
without having children, or lesbian ways of living. According to those
who believed motherhood was the only essential role of women, wo-
men’s right to self-determination, as egoism, was placed in opposition
to motherhood.
However, it has to be noted that although women in the movement
during the 1980s clarified that motherhood served to prevent women
from exercising choice in the selecting from a diversity of lifestyles,
they did not create a dichotomy between ‘motherhood and rights’. Gi-
ven the fact that concept of motherhood can be a political instrument to
impose certain values on women, women in the movement in the
1980s felt it necessary to clarify the oppressive aspect of motherhood.
In the change of attitudes towards motherhood, women in the 1980s
also spoke out to disabled people, especially against disabled men, ask-
ing why only mothers were the targets of their criticisms but not
fathers. Women declared that disabled men’s criticisms of women’s use
of phrases such as ‘right to self-determination’ were due to the men’s
own fears of being abandoned by their mothers. Yonezu says
I want men – not only conservative men, but also intellectuals,
who are arguing against women’s self-determination – to ask
themselves if they are afraid of being left alone by their mothers;
if they are actually dependent on motherhood; if they are trying
to bind women to the roles of mother and wife. I also want men
with a disability to ask themselves those same questions (1998:
238).
Thus, by defining motherhood as oppression of women, women could
not only declare that women were oppressed, but they could now also
uncover the fundamental sources of the criticism that disabled people
and anti-abortion activists had of the use of ‘women’s rights’. The criti-
cism was based on the ‘motherhood’ expectation that these two camps
had for women.
Yonezu also notes that women’s greater outspokenness about dis-
abled men had the effect of bringing the two movements closer during
the 1980s, rather than enlarging the gulf between them (2002: 235). In
the 1970s, women in the WLM were encouraged to repress their feeling
that women were oppressed because they were disability-free. Now relo-
cating the two forms of discrimination – against women and against
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disabled people – both movements started making an even greater ef-
fort to understand each other. On this point, Yonezu comments:
The disabled people’s movement posed very important questions
to us women in the women’s movement. And we have been con-
sidering the propositions by confronting our own negative ideas
about disability seriously, as well as our ideas about the life of a
foetus. Women have always thought about the whole issue,
without separating discrimination of women from that of dis-
abled people. Now we want disabled male people to consider the
issue of discrimination of women as well, because it is not possi-
ble to dissolve the entire situation of discriminations by underes-
timating the seriousness of one discrimination versus another
(2002: 235).
Rights and a ‘hierarchy of oppression’
The fact that women brought their own discrimination to the fore as
being just as important as other kinds of discrimination made women
in the reproductive health movement more assertive in constructing
their positions in the abortion debate and in attacking oppressive
authority. This change also affected the use of the term ‘right’, since
one major reason for the hesitation to use ‘right’ was the women’s
movement’s relationship to the disabled people’s movement. Now by
claiming that women’s discrimination was just as important as that of
disabled people, women could more confidently use the concept of
‘rights’ in their arguments. ‘Self-questioning about internalised eu-
genics on the individual level’ was no longer at the centre of the wo-
men’s movement during the 1980s.
This transformation in positioning their own discrimination also
opened up an opportunity to transform the relationships between wo-
men with and without disability in the movements that opposed the
anti-abortion movement, and in making one step forward: unity on the
common point of being ‘women’. According to disabled women, the
problem of being women was less seriously considered within the dis-
abled people’s movement or sometimes not considered at all, because
‘disability is a more serious problem’. However, towards the 1980s, wo-
men in the disabled people’s movement started bringing their identity
as ‘being women’ to the fore as well. Sanae Nakamura, a woman from
Soshiren, recalls a dialogue with a disabled woman:
We women went to a Zenshoˆren meeting in 1982 to have a debate
with disabled people about abortion. There in the meeting, we
were exposed to the conventional structure again [that women’s
discrimination is subordinated to that of disabled people, by civil
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servants in ministries and disabled people, who were mostly re-
presented by males]. On the way back, Tsutsumi Aiko, a woman
with a disability, said to me, ‘women should have made more
claims. We should have also quarrelled more amongst women
[with disability and without disability]. Without having straight-
forward arguments, nothing begins’ (Soshiren news (150) 1997).
This statement by Tsutsumi shows that disabled women had also been
subordinated as women within the disabled people’s movement. Now
she is declaring that she will face women’s discrimination as an impor-
tant issue. This is a change in the meaning of ‘women’ when used to
speak of discrimination against women, to include women with and
without disabilities.
Consequently, in 1985, the DPI (Disabled People International) net-
work for disabled women was organised. Its purpose and demands
were for disabled women to raise their voices, rather than being repre-
sented by disabled men. As more and more disabled women started in-
dependent living outside institutes or parents’ houses they also began
to demand the choice of giving birth or not. This was a critical turning
point in the relationship between women with disabilities and those
without.
Even so, though the two groups became closer this did not mean that
the gap between them had closed up entirely. It remained disabled wo-
men’s preferred desire to give birth rather than not to give birth. In
chapter 7, the issue of the meaning of the category of ‘women,’ with re-
gard to ‘right,’ will be considered.
Distance between the women’s movement and civil society
In the 1970s movements, the values of self-questioning and self-denial
were also accompanied by a thorough rejection of conventional society.
This total rejection also meant that the movements appeared to be ex-
treme, radical, and excessive to many people. One of the reasons is that
the participants in the movement during the 1970s were relatively
young. Since many of the women did not have their own families or
fixed jobs, they could sometimes take more risks in their activities.
However, during the 1980s, the women’s movement developed their ar-
guments and activities in a less antagonistic way. In the 1980s, the
movement attracted relatively older women, often with settled positions.
In the 1970s, although the WLM attracted a number of women from
all over the country, providing opportunities for women to get together,
the general public’s perception of the movement was that it was devi-
ant. The WLM radically rejected the norms that society imposed on wo-
men. In criticising society the movement sometimes used what the
public deemed ‘excessive’ expressions, such as omanko (cunts). The
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WLM embraced these expressions because they believed sexual libera-
tion was a critical issue that required strong language. Sometimes, dur-
ing demonstrations, physical confrontations between male bureaucrats
at ministries and the women in the WLM took place. The mass media
also described the activities of the movement as bizarre and frequently
made fun of them. However, these women opened a crucially important
door for the subsequent women’s movements, providing women with
enormous inspiration and solidarity. They looked ‘bizarre’ because it
was the first revolutionary action taken by women since the Second
World War, and such behaviour was very surprising in the eyes of con-
ventional people. Furthermore, women had to deconstruct internalised
male language while constructing their own arguments. The language
used by the WLM therefore sometimes sounded chaotic. Consequently,
women in general felt a distance from this 1970s movement, but the
distance decreased substantially during the 1980s.
Beginning during the 1980s, the women’s movement proceeded in a
more conciliatory way, but it was because an awareness of women’s is-
sues within other SMOs had increased, not because women compro-
mised their positions on issues. The fact that demands posed by the wo-
men’s movement were in line with international-level treaties gave le-
gitimacy to the women’s movement in Japan. The emergence of
research in the field of women’s studies also elevated the status of the
movement. Around this time, the term ‘feminism’ started appearing in
public – started being used in public, in the media and at public events.
Thus the women’s movement, women’s studies, and feminism all
started gaining acknowledgement from the public in general.4 At the
same time, it became ‘easier’ for women than it had been during the
1970s to claim for better conditions, due to international treaties which
supported women activists’ fighting spirit in Japan. According to Yuka-
ko Ôhashi, a woman from Soshiren, ‘this is due to the efforts made by
women in the movement to bring the issues surrounding discrimina-
tion against women to the foreground.’5
One of the reasons for the women’s movement’s hesitation to use
the concept of rights in the 1970s had been their own radical rejection
of the given social system. To use rights seemed as if they were asking
for more opportunities within the existing system. Now Soshiren used
the framework of the given social system to achieve their goals. Interna-
tional treaties, as a part of this framework, increased the opportunities
for women to use rights.6
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On a debate about the Mizuko business and the usage of the term
‘right’ in Japan
As mentioned earlier, there were businesses run by some Buddhist
temples, some being in a business relationship with right-wing politi-
cians, to console the souls of aborted foetuses.
The term Mizuko literally means ‘water children’, which stands for
children who could not come into existence and kuyoˆ means ‘rites to
comfort the soul of the dead’. Virtually all known usage of the term Mi-
zuko includes the spirit of newborn infants and young children. Mizu-
ko-kuyoˆ is a distinctively contemporary phenomenon, arising in the
1970s, which flourished in the 1980s and continued in the mid-1990s
though have been declining in numbers up to today in many areas of
Japan. While the businesses are a contemporary invention the services
they offer include rites that have the appearance of being traditional
and rooted in Buddhist customs.7 The phenomena arose not as an un-
mediated expression of popular sentiment about abortion, but as the
product of an intense advertising campaign by entrepreneual religious
activists. Although the term Mizuko-kuyoˆ is used in a variety of religions
today in Japan, it has no textual basis in any of them. According to He-
len Hardacre, the US feminist scholar of Japanese religion and society,
‘the absence of any textual “anchor” makes it possible for individual re-
ligionists to use the term as narrowly or as widely as they choose and as
their clientele will accept’ (1997: 2), eventually making it highly com-
mercial. The advertisements for Mizuko-kuyoˆ emphasise that the spirits
of aborted foetuses attack those women who ‘should have’ carried them
to term and become mothers. According to the advertisers, problems in
women’s lives, such as their children’s juvenile delinquency and bad re-
lationships with their husbands, are caused by the spirits of angry foe-
tuses, and therefore, Mizuko-kuyoˆ are advanced as the ‘answer’ and ‘re-
medy’ to problems (see chapter 4).
Women resort to Mizuko-kuyoˆ believing that there is some superna-
tural religious power in the rites to heal the soul of aborted foetuses
and to heal their pain from having had an abortion, although service is
indeed given by spiritualists. The kuyoˆ appear to be religiously relevant
and this is indeed partly the case, yet, as a number of feminists have
pointed out, one cannot deny that Mizuko-kuyoˆ are often a form of feto-
centrism and misogyny, being a product of the pronatal political current
(see Hardacre, 1997). In the rhetoric of those promoting the use of Mi-
zuko-kuyoˆ, women are often described as foolish, selfish, and sexually
promiscuous while men are almost never assigned any guilt for abor-
tion (Hardacre 1997: chapter 4). Feminists also criticise these busi-
nesses as nothing more than being money-makers (Miya, in Buckley
1997: 175), or ‘deceits of spiritualism’ (Ochiai cited in ibid: 176). These
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businesses charge an extraordinarily large amount of money for one
posthumous Buddhist name for the soul of an aborted foetus and for
its well-being, which comes in the form of a stone statute shaped like a
small child and is intended to function as a guardian deity for the
aborted foetus. One small statue in the 1980s sometimes cost even
more than one million yen, or some 13,500 euro.
Women who, experiencing an emotional feeling for their aborted foe-
tus, resorted to these businesses, were ignorant of the fact that these
were spouting anti-abortion propaganda, as well as money-making ven-
tures, under the guise of sympathetic humanism. For example, Yoshiko
Miya, a freelance writer and critic, commented in 1997 that, ‘the mem-
orialisation boom of the mizuko temples is an extension of the impover-
ishment of the modern condition. It is only about money’ (ibid: 179).
Women in the movement during the 1980s and 1990s criticised the fal-
lacy of the business, and expressed their hope that women could ‘see
through the sham of this black market in women’s guilt’ (ibid: 175).
As a consequence of the emergence of Mizuko-kuyoˆ, women in the
movement were critical of the use of the term ‘right’ in the abortion de-
bate, saying that rights did not appeal to women in Japan. They sug-
gested that because women who have had abortions seek the services of
Mizuko-kuyoˆ businesses to reduce their feelings of guilt the rights-based
arguments in support of abortion were not enough to make women feel
confident in their choice to have an abortion. Citing Ochiai, a Buddhist
nun, she continues,
Interestingly, Ochiai criticises the use of the concept of ‘mother’s
rights’ as a counterstrategy to the ‘sanctity of life’ platform. She
argues that the concept of ‘rights’ is itself the product of an im-
poverished modernism, and therefore it cannot function as a
source of power for the cause of women. Women perhaps still
have a lot to learn when it comes to moving beyond the strate-
gies of ‘the enemy’ (ibid).
Closer to the point, she argues that, if the concept of rights could appeal
to the feelings experienced by women who had had abortions, then so
many women would not be cheated by the Mizuko businesses. In rea-
lity, women are in agony – that means the concept of rights does not
empower women to deal with the experience of abortion. Rights are a
product of modernity, of which one characteristic is ‘rationalisation’ in
other words, ‘one should not regret one’s decision if it is logically ac-
countable’. But reality shows that the actual experience of abortion can-
not be simply rationalised by women.
This debate on Mizuko-kuyoˆ is analysed according to the genealogy of
the notion of ‘rights’ established so far. The term ‘right’ does not ab-
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solve women’s guilt. This means that a ‘right’ is not powerful enough
for women in this situation to positively affirm their decisions. Even so,
should we expect ‘rights’ to remove guilt? Since abortion is an act to
end a potential life and since it is never a joyful experience, it does not
seem that there are any concepts that could completely wipe out a wo-
men’s pain and sorrow due to undergoing such a procedure. The cri-
tique implies that a right does not correctly describe the actual process
of abortion. The problem is that ‘right’ tends to invite a clash of mothers’
rights and foetal rights, although women are grieving as a result of their
abortion experiences and are apologising to their aborted foetus. How-
ever, in chapter 3 I argued that it is a fallacy to apply a discourse about
the term ‘right’ to the foetus-woman relationship, although this is often
done. Rights are not used to analyse the foetus-women relationship, but
instead ‘rights’ are focused on the demand to end the oppression exer-
cised by the powerful to intervene in women’s reproduction.
Moreover, contrary to some women’s feelings that ‘rights’ should not
be used because of the guilt experienced by women after having an
abortion, the guilt actually appears to strengthen the argument for
using the term. Anti-abortion activists argue that the rhetoric of wo-
men’s rights is egoistic, and women choose to have abortions too easily.
However, the fact that women go to Mizuko temples means that wo-
men’s reproductive decision-making is not as easy as portrayed by anti-
abortion activists.
Anti-abortion activists show pictures of women kneeling down inside
a Mizuko temples apologising to their aborted foetuses in order to show
how painful abortion is, and to send a message that because women
suffer in this way, women should not have abortions. But this is a con-
tradictory argument. Anti-abortion activists say that women who have
abortions lack respect for life, regarding foetuses as pieces of fat. If this
is the case, then why do women go to temples to apologise to foetuses,
paying a huge amount of money to do so? Clearly, from the perspective
of women, abortion is not an act of intentional attack upon a foetus.
In my view, the Mizuko temples are not really a proper place for wo-
men to visit because these businesses take advantage of women by char-
ging them excessive fees. However, women’s acts of apologising to an
aborted foetus should not be criticised ethically. Coping with such a sig-
nificant event as an abortion in a woman’s life can require therapy, and
the act of consoling an aborted foetus can be part of that process. To
cite one report by Mariko Sanekawa, the Japanese anthropologist: what
most women do in visiting the Mizuko temple is to talk to the stone sta-
tute of a child as if talking to the aborted foetus. And often they say to
the ‘foetus’ ‘my decision was good for you, wasn’t it?’ and ‘It was for
your sake, wasn’t it?’ Sanekawa analyses that this is an assertion that
women did not seek to harm, or that women did not want to commit
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such a harmful act as abortion, to their would-be-children. It is, in a
sense, self-counselling (Sanekawa: 19-22).8
In using ‘rights’ it is crucial for the women’s reproductive health
movement to clarify the argument with which ‘rights’ is associated.
These criticisms on ‘rights’ among women in the movement are exam-
ples that illustrate the fact that both the theoretical concept and the gen-
ealogy of ‘rights’ have not yet been explored regarding what the concept
exactly means politically, but ‘rights’ is used by social movements in-
cluding those of women and disabled people based upon a vague under-
standing of the concept, because of the term’s self-evident nature. Initi-
ally, ‘rights’ are not expected to wipe out women’s pain and sorrow, but
‘rights’ are focused on the demand to end the oppression exercised by
the powerful to intervene in women’s reproduction. The problem of Mi-
zuko-kuyoˆ lies in the fact that there are people who use women’s feel-
ings for their own purposes and that women do not realise that they are
being cheated (ibid: 7-9).9 Rather than doing away with the term ‘right’
it should be used in women’s political struggles because this concept is
a fundamental tool to justify demands made to the state.
The 1980s in comparison with the 1970s
So far, I have shown that the change in the way the term ‘right’ has
been used is due to a number of factors.
Firstly, from the beginning of the political struggle in opposing the
attempt to delete the economic reasons clause, women in the move-
ment explained that they were controlled by the state laws and policies
for the state’s interest. Because of their opposition to this, they could
use ‘rights’ more clearly. In making claims, they used international trea-
ties, which are supposed to be even more legitimate than state laws and
policies. This worked well, because of a characteristic of ‘rights’: rights
emerge from a set of values covering the parties involved, who are re-
garded as having agreed to be subject to those values. The Japanese wo-
men’s movement used international occasions, such as conferences, to
raise their voices, and they attacked the government using international
treaties and laws.
Secondly, ways of thinking in the movement changed from the 1970s
to the 1980s. With regard to motherhood, women tried to coin an alter-
native expression for the relation between a woman and her offspring,
‘affection for life’ (inochi eno aichaku) or ‘appreciation of life’ instead of
‘motherhood’, saying that the tasks that were currently included in the
meaning of motherhood should not only be open to women but also to
men – so that a concept of parenthood was created. From the end of
the 1980s and into the 1990s, dissolving the myth of motherhood be-
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came one of the main activities in the Japanese women’s movement,
through publications and study meetings.
There were new problems emerging during this period within the
movement. Although the term ‘right’ was more frequently used, it did
not mean that hesitations and questions about the concept of rights had
disappeared or been settled during the 1980s. There was confusion
among women activists in the women’s reproductive health movement
about the effectiveness of using rights-based arguments, given that a
number of women resort to the business of consoling the souls of
aborted foetuses. However, it was apparent that women had mixed feel-
ings about having abortions, and this fact could be used to strengthen
women’s reproductive movement’s arguments in favour of access to
abortion.
Another problem was the meaning of the term ‘women’ – in particu-
lar the use of the term within the women’s movement – given the parti-
cipation of women from more diverse backgrounds in the movement in
the 1980s than in the 1970s. The rapid advancement of reproductive
technologies in particular compounded the complicated nature of the
meaning of the category ‘women’. This is because women with differ-
ent problems conceptualise and sometimes use technologies for differ-
ent reasons: while in the WLM during the 1970s, to secure access to
abortion was one of the main goals of the movement activities, during
the 1980s, ‘giving birth’, ‘infertility treatment’ and other issues regard-
ing reproduction came to the fore. ‘Women’ or ‘needs of women’ are
not monolithic any more. In abortion debates from the 1980s into the
1990s, the issue of reproductive technology became the centre in Japan
between the women’s movement and disabled people’s movement,
especially after the Eugenic Protection Law was repealed in 1996.
From the 1980s into the 1990s
New phase: The change of the Eugenic Protection Law into the Law to
Protect the Mother’s Body
In May 1996, members of Soshiren heard a rumour that the govern-
ment had started working on a revision of the Eugenic Protection Law.
Indeed, on 29 May, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) proposed a draft
revision of the Eugenic Protection Law. They proposed that the eugenic
part of the Eugenic Protection Law (the first part of the law) be deleted,
and that certain conditions permitting legal abortion (the second part of
the law) would remain intact (see appendices 2 and 3). This time, at-
tempts to introduce the selective abortion clause, and/or to delete the
economic reasons clause, were not suggested. The name of the new
proposed law was Bosei hogo hoˆ (the Law to Protect Motherhood).
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On learning of this proposal, Soshiren, together with other women’s
organisations, immediately began to put cautious pressure on Diet
members:10 They opposed the LDP’s proposal for two reasons. First, be-
cause they wanted the content of the existing law to be fundamentally
changed. The proposed law would only outline conditions for legal abor-
tion, however the women insisted that any new law should also cover a
larger range of reproductive and sexual issues. Secondly, they also
wanted the abolition of the abortion articles in the Criminal Code, be-
cause they symbolised an impediment to women’s right to self-determi-
nation.
The third reason they opposed the proposal was because of the name
of the proposed law. Women in Soshiren considered that issues of repro-
duction, including abortion, were matters related not only to women
who become mothers, but to all women. Therefore, the term ‘mother-
hood’ in the law was problematic, because it seemed to imply that all
women ought to be mothers, suggesting a denial of diverse ways of
being a woman, and eventually splitting women into those who are
mothers and those who are not.11 By criticising the name, Soshiren also
claimed that reproduction was not solely about motherhood, but also
about contraceptives, sterilisation, pregnancy, and abortion – the whole
of reproductive life.12 Eventually, the women’s movement groups pro-
posed that the name of the law be changed to hinin-shujutsu-oyobi-jinkoˆ-
ninshin-chuˆzetsu-ni-kansuru-hoˆritsu (the Law on Contraceptives, Sterilisa-
tion, Surgery, and Abortion), and they also proposed to reform the law’s
content.
Women in the movement started visiting Diet members to request
these changes. As a result, a women’s cross-party agreement was estab-
lished among female Diet members in order to prevent the LDP’s pro-
posal from being passed.13 Because of the lobbying efforts of women’s
movement activists, a number of Diet members were convinced that
the term ‘motherhood’ indeed symbolised a lack of understanding of
women’s reproductive and sexual rights and health.14
Abolishing the Eugenic Protection Law had been an aim of the dis-
abled people’s movement for many long years, and they did not want to
miss this opportunity to repeal the law. Therefore the disabled people’s
movement, especially men, did not agree with the demands raised by
the women’s movement groups, saying, ‘to focus on the problems of
the name of the law might nullify this great chance’.15 For disabled peo-
ple, it was more important to eliminate the eugenic part from the law
than to radically change the content of the law to support demands for
women’s full reproductive rights.
Similar pressure was put on women’s groups by the Ministry of
Health and Welfare and conservative Diet members, who said that ‘if
women are fighting so vociferously for a drastic change of the law, then
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in the end we cannot even produce any small improvements. First, we
have to do what we can, and improvements for women will follow’.16
Hence in the course of negotiations with the Diet and the Ministry, wo-
men’s groups were faced with several dilemmas. Eventually they had to
accept that the new law would not be drastically changed so as to in-
clude issues of women’s reproductive/sexuality, otherwise they would
risk the chance to delete the eugenic part of the Eugenic Protection
Law. Women’s groups chose to aim for a short-term success by posing
less of a fundamental challenge. They reluctantly agreed that the name
of the new law should be ‘the law to protect the mother’s body’, so that
at least the term ‘motherhood’ disappeared. The new law, the Law to
Protect the Mother’s Body, which is still in existence today, is a revision
of the Eugenic Protection Law, from which legal procedures for eugenic
surgery were deleted, and in which conditions allowing for legal abor-
tion remained intact.
On 17 June, however, women were able to persuade the House of
Councillors to add a supplementary decision to ‘continue an effort to
improve the law to enhance women’s right to self-determination in con-
sideration of women’s reproduction and sexuality issues’. With this, the
people within women’s movement groups expressed the view that they
regarded the new law as provisional, and that they would continue activ-
ities to improve the law to support women’s fuller reproductive rights.
The supplementary decision is an agreement from the Diet to collabo-
rate with women on this point. On 18 June, at the plenary session of
the House of the Representatives, the draft of ‘the Law to Protect the
Mother’s Body’ was voted on, in the name of the chairperson of the
House of Councillors Committee for Health and Welfare. The new law
was then officially adopted by the Diet and the law took effect in Sep-
tember 1996.
The motivation for the LDP’s and the Ministry’s proposal
There were only three weeks between when women’s groups learned of
the proposed change to the law and the new law’s official adoption on
18 June. The process of revision was embarked on unilaterally by the
government, without any consultation or open discussions with SMOs.
The motivation for the abolition of the Eugenic Protection Law was
neither to decrease discrimination against those with disabilities, nor
was it to improve women’s reproductive rights, but instead it was a re-
sponse to criticism from abroad. The international criticism was trig-
gered by the activities of Japanese women at the UN Conference on Po-
pulation and Development in Cairo (1994) and at the UN Women’s
Conference in Beijing (1995).
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In January 1994, prior to the Cairo conference, some hundreds of
women in Japan formed a non-governmental organisation named Ja-
pan’s Network for Women and Health (JNWH), with a view to coordi-
nating the activities at the conference and building unity among Japa-
nese women’s health activists. Their standpoint was
The population problem should be redefined from the perspec-
tive of sexual and reproductive health, placing emphasis on wo-
men’s self-determination of their fertility, and women’s physical,
social, and mental well-being throughout their life cycle (Ashino
1994: 2).
One crucial achievement was that JNWH translated reproductive rights/
health into the Japanese language, so that it could comprehensively cov-
er sexual and reproductive issues, instead of confining the concept
merely to pregnancy and delivery. Prior to 1994, both the Japanese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare had
translated the English term ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’
into ninshin-shussan-ni-kansuru-kenkoˆ-no-kenri, or ‘health and rights of
pregnancy and delivery’. ‘Reproduction’ is indeed not an easy term to
translate into other languages. For the Cairo conference, this translation
was about to be officially adopted by both ministries. But women’s
groups did their utmost to prevent this through lobbying and eventually
were successful in having the term ‘reproductive health/rights’ officially
translated as sei-to-seishoku-ni-kansuru-kenri/kenkoˆ. This term includes
not only the processes of pregnancy and delivery, but issues relating to
sexual and reproductive health and rights throughout a woman’s entire
life cycle, such as menstruation and menopause (Hara 1995: 216-218).
During these international conferences women gave presentations
that introduced the content and the practice of the Eugenic Protection
Law, as a serious case of discrimination against women by the state. For
instance, a leaflet entitled, ‘What is the Eugenic Protection Law? Sexual
abuse of women with disabilities’ was distributed during the conference
in order to attract participants to a session organised by JNWH.17 The
leaflet stated:
The Eugenic Protection Law is to prevent the increase of inferior
descendants. In this case, ‘inferior descendants’ means people
with disabilities. If we have diseases or disabilities which affect
our children, a doctor is allowed to give us involuntary eugenic
surgery. In Japan, there have been some cases in which doctors
exercised eugenic surgery on women with disabilities (they re-
moved the wombs of women with intellectual disabilities).
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This happened because women with disabilities are not sup-
posed to have their own children in our society. Staffs in institu-
tions also say that it is too much trouble for them to take care of
women with intellectual disabilities when they are having their
menstrual period.
Taiwan, Korea and China followed Japan and they all now have
similar laws. We are afraid this eugenic ideology is spreading
around Asia, due to Japanese leadership.
Every life is equally valuable. Everyone has the right to enjoy her
life. We are hoping to have a good discussion on this issue.
The session was held mainly by women from Soshiren, the DPI network
for disabled women, and the Japanese branch of Finrrage, a group of
women with infertility problems.18 The content of their session struck a
nerve with participants at the conference, and was reported on in a local
newspaper in Egypt as well as in newspapers in participants’ home
countries.19 This eventually led people in foreign countries to contact
the Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare to verify the leaflet’s content.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
felt pressure to repeal the law, as the statement by LDP Diet member
Etô illustrates: ‘It would be awful if our Eugenic Protection Law were to
be criticised in the United Nations Human Rights Committee or else-
where’ (Asahi Shimbun (The Asahi newspaper) 14 February 1996).
Once more, when the revision of the law was proposed, women’s
movement activists in Japan were confronted with the familiar structure
of the ‘hierarchy of oppression’. The Ministry explained that ‘first, the
disabled people’s issue is to be solved, and then women’s issues will
follow later.’20 As mentioned, some disabled men also argued that wo-
men should not neglect the chance to abolish the Eugenic Protection
Law, by complicating the argument. Discrimination against woman was
thus again taken less seriously than other forms of discrimination.
The disagreements between the disabled people’s and women’s
movements were not only about the name of the would-be law. Five
days before the law was officially accepted, male members of Aoi shiba
no kai sent a letter to Diet members, saying:
We ask you to revise the law no matter what, without getting
stuck on the problem of the name of the law, about ‘the Mother’s
Body’, partly because, in reality, women in general do not yet
have a consciousness sufficient to be able to make decisions
themselves. Considering the general situation, it is too early to
introduce the principle of ‘women’s right to self-determination’.
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Also, by adding a supplementary rule to the new law, promising
to improve the law in order to eliminate discrimination against
women, there is a danger that the selective abortion clause could
be added in the future. So please never promise women to im-
prove the law for their right to self-determination.21
The letter shows distrust of women’s decision-making capacity, saying
that women are not yet entitled to the right to self-determination. More
concretely, it shows their belief that if a woman can make a decision
completely at the individual level, she would choose to abort a foetus
with an anomaly. So, ‘women cannot make decisions on their own’
means that women are influenced by prevalent ideas about disabilities.
Moreover, the fundamental and well-known scepticism regarding the
meaning of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ is expressed here,
namely that ‘women would abort a foetus with an anomaly in the name
of women’s right to self-determination, and therefore, women should
not be entitled to the right.’
Later on it turned out that the content of the letter did not represent
the thoughts of Aoi shiba no kai, but had been sent by one member of
the group acting alone out of a sense of haste and fear. Yokota, a senior
leading member of the group recalls that the letter was not sent with
his consent, saying that, ‘Upon learning about the letter, I said that wo-
men’s right to self-determination is not an issue disabled men should
interfere with’ (Yokota & Yonezu 2004: 70-71; 91). At the same time,
however, he also admitted that he had a fear of missing the chance to
repeal the Eugenic Protection Law (ibid). It is observable that repeal of
the Eugenic Protection Law was an issue of life and death, to be
achieved no matter what, for their movement. They felt so strongly
about this issue also because reproductive technologies were becoming
increasingly advanced and available during this period, which made it
more possible to find anomalies in foetuses.22
In this political struggle, disabled women were caught between two
standpoints. They of course wanted to repeal the Eugenic Protection
Law, but since they shared the view about ‘women’s right to self-deter-
mination’, they were not completely satisfied with the way the law was
revised. To this day activist women with and without disabilities fight
together for the abolition of the abortion articles in the Criminal Code,
and for a new law on abortion based on women’s full reproductive
health and rights, which is not discriminatory against foetuses with
anomalies.
The Eugenic Protection Law no longer exists. There is no selective
abortion clause. Even so, the practices of reproductive technology are
becoming more and more widespread among the population and as a
result decisions to have an abortion based on the existence of a foetal
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anomaly have increased. Furthermore, such terms as reproductive
rights and women’s right to self-determination, came into use in inter-
national debates in a way that Japanese women’s and disabled people’s
movement groups did not agree with. In today’s context in Japan –
where there are no state laws or policies to impede the well-being of
women or disabled people, but there still is discrimination against wo-
men and disabled people – SMOs, including women’s movements
groups, are struggling with the question of how and where they can po-
litically orient their arguments in Japan. As a result the debate sur-
rounding the use of the concept of ‘rights’ has now entered a new
phase in Japan. What is the struggle, what are the points of contention
in this current debate in this new phase? This will be discussed in the
chapters that follow.
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6 The Debate on the Notion of Individual,
Political Rights after the Repeal of
the Eugenic Protection Law
In 1996, the Eugenic Protection Law was repealed. Although this discri-
minatory law against disabled people disappeared, it did not mean that
discrimination against people with disabilities disappeared or that wo-
men’s reproductive rights were established. Women’s movement
groups needed to continue their activities, seeking the abolition of the
abortion articles from the Criminal Code and confronting new issues,
such as those stemming from the rapid advancements in reproductive
technology.
This chapter presents a discussion of the transformations of the de-
bate concerning abortion and rights following the abolition of the Eu-
genic Protection Law.
The main problem after the Eugenic Protection Law: Reproductive
technologies
After the abolition of the Eugenic Protection Law, the aims of women's
reproductive movement groups were to revise the Law to Protect the
Mother's Body and to delete the abortion articles from the Criminal
Code. The women's movement group's now sought the establishment
of a law that finally covered the full spectrum of reproductive issues.
This struggle took place in the context of the debate on reproductive
technologies since the experimentation, development and practise of re-
productive genetic technologies involved the use of women’s bodies. Re-
productive technologies include Maternal Serum Screening (MSS: see
introduction for definition), amniocentesis (see introduction for defini-
tion), ultrasound and Chorionic Villus Sampling (CVS).1 Reproductive
genetic technologies include Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
(PGD).2 This book discusses mainly amniocentesis.
Players in the debate on reproductive technologies and women's reproductive
rights
Medical associations, ministries, and the Diet
Medical associations, such as Nichibo (currently Japan Association of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists or Nihon sanfujinka ikai, see chapter
2) and Nihon-sanfujinka-gakkai (Japan Society of Obstetricians and Gy-
naecologists, JSOG),3 are important medical associations. Both groups
are composed of gynaecologists and obstetricians. Although they are
neither governmental nor part of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, as
professional groups they have considerable influence in the medical
field, as well as in the decision-making process of the ministries. For in-
stance, Nichibo has the authority to certify doctors to perform abortions.
Without being certified by this association, a doctor cannot legally pro-
vide abortion services.
Research teams in university medical schools also play a major role
in advancing reproductive technologies. For example, in 1996, a re-
search team at Kagoshima University was successful in discovering the
genes responsible for muscular dystrophy through research conducted
on embryos. Following this event, ethical and legal pros and cons for
embryo biopsy came to the fore in the medical debate.4
The Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Scientific
Technologies each play major roles in issuing guidelines and regula-
tions on the practice of reproductive technology. In the Ministry of
Health and Welfare, there is the Koˆsei-kagaku-shingikai-sentan-iryoˆgijutu-
hyoˆka-bu-kai (the evaluation committee of high medical technologies in
health, welfare, and science) and under this committee are the Seisho-
ku-hojo-iryoˆ-ni-kansuru-senmon-iinkai (the special committee on repro-
ductive medical treatment) and the Shusseizen-shindan-ni-kansuru-sen-
mon-iinkai (the special committee on prenatal screening). Legal scholars
and medical doctors sit on these committees. As part of the ministry,
the two committees are entitled to formulate and issue guidelines and
laws for the use of reproductive technologies. They sometimes also in-
vestigate ethical problems in the practice of reproductive technologies.
The doctors on the committees act on behalf of the medical associa-
tions, and have a critical say in the decision-making process within the
committees. The medical associations can inform the ministries about
day-to-day practices that are experienced by their doctors, in order to de-
velop optimal legal conditions for their members’ practice. Groups of
women in reproductive health movements and other social movement
organisations (SMOs) currently engage in lobbying to block certain pro-
posals made by the medical associations, research teams in universities,
as well as ministries.
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Because a law can be modified, introduced, and repealed by a major-
ity vote of Diet members, women's movement groups lobby Diet mem-
bers. Women’s movement groups together with other SMOs sometimes
hold study meetings on reproductive issues inside the Diet building, so
that Diet members can join in.
Women’s reproductive rights/health movement groups
Soshiren currently continues its activities to push for the elimination of
the abortion articles from the Criminal Code, as well as monitoring and
reacting to attempts to change the legal conditions for abortion, either
by medical associations, the state, or anti-abortion groups. Women’s
groups, including Finrrage, also join in these activities, not only be-
cause of their concern about technologies for infertility treatment, but
also because they learned that fertilised human eggs were being used
for experimentation in such technologies as human cloning, something
which they oppose.5 Groups of disabled women, such as the DPI net-
work for disabled women, are also allied with the women’s reproductive
health groups and cooperate in some of their activities.
Women’s movement groups generally share a common aim to moni-
tor the political climate with regard to laws, policies, and guidelines re-
lated to reproductive issues. Individual women such as lawyers, Diet
members, and doctors are also active, both in political activities and in
the ongoing debates surrounding abortion. Movement groups’ links
with female Diet members are often very important, because female
Diet members are in a position to lobby ministries and Diet members.
Each of these women’s groups organises on its own, but they also form
alliances and meet together regularly.
Groups with regard to disabilities
As genetic research has facilitated the identification of more and more
diseases in a foetus, associations of parents with disabled children, such
as Nihon-Down-shoˆ-kyoˆkai (the Japanese Association for Down’s Syn-
drome),6 and other groups of people with genetic diseases (which were
discovered through the use of new technologies) are becoming active in
monitoring reproductive technologies. They mainly monitor the guide-
lines issued by medical associations and ministries, to ensure that
guidelines do not promote the use of technologies as a way to facilitate
selective abortion.
Aoi shiba no kai seems to be less visible in this field of debate than it
was in the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the repeal of the Eugenic
Protection Law. This is also because the main concern of people within
Aoi shiba no kai is now the establishment of independent living oppor-
tunities for disabled people at the community level.
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The opponents of reproductive technologies– collaboration of SMOs across
‘women’ and ‘disability’
Alliances of groups of women and disabled people are united to moni-
tor medical associations and the ministries especially on drafts of guide-
lines regarding the use of new technologies. They try not only to work
together for the same purpose, but also to strengthen solidarity, in order
to find common interests and to understand differences in points of
view. Nowadays letters to mention their opinions about the way technol-
ogies are practised at hospitals are signed by a list of names of both
groups and individuals.
In July 1996, just after the conversion of the Eugenic Protection Law
into the Law to Protect the Mother’s Body, a group called karada-to-sei-
no-hoˆritsu-o-tsukuru-onna-no-kai (Women for an Alternative Law for
Contraception and Abortion) was established. Soshiren and the DPI net-
work for disabled women were also active in this alliance. The alliance
meets monthly. As the group’s name suggests, the alliance is aimed at
making a new law, based on women’s right to self-determination, to re-
place the Law to Protect the Mother’s Body.
In November 1999, just after Nichibo presented a proposal to revise
the law on abortion, a new network of different groups, called botaihogo-
hoˆ-kaitei-o-kangaeru-network (a network to examine the revision of the
law to Protect the Mother’s Body) was established.7 The aim of this net-
work, which is still in existence, is to discuss the content of the new
law for women’s fuller reproductive rights on the civil level and to lobby
the government and ministries by providing criticism and opinions on
the current laws regarding reproduction. This network was initiated
mainly by three groups, Soshiren as a women’s reproductive movement
group, Nihon-Down-shoˆ-kyoˆkai as a group of parents with children with
Down’s syndrome, and Finrrage as a group of women with fertility pro-
blems.
These alliances are established because questions of reproduction
and technologies involve not only women, but also women and men
with various other concerns, such as family members of disabled people
and groups of people with genetic diseases that are not necessarily dis-
abilities.
While sometimes reluctant to agree that women have a ‘right to self-
determination’, disabled people’s movement groups have demonstrated
that they are willing to try to understand the opposition these groups
have to the abortion articles in the Criminal Code, as well as to learn
about the history of oppression and control of women’s reproductive ca-
pacity.8 Therefore, these alliances and networks of SMOs who I refer to
hereafter as ‘the opponents’ to prenatal screening, in contrast to medi-
cal associations, tried to find commonalities among the arguments put
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forth by the different groups that came together in opposition. SMOs
are here defined to be those organisations that came together to chal-
lenge medical associations with regard to the use of reproductive tech-
nologies. ‘The opponents’ refers to SMOs that believe that patients
should not feel pressured to use reproductive technologies and that
such technologies should not be used in a way that increases discrimi-
nation against disabilities.
Anti-abortion groups
On 1 February 2000, Masakuni Murakami raised a question in the Diet
about the deletion of the economic reasons clause, saying ‘the clause is
the fundamental cause of the lack of respect for life’.9 For the first time
since 1982, Murakami was again prepared to take actions to limit wo-
men’s access to abortion by revising laws. However, because the direc-
tor of the religious group Seichoˆ no ie had died in 1985, with whom
Murakami had a close tie, and Murakami was arrested for bribery in
March 2001 and had to leave the Diet, the face of anti-abortion groups
at the national level changed. Currently, anti-abortion groups seem to
be more based on citizens such as nurses, schoolteachers and house-
wives, rather than specific religious groups or politicians. The main
anti-abortion group is Seimei Sonchoˆ Centre (Pro-life Centre), which
publishes a newsletter called Seimei Sonchoˆ News, develops fundraising
campaigns and holds annual meetings called Seimei sonchoˆ no hi no tsu-
doi (a meeting for the day of respect for life). Their position on ‘respect
for life’ is based more on ‘the dignity and mystery of nature’ (Murakami
Kazuo 1998: 2) and ‘humanism’10 than on national economic power, as
was the basis for much of the anti-abortion rhetoric in the debates of
the 1970s and 1980s. Although anti-abortion groups’ activities are now
smaller scale than they were during the 1970s and 1980s, women’s re-
productive health movement groups are cautious about these groups be-
cause there is a chance that, given the low total fertility rate and the
greying of society in Japan, the members of the anti-abortion groups
might ally themselves with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which
aims at encouraging women to have more children in the situation that
Japan’s total fertility rate is unprecedentedly low.11
During the process of the conversion of the Eugenic Protection Law
into the Law to Protect the Mother’s Body, Seimei Sonchoˆ Centre pre-
sented demands to the Ministry of Health and Welfare and to the Diet,
saying that it was desirable to delete the eugenic part of the law, but not
to increase women’s access to abortion, nor to abolish the abortion arti-
cles in the Criminal Code. Seimei Sonchoˆ Centre and other anti-abortion
groups also demanded that an article should be added to the new law,
saying, ‘the life of a foetus is as valuable as the protection of mother-
hood’ (Seimei sonchô centre Seimei sonchoˆ news 137(13), 1 June 1996:
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10-11). In the end, this article was not added, and since then anti-abor-
tion groups refer to the Law to Protect the Mother’s Body, as ‘the law to
discriminate against the foetus’s life’ (ibid).
The position of medical associations and ministries on reproductive
technologies
As genetic research and reproductive technology advance, medical asso-
ciations as well as university medical school teams are issuing guide-
lines and suggestions about the reforms of the Law to Protect the
Mother’s Body. Characteristics of their positions follow, focusing in par-
ticular on how they construct arguments about ‘women’s right to self-
determination’.
Medical practice of technology initiated by an individual client’s request
Since the introduction of the Eugenic Protection Law in 1952 up till to-
day, abortion of a foetus because an anomaly has been detected has
been done under the economic reasons clause, or a ‘loophole’. Selective
abortion under the economic reasons clause is, technically speaking, il-
legal.12 Because doctors do not want to risk breaking the law, debate
from the medical side has concentrated on reforms of the Eugenic Pro-
tection Law and has been directed on issuing guidelines about the
range of medical applications including the use of reproductive genetic
technologies and selective abortion. In the doctors’ claim for a legal
guarantee for their medical practice, their basic reasoning is that ‘there
are demands from clients for the practice of reproductive genetic tech-
nologies’ as the citation shows below:
Prenatal screening is practised only when couples, or would-be-
parents, expressed a need for its application. They visit us in
medical institutes for counselling, and technology is applied
when they ask for it. There are a number of types of diagnostic
procedures, but the choice of diagnostics follows from the dis-
cussion between a couple and the medical doctors.13
This approach to carrying out prenatal screening is based on the idea
that doctors should be able to fulfil clients’ demands, because a doctor
is supposed to offer service if possible. Another citation from the doc-
tors states:14
There are infertile women who really want to have a child. At the
same time, to hope for a healthy child is not necessarily ethically
problematic. When a woman visits us for treatment, we, as medi-
cal doctors, cannot tell them that they do not have to give birth,
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as long as there are technologies that might enable them to give
birth. We are dealing with an individual woman as a patient who
visits us, not women in general. [...] With regard to prenatal
screening, this is practised in accordance with a couple’s self-de-
termination. [...] Thus by honouring the requests of clients, we
are trying to contribute to the ‘right of women to give birth’.
Thus, medical doctors do not want to say ‘no’ to clients’ requests for
prenatal screening when there is an opportunity to satisfy the requests
of their clients.15
‘World trend’ to justify the practice of technology
Another reason why it is difficult for doctors to say ‘no’ to clients’ who
request prenatal screening or fertility treatment, is that for doctors,
being able to treat patients using the most up-to-date technologies is a
criterion for demonstrating how capable they are as medical profes-
sionals. In Japan, some doctors run private clinics, and a good reputa-
tion, which would include demonstrable knowledge of the latest tech-
nologies is important in order to attract clients and remain financially
viable. Indeed, it is plausible for clients to think that the more advanced
technologies a doctor can use, the more professional the doctor is, and
that doctors with the most recent information are more energetic, en-
thusiastic, intelligent and therefore, more reliable. In the medical asso-
ciations documents it appears that doctors do not want to lag behind
their peers in other countries in terms of use of the most advanced
technologies.
In order to justify the introduction of the practice of new reproduc-
tive technologies, medical associations often refer to the World Health
Organisation (WHO) guidelines and the criteria of other technologically
developed countries. For example, when the Japan Academic Society of
Gynaecologists and Obstetricians announced in 1998 that they were
going to broaden the indicative range of embryo biopsy in use, they
simply said:
Nowadays clients ask for an embryo biopsy. [...] According to
trends in the world, technologies for artificial fertilisation and
embryo biopsy are more and more accepted. [...] Therefore, we
intend to practice this technology by enlarging its indicative
range.16
Thus it is observed that the justification for the use of technology by
medical associations is based on client demand, and in order to further
justify the use of these technologies, world trends are cited. The refer-
ence to ‘world trends’ also has to do with justification in terms of safety,
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according to the reasoning that because the technology has already been
used in such-and-such a country, it is safe.
This way of reasoning, citing respected international organisations, is
often found in a number of fields in Japan. The positions of such orga-
nisations as the WHO and the UN on issues are sometimes held sacred
by medical associations in Japan. This situation can serve a positive
function for social movements; for example, terms such as ‘women’s
right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive rights’, which were legiti-
mized by their use by international organisations, are now widely used
in Japan. Today, nobody, either at Japanese medical associations or with-
in government, would reject these terms.
However this tendency to be influenced by the position of international
organisations can also have a negative impact on the lobbying efforts of
local organisations who might have different positions on the issues. As
will be shown, there are critical differences in the interpretation of wo-
men’s reproductive rights and rights to self-determination between Ja-
panese medical associations and women’s reproductive movement
groups.
On women’s right to self-determination and reproductive rights
For medical associations the concepts ‘women’s right to self-determina-
tion’ and ‘reproductive rights’ are synonymous with the fulfilling the re-
quests of their clients in a situation where sufficient information has
been provided. Doctors see one aspect of their role in facilitating the
implementation of women’s right to self-determination as giving gui-
dance to clients from a neutral position. Hence medical associations
use the term ‘right to self-determination’ as if it is another expression
for ‘informed consent’ and ‘right to privacy’.17 Based on this under-
standing, medical associations argue that legal adjustments are neces-
sary for the practice of new reproductive technologies, in order to en-
hance women’s rights to both self-determination and reproductive
rights. Here the immediate or future impact of a technology on society
is not doctors’ main concern.
Actually, in the name of ‘enhancing women’s rights to self-determina-
tion’ Nichibo presented an idea for a proposed new law in March 1999.
They recommended that ‘a selective abortion clause for individual wo-
men should be introduced. At the same time, abortion during the first
12 weeks of pregnancy should be legal on the demand of women, with-
out specific conditions. This is for women to enjoy the “right to self-de-
termination”.’18
This proposal was opposed by both women’s movement groups as
well as disabled people’s groups, and was not introduced to the Diet. In
August 1999, Nichibo made another proposal, saying: ‘abortion within
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the first 12 weeks of pregnancy is based on women's rights, hence wo-
men can have an abortion given the consent of the pregnant woman.
After 12 weeks, the condition is: In the case of a possibility that conti-
nuation of pregnancy and delivery might damage the mother's health
due to physical, mental, or social reasons.’19
The content of the proposed law was actually ‘silent’ about specific in-
dications in which ‘selective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly’
would be legal. This proposal was again rejected by both women and
disabled people's movement groups, and as a result was not introduced
in the Diet. The proposals show that within medical associations the
understanding of the concept of ‘rights’ is based primarily on the prin-
ciple of right to privacy.
Individual doctors and their perspectives on women’s right to self-
determination
So far I have described how the concept of women’s right to self-deter-
mination was interpreted by medical associations. These associations
want a law that legalises abortion on the grounds of ‘women’s right to
seek happiness’, which would include having a child without an anom-
aly. Therefore, they want a law that legalises selective abortion without
specifically referring to a foetal anomaly as legal grounds for abortion.
However, during field research in Japan in 2006 and 2007, I found
that some individual obstetricians have opinions that differ from those
of medical associations, on issues such as the practice of selective abor-
tion, having a child with an anomaly, or what the law for abortion
should be. I would like to share what I learned regarding how obstetri-
cians deal with the application of reproductive technologies, selective
abortion, and the concept of self-determination during interviews I con-
ducted with 11 individual obstetricians in 2006 and 2007 in Japan.20 I
think this is useful in illustrating that debates on the issue of selective
abortion are never monolithic, nor are the issues relating to selective
abortion, such as the implication of self-determination, or the issue of
who the women are when we refer to ‘women’s rights’.
The doctors I interviewed during field research reported that they did
not actively talk about prenatal screening options (including amniocent-
esis and maternal serum screening) with their patients because (1) they
are aware of the eugenic past of Japan and are afraid of being labelled
as eugenic practitioners, (2) they do not think that having a child with
an anomaly is always so bad, (3) if doctors refer to prenatal screening,
patients tend to interpret this as a recommendation that they undergo
screening tests and doctors want to avoid this because it would feel like
doctors are preventing patients from practicing self-determination, (4)
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selective abortion is, technically speaking, illegal in Japan, and (5) they
generally do not like to perform abortions (Kato 2007).
Unlike medical associations, individual medical doctors did not ap-
pear to consider that having a disabled child is an obstacle to women’s
happiness. This attitude towards having a disabled child stems from
two facts: Firstly, individual medical doctors have more opportunities to
see children with anomalies and they consider having an anomaly not
necessarily such a tragic event, as is widely viewed in society. Some doc-
tors mentioned that Down’s syndrome, for example, which is one of
the main disorders that prenatal screening is used to detect, is not such
a severe abnormality that the foetus should be aborted. Doctors also
said in their experience that although young parents are shocked in the
beginning, no couples remain unhappy forever: They start loving their
children with anomalies. Secondly, doctors know that referring to pre-
natal screening, as a form of information provision, can be easily under-
stood by patients to be a recommendation to have prenatal screening.
Therefore, they do not want to mention prenatal screening because they
do not want to ‘guide’ patients but they want to stay ‘neutral’. Otherwise
they risk being accused of recommending that their patients have pre-
natal testing. In this situation, for individual doctors, not mentioning
prenatal screening could be perceived as exercising respect for a pa-
tient’s right to self-determination. At the same time, a doctor is exercis-
ing his right to self-preservation – i.e. not risk being accused of inciting
people to break the law.
In this way, medical doctors and medical associations have different
positions on selective abortion. The way in which self-determination is
understood and practised by individual doctors might differ from that
of medical associations, too: as mentioned, self-determination as under-
stood by medical associations is equated with ‘access to prenatal screen-
ing, selective abortion, and a right to seek happiness’, while self-deter-
mination by individual doctors tends to be understood to be ‘decision-
making where there is no intervention by medical doctors’.
Similar is the diversity within one category ‘women’. There is a term
‘womens’ rights’, but a question arises here whether women’s move-
ment groups represent women’s needs in general: Discussions by wo-
men’s movement groups on reproductive technologies and those by in-
dividual women may differ. The question of the category ‘women’ is ad-
dressed later in this chapter and chapter 7. In this way, the same terms
such as ‘self-determination’ or ‘women’ have different meanings and
imply different issues from group to group, such as doctors and wo-
men. There are different meaning and issues regarding concepts of
rights and self-determination due to different levels of involvement, ex-
periences and expectations according to the background of different ac-
tors. Empirical research can demonstrate the diversity of conceptual
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meanings and terminology, and their implications, among different ac-
tors. In this book I focus on the analysis of public debate.
Arguments from the opponents
The following excerpt presents the interpretation of the concept of wo-
men’s right to self-determination by Soshiren:
Firstly, women’s sexuality and bodies are to be respected socially.
Secondly, we should oppose population control and eugenics,
which use women’s bodies. Thirdly, women themselves decide
whether to give birth or not. But this does not include selection
according to whether the foetus has a disability or not. Fourthly,
to oppose pressure or coercion towards any of the following: giv-
ing birth or not giving birth, contraceptives, sterilisation, or sex-
ual preferences. Lastly, women’s right to self-determination is
based on a society where no women and no children are discri-
minated against, whether a woman gives birth or not, a woman
has a disability or not, a child is male or female, and has a dis-
ability or not (cited by Yonezu, in Soshiren news (157) 28 July
1998: 4-5.).
These points made by Soshiren are given in order to refute the medical
associations’ argument about women’s right to self-determination;
based on the original aims of Soshiren’s establishment, as well as the
group’s activities over a period of more than 20 years.
Denial of the attribute ‘disability’ inherent in reproductive technologies
Medical associations state that prenatal screening technologies do not
target all diseases but actually are only used to detect serious diseases,
for which there are no medical remedies, and when it is clear that the
disease would lead to the death of the child. However, opponents to the
use of these screening technologies state that screening only strength-
ens the negative ideas about the diseases, and violates the human rights
of people who are already living with these diseases. Opponents to
screening criticise the value attached to the eradication of disability; they
feel that screening implies that the eradication of disability is ethically
justified; however opponents to screening disagree.
The fundamental criticism of prenatal screening by those who oppose
it is based on their fear that screening promotes the, in their view, in-
correct idea that to be ill or disabled causes unhappiness to a person, fa-
mily, and society. In their view there are a number of people who assert
that they are happy living with disabilities and/or with disabled chil-
dren. The opponents to prenatal screening problematic the implicit jud-
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gement about disabilities made by medical associations when they sup-
port such screening processes, since the position of these associations
play a powerful role in influencing public opinion.
Opponents to prenatal screening also believe that such technology,
which position disabilities as a cause of unhappiness, will NOT encou-
rage society to mitigate discrimination against and improve the position
of disabled people. Disabled people feel that their existence is denied
because selective abortion is an act of ‘eradicating’ beings because of a
certain attribute.21 The introduction of the selective abortion clause,
which identifies ‘a disability’ as a reasonable motive for abortion, would
‘signify that the law indicates who should be born and who should not
be born’22 by raising ‘norms about who is socially fit and who is not’.23
In their view, this would eventually lead to the conclusion that disabled
people are actually not supposed to be members of society.
Moreover, according to opponents to prenatal screening, to stigmatise
the birth of people who have diseases that can be detected by reproduc-
tive technologies would decrease interest in developing the medical
skills needed to ‘cure’ these same diseases. For example, Mariko Tamai,
who is a clinical psychological counsellor, as well as the mother of a
child with Down’s syndrome, argues as follows:
In 100 years, people with Down’s syndrome might be very rare
in society. But there is always a chance that children with Down’s
syndrome might be born. What if a woman gives birth to a
Down’s syndrome child in such a situation? And people with
Down’s syndrome would be marginalised, having more and
more difficulty living in society, being talked about behind their
backs: why are they born while it is possible to avoid having
them born? (Tamai 1998: 114).
Of course there will never be a situation where there is no disability, no
matter how advanced technology is. So one might argue that the devel-
opment and practice of prenatal screening technologies would not mar-
ginalise disabled people. However, this argument must be rejected for
two reasons. Firstly, note that within the category ‘disability’ there is
also a certain hierarchy. It is reported that those with acquired disabil-
ities tend to feel superior to those with innate disabilities or hereditary
disabilities, and those with curable disabilities look down upon those
with incurable disabilities. Technologies might be able to detect an in-
creasing number of disabilities prenatally, which might make it possible
to medically treat these disabilities in foetuses and newly born babies.
This can be considered a positive function of such technologies. Yet, it
has to be kept in mind that a hierarchy of oppression within the cate-
gory ‘disability’ remains as long as disabilities never completely disap-
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pear. For the time being, what technologies can do is to shift the bor-
ders of such a hierarchy (regarding who is superior to whom) within
the category of disability. The shifting of such borders could for exam-
ple serve to marginalise even more those whose disabilities cannot be
treated medically, in contrast to those whose disabilities are treatable.
Even within a group of people with the same disability, those with a
mild disability tend to look down on those with severer levels of disabil-
ity.
Secondly, Yokota and Yonezu argue that even if certain disabilities are
totally eliminated through the implementation of prenatal screening
technologies, other physical and/or mental phenomena, which are not
currently categorised as a ‘disability’, will be categorised as disabilities
at a later stage. Finally, even those who walk more slowly or more
quickly than others, very tall or short people, those who eat much more
or much less, and so on, endlessly, might be categorised as disabled
people. Everybody, in the end, ‘gets old’, which actually means to be-
come ‘less able’. Then elimination of a predisposition toward all these
conditions would be endless, and there would be nobody in society in
the end. Yonezu concludes, ‘As no single person is perfect, and as no-
body’s life is without obstacles, humankind does not have to be uniform
or “perfect”. Accordingly, the idea of trying to eliminate all the “unu-
sual” phenomena in itself is even pathological (which is the fundamen-
tal value inherent in the practice of selective abortion and in some re-
productive technologies).’24
It should also be clarified that while disabled people fight against the
ideas that deny their disabilities, and wholeheartedly believe that their
disabilities and disabled bodies are viable in society too, this does not
necessarily mean that they refuse to receive medical treatment to im-
prove their physical condition. Rather, it is perhaps necessary to trans-
cend the dualism of ‘health’, as positive, versus ‘illness’, as negative.25
For example, Susan Wendell, a feminist philosopher, who has Myalgic
Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue and Immune Dysfunction Syn-
drome (ME/CFIDS), states:
I find that my own resistance to the attitude that I need to be
‘cured’ in order to be a whole or fully acceptable person infuses
my desire for a ‘cure’ with ambivalence. I want to have more en-
ergy and less pain, and to have a more predictable body; about
that there is no ambivalence. Moreover, I feel heartache when I
hear about someone being diagnosed with ME; how could I not
want a cure for everyone else who suffers from it? Yet I cannot
wish that I had never contracted ME, because it has made me a
different person, a person I am glad to be, would not want to
have missed being, and could not imagine relinquishing, even if
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I were ‘cured’. For example, I cannot imagine that I would ever
stop identifying myself as a person with a disability, and when I
think about the probability that others would stop identifying me
as one if I were ‘cured’, it is hard to imagine how I would deal
with the dissonance. Perhaps the best summary of my attitude
toward ‘cure’ is this: I would joyfully accept a cure, but I do not
need one. If this attitude toward ‘cures’ were taken for granted
in my society, then the search for them would not be accompa-
nied by insulting implications, as it often is now (Wendell 1996:
83-84).
Yonezu, who was infected by poliovirus in childhood, and is active in
women’s reproductive health movement, shows a similar way of think-
ing about ‘cure’ and ‘benefit from living with disabilities’:
Medicine is developed for the convenience of state interests
[cost-benefit and efficiency in economic and productive activ-
ities]. Therefore, for medical associations, ‘disability’ is merely a
case study, but not what is to be treated for the enlargement of
human potential. We cannot ally with such a medical system.
But at the same time, I feel anger about the fact that the possibi-
lity of treatment has been prevented because we cannot ally with
medical associations, on account of their being how they are. As
long as medicine is allied with the state’s interests, we cannot
take the opportunity, being bound by disabilities for our whole
lives.
I request that medical associations make an effort to mitigate dis-
abilities for our human potential. Achieving this means nothing
other than drawing medical doctors toward disabled people’s side
from the state’s interests. Disabled people are wonderful just
being how they are. But to affirm disabilities and to desire for
mitigation of disabilities will never contradict each other. We
have not been able to say easily that we want our own disabilities
to be cured. Now we demand a medical system in which we can
honestly say that we want our disabilities to be cured! (Yonezu
1975)
Pointing out the link between the state and the medical system in terms
of interests in social and economic efficiency, Yonezu also emphasises
that the advancement of reproductive technologies to eradicate the exis-
tence of people with disabilities will eventually prevent the development
of medical treatment to mitigate or cure disabilities.
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To have a disability may well often be inconvenient. Most of us would
find it better to be without disabilities, in order to move and think
freely. Therefore, one might argue that preventing the birth of disabled
children is a benefit for the future of humankind.
The opponents of prenatal screening technologies who are active in
SMOs argue, however, that there is always a possibility of giving birth
to disabled children. The practice of selecting and eradicating deformed
foetuses, they say, would lead to pressure on pregnant women to give
birth exclusively to disability-free children.
These opponents to prenatal screening are not criticising individual
women who might have selective abortions of foetuses identified as
having deformities. They are aware that selective abortion of such foe-
tuses might sometimes be necessary for women on some occasions,
just as abortion is sometimes necessary for women. Prenatal screening
technologies are also sometimes used to prevent the death of foetuses
with anomalies. Some people are also of the opinion that information
about an anomaly of a prospective child provided through screening
technologies makes it possible for prospective parents to prepare men-
tally and to make physical/logistical preparations for the arrival of such
a child, for example by raising their awareness of the disorder. One pae-
diatrician, Kazusô Iinuma, for example, reports that he has been trying
to promote maternal serum screening with the intention of enhancing
understanding of pregnancy among pregnant women so that they can
understand what prenatal screening is and decide whether to have it
done. In the event that an anomaly is discovered through such screen-
ing, he says, the prospective parents can prepare themselves for the
birth of the child with proper knowledge of the anomaly, instead of
being shocked by the sudden news when the child is born (website of
the clinic of Dr Iinuma: http://www.ig-clinic.com/). A genetic nurse,
Naoko Arimori, also points out the necessity of patients becoming more
knowledgeable about pregnancy and risks of pregnancy (‘wise patient’)
(Arimori 2005: 117-122). Each pregnancy is different. During field re-
search, I came across a number of couples and women who are grateful
for the role that prenatal screening technologies played in saving the
lives of their disabled children.
The main concern of those who oppose the use of prenatal screening
technologies is that the development of technology, which is based on
the devaluation of disabilities, would probably not lead society to a fu-
ture in which conditions are improved for the lives of disabled people.
On the contrary, according to them, the technology will further stigma-
tise people who are born with a disability. So, if these technologies are
used, then there should be a simultaneous effort by society to eliminate
discrimination against people with disabilities. In this way, the oppo-
nents point out the link between the fundamental value of the technolo-
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gies and the future of society guided and constructed by certain values.
They conclude that some reproductive technologies, specifically prenatal
screening technologies, will lead to more difficulties for both women
and disabled people.
Positive steps end discrimination against and negative perceptions of people
with disabilities: A responsibility of the medical professional
Most opponents to prenatal screening technologies do NOT propose
that the practice of selective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly
should be prohibited, nor do they blame individual women for choosing
to have a selective abortion of such a foetus. The problem, in their view,
is the context in which selective abortion is practised, and the assump-
tion that ‘to be disabled causes unhappiness’. Of course they believe
abortion should be accessible to women upon demand, but in the cur-
rent context, if a disease is discovered in a foetus, it is likely that many
women will choose to have an abortion, because society in general, in-
cluding doctors and many women, would not challenge the assumption
that a disability is a cause of unhappiness.
Those who oppose prenatal screening believe that if abortion of a de-
formed foetus is legal, giving birth to the child and in a welcoming en-
vironment should also be an available option. In this regard, the oppo-
nents argue that there must be positive policies or activities to end dis-
crimination against people with disabilities and/or the negative
perceptions that currently exist about people with disabilities. Getting
rid of these cannot be done only by one individual, by women’s repro-
ductive movement groups, or only by other SMOs, but requires a colla-
boration of all kinds of social groups, including the powerful. In this re-
gard, the opponents criticise the attitude of medical associations. The
opponents’ criticism is that, ‘By claiming that women initiate prenatal
screening it sounds as if doctors are avoiding taking responsibility for
any ethical problems connected to the use of such screening technol-
ogy’. They believe that doctors would escape from their responsibility
for the practice of prenatal screening when the practice of reproductive
technology is questioned whether it is eugenics or not, by saying, ‘my
clients decide to undergo prenatal screening, not I. I did not mention
anything about prenatal screening’.26 Since the practice of prenatal
screening and selective abortion of foetuses with anomalies carries ethi-
cal problems, and because social cooperation is necessary to change
conditions so that the birth of a disabled child would be welcomed, the
opponents assert that medical associations and governmental ministries
have the responsibility to eradicate discrimination against people with
disabilities. The DPI network of disabled women, for example, argue
that doctors themselves should get rid of their eugenic thoughts,27 and
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positive policies should be enforced to get rid of biased ideas about hav-
ing disabled children.28
A question remains concerning whether we want to give this respon-
sibility to doctors, in the light of self-determination. I would answer this
question in the following way, echoing the position taken up by those
who oppose prenatal screening: it is doctors who develop and practice
screening technologies. They also have the power to issue guidelines
and laws that profoundly influence the lives of citizens. Lay people, on
the contrary, are ‘powerless’ to improve the ways in which technologies
are practised, because of the skill and knowledge that doctors have ac-
quired and the fact that doctors deliver these services. Although govern-
mental ministries and other related organisations frequently ask lay
people for opinions about guidelines, lay people require considerable
time and effort to understand medical jargon and concepts, let alone to
raise critiques. In the meantime, the technologies become even more
advanced. Decisions to practice a new technology are also made in the
closed circle of the medical field, although the technology intimately
permeates our daily lives.
Therefore even if we do not want to grant them power, the fact is that
doctors already have power, because of the medical skills and knowl-
edge they have. Both lay people and doctors have to start by acknowled-
ging this fact. Since this power is not shared by lay people, doctors do
have an ethical responsibility to develop and use the skills they have.
This does not mean that lay people have no responsibilities. They may
not have medical skills, but they have a responsibility to develop their
opinions and share these with doctors and the government. This is ac-
tually what the opponent to prenatal screening is doing. For doctors to
be ethically responsible, they need to listen and act upon the concerns
of the opponents to current and future technologies, as they have im-
portant insight into and unique perspectives on the sometimes negative
impact of medical practices.
Moreover, because of the power of doctors, they cannot be neutral in
relation to their clients’ decision-making processes. Doctors need to be
aware of their influential position and need to understand the fictitious
nature of ‘neutrality’. While doctors argue that the practice of screening
technologies is based upon an individual woman’s request, in the pro-
cess of decision-making a woman takes into account the opinions of
her doctors in one way or another, although to what extent differs in
each case. Because technology is never value-neutral, those who develop
the technology, those who have an influence in making guidelines and
laws, and those who have the knowledge to use it, cannot avoid their re-
sponsibilities. Those who are privileged and powerful ought to exercise
these advantages responsibly, especially because they hold the power to
influence the lives of those who do not have the skill and knowledge to
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use the technologies. So, acknowledging the given power relation
means that doctors should stop claiming that they are neutral; doctors
cannot be neutral, and doctors cannot avoid having an influence on cli-
ents’ decision-making. Therefore it could be said that doctors have a
considerable influence and responsibility to take steps to correct proble-
matic values that exist in relation to these issues. In order to define
what is problematic, to discuss how problems need to be corrected, and
to develop ethical guidelines regarding the practice of reproductive tech-
nology doctors need to more actively seek the input of more SMOs.
Critiques of ‘world trend’
The opponents to prenatal screening are reluctant to employ ‘world
trends’ as criteria for judging the ethics inherent in reproductive tech-
nology, including prenatal screening, since guidelines that are issued at
an international level are often based on the assumption that having a
disability is negative and that aborting a foetus with a disability is justi-
fied.
Kôdô Satô, a gynaecologist/obstetrician who opposes the introduction
of a selective abortion clause in Japan, has concluded that the standards
and guidelines proposed by the WHO are not free from negative ideas
about disabilities. He believes that it is problematic simply to refer to
European and North American situations as examples of prenatal
screening and as criteria for selective abortion. Citing Modell, Kuliv,
and Wagner (1991), who were entrusted by the WHO with analysing
the practice of prenatal screening in Europe, Satô suggests that the de-
velopment of the ethical logic about prenatal screening in Europe is as
follows:
The number of people with hereditary diseases might increase
because foetuses with sickness do not die as easily as before.
! Policies are necessary to deal with foetuses with diseases.
! Therefore, genetic advisors should not just give advice to
people who visit a genetic counselling clinic, but in order to de-
crease the number of births of sick foetuses, such as babies with
Down’s syndrome, mass screening should be more positively re-
commended by the genetic advisor (Satô 1999: 60-61).
He criticises the fact that this rationale for prenatal screening does not
question whether selective abortion leads to discrimination against peo-
ple with disabilities. On the contrary, the logic assumes, as axiomatic,
that deformed foetuses should be aborted.29 Like the opponents’ per-
spective described above, Satô’s view is also based on worries about fu-
ture society being guided and constructed by reproductive technologies’
values about disabilities that might lead the society to severer discrimi-
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nation against people with disabilities. Once the development of tech-
nology is started based on the view that a disability is a cause of unhap-
piness, the future lives of disabled people will be no easier: they will be
stigmatised, or pitied at best. This is contrary to the aim of eliminating
discrimination.
Describing processes of counselling taking place in European coun-
tries, he goes on to say:
The WHO guideline for Europe is based on ‘informed consent
without intervention’ and ‘the decision should be made on an in-
dividual level’; however, as there is thus definitely an idea that
deformed foetuses should be decreased, the counselling itself is
hardly neutral, but is in reality instructive. The counselling tak-
ing place in Europe and North America in reality functions to
convince clients that abortion because of a disability of the foetus
is ethically not problematic.
The WHO has been promoting mass screening, using the
principle of self-determination according to the way the principle
is used in Europe (Satô, 1999: 115-116).30
Finally, Satô concludes that, ‘Although Japanese medical associations ar-
gue that prenatal screening is widely practised in European countries
because these countries have thorough counselling systems, the reality
is that children with Down’s syndrome are thus thoroughly discovered
and aborted’ (Satô 1999: 54-58).
Ritsuko Sakai, a journalist, after researching the counselling system
in England, also observes that each act of counselling is aimed toward a
decision to abort a deformed foetus in the end, although counsellors
never say what the decisions should be (Sakai 1999: prologue; chapter
1). Certainly the opponents in Japan would not accept this practice as
ideal.
Are ‘struggle’ and ‘no regret’ signs of ‘responsible’ decision-making?
Often the selective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly is justified on
the grounds that the decision was good because the pregnant woman
‘struggled’ to make her decision, or that she had ‘no regrets’ after the
decision (Tamai 1998).31
The Japanese clinical psychological counsellor Tamai points out a trap
in this logic. She argues that in many cases, the conclusion is already
there, in other words, the decision has already been made to have an
abortion, and the struggle is actually a process to convince oneself ethi-
cally that having the abortion is justified. In this way, ‘struggle’ is be-
coming a justification to abort a foetus with an anomaly (ibid). Tamai
also points out that in the some context medical associations’ use of
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‘self-determination’ is not correct, because in practice the choice to give
birth to a deformed foetus does not have the same meaning as the
choice to abort a deformed foetus. Yonezu and Yokota also point out
that the term ‘“self-determination” used by medical associations, is
“self-determination” when there are no other choices than selective
abortion. Furthermore, if a woman, knowing the foetus is disabled,
chooses to give birth to a disabled baby, the principle of “self-responsi-
bility” will possibly be imposed on women. This situation is only put-
ting more pressure on women’ (Yokota & Yonezu op. cit: 84-86).
Tamai’s criticism is NOT aimed at individual women who choose to
abort a foetus that has an anomaly. The problem is that decision-mak-
ing is not acknowledged in the context of problematic values in the so-
cial context in which decisions are made. Nor is decision-making recog-
nised to be taking place in the context of future social reform with the
intent to reduce women’s struggles in reproductive decision-making
about a foetus with disabilities.
Tamai’s point is that debates in society need to go beyond ‘if a wo-
man struggled, the decision is ethically not problematic’. Behind this lo-
gic is actually the belief that ‘it is reasonable to abort a foetus because it
has a disability’. She stresses that the attitude not to question this belief
will not create a society in which there is less discrimination against
people with disabilities. Her criticism is geared to medical associations
and the ministries in particular.
As mentioned earlier in chapter 2 and 3, many women considering
abortion of a foetus with an anomaly have expressed feelings that ‘I
wish I could give birth, but in the given social conditions, it is not yet
possible to do so,’ ‘I myself do not discriminate against disabilities, but
I am not strong enough to fight against the bias around me,’ and ‘I feel
sorry because the child would be made fun of by others for his/her
whole life.’ Questions in the decision-making process when deciding
whether to terminate a pregnancy if the foetus has been found to have
an anomaly might be even more concrete: ‘What special and extra
things must I do after the birth of this child? Where is an appropriate
school or a job for this child?’32 In the decision-making process, women
would weigh the expected extra tasks of having a disabled child and the
level of social support. Thus, social conditions are highly relevant in the
decision-making process, and therefore the decision and its meaning
should be viewed in relation to social values.
Indeed, discrimination is too powerful for one individual to fight
against. The opponents to prenatal screening are in favour of providing
solidarity to fight against discrimination against disabled people, and to
improve the social situation of disabled people, so that a disabled indivi-
dual could live in better conditions. To this end, people in disabled peo-
ple’s movement need the cooperation of governmental ministries and
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doctors to end discrimination against people with disabilities, instead of
merely accepting the status quo. To justify selective abortion of foetuses
with anomalies in the name of ‘struggle’ or ‘no regret’ is not sufficient
to bring about a reform of the problematic status quo currently faced by
disabled people in Japan.
Reproductive technologies use women’s bodies
Most reproductive technologies practiced on women are invasive. In or-
der to fertilise an egg in a test tube for fertility treatment or to perform
an embryo biopsy an egg has to be removed from a woman’s body via a
medical procedure. This procedure is considerably more complicated
than obtaining sperm from men.
Not only physically but also psychologically, women carry more of the
burdens of reproductive technology. For example, as Yokota states, there
is the perception within Japanese society that having disabled children
is the women’s (or mothers’) fault (Yokota & Yonezu op. cit.: 75). Choos-
ing not to have prenatal screening, despite access to such technology,
requires an enormous determination from a woman.33
For these reasons, the opponents, especially women’s groups, argue
against the use of some reproductive technologies.
Contrasts between the opponents and medical associations in the meanings
of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive rights’
According to Japanese medical associations, women’s right to self-deter-
mination means that individual women can have access to the proce-
dures they want, namely, prenatal screening and abortion of a foetus
with an anomaly, without interference. The decision to make use of
available reproductive technologies ought also to be based on sufficient
information, according to the medical associations. Rights here are
about ‘accessibility’, ‘voluntary decision-making’, and ‘privacy’, which
are almost synonymous with informed consent by an individual.
These are plausible characteristics of ‘rights’, given the nature of
medical practice. Interaction between a client and a doctor ought to hap-
pen confidentially, in a closed circle, on the individual level. Hence, in
principle, one client’s request should ethically have nothing to do with
another’s; the social meaning of one individual’s decision is not sup-
posed to be questioned, as long as the decision does not directly harm
others. Because optimal medical practice is the primary concern of doc-
tors, to broaden the legal options of the medical practice is likely to be
the doctors’ major concern.
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Some doctors argue that ‘to abort a severely deformed foetus is a
mother’s right to seek happiness’. This logic implies two things. One is
that raising a severely disabled child is difficult in the current situation.
Therefore, if there is a request from a woman to check for, and to abort,
a severely deformed foetus, because having a disabled child is negative
and difficult, this is ‘a mother’s right to seek happiness.’ The other
meaning implied in this statement is that, technically, the abortion of a
deformed foetus specifically because it is deformed is not legal under
the current law because there is no selective abortion clause that allows
this. In Japan, abortion is legalised under economic reasons clause and
sexual assaults. More than 99 per cent of abortion is carried out under
the economic reasons clause. Because women ought to have the right
to be able to choose this alternative legally, medical associations are
fighting for the introduction of a selective abortion clause in the name
of ‘women’s right’. According to medical associations, it is merely the
offer of a possibility, and it is not intended to say that all women must
choose to abort their deformed foetuses. Decisions are made on a pri-
vate, individual level, and therefore neither a selective abortion clause
nor decisions to abort deformed foetuses symbolise discrimination.
However, the opponents to prenatal screening are sceptical about
these arguments. There is a crucial problem in the given assertion that
‘to abort a heavily deformed foetus is a mother’s right to seek happi-
ness’. It is indeed implied that abortion of a foetus with an anomaly is
decided by individual decisions, leaving room for the possibility to abort
or to give birth to a disabled child. But the problem lies in the fact that
the existence of a disability matters, in that there is a social condition
where disability is defined as a cause of unhappiness and a hindrance
to women’s right to seek happiness. This logic is ethically hardly ques-
tioned. The opponents’ point is the fact that it is more difficult to rear
disabled children in the current social context and that in itself constitu-
tes discrimination against those with disabilities as compared to those
without disabilities. People from the disabled people’s movement de-
clare that lives with disabilities are not always unhappy, or even ‘we are
happy because of our disability’, so it is judgemental to define the fu-
ture of a disabled child as unhappy.
Moreover, the opponents to prenatal screening argue that doctors al-
ready let women practise eugenics through self-determination, but wo-
men in the reproductive health movement refer to this as ‘a twisted
concept of women’s right to self-determination’ (Yonezu 2002: 234).
For instance, during the 10th meeting of the evaluation committee of
high medical technology under the Ministry of Health and Welfare on
22 June 1998, the discussion focused on how to make it possible for
doctors to fulfil an individual’s request to have a selective abortion,
without introducing the selective abortion clause into the law. Doctor
188 WOMEN'S RIGHTS?
Ichiro Matsuda suggested that the criteria to allow a woman to have an
abortion should be: ‘women’s psychological and physical burden from
pregnancy and delivery’. Linking ‘women’s right to self-determination’
and ‘selective abortion’ should logically be as follows:
As the WHO declares, women have a right to decide to give birth
or not to is the most important. ! The decision-making is re-
lated to the level of the disability of the foetus. ! The judgement
of the severity of the disability should be left to the pregnant wo-
men with sufficient provision of information. ! Thus, if ‘preg-
nant women’s psychological stress’ is postulated as an indication
for legal abortion, there is no need for introducing a selective
abortion clause. With this indication, in practice, medical doctors
can legally provide a selective abortion, and women can have a
selective abortion (Soshiren news (157) 28 July 1998: 4-6).
Yonezu, of Soshiren, responds to this logic as follows: (1) According to
this logic, women’s right to self-determination is synonymous with the
elimination of disabled people by means of individual women’s bodies.
In other words, Doctor Matsuda assumes that all women would choose
to have an abortion. (2) This argument fails to consider social reforms
which aim to create a situation where there is no social difference be-
tween the choices about whether to give birth to a child with or without
disability.34
A worry about ‘privacy’ is also expressed by the women’s movement.
Abortion is an individual matter in which the state should not inter-
vene. However, making abortion issues ‘individual privacy’ is proble-
matic as well. In the name of ‘privacy’ the state might fail to make an
effort to provide safe abortion. It might also fail to eliminate dominance
in the private sphere, such as men’s dominance over women, as well as
discrimination against those with disabilities. In the name of ‘privacy’
the state might fail to provide conditions and contexts where private
rights can be exercised by its citizens. In this way, the opponents to pre-
natal screening argue that the fact that the state does not have any dis-
criminatory laws is not sufficient to guarantee women’s right to self-de-
termination or to eliminate discrimination against those with disabil-
ities. On the contrary, by being ‘silent’ the state might be an accomplice
to impeding the exercise of women’s and disabled people’s right to self-
determination.35
It should be noted that the meaning of eugenics has changed in the
period following the Eugenic Protection Law, because of the rapid ad-
vancement of reproductive technology. Under the Eugenic Protection
Law (1948-1996), eugenics meant state intervention to control the qual-
ity of the nation’s population. Indeed, the concept of eugenics tends to
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be linked to statutory policies and laws, or the institutionalised form of
discrimination of disability. But now, when social movement groups in
Japan refer to eugenics, this usually means the informal but widely ac-
cepted idea that ‘it is better to have a disability-free child than to have a
disabled one’. In the view of Japanese SMOs, technology aims to dis-
cover and eliminate disabled beings, and thus, medically, eugenics is
practised at the level of the individual. People within the women’s
movement call it ‘modernised eugenics’ or ‘eugenic practice by means
of an individual women’s body’. In this view, when people in social
movement groups use the terms ‘coercion’ or ‘force’ these terms mean
‘silent pressure’ exercised by dominant values and norms relating to re-
production and disability, rather than institutionalised pressure (Yone-
zu, in Soshiren news (173): 5-6).
Debate about women’s right to self-determination amongst the opponents
The opponents to prenatal screening agree in principle that the state
should not intervene in women’s reproductive decision-making. There-
fore they agree that the abortion articles which place limitations on wo-
men’s access to abortion should be deleted from the Criminal Code.
They also maintain that reproductive technology, such as prenatal
screening, impedes the implementation of women’s right to self-deter-
mination, through ‘silent pressure’.
Groups representing disabled people, as well as parents’ associations
of disabled children are reluctant to use the phrase ‘women’s right to
self-determination’ in their arguments against prenatal screening (Yone-
zu op. cit.: 235). They suspect that women in general would choose se-
lective abortion if self-determination gave them the right to do so. In
this situation, a question raised by SMOs who focus on disability issues
is: Is it in line with their position on the issue of prenatal screening to
use ‘women’s right to self-determination’?
The issue of the selective abortion of a foetus with a disability, in-
volves both a women and a deformed foetus. So who does ‘self’ refer to
here? Only the pregnant woman, or does this include the foetus? Is the
foetus part of the pregnant woman? In either case, what is the reason-
ing? On the theoretical level ‘self’ is as much of a hot topic as ‘rights’ in
the contemporary debate among the Japanese alliance of opponent to
prenatal screening, as well as within the academic field of reproductive
health studies and disabled studies. A number of scholars have written
on the topic of ‘the right to self-determination’ in the context of both
the Japanese women’s movement and disabled people’s movement, out-
lining both pros and cons of using this term as a justification for wo-
men to have access to selective abortion.
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For example, Yoshihiko Komatsu, a professor in the history of medical
science who deliberates on the ethical issue of euthanasia and human
relationships, rejects ‘women’s right to self-determination’ (1998; 2000).
He argues that the rhetoric made sense in the presence of state interven-
tion into women’s reproduction under the Eugenic Protection Law, as
well as in the presence of male oppression (Komatsu February; March
2000). He calls this oppression a ‘vertical oppressive relationship’ be-
cause of male and state oppression of women. But with the practice of re-
productive technology, the focus is, according to him, on the relationship
between a pregnant woman and a deformed foetus, which he calls a ‘hor-
izontal relationship’. Here not only a woman, but also the foetus is in-
cluded in the concept of ‘self’, and unlike the state or male patriarchy, in
his view a foetus is not oppressing a woman. So Komatsu concludes that
pregnant women should not use ‘right to self-determination’ in speaking
about any context that relates to their foetus. What is common to reject-
ing ‘women’s right to self-determination’ both among these academic
works and selected social movements, is the fear that this concept might
provide a justification to eliminate foetuses with anomalies, due to wo-
men’s discrimination against people with disabilities.
To secure access to abortion – this is the basic aim of the women's
reproductive health movement in Japan. But the movement does not be-
lieve that the introduction of a selective abortion clause to legally allow
for the abortion of foetuses with anomalies would enhance women’s
ability to exercise their right to self-determination. Until now, the best
way to reconcile these two contradictions has been to distinguish be-
tween ‘I abort this foetus because it is disabled, although I want to have
a baby’ and ‘I abort this foetus because I cannot manage to raise a dis-
abled child, although I want to give birth to the foetus.’ However, on
the practical level, it is very difficult to distinguish between the two si-
tuations. When a pregnant woman learns that the foetus she is carrying
has an anomaly and has to decide whether to have an abortion or not,
she is likely wondering whether she can manage rearing it because the
foetus is disabled. This question has to do with who the ‘self’ is in ‘wo-
men’s right to self-determination’. When a pregnant woman makes a
decision about abortion, she is making a decision about her own life,
but the foetus is also involved. As reviewed so far, the fundamental po-
sition of the women’s reproductive movement in Japan has been that a
pregnant woman has the decisive say in this situation, because it is she
who goes through the entire physical and psychological processes of re-
production. However, in the practice of selective abortion, a question
arises as to how the disabilities of the foetus or the life conditions of
the future child are taken into account in the process of deciding to
have an abortion. One major justification for selective abortion is ‘(un)
happiness of the future child’ and not necessarily the happiness or un-
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happiness of the woman. Now, is it the pregnant woman herself who is
‘the self’, and is the foetus also included as part of the woman’s self or
is the foetus seen as a separate self?
Women’s groups argue that when it comes to the issue of the selec-
tive abortion of a foetus with an anomaly, even women ought not to de-
cide whether the future child would be happy or not after its birth, and
therefore, in the sense of disability, the foetus is ‘the other’ and not part
of the ‘self’ of a pregnant women. The logic here is that ‘although wo-
men have the right to decide whether or not to give birth, women do
not have the right to decide about the quality of the child’. Women in
the reproductive health movement in Japan are trying to find a way to
maintain this logic without retreating from the issue of women’s right
to self-determination. Yet, for the movement, this ambivalence is not
strategic. To declare that ‘the foetus is “the other” being from the wo-
man’s self’ or ‘women do not have the right to decide the quality of a
foetus’ is perilous, and provides an advantage for the arguments of anti-
abortion activists (Ashino, in Soshiren News (177) 2000: 5). On the issue
of the self, there is a gap between academic reflection and movement
practice. The only way to establish women’s right to self-determination
without discrimination against those with disabilities is to mitigate the
difference between the meanings of selective abortion of a foetus with
an anomaly and of abortion in general. This is the final aim of those in
the women’s reproductive health movement.
The opponents to prenatal screening are aware that this aim is an
ideal. However, they are also aware that no matter how idealistic their
final aim is, it is the task of social movements’ to gear society to a fu-
ture where people with different backgrounds are able to live with dig-
nity without discrimination, although it might take a very long time to
achieve this. Therefore, people in the social movements of disabled peo-
ple and women argue that social support and effort are necessary to cre-
ate a society where disabled children are as welcome as non-disabled
children.
What can be learned from these debates?
According to Japanese medical associations and governmental minis-
tries, the term ‘women’s right to self-determination’ means individual
women’s practice of decision-making, where the content of the deci-
sion is not questioned. Because the content is related to the context of
the decision-making, the context is not questioned either. The context
is, in this case, biased against people with disabilities. Moreover, be-
cause the perception of disabilities is so fundamentally negative, the
meaning of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ is sometimes consid-
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ered widely in society to be synonymous with the decision to abort a
foetus with an anomaly. At the same time, activists in some SMOs re-
lated to disabilities, as well as some scholars, are critical of ‘women’s
right to self-determination’ because they fear that women would choose
to have a selective abortion in the name of exercising their right to
self-determination.
There are commonalities in those arguments. In both arguments, the
content of decisions made on the basis of a right is considered as being
alienated from the context in which the decisions are made. On the one
hand, medical associations consider rights to be an individual-level
practice. This view suggests that the ‘self’ is trying as much as possible
not to be influenced by the surroundings, especially by the powerful.
Therefore the argument of the ‘neutrality’ of medical doctors comes
into play here. These ideas of medical associations relate to the concept
of the practitioner of rights, that is, the ‘self’. Just like the concept of
‘rights’ the ‘self’ implies alienated nature: in the medical associations’
argument, ‘self’ is expected to be distancing itself from the surround-
ings as much as possible, except for sufficient information for decision-
making. The ‘self’ should be independent and mature enough not to be
influenced by its surroundings, especially the powerful. These images
of the ‘self’ are often the model of ideal decision-making for medical as-
sociations. The women’s movement and other SMOs reject this view as
unreal. A ‘self’ that distances itself as much as possible from its sur-
roundings stems from the liberalist argument of individual citizens.
On the other hand, critiques of ‘women’s right to self-determination’
among the opponents to prenatal screening do not favour this rhetoric,
because they believe that the ‘self’ will not challenge the problems in-
herent in the context in which decisions are made. Their critiques are
based on a fear that ‘women’ in ‘women’s right to self-determination’
would be the self who acts to maximise its interest. Whether the act is
discriminatory or not, or where the act leads society, are not main con-
cerns of the ‘self’. This again implies the idea of liberalism.
It seems that one crucial cause of the disagreements in the contem-
porary debates about rights is inherent in the liberalist implication of
‘women’s right to self-determination’. The terms ‘right’ and ‘self’ were
introduced from the West, therefore it is no surprise that liberalist
meanings developed in Western political philosophy are attached to
these terms even when used in non-Western societies (although these
non-Western societies might have indigenous concepts equivalent to
‘right’ and ‘self’). As reviewed in chapter 3, the liberalist way of thinking
developed in Western political philosophy in order to prevent authority’s
unreasonable rule over the individual. In the sense that liberalism is
about liberation of individuals from authority, the concept was/is a great
achievement in the West. But because it is such a crucial concept, it
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seems that sometimes only its idealistic aspects are emphasised as cri-
teria for ethics, and this makes it alien to reality. In other words, we of-
ten take the liberalist idea of decision-making as the absolute principle:
not to intervene in another’s decision-making is ethically good, regard-
less of its content or the context in which the decision is made. In dis-
cussing the ethics of decision-making, concepts of ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-
intervention’ are often brought out, although we all know these are a
fiction. What is more, despite the fictitious nature, actual guidelines are
constructed on this fiction. This can result in socially indifferent atti-
tudes about problems that might stem from the social conditions where
decisions are made.
Conceptually, self-determination is often defined in terms of liberal-
ism, but in practice there seems to be something more than liberalism
here. It also seems that in considering the concept of self-determina-
tion, liberalism is taken as absolute because it is not possible, or at least
very difficult, to go beyond the liberalism concept. This makes it worth
considering and theorising a meaning of ‘self-determination’ that goes
beyond liberalism. ‘Right’ and ‘self’ need to transcend the image of iso-
lated individualism, so that they can be understood as related to the
context and imply a ‘challenge to the system’. Arguments by the Japa-
nese women’s movement are worth examining in this regard. The next
chapter will consider ‘women’s right to self-determination’ in terms of
liberalism, trying to discuss what women’s movements are suggesting
about the right to self-determination.
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7 Liberated Individuals?
The meaning of the ‘self ’ with ‘women’s right to self-
determination’
Entering the 1990s, in Japanese abortion debates the term ‘right’ is
used more and more frequently, in the form of ‘right to self-determina-
tion.’1 The phrase opened a route toward possible collaboration between
women with and without disabilities, since both the acts of having an
abortion and of giving birth were considered to fall within the scope of
‘women’s right to self-determination’. Thus, when women in the Japa-
nese women’s reproductive health movement referred to ‘women’s
right to self-determination’, they meant more than women’s right to
give birth or not. Women’s right to self-determination had become an
instrument to resist oppression and values that, even without visible
coercion, pushed women into making certain choices.
However, chapter 6 showed that there was a difference between how
medical associations and social movement groups conceptualised ‘wo-
men’s right to self-determination’. Medical associations tended to un-
derstand women’s right to self-determination as referring to a situation
in which an individual woman can make a decision, given sufficient in-
formation, and can do this without outside intervention. Applied to the
abortion context, the view of medical associations was that in order to
exercise this right to self-determination women’s requests for prenatal
screening and selective abortion should be answered. And as long as
the decision to have prenatal screening or to select to abort a foetus
with an anomaly did not directly harm others, the content of a woman’s
decision was not questioned ethically; because the decision was made
by the individual concerned, in the view of medical associations the de-
cision could not be discriminatory. They also did not question the ethi-
cal context of women’s decision-making.
Medical associations also propose that the law should be reformed ac-
cording to ‘women’s right to self-determination’, so that a woman can
have a selective abortion upon demand. Requests for medical services
and medical practices are based on individuals: the requests are made
and the practices are carried out by individual patients and individual
medical practitioners. According to this argument, a selective abortion
clause would not be ethically problematic because it would just provide
women with the option of having a selective abortion, and no woman
would be obliged to act upon it. Since doctors in medical associations
were aware that the introduction of a selective abortion clause would
lead to protest from some social movement groups, their idea was not
to introduce a selective abortion clause as such, but to reform an abor-
tion law, so that it would specify no specific conditions under which
abortion would be allowed other than a situation in which pregnancy
would cause ‘women’s physical and mental stress.’
However, the women’s movement thought differently about the con-
tent of ‘women’s right to self-determination’. The current use of repro-
ductive technology actually indicated certain values with regard to wo-
men’s reproductive decision-making. Reproductive technologies such as
prenatal screening were developed to discover foetal anomalies, and
their use aimed at eliminating disability, hence this practice is definitely
based on the belief that ‘disabled children should not be born.’ Such a
belief puts pressure on women to give birth to disability-free children,
so they are actually ‘forced’ into making a certain decision in the name
of self-determination, instead of actually enjoying the right to self-deter-
mination in a true sense. Women’s right to self-determination, accord-
ing to the women’s reproductive health movement meanwhile, means
that a woman can choose to give birth to disabled children under condi-
tions where there is no obstacle to bear or rear them.
The proposal for an abortion law based on utilitarian liberalist ideas
would be acceptable to women’s reproductive health movement groups,
because the reasons for abortion differ from woman to woman. ‘A law
based on utilitarian liberalist ideas’ means a law that legalises abortion
without stipulating specific conditions in which abortion would be al-
lowed. Under such a law, a woman’s request for abortion is granted up
to a certain number of weeks of pregnancy, according to her own (and
often her doctors’) judgement. In the sense that the law does not pro-
vide specific conditions, or the law is ‘silent’, it is called ‘liberalist.’
Indeed, I believe that the state should not guide women by proposing
indications for abortion. Reproductive decision-making should be, in
principle, entrusted to individual women’s decision-making capacity
without the state formulating conditions. However, the women’s move-
ment argues that merely introducing ‘the liberalist law model’ would al-
low current dominant values to override women’s decision-making pro-
cesses, leaving the real problem – the problem of certain forces exercis-
ing undue influence on women considering abortion – invisible and
faceless. Therefore people in the women’s movement argue that a ‘si-
lent law’ should be coupled with governmental efforts to eradicate the
idea of disability as negative.
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Although some social movement groups, such as the association for
parents with disabled children, basically agree with women’s right to
self-determination as a piece of political movement rhetoric, these
groups are also sceptical about the term ‘women’s right’. This is be-
cause of a concern that women might abort a foetus with an anomaly.
In addition to the connotations of the term ‘right’, ‘self’ implies a
selfish image for the practitioner of rights. The image of ‘self’ here is
‘not related to’ or at least not ‘challenging’ the problematic context in
which decisions are made. Since both ‘self’ and ‘rights’ have roots in
liberalism and enlightenmentalism, the image of a ‘self’ as a practi-
tioner of ‘rights’ shares a commonality of meaning between those in
medical associations and some social movement groups, in that the self
is viewed as unrelated, or as failing to challenge the broader context in
which it exists. On the one hand, according to the medical associations,
the practice of the right to self-determination, isolated from any context,
is considered to be ‘ideal’ because decision-making should be exercised
by an individual. The medical associations argue that ‘because the right
to self-determination is practised on the individual level, the practice
does not collectively become discriminatory’. On the other hand, some
social movement groups, such as the parents’ association, express the
criticism that women’s right to self-determination is likely to be prac-
tised and understood as if it were an individual practice, even while
there are problems (a bias against disability) in the conditions under
which an individual makes a decision. Therefore, both medical associa-
tions and social groups regard the context where decisions are made as
a given condition that is not challenged by the self.
On reflection, a liberalist view of ‘self’ and ‘rights’ is indeed an ortho-
dox and dominant way of conceptualising the ‘right to self-determina-
tion’, where it is often assumed that a decision-making process without
outside intervention is optimal, given sufficient information, and that
any decision made by the individual concerned ought to be respected,
regardless of its content, as long as it is not harmful to others. In many
medical guidelines, it is observed that this way of exercising self-deter-
mination is often considered to be the ‘sacred principle’. Although this
idea manifests itself in diverse ways in different societies, in many so-
cieties there is a shared value that it is ethically correct not to intervene
in the affairs of others. But at the same time, it seems that this princi-
ple is accepted only because it is too difficult to develop it further than
a non-intervention position, although everyone knows and feels that
such a belief is not sufficient for understanding self-determination,
especially when we look at how the principle is practised in the actual
medical world. First, decisions are made according to the values at sway
in a particular context. Second, an individual hardly makes a decision
without considering the opinions of those within her surroundings, and
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it is not necessarily absolutely sacred that one makes a decision totally
without the intervention of another. Then, what is the principle of the
‘right to self-determination’ that goes beyond non-intervention princi-
ples? Isn’t it worth trying to go beyond it, by embodying thoughts about
the right to self-determination, apart from liberalism? In order to do so,
first the liberalist genealogy of the Western political philosophical tradi-
tion will be traced. To refer to liberalism here is logical and defensible,
because the Japanese medical associations refer to the way that repro-
ductive technologies are practised in Western Europe or North America,
when describing the idea of ‘isolated self’.
Liberalism
Liberalism’s genealogy
Liberalism has its genealogy in England around the beginning of the
17th century, which saw the start of ‘the era of reason’, as was discussed
in chapter 3. As Thomas Hobbes’s memorable phrase goes, ‘The liber-
ties of subjects depend on the silence of the law’; the fundamental idea
of liberalism has rested upon a concept of freedom from the constraints
of the state (Edwards 1967, 3, 4: 458).
Given Hobbes’ view about relationships among human beings in
their natural condition, or bellum omnium contra omnes, it can be de-
duced that liberalism originated in the idea that an individual is a po-
tential attacker of another’s interest, as well as the idea that the power-
ful are potentially the evil oppressors of individuals. The view that hu-
man beings are naturally egoistic and hostile to others is the
fundamental tenet of liberalist belief, in other words; ‘others ought not
to intervene in one’s decision-making’.
However, at the same time English liberals have also been careful not
to press the notion to anarchist extremes. As Locke summarised, ‘life,
liberty, and property’ are to be protected by state law. A state was also
considered to be a necessary institution, ensuring order and law at
home, defence against foreign powers, and the security of individuals.
Thus, according to liberalism, a state’s power ought to abstain from in-
volvement in an individual’s life, but at the same time a state is entitled
to function only to the extent that it ‘extends the liberties of subjects in-
sofar as the law is made to curb and limit the activities of the executive
government’ (ibid).
Later in England, discussion over liberalism merged with utilitarian
thought. Here the point was that an individual’s liberty is a necessary
condition for the happiness of the whole of humankind, because an in-
dividual member of society can calculate cost-benefit using ratio, so that
the individual can maximise utility or satisfaction. Thus, liberalism as-
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sumes that an enlightened individual is able to judge using a ratio of
what is good for the self, in order to satisfy the self (ibid: 458; Uchida
et al. 1993: 40-41). The principles of non-intervention and of an indivi-
dual’s liberty are both enforced by the power of human ratio. Following
this line of thought, a state ought to have a minimum function, given
an absolute trust in ratio, as possessed and practised by an individual.
Liberalist ideas were exported to other European countries, such as
France and Germany, as well as to North America, and thinkers in each
country followed different ways of developing these ideas. All in all,
schools of liberalism may be classified as the Lockean and the e´tatiste.
Locke contends that ‘the liberalism of the minimal state, individualism
and laissez-faire, [...] sees freedom as something which belongs to the
individual, to be defended against the encroachments of the state’ (Ed-
wards 1967, 3, 4: 459-460); E´tatistes argued that ‘as long as the state be-
longs to the people, the enlargement of the power of the state is equally
an enlargement of the people, and therefore the freedom of its citizens
can be made to enlarge and improve, [...] seeing it as something which
belongs to society with the state as the central instrument of social bet-
terment’ (ibid, 459-461).
A debate between the two is about the state’s role in an individual’s
freedom, whether a state must be minimal so as not to intervene with
an individual, or be entitled to a certain degree of power in order to fa-
cilitate the expansion of an individual’s freedom. However, in both
schools of liberalist thought, the consistent points and the purposes of
liberalist discussion are how to enlarge and protect an individual’s free-
dom. Both schools believe that the self (the individual) is able to exer-
cise sound judgement by using ratio with the aim of maximising its in-
terest and satisfaction.
The fundamental view of human beings to be deduced from liberal-
ism is as follows. Firstly, liberalism assumes that individuals act for
their own advantage. Secondly, therefore, liberalism seems to believe
that individuals project their own egoism to intervene in the decision-
making of other. Thirdly, because the individual, or an actor, is viewed
as mature and knowing what is good for herself self, individual should
not intervene in the decisions of others. This can be an expression of
trust in someone’s decision-making capacity. An individual is mature
and knows what to do, and others, including the state, are natural op-
pressors of the individual. Therefore, individuals and the state should
not intervene in the decision-making of individuals – this is the funda-
mental premise of liberalism based on the utilitarian, enlightened self.
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Liberalism in reproductive issues
With regard to such issues as reproduction, and especially abortion, it
is likely that women’s reproductive health movement’s struggle to se-
cure access to abortion is settled by a liberalist state law, or that the law
does not enforce a certain morality on the whole nation, but instead the
law ‘silently’ provides a framework that maximises all citizens’ opportu-
nities to pursue their varying conceptions about their own life, the life
of a foetus, and life plan of those who decide whether to continue with
pregnancy.2 Since reasons for abortion vary among individual women,
in one respect a liberalist style of law functions positively for the exer-
cise of women’s right to self-determination. A liberalist form of law also
curbs state control of women’s reproductive decision-making. When re-
sponsibilities for reproductive issues are underwritten by a society or a
state as a whole, rather than being left to individual women, it seems
that the state is justified in creating stronger incentives to encourage
women either to terminate or to retain their pregnancies. In order to
prevent the state from using a woman’s body for its collective interest,
it is in one sense crucial that a state withdraw from women’s reproduc-
tive issues, and only provide access to abortion for individuals, without
commenting on the issue of reproductive decision-making.
Thus because a state tends to intervene in women’s reproductive is-
sues for population control, the liberalist idea can function as a power-
ful weapon in political struggles. The liberalist idea of the self, in ‘wo-
men’s reproductive right to self-determination’, plays a critical role
when one’s decision is determined or even imposed by others because
of a power imbalance, and when the right to self-determination is in-
voked by women against the powerful, to demand that they not inter-
vene in her decision-making process.
However, according to the Japanese women’s movement, the liberalist
condition is not sufficient to exercise women’s right to self-determina-
tion. Women’s groups not only do not believe that individual decision-
making takes place in isolation from any context, but they also suggest
that it is perilous to view decision-making only from an individualist
perspective. On this point, these women’s organisations are rejecting
liberalism. As was mentioned earlier, the liberalist practice of the right
to self-determination is indeed one effective aspect of the political strug-
gle in securing legal access to abortion. But liberalism is not sufficient
to fully describe the practice of the right to self-determination.
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On the meaning of ‘women’s right to self-determination’ as used
by the women’s movement
To understand the concept of women’s right to self-determination as it
was used by the women’s movement in the 1990s in Japan, this section
probes the fundamental mechanisms at work in this concept. First,
what was the motivation behind women’s claim to a right to self-deter-
mination? The fact that women used the rhetoric of ‘women’s self-deter-
mination to give birth or not to give birth’ implies that women are not
able to decide whether or not to give birth on their own; that ‘whether
or not to give birth’ is decided by others. In the 1980s in Japan it was
clearly defined that the fight for self-determination was aimed against
state laws and policies. The articles on legal sterilisation of disabled peo-
ple in the Eugenic Protection Law clearly set the norm regarding dis-
abled people’s reproductive practices. The attempts to delete the eco-
nomic reasons clause were obviously a case of state intervention to limit
women’s access to abortion. The abortion articles in the Criminal Code
meant that women were basically prohibited from having an abortion,
and this signifies the penetration of state power into women’s bodies.
Yet after the repeal of the Eugenic Protection Law, medical associa-
tions and the ministries claimed that decision-making should be en-
trusted to individual women, so that each woman could have her repro-
ductive request fulfilled. Nichibo, one of the powerful medical associa-
tions, even contended that, up to a certain number of weeks of
pregnancy, no specific reasons should be required for women to have
an abortion, but a woman can have an abortion just because she deci-
des to do so. A woman can decide on her own, and her word is abso-
lute. And this, according to Nichibo, is women’s right to self-determina-
tion. Then why do women in the movement reject this proposal for a
‘real’ women’s right to self-determination? And in the view of the wo-
men’s movement, who (or what) makes reproductive decisions on be-
half of women?
One answer is ‘unwritten values’ that are dominant in society about
what is socially acceptable. The existence, practice, and development of
reproductive technologies are based on certain societal values, that ‘dis-
ability is negative’ and ‘can be eliminated’. This reasoning would hold
that women’s reproductive decision-making is shaped by a bias against
disability’ and that therefore women should only give birth to non-dis-
abled children. Indeed, if there was no bias against disability and if the
‘meaning’ of giving birth to children with or without disability was not
different, then women’s reproductive decision-making about giving
birth to foetuses with or without anomalies would not matter. Repro-
ductive technologies, such as prenatal screening, would also be prac-
tised differently. Instead of being used to discover disabilities they
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would be used to provide proper treatments in case of an anomaly of a
foetus. Thus, one conclusion appears here: in order to enhance wo-
men’s right to self-determination, an effort is required to remove the
bias against disabilities. In the liberalist perspective, how is the bias
against disability expressed in the context of the issues of selective abor-
tion and prenatal screening?
Reproductive technology and the bias against disability
Are prenatal screening and selective abortion of foetuses with anoma-
lies a form of discrimination against disabled people? Indeed, disabled
people have often stated that prenatal screening and selective abortion
are practices that ‘deny’ the existence of disabled people who are already
alive, as they carry the connotation that disabled people should not have
been born (Aoi shiba 1973; Yokota 2004).
But prenatal screening and selective abortion target unborn foetuses,
and these practices are not a direct attack upon people already living
with disabilities. There can be policies on the state administrative level
that allow for a foetus with a disability to be aborted and that call for
the respect and protection of people with disabilities (Sakai 1999).
Moreover, an unborn foetus with a disability and disabled people
have a different ethical status. A foetus can be legally terminated under
the law, but this does not mean that human rights principles should
not be applied to disabled people who are already alive.
Thus, the logical link between deformed foetuses and disabled peo-
ple, implying that prenatal screening and selective abortion deny the ex-
istence of disabled people, does not hold up. But why do so many dis-
abled people feel violated by the practices of prenatal screening and se-
lective abortion?3 Where does this link come from? And when prenatal
screening and selective abortion are practised by individuals without
any public policies, should this be labelled ‘bias against disability’? If
women’s claim to the right of self-determination stems from ‘bias
against disability’ inherent in the practice of some reproductive technol-
ogies, then it is crucial to reflect on the link between the bias against
disability and reproductive technologies. How does ‘bias against dis-
ability’ affect people in society, including disabled people, as well as wo-
men?
Bias against an attribute, being disabled
If a selective abortion does not constitute direct discrimination against
disabled people who are already alive, then the attribute ‘being disabled’
comes to the fore in unearthing the mechanism of the link between
‘the practice of prenatal screening to discover disabilities in foetuses’
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and ‘denial of the existence of disabled people who are already born’,
because this attribute is the only commonality between the aborted foe-
tus and disabled people. In other words, it seems to be logical to say
that the fact that a foetus is aborted ‘because of a certain attribute’
makes disabled people who have that same attribute feel that they are
being attacked.
Several observations can be noted about this attribute in relation to
the practice of selective abortion are as follows. First, the attribute is
looked at with a negative bias. It is considered to be negative. It is con-
sidered to be more difficult to live with this attribute than without it.
Second, selective abortion is an act of eradicating the existence of those
with this attribute, because, after being born with the attribute, it is typi-
cally not removable through medical treatment. If the technology was
aimed at removing or curing disabilities, instead of the entire beings
who have the disability, then disabled people would not have reacted as
critically as they did to the technology. Thirdly, for those living with this
attribute, being disabled, the fact that they have the attribute is impor-
tant to them. If it were not important, then they would not be upset by
the attribute being looked at with a negative bias.
There are a number of other kinds of attributes, such as ‘being the
sixth child in a family’. Yet it is not likely that people who are the sixth
child, and born before the more widespread use of contraceptives,
would feel offended by the current practice of family planning, and
would formulate a group for ‘the sixth children’ to oppose the use of
contraceptives because contraceptive methods caused a decrease in the
existence of ‘sixth children’. Maybe anti-abortion activists would oppose
abortion for any reasons; however, even they would not argue that an
abortion is problematic specifically because it is aborting ‘the sixth’
child. So, it is not likely that abortion of the sixth would-be-child, in the
context of family planning, would be questioned ethically. This means
that there is a difference between the meaning of the attributes ‘the
sixth child,’ for example, and ‘being disabled’. Because selective abor-
tion is due to the attribute ‘disability’, it is ethically questioned by peo-
ple with the same disability.
Then why does the attribute ‘being disabled’ seem so significant?
Why do disabled people react more sensitively than people with other
kinds of attributes? Consider the following three points as interrelated
with one another: Firstly, ‘a disability is an important attribute’ because
‘it is considered to be negative (oppressed, undervalued)’ and ‘it is not
easier to live with it than without it’, but ‘it is not removable’ and there-
fore ‘people with the attribute have to find a way to live with, and get
along with, the attribute’. So the attribute is highly integral to a person,
so integral that it is a crucial part of the construction of their ‘self’. The
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attribute is deeply related to the person’s self-identity and way of life.
Thus, integrity of the attribute is one point.4
Secondly, it is quite imaginable that a person with a disability strug-
gles to cope with the attribute. There are a number of comments made
by disabled people that they lead a happy life ‘because of the disability’.5
It is at least clearly said that there are possibilities for happiness in life
that cannot be uniformly attributed to the fact of being either disabled
or not. So, ‘disability’ could provide a positive function in people’s lives.
Thirdly, the value inherent in some reproductive technologies, how-
ever, inevitably implies that having a disability is negative, and a being
with a disability can be justifiably eradicated. Indeed, one of the plausi-
ble reasons to justify selective abortion is ‘happiness/unhappiness of a
would-be-child’. Yet contrary to this reasoning disabled people repeat-
edly claim that ‘we are not unhappy; do not judge us, our life, or our
happiness’. This means that the positive effect that an attribute can
bring about may be misjudged, misunderstood, and underestimated. It
is likely that when something is misunderstood or underestimated
those concerned will raise objections to correct the judgement, saying
that it is an incorrect understanding. Thus, a misjudgement, and a de-
mand to correct the misunderstanding, is the third point that helps to
explain the sensitivity shared by disabled people about the use of prena-
tal screening and selective abortion of foetuses with anomalies.
One conclusion that I can draw is that disabled people’s claim that re-
productive technology is discriminatory is based on their motivation to
correct the misjudgement, misunderstanding, and/or undervaluation
that they believe surrounds the role of the attribute ‘being disabled’ in
their lives. In other words, their refutation of the way of thinking inher-
ent in reproductive technology is an expression of their desire for a vali-
dation of the value they place on this attribute. The attribute is impor-
tant to them because of its integral role in their lives and because of the
way it is oppressed. Thus the importance of an attribute is a political
question of how an attribute is judged and treated by dominant values,
including any oppression of the attribute. And, the more important the
attribute is to one’s existence, and the more misunderstood the attribute
is, the stronger the rejection of the misunderstanding is by those living
with the attribute.
Critics may argue that there are disabled people who truly suffer
from having this attribute, who have no feelings of happiness in life at
all, and who therefore wish they had been aborted. The experience of
life is up to the individual, and the decision about the use of prenatal
screening and selective abortion is also left to the individual. I agree
that the reproductive decision-making ought to be entrusted to indivi-
duals, so those who truly believe that having a disability is a negative
thing will be entitled to choose to have a selective abortion. However I
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recognise there is a certain dominant belief within the context in which
individuals make these decisions which holds that a disability is nega-
tive, and makes it more difficult for women to give birth to disabled
children than to disability-free children. To use liberalist notions to jus-
tify the use of reproductive technologies such as prenatal screening and
selective abortion in today’s social environment means guiding society
in a certain direction in the future – toward a scenario where more and
more foetuses with anomalies are aborted, where it becomes excep-
tional for a pregnant woman to refuse prenatal screening, and where if
that woman gives birth to a disabled child, she will be blamed.
Moreover, when disabilities, which are targeted by reproductive tech-
nology, become a rare phenomenon, doctors may not be encouraged to
develop skills to mitigate the burdens that result from these disabilities.
This would tend to marginalise people who have disabilities that can be
detected by prenatal screening even more, driving them deeper into the
isolated corners of society. Is this what we want in the future, with re-
gard to disabilities and women’s reproduction? Since social movements
are driven by people’s visions of what they want society to be like in the
future, it is no wonder that people in the disabled people’s movement
link concerns in the current practice of reproductive technology to fu-
ture visions of society, carefully monitoring the direction that society is
heading in. Bonded by the same attribute, disabled people do not only
relate themselves to aborted foetuses, but they are creating solidarity
with future ‘comrades’ for the well-being of those with the same attri-
butes. This is the reasoning that links the practice of eradication of a
foetus with an anomaly and the associated sense of discrimination felt
by disabled people.
Liberalist ideas have some important points: when it comes to resis-
tance to state oppression and a claim for freedom from oppression, lib-
eralist ideas function as an effective instrument to demand a fair treat-
ment. But an individual’s behaviour is not limited to interacting with
the given social context; it also affects the future of society where all
members of society are related. If reproductive technology does not di-
rectly attack disabled people, the problems inherent in the use of this
technology are connected to the issue of how to evaluate disabled peo-
ple’s existence, and moreover, to the question of what the future society
will be like.
Social movements often deal with an attribute that becomes a bond
of solidarity, for example, ‘being a woman’ in the case of women’s
movements. Social movements are also often concerned about the fu-
ture direction of change in society. In this light, it can be said that social
movements’ concern is not only with the current life condition of their
members, but is also often with the well-being of those who will have
the same attribute in the future, in a given society. Even if discrimina-
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tion is not a direct attack on certain people, nevertheless selective abor-
tion and prenatal screening are likely to lead to the marginalisation of
certain people who have the same attribute – this is how I read the ar-
gument by the disabled people’s movement group with regard to selec-
tive abortion and bias against disability.
Indeed, in trying to predict what society will be like in the future, it
seems likely that the liberalist way of using reproductive technology
would bring about more difficulties in disabled people’s lives. Selective
abortion and prenatal screening are biased against disabilities, and both
have an impact on the way members of society will lead their lives in
the future. The medical association’s argument that individual decision-
making does not lead to discrimination is thus refuted. Then how does
the bias against disabilities affect women’s reproduction?
‘Bias against disability’ and ‘women’s self ’
The act of giving birth is one of the most important events in women’s
lives. It is not only because of the unique involvement of a woman’s en-
tire being (both physically and psychologically) in pregnancy and deliv-
ery, but because the child she gives birth to will affect her entire life,
her whole life plan, her existence, and her self-identity.
The value attached to different kinds of children is socially con-
structed. In a context where a disability is considered to be negative,
and where giving birth is considered to be the supreme mission of wo-
men, giving birth to a disabled child will badly stigmatise a woman’s ex-
istence and identity.6
Decisions of whether or not to give birth to a disabled child are a fun-
damentally different choice from, for example, decisions of whether to
help a disabled person in the street or to hire a disabled person for a
job.
The Japanese sociologist Yumiko Ehara points out that the decision
to give birth to a disabled child or not poses quite difficult questions for
women about themselves.7 One question, for example, is, ‘if I abort my
foetus because of a disability, doesn’t it mean that I am not ready to be
a mother, because mothers should accept and love their child whatever
they might be like?’ Thus the decision-making process for a woman in
this situation actually includes asking herself questions about herself,
such as ‘what do I think is a good mother?’ and furthermore, ‘what do I
think is a good thing and a bad thing to do as a human being?’
The issue of what kind of children to give birth to is thus intimately
related to a would-be mother’s self. Would-be mothers who most ac-
tively try to co-exist with disabled people in society, by supporting them
through concrete actions in their daily life, might struggle when it
comes to decisions concerning whether to give birth to a disabled child.
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This is because a child is so intimate to one’s self and identity. Thus, a
socially constructed value about the kind of children a woman has af-
fects women’s reproductive decision-making process, with reproductive
issues as an intimate part of ‘self’.
The liberalist self
The liberalist definition of ‘self-determination’ leads to a form of deci-
sion-making based on the decision-maker’s will being supreme. Inter-
vention from the surroundings ought to be avoided as much as possi-
ble. This is based on the assumption that surroundings might project
interests on the decision-maker. In light of the genealogy of liberalism,
this assumption stems from a view that each individual is supposed to
act in order to maximise her/his utility and happiness, and this funda-
mentally conflicts with the interests of others.
Especially when there is a power imbalance between those concerned
in making a decision, it is important to stick to this liberalist principle,
in order not to be exploited by others. In this regard, liberalism is a con-
ceptual instrument to claim freedom from the oppression of the state
and from any kind of power. However, it has been suggested that the
liberalist content of the ‘right to self-determination’ is not sufficient.
Firstly, even if there is an ethical problem in the values within the sur-
roundings where decisions are made, a liberalist way of reading and ex-
ercising self-determination would merely hide the mechanism of the
problem. Secondly, it is impossible to totally separate an individual from
his/her surroundings. Moreover, the relationship between the decision-
maker and the surroundings is not always hostile. ‘War of all against
all’ does not always happen. An individual might need support from
her surroundings, and those surroundings might tend to help her to
make her decision, such as in the doctor-patient relationship, for exam-
ple. Here, the liberalist way of defining self-determination – which is
based on ‘self-defence’ against others’ projection of their interests – is
not very applicable.
Self-determination in terms of self-defence is also not always the ab-
solute principle in our daily lives. For example, assisting with another’s
suicide is prohibited in many countries, although the act of assisting
the suicide, in this case, would be supporting the other’s self-determina-
tion. This example shows that the principle of self-determination, based
on liberal individualism, does not always represent the absolute good.
Moreover, there are even situations where we do not care if others de-
cide about certain matters for us, for example, what to eat for dinner.
From these cases, it can be said that our practice of self-determination
is based on the sense that ‘in certain matters, self-determination is im-
portant, but not in others’. In the present debate about the practice of
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reproductive technology and women’s right to self-determination, cen-
tral matters are an attribute such as ‘disability’ or ‘the act of giving
birth’, as was discussed above, and the importance of these matters is
socially constructed.
There is an intuitive feeling that liberalism is not perfect. Then, if lib-
eralism is not perfect, what is the meaning of ‘right to self-determina-
tion’ as expressed by the women’s movement in Japan in the 1990s re-
garding the reproductive technology debate? The following are several
quotes from people within the women’s movement at that time regard-
ing the concept of women’s right to self-determination.
Women’s right to self-determination as claimed by women within the
women’s movement
(1) ‘... One of the points in the recent sociological argumentation on
self-determination is, “not to decide for others, and not to be decided
by others.” ... Not to decide about others is important, but put into ac-
tual practice, would be rather difficult. Indeed, if the self is not
decided by others and the other is not decided by the self, but both
can make individual decisions and choices, and if there is a relation-
ship and environment where both can co-exist together, then this
would be a wonderful society’ (Yonezu, in Soshiren news (176): 4).
(2) ‘The assertion by women that women want to decide about their
own bodies themselves is never selfish, but instead, is one of the
principles of “deciding on one’s own”. One knows one’s own pain
of the self, and this fact could even be extended to my imagination
about another’s pain; I want to protect myself on my own just as
others want to do – I want to continue struggling for the improve-
ment of the law, as well as the social system, so that people can
practice this principle’ (Soshiren news, (133) July 1996: 3-4).
(3) ‘We seek social conditions where all the decisions are supported
and welcomed, even choices to give birth to a foetus with an anom-
aly’ (Soshiren news (164) March 1999: 3).
‘The self is not decided by others and the other is not decided by the
self’ from the first quote shows that self-determination is a claim that
such an important issue as giving birth should not be controlled by
others, not to mention whether or not to give birth, when, how many,
and what kind of children to have. With regard to selective abortion and
prenatal screening, the point that should not be controlled by others is
a decision regarding ‘an attribute’, in other words being disabled. So,
by ‘not decided by others’ means that a certain attribute is not to be un-
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fairly judged and its value should not be ignored. In this light, ‘inter-
vention’ or ‘deciding about others’ means ‘to judge the decision by giv-
ing the decision an unfair evaluation because of a certain attribute’. If a
woman finds that her foetus has a certain attribute, she has to wonder
if it is a good decision to give birth, or not. If she wants to give birth to
a disabled child, it would not be as easy as giving birth to a non-dis-
abled child. So her decision is controlled by the value attached to the at-
tribute.
The women’s movement’s desire in the 1990s and now is to set up
conditions where women can give birth to a disabled child and the child
is welcomed. And a woman should not be misjudged negatively, if she
chooses either to not have prenatal screening, or indeed if she chooses
to give birth to a disabled child, as the third quote says.
For disabled women the issue is more comprehensive than these.
The claim by disabled women is that they should not be disapproved of
their potential and desire to have children because of their ‘depen-
dence,’ or because of their deviation from the ideal image of woman-
hood. On the contrary, they should be able to fulfil their desire with the
support of society, and even if their child is disabled, these women
should be supported in their decision to give birth to disabled children,
because independence is not doing everything alone without the help of
others.
The second quote is about imagining another’s pain. This is an ap-
peal for others to imagine ‘if I had the same attribute, and if I was con-
fronted with the same situation, would I want to be judged and evalu-
ated?’ What can be said from the reading of these three citations about
women’s right to self-determination?
When a ‘right to self-determination’ is considered, an individual’s
right to decision-making is limited. This impediment to decision-mak-
ing is due to a certain attribute involved in the decision, specifically,
when ‘something’ is misjudged, disapproved of, or underestimated. So
although ‘self-determination’ is not always the ‘sacred’ principle, it ap-
pears to be an important rationale when certain important attributes are
involved. Self-determination is used when those advocating self-deter-
mination deem ‘something’ to be crucial for their existence and for
their way of life, and when that something is integral to their construc-
tion of their ‘self’, such as a disability is for disabled people or repro-
ductive decision-making is for women. Moreover, the attribute also be-
comes important and sensitive, depending on how society and domi-
nant values judge the attribute. The attribute becomes important when
it is misunderstood, misjudged, and underestimated unfairly. Self-deter-
mination, in this light, is to be defined as a claim for others ‘not to look
down on my decision because of the attribute’. Actually the reasoning
so far does not really reveal a big difference from the liberalist view, be-
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cause this reasoning can sound like: ‘Others should leave me alone, no
matter what decisions I make, without making any judgement about
my decisions’.
Self-determination as viewed by the women’s movement goes beyond
such a principle of non-intervention. Actually their view of ‘self-determi-
nation’ (and that of other social movement groups in Japan) was influ-
enced by the meaning assigned to the concept of self-determination by
the disabled people’s movement’s independent living movement.
There is no official definition of the concept of ‘independent living’.
Reviewing the movements’ positions, a fair definition would be ‘living
in the manner in which one chooses, outside an institution or family
home, with any necessary assistance for daily activities’ (for more infor-
mation about this concept, see chapters 1 and 4). This demand for inde-
pendent living was a refusal to allow others to decide about an indivi-
dual’s living conditions, and specifically was a refusal to live isolated
from the local community or society in general; it was a refusal to live
life without having the opportunity to exercise basic human activities in
contemporary society, such as shopping, using public transportation,
falling in love, and so forth. This movement was an effort to redefine
disabled people as members of society who deserve to have the choice
to lead a life as other human beings do. The freedom to make mistakes,
take risks, and experience difficulties and quarrels in human relation-
ships was also included.8
On the fundamental level, this independent living movement’s con-
cept of self-determination attempts to overturn a number of concepts
that had been taken for granted. It required a total redefinition of the
concept of ‘dependence’ and ‘independence’. It also requires people
without disabilities to reflect upon themselves and recognise their
biases. Due to this self-reflection, people with and without disabilities
would be able to become friends on equal footing, instead of the fixed
hierarchy of ‘the supporter’ and ‘the supported’, which creates unilat-
eral dependency. According to Mushitarô Ogura, a disabled person ac-
tive in the 1980s and 1990s independent living movement:
Disabled people or those who provided care to disabled people
were required to embrace the strictly radical ideas of the 1970s
movement to ‘criticise themselves’ in order to question the inter-
nalised negative bias against disabilities. During the 1980s, it be-
came clearer that becoming aware of internalised ‘discrimination
against disabilities’ does not mean having a guilty consciousness
on the part of people without disabilities toward the disabled peo-
ple, or of people with fewer disabilities toward those with more
disabilities. This sort of consciousness is, in the end, that of selected,
superior people.
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Suppose there is a person who cannot drink water while I can do
it freely. How would you feel about this? Would you be all right
leaving the situation as it is? You never know when you might
become like that person. Sharing ideas is a feeling of this kind, a
matter of sympathy (Osano 1998: 80).
My fingers move; then, why don’t I share my fingers and do something
with those whose fingers don’t move smoothly? Using my fingers, the
person can do what s/he wants. Moreover, the ability of my fingers be-
comes a part of the abilities of the other person. Achieving what that
person wants using this shared ability is an expression of that person’s
independence – this is how I understand the principle of self-determi-
nation in relationships between those with and without disabilities.
From here, it can be deduced that independence is not only doing
something on one’s own. It is necessary to acknowledge that many fac-
tors support an individual in successfully doing something. Then it is
necessary to establish an environment that supports an individual’s
wanting to do something and ability to do that.
In line with this, the second quote above expresses a hope for the co-
existence of the consequences of all the decisions. Consider the mean-
ing of ‘co-existence’ with ‘imagination’ and ‘right’ as key words. When
someone claims something to be ‘right’, as in correct, this expresses the
person’s feeling of oppression and the belief that the oppression should
be removed, in order to be fair. To improve the oppressive situation,
‘imagination’ (of the person’s pain by others) is required. This is a re-
quest for people not to do things to others that they would not like to
have done to themselves (non-intervention), but also to imagine what an
individual would like to have done by others if the individual were in
their position. This is, in other words, a hope that the individual’s deci-
sion will not be misjudged and looked down upon, and in fact, will be
supported by others. In this reasoning, self-determination is defined as
being exercised only when there are others around the individual, and
only when others approve of the value of the individual’s decision. In-
deed, discrimination and oppressive situations are about the interaction
of social groups who have different degrees of power, so policies to im-
prove the situation cannot exist without the collaboration of the power-
ful. The request for imagination is actually a transformation of values, a
way of thinking about a certain attribute and a certain related decision,
because of the principle ‘not to decide for others, not to be decided by
others’. To this end, not to give a negative response to the decision is in-
sufficient. So ‘co-exist’ goes beyond meaning different actors exist at the
same time without engaging in oppressive relationships, but instead it
means that the different actors affirmatively support each others exis-
tence, with an acknowledgement that one cannot exist without the other.
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Liberalist and Enlightenmentalist thoughts assume that being right is
something that is inherent in every human being. This is a powerful in-
strument to challenge the intervention of authority during political
struggles. Because women’s reproductive capacities tend to be used for
states’ collective interests, the liberalist meaning of ‘right’ is significant,
too. Yet the view that every human being is entitled to rights does not
guarantee that all human beings actually practise and enjoy rights. For
rights to be practised and to go beyond a mere theoretical concept, the
surroundings are required to acknowledge rights as inherent in a being
and to support an individual’s ability to exercise them. In this context, it
was argued earlier that ‘imagination of the other’s pain’ is required. But
this does not mean that all individuals have to experience and choose
the same ‘painful’ situation. The focus is on the way of thinking, or
paradigm, inherent in the context in which decisions are made.
How does a paradigm shift happen?
It should be clarified that women’s reproductive health movement and
disabled people’s movement are careful not to criticise individuals who
make ‘problematic’ decisions, such as aborting a foetus with an anom-
aly. In the 1970s there was a tendency in the debate between the move-
ments of women and disabled people for disabled people to question an
individual woman about whether she would give birth if her foetus had
an anomaly, and a woman in the movement would take the question
seriously, asking herself if she would do it or not. However, by the
1980s, both groups gradually changed their attitudes to focus more on
questioning social structures, feeling that it was inappropriate to con-
front an individual, who is, in reality, not pregnant, with such a ques-
tion. The movements also focused more on the context in which deci-
sions were made by individuals, and they aimed to build an argument
that set up conditions for individuals’ decision-making, and eventually
aimed to develop a clear outline of the conditions necessary to facilitate
decision-making by an individual, whether a woman or a disabled per-
son. This was the target of both movements. Therefore, a criticism of
the technologies by the movements is notably different from an argu-
ment that selective abortion or prenatal screening should be prohibited.
The target of the criticism by SMOs is the societal value behind the
practice of prenatal screening and selective abortion: the belief that dis-
abled children should not be born. The problem is the hierarchical rela-
tionship between values attached to the birth of a disabled child and a
non-disabled child, as well as between the choice of a woman to give
birth to a disabled child and to a non-disabled child. To shift the para-
digm shared by society, collaboration from influential parties is neces-
sary, such as doctors and governmental ministries, particularly because
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they have the knowledge and skill necessary to put reproductive technol-
ogies into practice, and the authority to issue guidelines and laws.
The question is again ‘are we really happy to have such a society,
where disability is eliminated more and more?’ However advanced tech-
nologies become in the future, there is always the possibility of giving
birth to disabled children. Then, do we really want a social situation
where women are more fearful because of the possibility of giving birth
to disabled children with more screening techniques in use?
Critics may argue that imagination also differs from individual to in-
dividual. How to imagine the pain of living with a disability as well as
the joy it can bring differs from person to person. The point is, it does
not matter if detailed ideas differ between individuals. In whatever
form, more serious consideration about a life with a disability, and its
possible joys, will lead society to develop into a context in which dis-
abled people can live more easily, and be more accepted than they are
now, as well a place where it will become easier for women to choose to
give birth to disabled children.
On the right to self-determination
Self-determination is possible only when there is understanding, a sup-
portive environment, and when the right to self-determination includes
transforming ideas about others. Since rights are an instrument to im-
prove an oppressive situation, the right to self-determination actually re-
quires a value change in others, and this also implies a challenge to sur-
rounding structures.
Diagram 2: Self-determination – ‘self ’ and ‘other’
 
self self
other other
Self-determination is oriented towards
the other to protect the self from the
other’s intervention. So self-determi-
nation tends to be conceptualised as
isolated individualised decision-mak-
ing as the absolute principle.
Self-determination is practised given
another’s support to make the deci-
sion possible. So, the right to self-de-
termination is a claim for the other’s
value transformation. At the same
time, the self exercises the liberalist
right to protect the self from others.
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To summarise the concept of women’s right to self-determination held
by the women's movement: this is the right that an individual is en-
titled to exercise when they are prevented from deciding something on
their own. If the issue on which the individual is making a choice is
not generally viewed to be very important, even though women are pre-
vented from freely choosing, they might not attempt to assert the right
to self-determination. When there is an attempt to assert the right to
self-determination, the decision on the matter is important to one’s life.
The issue to be decided upon is considered by the women’s movement
to be important if it is integral to the life of the decision-maker. When
an individual’s ability to make a ‘choice with regard to this important is-
sue is interfered with and if the individual’s value is challenged, there
is an attempt to assert the right to self-determination. In the issue of
prenatal screening and selective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly,
the issue to decide upon that is at the centre of the rights discussion is
‘an attribute’ (the attribute of being disabled) or it is a reproductive
choice. These attributes are what is important and integral to the indivi-
dual, but are also open to misjudgement and infringement. An attempt
to assert ‘self-determination’ appears when the matter is important, so
important that one hopes that the decision related to the attribute will
not be interfered with. But it is not only the principle of ‘non-interven-
tion’ that matters here. The right to self-determination is even an at-
tempt to assert the right to require support of the decision related to
the attribute, and to support the means to correct misjudgements about
the attribute, or a transformation of the value shared in society. Thus
self-determination is not merely a concept of not intervening in each
others’ lives, as liberalism contends, but it requires both the other’s
transformation of ways of thinking (others’ internal revolution) and also
their support. This is because a decision is realised only when it is sup-
ported by others, especially in the situation where there tends to be dis-
approval of the decision. Mutual support when making decisions that
society does not approve of – this is the meaning of ‘co-existence’. So
the attitude of others who surround an individual (the self) affects
whether or not the practice of self-determination can be realised. ‘Right’
is attached to self-determination because of society’s disapproval of the
potential decision one might choose to make. The right to self-determi-
nation is thus a site for a political struggle, and is a claim for the trans-
formation of the value held by the surrounding context (society), in
which decisions are made.
Thus, the ‘self’ is viewed as a challenger, to mitigate the discrimina-
tion and power imbalance in the social context, and is a politically
highly active being. Along with the image of ‘self’ one can consider
‘rights’ as an instrument to make a possible challenge to the discrimi-
natory structure surrounding the self. And when using ‘rights’ it is clar-
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ified that the self is oppressed, and use of the right to self-determina-
tion means that self-determination is not being practised because of the
oppressive condition. This suggests that there is a power imbalance and
discrimination, and clarifies that the rhetoric is a claim for improving
the situation.
‘Who is the self ’ in women's right to self-determination
Problems of representation and the category ‘women’
Disabled women, along with people within the women’s reproductive
movements, argued with disability-free women, saying, ‘you can decide,
you have alternative choices, but we cannot,’ and ‘you say you choose,
but a woman is not actually self-determining [unless bias against dis-
ability is ended, because under the current norm that views disability as
negative, women are ‘made to’ choose to abort a deformed foetus]’.9
An example of problems of representation regarding the category
‘women’ is a conversation that I had with a woman with CP.10 She was
once living in a residential institution, but later on she left the institu-
tion to live on her own, with the help of assistants. She had been active
in the disabled people’s movement against institutionalisation. She re-
called that what came to her mind immediately after she came out of
the institution was not ‘rights’, but rather ‘anger’ against what had been
taken away from her– freedom, respect as a human being, and all of
the other things that are normal for disability-free people. She said:
‘Rights’ are a concept for those who have access to resources in
the existing system. But rights do not appeal to those who are re-
garded as deviants in the given system. [...] Besides, in achieving
independent living, what disabled people have to do is to ‘ask’
others for help. And in asking, is it proper to stick to ‘rights’ in
building a relationship with others?
Some important points can be observed from this comment. She says
that rights are not proper to assert because she has to ask for help.
From this statement, it can be deduced that rights are a tool to stake a
claim, and therefore it is not always proper to assert a right, especially
when it is more important for the oppressed to establish a harmonious
relationship with others. Rights have both an individualist and an ag-
gressive image, as described in the previous chapters. For some op-
pressed people, rights are not necessarily the only concept or the pri-
mary concept that they think of, as a tool to improve their situation.
Also, for those who have spent all their lives separated from main-
stream society, either in an institution or at their parents’ homes, some-
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times without even a basic education, rights might not function as a
word or concept that has any bearing on the frustration they experience
in their daily life. Since rights are closely connected to the law and the
policies of the state, rights are highly political, philosophical, abstract,
and intellectual concepts, which cannot always express the agonies of
those who are most oppressed.
When considering a woman’s right to self-determination a problem
is the practitioner of rights, or the category ‘women’; the claim by dis-
abled women that ‘rights are not for us’ means, in other words, ‘don’t
you include us when you say ‘women’ because we women are different
from you women. The problems we face are different from what you
face’. Within the category ‘women’, there is a diversity, power relation-
ship and different conditions, such as disabled women and non-dis-
abled women. It is not possible to generalise what ‘women’ are, or what
the problems faced by ‘women’ are.
On a different level, there is a question raised by disabled people
about whether ‘women’s right to self-determination’ includes all wo-
men – i.e., does the scope of this category go beyond the women in the
women’s reproductive rights movement who have asserted that they
have such a right? Disabled people would say that they acknowledge
that, unlike women in general outside the movement, women who par-
ticipate in the women’s movement were conscious enough to realise
the seriousness of the issue of discrimination against disabled people.
Therefore, they have sometimes suggested that women in the reproduc-
tive health movement may use the term ‘women’s rights’ but the terms
should not be extended to mean women outside the women’s move-
ment.
Hierarchy, different consciousness, and the role of the category ‘women’
There are two difficulties with the category ‘women’ – the power hierar-
chy among women and different consciousness.
Indeed, ‘women’s rights’ implies that there is ‘the woman’ – a gener-
alisation of ‘women’. Generalisations are often made by the powerful.
Generalising is a process to do away with or to ignore diversity. Those
who make generalisations do not feel diversity is necessary or impor-
tant. They are satisfied with the generalised categorisation because their
interest is being represented; it is likely that they are in a majority posi-
tion, either in terms of quantity or power. Those who are not in the ma-
jority need to draw attention to the way in which they differ from the
majority because this difference matters to them. Why does it matter?
Because the difference influences their well-being in a crucial way for
them, mostly in an oppressive way. In comparison to disabled women,
disability-free women are likely to be more powerful and privileged.
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There are feelings among disabled women that disability-free women
will not understand or represent the interests of disabled women. This
is the same process of generalisation as the heterosexual forgetting
about the existence of the homosexual by universalising heterosexuality,
or men universalising human beings while forgetting women.11
At the same time, women who believe that conventional women’s
roles are truly women’s because of their being women might not feel
represented by the feminist rhetoric of ‘women’s right to reproductive
self-determination’. For women who live happily with conventional va-
lues, conflict with men and authority, in the name of ‘women’, only
causes unnecessary problems. Women in the reproductive health move-
ment also have worries about the reproductive decision-making prac-
tised by many women in general. For instance, some women might be
ignorant of their bodily systems, they might have an abortion without
any serious consideration, or they might fail to ethically reflect upon
their anti-disability biases.
But then, is it wiser to stop saying ‘women’? In the practice of politi-
cal struggle, identity is necessary, especially when the category itself is
oppressed by the more powerful, in this case ‘men’. If one woman’s in-
terests are not totally represented by such terms as ‘women’ and
‘rights’, on certain politicised occasions, such as during a courtroom
trial, it is still important to use the category ‘women’, even if it is in-
complete. This is because the category ‘women’ is widely acknowledged
for its value and significance as a category of the oppressed, and
chances are that the acknowledgement entitles a person to rights to jus-
tify a demand. A ‘right’ or the category ‘women’ is incomplete, but
these categorisations cannot be abolished as long as they are a tool to
support a demand to stop unfair treatment. Then the point is not
whether women should stop saying ‘women’s rights’ or not, but that
the application of the term should be broadened to include women with
as many diverse backgrounds as possible. If rights do not appeal to rela-
tively more powerless women, then the only way to solve this problem
is to enrich the concept so that it becomes attractive. If women in gen-
eral are less aware of the ethical problems of selective abortion, or of
discrimination against disabled people, then the only way to make them
more aware is to raise their consciousness. Consciousness-raising is the
target of movement activities in a sense; perhaps movements in colla-
boration with academics, are the only way to raise consciousness among
women in general.
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Who are ‘women’ in ‘women’s right to self-determination’ as used by the
women’s movement?
The practice of ‘rights’ as has been proposed here is an active approach
to the values of other people, so that the way of thinking about people,
about the ‘oppressed attribute’, changes. The concept of ‘rights’, in this
light, is a political instrument for social movement groups to actively
engage with socially constructed values, in order to challenge them.
Meanings of ‘a challenge to change socially constructed values in so-
ciety’ can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the political struggle
that makes use of women’s right to self-determination is oriented to-
ward the creation of conscious women in the social context in which
the struggle is taking place, whether it be about women’s issues or dis-
abled people’s issues. So the use of ‘women’s right to self-determina-
tion’ is in order to mitigate bias against disability. And if ‘women’s right
to self-determination’ is an expression that challenges discrimination, it
can be said that the use of this rhetoric is aimed at trying to include as
many different women as possible, who may feel that they have been
excluded from the category ‘women’ because of discrimination. Thus
‘rights’ or ‘women’s self’ are not tools to entitle privileged women, as
disabled people worry, but are tools to promote a continuous effort to
expand what is encompassed by rights, incessantly challenging the dis-
crimination inherent in society. This effort to raise consciousness
among women and other citizens is taken with the hope that it will re-
sult in broader solidarity amongst women in the future.
Earlier it was suggested that when disabled people express their wor-
ry about the use of reproductive technologies, they are acting in solidar-
ity with future disabled ‘comrades’. Accordingly, women’s movement
groups propound a view of individual women who are conscious of
what decisions they are making in what social conditions, who are ready
to face choices, and who have good judgement of how their decisions
are connected to the contemporary and future society. Women’s move-
ment groups are considering the ‘mature’ women in the future, when
they assert ‘women’s right to self-determination’. For women in general
to be mature, movements must keep issuing challenges to improve so-
ciety. Social movements, struggling for the well-being of women and
disabled people, as I have observed in my analysis, are about hopes for
the future direction of a society. Without an optimistic view for the fu-
ture, how can a social movement sustain itself? Hope and trust are the
principles and motivations for social movements, and this includes the
women’s movement.
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Conclusion
Summary of the Analysis and the Future
of the Concept of ‘Rights’
1970s: ‘Women’s right to abortion’ is women’s egoism
In 1972, when the Ministry of Health and Welfare, together with the re-
ligious group Seichoˆ no ie, attempted to revise the law in order to limit
women’s access to abortion, women all over Japan united to prevent
this revision. In doing so, women used the slogan ‘women’s right to
abortion’, but the phrase soon invited criticism from disabled people.
The argument of disabled people was that women should not use the
phrase of ‘a right to abortion’ because it would include the right to abort
foetuses with disabilities. According to them, if women abort a foetus
with an anomaly because of the anomaly, this would be a form of discri-
mination against people with disabilities. The disabled people’s move-
ment also contended that women should examine the discrimination
against the disabled that they had internalised within themselves. In
this context, the disabled people’s movement concluded that a ‘women’s
right to abortion’ was an expression of women’s egoism.
Anti-abortion activists also focused on the concept of ‘rights’ in their
arguments against abortion, saying that by demanding a ‘right to abor-
tion’ women were requesting the right to commit murder. Conse-
quently, they also believed that ‘women’s right to abortion’ was wo-
men’s egoism.
Women in the WLM during the 1970s found the term ‘right’ to be too
limited. They wanted to question the meaning of abortion within Japan’s
historical context and within the society’s contemporary context, but the
phrase ‘right to abortion’ did not facilitate such debates, nor did it go be-
yond the issue of ‘legal access to abortion’. They started discussing the
limitations of the concept of ‘rights’ and tried to find phrases that would
more accurately portray their movement’s thoughts on abortion.
Why should the issue of ‘women’s rights’ be egoism? Consideration of the
concept of ‘rights’ according to its genealogy
Following from the genealogy of the concept of ‘rights’ the term is an
instrument used by the oppressed to call for better conditions. There-
fore, the prerequisite for the use of the concept is that it can be used
when there is (the possibility of) injustice, and it can be used by the op-
pressed to improve the situation.
To analyse the relationship between disabled people and non-disabled
women in terms of the hierarchy of oppression, the former regarded
the latter as their oppressors. To begin with, disabled people felt that
women represented ‘mothers’. From their perspective mothers are phy-
sically and psychologically the closest people they have contact with who
are disability-free people. As their parents, disabled people believed that
these ‘mothers’ tend to act too protectively or paternalistically. The
WLM was composed mainly of disability-free women; so, to disabled
people, when women used the term ‘right’ it looked as if their oppres-
sors were portraying themselves as victims. Hence, disabled people
could not accept that ‘their oppressors’ were using the concept of
‘rights’.
Analysing the debates between the two movements in the 1970s re-
veals that discrimination against women existed within the disabled
people’s movement. This is mainly because the disabled people’s move-
ment at that time was represented by disabled men. These men labelled
women ‘the closest oppressors’ on the one hand, but on the other hand
they expected women to be unconditional caregivers. Therefore, they
could not accept women’s demand for the right to abortion – perceiving
abortion as women’s abandoning of their children. Yonezu points out
that ‘in retrospect, probably there was a fear of being abandoned by
their mothers among disabled men (as well as anti-abortion men)’ (Yo-
nezu 1998: 238) To expect women to be unconditional caregivers im-
poses a conventional role upon women, implying discrimination against
women internalised within the mind of disabled men. Disabled men
criticised women who used the term ‘rights’: according to disabled
men, women should quietly embrace any children instead of asserting
their own rights. In this way disabled men discriminated again women,
although they did not acknowledge this.
Indeed, disabled people at that time argued that discrimination
against the disabled was more serious than discrimination against wo-
men, and that being disabled was more difficult than being a woman.
For instance a disabled person might require assistance to eat and ex-
crete and such help might be difficult to get. However, the seriousness
of discrimination in each case is not what should be weighed. The argu-
ment that ‘women’s discrimination is less serious’ in itself is discrimi-
natory against women, underestimating or even ignoring seriousness of
the issue of discrimination against women. Whether it be as ‘nearest
oppressors’ or ‘unconditional caregivers’, women were reduced to the
role of mothers, and this process of conflating women to mothers is
based on gender bias. In this way, discrimination against women was
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underestimated and invisible for, and carried out by people in the dis-
abled people’s movement.
Women using the concept of ‘rights’ intended to criticise oppression
of women by the state and by men. However, because discrimination
against women was ignored and because of the gender bias internalised
in disabled men, abortion debates at that time were focused only on the
foetus – woman relationship. When this focused, there was no consid-
eration of the causes that lead women to have an abortion – although
actually, to a considerable degree, if not always, gender discrimination
is often the cause of women considering an abortion. Ignorance of dis-
crimination against women was one reason that women’s rights was
considered egoistic. Consequently the act of abortion was understood to
be an attack by a woman against a foetus.
Anti-abortion activists did not specifically focus on the issue of the se-
lective abortion of a foetus with an anomaly, but they generally criticised
women as being egoistic for having abortions. In principle, this label-
ling of women as egoistic and selfish was due to failure to acknowledge
discrimination against women. Women’s demand to end oppression
against women may well sound like a selfish demand, as anti-abortion
activists regarded women as naturally as they are, making the demand
for change or improvement itself superfluous.
In this regard, when the usage of the term ‘right’ is criticised, there
is a possibility that those critics assume that the oppression against
which the right is being asserted is something natural and not oppres-
sion at all; they expect that the oppressed remain obedient, and that the
oppression be maintained. Or simply, they believe that the status quo
should be maintained. Therefore in order to further the social and poli-
tical agenda of the oppressed group it is critical that they raise aware-
ness and acknowledgement of the oppression that they experience,
otherwise society will reject any claim they make to entitlement to
rights.
Problems with the concept of ‘rights’ in the genealogy
In addition to the fact that discrimination against women was clearly
disregarded in the process of social movement activities during the
1970s, the concept of ‘rights’ asserted by women were not only misun-
derstood but it also sometimes implied the idea of dominance and con-
flict. In chapter 3, the genealogy of the notion of ‘rights’ revealed that
one aspect of ‘rights’ implies that the individual makes choices in order
to maximise his/her interests. An individual is defined as a benefit-see-
ker without any limits who is destined to have conflicts with other indi-
viduals. The rights of one person are a potential threat to another’s
rights. In this way, the definition of ‘rights’ is based on the idea that
one person exercising their rights and another individual exercising
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their rights are mutually exclusive. Thus the concept presumes that ex-
ercising rights always contains the possibility of violating another’s
well-being.
Since the concept of ‘rights’ originated in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, the combative implication of the usage of rights can be attributed
to Western political philosophical thought regarding the characteristics
of an individual and relationships between individuals. Of course, a
great number of philosophers have discussed the concept of rights in
different ways in many parts of the world. But in talking about rights in
textbooks on political philosophy, there are certain canonical ways of
constructing debates, starting with those debates lead by Hobbes, Locke,
Bentham, and others (see chapter 3). These thinkers’ arguments differ
in their detail, but they are based on rather pessimistic views of human
beings – seeing them as selfish and combative beings. The implication
of the concept of rights is constructed accordingly. Of course, a political
citizen needs to be critical, outspoken, and sometimes combative to-
ward unfair authority, but it is also important to trust other human
beings. However, the combative aspect of rights is often emphasised
when conceptualising the term.
The WLM in Japan in the 1970s also fell into the trap of the conflic-
tual implication of the concept of rights; when women in the WLM
used the slogan ‘women’s right to abortion’ the idea of a right of a foe-
tus arose as a counterforce, whereby a right of a foetus is considered to
be ‘violated’ by a woman’s right.
Thus, criticism of women’s rights often requires the consideration of
‘a foetus’s right’ in order to weigh the rights between a woman and a
foetus. In order to do so, the ethical status of the foetus must be de-
fined. A conflictual picture between a foetus and a woman is thus con-
structed. Giving rise to a conflict between parties while there might ac-
tually be no conflict, is one limitation inherent in the concept of ‘rights’
and was one reason for women to hesitate in using it.
The hesitation within the WLM to use the term ‘right’ in abortion debates
To begin with, the hesitation of women in the WLM to use the term
‘right’ as a movement slogan was because ‘the right to abortion’ implied
that women were only concerned with requesting legal access to abor-
tion, and were not interested in extending their debates to question the
implications of abortion: the role of abortion in the social context of that
time. Abortion was not what women wanted to have, but was the last re-
sort of contraceptive method as a result of poor provision of informa-
tion on reproduction and insufficient communication between men
and women. Being viewed as a part of the state’s political and economic
policies, abortion had been a tool of population control. The state’s pol-
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icy of the sterilisation of disabled people was also based on the same in-
terests. The Eugenic Protection Law set out legal conditions for both
abortion and the sterilisation of disabled people, but given the state’s
position on these two matters, it was logical that they were stipulated in
one law.
The concept of selective abortion is based on the same logic that the
state wants to secure better quality nation and the fact is that women
tend to act on this logic, not wanting to have a disabled child. Many wo-
men, especially outside the movement, would indeed regard the fact
that a foetus has an anomaly as a justifiable reason for having an abor-
tion. This might be ethically problematic, yet the ‘right to abortion’, in
the view of the WLM, could not explicitly communicate ethical pro-
blems about the selective abortion of deformed foetuses. Receiving criti-
cism from the disabled people’s movement – for example, ‘what is
wrong with being disabled?’ – women in the WLM, being mostly dis-
ability-free, confronted the ‘discrimination’ internalised within them-
selves. ‘Right to abortion’ was not sufficient to problematise all the con-
cerns connected to abortion.
Another reason for women’s hesitation in using the concept of rights
was that they did not agree with the competitive relationship between a
foetus and a woman that it created, in which the rights between the two
parties had to be weighed. As mentioned, a rights framework tends to
generate such a picture with polarised opponents. Therefore this adver-
sarial picture is, in a sense, a logical basis for building a justification for
killing a foetus.
However, women in the WLM during the 1970s did not take up this
position, which would pit women’s needs against the life of a foetus. In-
stead, women in the WLM tried to face the fact that abortion itself is in-
deed an act of killing. They tried to do this by positioning themselves
alongside the foetus, instead of assuming the competitive relationship
between a foetus and a woman. By doing so, women expressed the pain
experienced both during and following an abortion, and drew attention
to the reasons why a woman might have to have an abortion, despite
this pain. The idea that ‘abortion is an act of killing’ was directed to-
ward women themselves, encouraging them to think about themselves
seriously, including why women choose whether or not to give birth.
This idea was also aimed at those who criticised women’s rights rheto-
ric for being egoistic and unfeeling about the act of having an abortion.
The WLM further contended, from time immemorial, abortion has
been a means of striking a balance between resources and labour in so-
ciety, so those who criticise abortion are also indirectly benefiting from
‘acts of killing’. The WLM constructed argument in favour of securing
access to abortion and held that current social conditions necessitated
access to abortion for women, and also maintained that women do not
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choose to have abortions because they like having them. This is an in-
teresting point, but to critics, this argument was too confrontational be-
cause this argument required listeners to stop and think deeper the
meaning of abortion in the Japanese social context. An attempt to limit
women’s access to abortion failed anyway, because of the persistent ac-
tivities of the WLM. This argument, which tries to highlight the pain -
both psychically and physically- of abortion, was taken up by the succes-
sors of the women’s reproductive health movement during the 1980s
and thereafter was at the core of the abortion access argument of the
women’s reproductive health movement in Japan.
Another reason for women’s hesitation in using the concept of
‘rights’ was because they felt that doing so would mean relinquishing
their claim to the concept of motherhood, which was something they
did not want to do. As mentioned, abortion had been a means of balan-
cing society, and safeguarding it at the cost of what are considered to be
‘social nuisances’ in some occasions (Tanaka 1973; Appendix 5: 1),
namely foetuses. Modern society is constructed by cutting out ineffi-
ciency and choosing efficiency, and women and disabled people named
this the ‘ethics of productivity’. Criticising these ethics, women affirmed
their own ‘deviant’ and ‘contradictory’ bodies with menstruation and re-
productive capacities. They rejected the attitude of cutting away ‘social
waste’ for the sake of prosperity, and instead tried to construct an argu-
ment for the co-existence of what was deemed to be weaker with that
which was deemed to be stronger. This was also why women in the
WLM did not simply ignore disabled people’s question, ‘would you give
birth to the child if it is disabled?’ Women also wanted to reflect on the
fact that Japanese society had constructed an identity for disabled peo-
ple which deemed them to be ‘social waste’ because of their unproduc-
tivity; women in the WLM did not want to perpetuate this value.
‘Motherhood’, which women in the WLM tried not to leave out, was not
the ideal image of womanhood. The intention of women in the WLM
was to restore the value of ‘nurturing life’ to society and they wanted to
appreciate processes and beings which are not always effective or ra-
tional, contrary to the basic principle that economic growth and the pro-
cess of modernisation require. To appreciate what is not effective or ra-
tional means to challenge the fundamental values inherent in society.
This should not be the women’s role exclusively, but should also be re-
quired of men.
Since the phrase ‘right to abortion’ tends to rationalise these proble-
matic ethics connected to the act abortion and does not stimulate de-
bates on these issues, women in the 1970s WLM felt reluctance to use
the concept of a rights. The ‘right to abortion’ could not express the so-
cially and historically problematic meaning of abortion, and the expres-
sion implied that the target of the women’s movement was solely ‘se-
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curing access to abortion’. The pain caused by an abortion was rationa-
lised and blunted when the debate focused on access to abortion.
However, women in the movement did not back down from their be-
lief that women should have the final say in deciding whether or not to
have an abortion. Instead, they stuck to the principle that ‘neither the
state nor men will control women in reproductive decision-making’.
Thus, they needed to use the concept of ‘rights’ in order to criticise wo-
men’s oppression by the state and by men, however they were in a di-
lemma about using it.
The dilemma of whether or not to use the concept of ‘rights’ existed
within the WLM itself, but not as a question that led to a polarisation
within the movement. Rather, it was a question that each individual wo-
man within the movement asked herself. There were women who sepa-
rated from the WLM, forming their own group, Neo-lib Chuˆpiren, be-
cause of opinions that differed from others within the WLM and be-
cause their idea of organising the movement was different (Chûpiren
Neo-lib (22) 1973: 4). Chuˆpiren attracted women who thought that the
term ‘right’ should be used to clarify their demands regarding abortion.
Chuˆpiren’s position was to separate the issues of abortion and discrimi-
nation against disabled people, defining the latter as a problem for wel-
fare policies. This group was not active for very long. This was mainly
because of the domineering attitude of its leader (Lib Shinjuku Center
Konomichi hitosuji (15) 1975: 4-5), but also because its position on the
concepts of ‘rights’, ‘abortion’, and ‘disability’ did not take into consid-
eration the issue of selective abortion or the ‘meaning’ of abortion in Ja-
pan’s historical or contemporary context. Japanese abortion debates in
later periods ‘inherited’ the tendency to consider discrimination against
women and against disabled people when taking up the issue of abor-
tion, as the WLM had done.
Comments about the concept of rights from the analysis of the 1970s
abortion debate
How to use ‘rights’ in the phrases of political movements
In the introductory chapter I assumed that the disagreement between
the disabled people’s and the women’s movements was due to the con-
cept of ‘rights’. Because ‘rights’ is based on the assumption that indivi-
duals are combative and egoistic, ‘women’s rights’ was similarly criti-
cised. The genealogy of the concept in chapter 3 argues that this was in-
deed the case. Those ideas stem from the Western philosophical
tradition, more specifically the tradition of utilitarianism, liberalism,
and enlightenmentalism.
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As the core of the debate was analysed, however, it also emerged that
in addition to the original characteristics of the concept such variables
as ‘how the environment acknowledges discrimination’, as well as the
way the term ‘right’ is used, determine the nature of the debate on the
application of the notion of rights. ‘The right to abortion’ could not
avoid emphasising the act of abortion without questioning the act of
giving birth. Further, given the fact that ‘rights’ are a highly legal con-
cept, ‘the right to abortion’ tends to reduce abortion debates to the mat-
ter of legal access to abortion.
Apart from the problems of the term ‘right’ in itself, when society
fails to acknowledge discrimination experienced by certain groups of
people, a claim to an entitlement to a ‘right’ by the oppressed people ex-
periencing that discrimination sounds aggressive and selfish, because
others see the discrimination is ‘natural’ and not a form of oppression.
In abortion debates, the problem is reduced to a foetus – woman rela-
tionship because of the absence of a proper acknowledgement of discri-
mination against women; women are viewed solely as ‘the attacker’ of a
foetus, instead of people who are oppressed. This denial of discrimina-
tion is a serious form of discrimination in itself.
In order to be understood properly, women in the WLM mainly re-
placed the concept of ‘rights’ with two phrases: ‘to give birth is egoism,
not to give birth is egoism’ and ‘we demand a society where we can give
birth – we want to give birth’. With these phrases, women in the move-
ment tried to broaden the scope of the debate from ‘a foetus – woman
relationship’ to ‘the whole of society, which is involved in the issue of
abortion’. Women also tried to express the pain of having an abortion
in this context. Unfortunately, the ‘right to abortion’ could not convey
the idea that the WLM aimed to change the meaning of abortion in re-
lation to the act of giving birth and aimed to criticise the use of abortion
in population control. The concept of ‘rights’ could not extend the abor-
tion debate to a demand for improvement in social conditions where in-
dividual women make decisions. But if women want to continue to use
the term ‘right’ in their political struggle, it needs to be enriched and
broadened. In what follows, I discuss what needs to be expressed by the
concept of rights according to the 1970s Japanese WLM’s argument.
Philosophical contribution by the Women’s Liberation Movement’s abortion
debate
On dualism
Conventionally, anti-abortion activists tended to weigh women’s right to
abortion against the right of a foetus. Disabled people did not deploy
the argument of this ‘clash of absolutes’ (Tribe1992) in criticising ‘wo-
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men’s right to abortion’, but both anti-abortion and disabled people’s
activists held that a woman decides about the future of a foetus based
on egoistic criteria. This is a dualist way of viewing the act of abortion,
stemming from the term ‘right’.1 Also the focus on abortion, without
considering the meaning of giving birth, is based on a dualism between
the acts of giving birth and not giving birth. To draw the concept of du-
alism in a diagram:
Diagram 3: Dual power interaction
 
A
B
In this diagram, the bi-directional arrow l indicates that A and B are se-
parate, conflicting beings. At the same time, it is clear that A is domi-
nant over B, which is shown by the down arrow #. In the context of the
issue of abortion, the act of giving birth, A, is mostly positively valued,
while B, or the act of not giving birth, is valued negatively. Women who
give birth are admired unconditionally (A), while women who have an
abortion are called ‘egoistic’ and ‘aggressive’ (B). The link between the
two acts is barely questioned, but each act is attached to opposite ideolo-
gies in society. This is how those who criticise ‘women’s right to abor-
tion’ view the relationship between the acts of giving birth and not giv-
ing birth. Another analogy is made between ‘a foetus and a woman’.
Critics of ‘women’s right to abortion’ argue that women dominate the
foetus, as the down arrow # shows, and that women easily decide to
have abortions, with hardly any sympathy for a foetus in terms of re-
spect for life, as the bi-directional arrow l shows.
However, women in the WLM faced the fact that abortion is an act of
killing a life, bringing ‘pain’ to the fore. At the same time they tried to
broaden the focus of the concept of ‘rights’ from focusing solely on
abortion to include the act of giving birth.
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Philosophically speaking, I observe that the Japanese WLM’s argu-
ments suggests a critical new paradigm replacing the ‘dualism’ in
which abortion debates are so easily trapped. The following diagram ex-
plains this view:
Diagram 4
A
B
In this diagram A encompasses B, rather than being in conflict with B.
There is no competition between A and B, but there is recognition that
A ‘hosts’ B. In the context of the issue of abortion, for example, A is be-
coming pregnant, or the act of giving birth. Abortion is sometimes una-
voidable, but higher or lower values are not attached to either A or B.
Both events happen, and if an abortion is considered ‘egoism’, then the
act of becoming pregnant and giving birth can also be considered ‘ego-
ism’. A can also be compared to a woman, whereas B can be compared
to a foetus. A is not necessarily willing to attack B, but when A has to
do so, A feels pain, even sometimes wishing to maintain B. In the
above diagram, the pain of B is not giving joy to A, but on the contrary,
B being hurt also hurts A. Abortion is an act of killing a life, and this is
not positive for the foetus, but it is not positive for the woman either.
Also, B’s existence is not independent from A, but is the result of A’s
act – A is hosting B. When a woman feels attacked by a pregnancy, her
anger might be a response to ‘additional’ issues, such as mistakes in
using contraceptive methods, an uncooperative attitude on the part of
her partner about contraception, her life plan, complex legal procedures,
or pressure on her from her surroundings to give birth – all involve dis-
crimination against women. Her anger and hostility are not directed so-
lely toward the foetus. I assume that for many women a foetus’s exis-
tence does not mean that the foetus intends to threat the would-be
mother. Finally, a woman has the say over whether or not to abort the
foetus, which is also expressed in diagram 4 where A includes B.
The act of defining
In addition to suggesting this paradigm shift away from the terms of
dualism, problems in the act of ‘defining’ are also pointed out here. As
mentioned, the phrase ‘a woman’s right to abortion’ tended to bring
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the concept of ‘the right of a foetus’ into the abortion debate. This at-
tempt to weigh the rights of the woman and the rights of the foetus
mean also defining the ethical status of a foetus, otherwise the task of
weighing these two vis-à-vis each other would be impossible. However,
women within the Japanese WLM consciously avoided mapping out a
conflictual and competitive picture of the relationship between a foetus
and a woman. Therefore they also avoided defining the ethical status of
a foetus, that is, deciding whether it is a human being. They confined
themselves to saying, ‘we do not define whether a foetus is a human
being, but it is a being with life.’ What can be deduced from this atti-
tude, in the light of problems inherent in the act of defining?
To begin with, it seems that ‘a conflict’ and ‘the act of definition’ are
different sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the act of defining
the ethical status of a foetus happens when there is a motivation to criti-
cise women’s rights, that is, to weigh a woman’s right against that of a
foetus. So a prerequisite to the act of defining a foetus is conflict, and
therefore the tendency of anti-abortion activists would be to adjust em-
pirical facts within the definition in order to win the debate. This is not
only true for abortion debates. For example, when disabled people
blamed women in the WLM for their assertion to secure access to abor-
tion, the disabled people weighed the seriousness of discrimination
against the disabled against discrimination against women, in order to
argue that their discrimination is more serious. Women in the WLM
held that the degree of discrimination for either women or the disabled
cannot be defined quantitatively. This holds true in any ideological poli-
tical debate, such as liberalism versus communism, or materialism ver-
sus idealism. Thus, definitions are made for the purpose of excluding
the other, i.e., the opposing side of the debate.
On the other hand, the act of giving a fixed definition necessarily
means eliminating what cannot fit into the definition, and tends to nar-
row the nature of the concept being defined. The act of definition could
eliminate things that opponents in debate might have in common. Thus
creating an obstacle for the debating parties if they are seeking a possi-
ble meeting point, and unnecessarily extend a conflict. For example, in
abortion debates, not only in Japan, but also in many other countries,
anti-abortion activists sometimes ‘define’ women in the WLM as wo-
men who ‘regard a foetus as a lump of fat’. However, according to avail-
able sources, I never found that such a statement was made by women
in the women’s reproductive movements. While the women’s move-
ment’s position might include a ‘respect for life’ perspective when wo-
men bring ‘pain’ to the fore, the women’s movement is perhaps re-
garded with hostility by anti-abortion activists because of the definitions
attributed to the women’s movement by anti-abortion activists.
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Furthermore, to polarise a debate reduces the issue to weighing the
ethical values of two parties. In abortion debates, weighing the ethical
values of women and the foetus by defining their moral status makes a
number of critical matters invisible: discrimination against women, wo-
men’s relationships with their partners and/or the father of the child,
as well as norms and values surrounding both the woman and the foe-
tus. Moreover, the act of giving a static definition is followed by the act
of imposing ‘the definition’ on a general audience, although the man-
ner of regarding such matters as pregnancy and the status of a foetus is
based on partial and concrete experiences.
I do not suggest taking a relativist attitude, but I do question the act
of giving a narrow, inflexible definition, which is uncertain in its nature,
and I question the imposition of such a definition on others. The mean-
ing of what we experience might change in the future, and many mat-
ters we experience are relative, not absolute, so why not avoid giving an
arbitrary, artificial definition to what is uncertain? I think that this is a
modest reasonable attitude, because it eventually might give rise to the
possibility of reaching a better understanding between seemingly con-
flicting positions on an uncertain matter.
Defining the status of an embryo or a foetus is becoming more and
more focused, especially because of the advancement of reproductive
technology. However, the entitlement to personhood or patienthood of a
foetus or an embryo would degrade a woman’s body to a mere environ-
ment for the pregnancy, and this tends to strengthen the relationship
between doctors and scientists and the foetus. Besides, a pregnancy is
also objectified as a target of observation. The women’s movement has
been fighting for subjectivity, or true independence (shutaisei) to enable
women to live their lives as full people, but by allowing technologies to
intervene, regarding foetuses above pregnant women, these newly
emerging phenomena seem to be destroying what women have
achieved so far.2
To divide and reduce an issue when discussing the nature of that is-
sue, giving a fixed definition to each polar in dualism, often simulta-
neously drawing a combative picture between the polars and creating a
hierarchy, is traditionally a major characteristic of Western philosophy.
Dualism, reduction, and the act of defining are linked with one another,
manifesting themselves in constructing the meaning of political con-
cepts. This way of thinking is also reflected in how the concept of
‘rights’ is conceptualised. In this way, the genealogy of the concept of
‘rights’ partially shows where egoistic, aggressive, and conflictual impli-
cations of the term come from.
It is important to add that my argument using diagrams 3 and 4 does
not imply that the concept shown by diagram 4 is superior to the con-
cept in diagram 3. To consider that there are only these two ways of con-
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ceiving matters, and that one is superior to the other, would be another
dualism. A conflict is sometimes necessary in order to say NO to op-
pression, for example of women to oppression by men or oppression by
the state. The conventional meaning of ‘rights’ is still necessary in this
respect. However, conventional ‘rights’ do not imply the concept shown
in diagram 4. This discussion is an attempt to enrich the meaning of
the concept by pointing out what has been missed.
The 1980s: International arguments, new rhetoric, and a new
phase in movements’ activities
During the 1980s, the women’s movement was able to use the concept
of ‘rights’ slightly more easily and more frequently than during the
1970s. This was because new phrases emerged that made use of
‘rights’, such as ‘women’s right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive
rights’, instead of ‘right to abortion’. These two newer phrases had
broader scope, encompassing both the acts of ‘giving birth’ and ‘not giv-
ing birth’. Therefore, unlike in the 1970s, the women’s movement
rhetoric was not focused solely on the issue of abortion itself, but it fo-
cused on whether women were able to make reproductive decisions on
their own, instead of others deciding for them. These new phrases also
broadened the range of meaning of the term ‘women’. When abortion
was mentioned in movement phrases during the 1970s, women who
were not expected to give birth, such as disabled women, were excluded
from the category of ‘women’. However, with the new 1980s rhetoric,
women who were not expected to give birth, yet who wanted to give
birth, were now included within the scope of the discussion.
The participation of disabled women in both women’s and disabled
people’s movements also increased as more and more disabled women
left disabled people’s institutions to live independently. In the movement
for independent living, more disabled women experienced reproductive
sex, motivating them to participate in the women’s reproductive move-
ment and to oppose attempts by anti-abortion activists to outlaw abortion.
In addition to the participation of more disabled women in move-
ments of women and disabled people, disabled men, who had opposed
the phrase ‘women’s right to abortion’, also witnessed their partners’
abortions. These men came to know that abortion was not a joyful ex-
perience and that choice is necessary.
There was also a change on the part of women; women who had not
been in the 1970s movements were now participants in women’s move-
ment activities. Those who were unaware of the whole sensitive debates
of the WLM about the term rights during the 1970s, used the term
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‘right’ as a political instrument to say no to state intervention in wo-
men’s reproductive decision-making.
These changes in the 1980s also altered the relationship between dis-
crimination against disabled people and discrimination against women.
In the 1970s, disabled people did not want to hear women using the
concept of ‘rights’ because of their belief that discrimination against
people with disabilities was more serious than discrimination against
women. Yet in the 1980s there emerged a sharper consciousness that
these two types of discrimination should not be weighed in such a man-
ner. Discrimination against women is as serious as that against people
with disabilities – this position became more accepted by disabled peo-
ple during the 1980s, making it easier for the women’s movement to
adopt the language of rights.
The use of positions taken up at the international level is often an ef-
fective strategy to convince Japanese authorities that such a position
would be valid in the Japanese context as well. As the phrases ‘women’s
right to self-determination’ and ‘reproductive rights’ came into use at
international conferences and these rights were accepted as women’s
basic human rights, very few in Japan would reject the phrases.
Because of these changes, women’s movement activists could use the
concept of ‘rights’ in the 1980s more than in the 1970s. However, the
problems inherent in the concept – the liberalist, enlightenmentalist
connotations of ‘rights’ – were not solved. This period witnessed a rapid
development of reproductive technologies, including technologies to
find disabilities in foetuses. While with the emergence of the term ‘self’
in the phrase ‘right to self-determination’ abortion debates began to
take up new questions, such as ‘who the self is’.
The 1990s into 2000s: Liberated individuals?
In 1996, the Eugenic Protection Law was revised to become the Law to
Protect Mothers’ Bodies. In the new law, all the articles on legal proce-
dures for eugenic surgery were deleted from the Eugenic Protection
Law, and the conditions for legal abortion from the law remained in ef-
fect. In other words, only the legal conditions for abortion in the Eu-
genic Protection Law remained and that part now consists of the Law to
Protect Mother’s Bodies. The new law is therefore mainly about the le-
gal conditions for abortion. The new law does not contain a selective
abortion clause. Deletion of the eugenic part from the law was positive,
but neither disabled people nor women were totally satisfied with the
new situation. They now felt threatened by reproductive technology; dis-
abled people were worried that some reproductive technologies would
stigmatise disabilities, and women were worried that technologies
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would pressurise women with regard to what kind of children they
would have to produce.
Indeed, the doctors’ associations started arguing strongly for the ne-
cessity of a selective abortion clause so that doctors could legally prac-
tise prenatal screening and selective abortion. Currently, abortion for
any reason is performed under the economic reasons clause, may it be
unplanned pregnancy, teenage pregnancy or in the case of a foetal
anomaly and a selective abortion. Among these reasons for abortion,
only an anomaly in a foetus is often ethically questioned in public de-
bates because of the sensitivity of the issue, given the Japan’s eugenic
history. Doctors are afraid that their practice of selective abortion might
be disclosed by the mass media, because selective abortion under the
economic reasons clause is, strictly speaking, illegal and its practice
might also be viewed as ethically problematic. Therefore, medical asso-
ciations would like the law to be changed so that medical doctors do not
have to be afraid when they perform selective abortions.
The attempt to introduce the selective abortion clause by medical as-
sociations were opposed by women’s and disabled people’s movement
groups, because these groups argued that the introduction of the selec-
tive abortion clause would increase discrimination against people with
disabilities and would impede women’s right to self-determination. In
1999, doctors proposed revising the conditions for legal abortion so that
women could have unconditional access to abortion up to 12 weeks of
pregnancy. Before 12 weeks of pregnancy, abortion would be possible
under the 1999 proposal in any social, economic, or physical situation
which affects the pregnant woman’s health. According to the medical
associations, women’s right to self-determination and reproductive
rights are both understood to be ‘an individual decision, without inter-
vention by the surroundings, where sufficient information is given’.
Ideas about the right to self-determination as understood by medical
associations can be attributed to the enlightenmentalist, liberal, and uti-
litarian ideas of ‘self’ and ‘rights’, in the tradition of Western political
philosophy. There the ‘self’ is considered to be a strong and conscious
individual who knows how to act. In the practice of the ‘right to self-de-
termination’ the values in the decision-making conditions are not ques-
tioned, as long as the self is able to exercise its autonomy with suffi-
cient information. The influence of each self’s decisions on the social
environment, or the future of society, is not questioned either.
The 1999 proposal was not passed because of the opposition of
SMOs. Although SMOs united in opposing the proposal, it is possible
to observe that women’s reproductive health movement groups and the
other SMOs argued differently. Although the law does not have a selec-
tive abortion clause, the practice of some reproductive technologies
would eventually lead to increasing discrimination of disabilities, be-
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cause the technologies are based on the belief that ‘disabilities cause
unhappiness’. The groups also argued that the practice of prenatal
screening and selective abortion, without an effort to remove bias
against disabilities, therefore is a eugenic practice in the name of ‘an in-
dividual woman’s self-determination’. They argue that the powerful,
such as medical associations and governmental ministries, are responsi-
ble for making an effort to stop discrimination against disabled people.
According to the opponents to prenatal screening, women’s right to
self-determination is a decision that should be made in a context where
giving birth to a disabled child is supported and welcomed as much as
having a child without a disability. For them prenatal screening and se-
lective abortion that takes place in the situation where there is no discri-
mination against disabilities, is the real ‘women’s right to self-determi-
nation’ and ‘reproductive rights’.
The medical associations’ way of understanding the concept of
‘rights’ is based on conventional political and philosophical ideas about
‘self’ and ‘rights’, that the individual self seeks to further his/her own
interests. Therefore, not to intervene in another’s decisions is a condi-
tion for maintaining the well-being of an individual self, as the self is in
the best position to know its own interests. The characteristic of the in-
dividual self, according to medical associations, is that the self is iso-
lated from its social environment; values in the decision-making condi-
tions are not questioned, nor are the influence and meaning of the con-
tent of the decision to society and its future. Hence, medical
associations tend to argue that as long as the decision is made at the in-
dividual level, if it is a decision to abort a foetus with an anomaly, the
decision per se is not a form of discrimination against people with dis-
abilities. Moreover, doctors argue that they are meeting an individual
client’s request and that they are not increasing the level of discrimina-
tion against those with disabilities within Japanese society. According to
these arguments, the ‘self’ is viewed as something that does not chal-
lenge problems that exist in the decision-making process that the self
engages in.
In retrospect, this isolated ‘self’ and the practice of rights have been
crucial problems for those engaged in public debates on abortion in Ja-
pan since the 1970s to the extent that these terms became the core of
disagreement with and misunderstanding about each other. The ‘right
to abortion’ could not express the problematic meaning of abortion in
Japanese society and history, and since the phrase ‘women’s rights’ was
insufficient to challenge the problems of discrimination against those
with disabilities, women hesitated to use rights in their argument.
Now women’s and other SMOs argue that ‘women’s real right to self-
determination is possible only when there is an effort to remove discri-
mination against those with disabilities’. The self conceptualised within
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this idea goes beyond ‘the isolated self’ and is something more actively
related to its environment. Exploring the concept of ‘rights’ can provide
another idea of ‘rights’ which will, hopefully, enrich the concept overall.
The following section considers what has been observed from Japanese
women’s movement’s arguments concerning women’s right to self-de-
termination.
The possibility of enriching the concept of ‘rights’
What is called the ‘modern self’ (or ‘modern ego’) presumes an isolated
self, that is, a self separated from the other, especially an ‘ineffective’,
‘unproductive’ other, in order to increase the utility (or happiness) of
the self as much as possible. In this view, utility is gained by winning
the competition for productivity and efficiency. Every one of us more or
less has a desire not to be a loser in this competition, but wants to be
superior to others. Having a disabled child, or being disabled, means
dropping out from this competition and represents a deviation from so-
ciety. In this light, the fear of having a disabled child stems, in one way,
from a fear of losing in the competition, being looked down upon by
others, and becoming a social deviant. Apart from the issue of ‘disabil-
ities’, this way of viewing the self is so frequently witnessed in today’s
world in general, as is clear from jealousy toward random people’s suc-
cess on a daily level to nationalist competition at the international level.
In every corner of society and the world, the ideas that ‘I want to be
superior to others’ and ‘another’s well-being violates my well-being’,
based on an assumption that ‘the utility (happiness) of others decreases
the utility (happiness) of myself’, are prevalent.
In this value system, the existence of others can be either a potential
threat to the self or a potential target for elimination. Inefficient and un-
productive beings are inferior deviants, while efficient and productive
beings are rivals. Conventionally, the concept of ‘rights’ is also based on
this notion of the relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Unpro-
ductive and ineffective beings were/are not entitled to rights, or other-
wise the exercise of rights assumed a potential attack from others, as is
clear from its implication that ‘one’s usage of rights would lead to viola-
tion of others’ rights’.
I sincerely question these fundamental values, namely the ‘ethics of
productivity and efficiency’. Is it so important to be more efficient and
more productive than others, and is what I look like to others so impor-
tant, or how stylish my life is? Is it the absolute aim to win in a compe-
tition? Maybe there is something more important than winning or los-
ing in a competition. ‘What is more important’ might be something
which stems from unexpected events in life, such as having and living
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with a disabled child, for example a certain sense of fulfilment and dis-
covery of life, which cannot be found only through having children
without disabilities.
By saying this, I do not intend to say that I, you, or others MUST give
birth to disabled children, or that having disabled children always
means a better or more fulfilling life. I want to say that nobody, no
authority or no norms ought to cancel out this possibility, the possibility
to feel a certain sense of fulfilment, or to experience ‘another’ way of
living a life by having a child with a disability. I do not want my oppor-
tunity for these possibilities to be taken away if I get the chance, nor for
others, who might want the opportunity to have disabled children. So-
ciety must not name those who (choose to) have a disabled child ‘stu-
pid’ – ‘stupid because there is access to technology to discover and elim-
inate foetuses with anomalies’. I also hope that nobody suffers from
such stigmatisation. If anybody is suffering, this is not the good society
I wish for. The practice of some reproductive technologies would not
create a comfortable situation for some women or disabled people in so-
ciety, because values inherent in society assume that a disability causes
unhappiness both to a child and its parents.
To have disabled children must remain an option in society. To exer-
cise this right without being stigmatised, I believe that I would need
true support and understanding, but not pity. For this support, society’s
consciousness needs to change, from pity for those who have disabled
children to a richer recognition that anyone might have, could have, or
could have had disabled children. Whether a person in society does not
plan to give birth, whether a person has finished giving birth, or if they
have children who are not disabled, should not matter. What matters is
that it could happen to anybody. Therefore, support for those who have
disabled children is not geared only to individuals who actually have
disabled children, but to our entire society. One individual’s enjoyment
of the right to be able to decide whether to give birth to a child with an
anomaly and support for this right benefits others who are not even di-
rectly involved in the issue.
Can we now shift to a paradigm where the happiness of others is not
contradictory to one’s own happiness, but where one’s own happiness
is based on a truly strong self with willpower and the power of imagina-
tion, who enjoys another’s happiness, by acting on the belief that an-
other’s happiness increases one’s own happiness? Instead of the ‘zero-
sum’ view of happiness between the self and the other, can’t we believe
that the other’s happiness can enrich our own life? Between the self
and the other in this relationship, the self does not disappear because
of the other, but ‘I maintain myself while letting others live inside my-
self’. According to the aforementioned two diagrams, this idea about
the relatedness between the self and other is also explained in diagram
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4. In the context of this argument, instead of letting the issue of con-
ceiving and delivering a disabled child be the other’s issue isolated from
me, let’s consider it by using the power of imagination, let’s relate it to
myself, facing the fact that ‘it can happen to anyone’.
It has to be noted that this argument is geared not only to Western
political philosophy any more, but also to the exclusionist way of aspir-
ing for superiority. This is partially because attempts to shift into this
paradigm are made to a certain extent in ‘the West’ as well, e.g., in hu-
manist circles, and also because the exclusionist way of thinking is pre-
sent in all cultures and individuals. Yet, because the originally Western
term ‘right’ is discussed here, Western philosophy has been the focus
in this book.
At the same time, the way of conceiving utility can be transformed.
Winning in a competition means that one has obtained more benefit
compared to others. This is relative happiness. However, there must be
an intrinsic value in every being, in every way of living, which looks like
a ‘loser’ in the competition, like ‘being disabled’. Probably the value of
a being lies in the simplest fact that ‘the being exists’. If one finds abso-
lute value in oneself regardless of how others are, or without comparing
oneself to others, the life of the person becomes worthwhile. It is the
absolute happiness of the being.
This is a question fundamental to society: the competition which ex-
ists among people, as well as the idea that winning the competition is
the source of utility (happiness) of individuals. But isn’t it all right if
one is not number one? Not being number one, the person still has a
value. So, find the value, and stick to it tenaciously, no matter what
others do.
I want to consider what I have said so far in the light of the concept
of ‘rights’. Rights inherent in an individual. However, no matter how
hard the individual makes a demand based upon rights, unless the so-
ciety understands and/or supports the justifiable value of the request,
‘rights’ do not materialise. When an individual makes a request, the
chances are that the individual is already in an oppressed situation be-
cause of a certain attribute. Moreover, as mentioned, the discrimination
against the attribute is taken for granted, and the oppression of the indi-
vidual who has the attribute is assumed to be natural. So when the indi-
vidual makes a demand, the purpose of the individual’s action is not
only reaching the target of the demand itself, but also to change the va-
lues inherent in the society on how to view the discrimination of the at-
tribute.
As a response from society, ‘tolerance’ or ‘indifference’ is not suffi-
cient, but ‘imagination of the pain’ is also required. ‘Indifference’ or
‘tolerance’ is insufficient because they do not contribute to improving
society by removing discrimination. So, strictly speaking, an indifferent
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attitude is virtually the same as contributing to socially problematic atti-
tudes. Confining ‘rights’ to an isolated individual’s actions, as medical
associations argue, might be increasing the practice of implicit discrimi-
nation, which may not be visible at first glance.
The practice of rights therefore requires support and understanding
from an individual’s surroundings (society), and so the meaning of
‘rights’ is understood to include a challenge to social conditions. I con-
clude that this was and is one of the critical messages that the Japanese
women’s reproductive movement wants to convey. A request for imagi-
nation is different from requesting others to experience the same pain
and suffering, but, rather, is on the level of considering ‘Are you satis-
fied with yourself when you see someone in front of you who cannot
drink water on his/her own, while you can drink water yourself?’ (Osa-
no 1998: 80). ‘You might have been in that position, even if you have
never been, or will never be, in the same situation. Then can you disre-
gard the situation of discrimination against a certain attribute?’ (ibid)
I believe that however advanced technology is, the issue of the birth
of a deformed child will never completely disappear. If ‘disability’ does
not disappear from this world, should we accept the situation where
disabilities are increasingly stigmatised, or should we try to remove or
mitigate the stigma as much as possible? Moreover, as a woman who
may give birth in the future, a more fundamental question for me is:
do I feel comfortable in permitting a situation where giving birth to a
disabled child is becoming more stigmatised, while there is always a
possibility that I might give birth to disabled children? Even if some wo-
men do not plan to give birth in the future, is it all right to leave the si-
tuation as it is for the future of other women? My answer is no. I do
not want to be forced to give birth to a certain kind of child, but want to
be free in my reproductive activities, and I know that if I give birth to a
disabled child, I will want the child and myself to be accepted and sup-
ported. I relate this concern to other women in the contemporary period
and in the future. Until there is a situation where no disabilities exist,
and as long as women continue to reproduce, there is always a chance
of giving birth to disabled children. To make an effort to eliminate any
discrimination of disabilities or women, and to affirm these attributes
means to support myself in the unknown future, because I might be-
come disabled, I might have a disabled child, or someone in my family
might become disabled, and so on, endlessly.
Demands based on the concept of entitlement to ‘rights’ constitutes
an attempt to transform values inherent in the context in which the
rights are used, as well as an attempt to transform the consciousness of
those who make up society. Thus, rights are not a mere instrument for
requesting something to benefit an individual, but are a tool to build so-
lidarity with others who live in the contemporary period, or in the fu-
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ture. Conceived in this way, they can be a bridge between the self and
others, as well as between the present and the future. When ‘rights’ are
understood to be an instrument for building solidarity with others to al-
leviate their suffering, isn’t it so that the aggressive image of rights can
shift into an image of thoughtfulness and consideration? The concept
of ‘rights’ being an instrument, ‘movement’ then is the practice of soli-
darity in itself, using ‘right.’ A social movement is a place where people
can share similar painful experiences, a sense of anger, tears, dreams
for the future, and can stand up together for social transformation. A
social movement is an endeavour to raise private issues to the public
and political level. The concept of ‘rights’ is an instrument to activate
this function of a movement.
The Japanese women’s movement was able to reach these insights
because of its long years of debate with the disabled people’s move-
ment, and because women in the movement seriously deliberated upon
the issue of discrimination against people with disabilities when they
were considering the issue of abortion. They also seriously questioned
and hesitated using the concept of rights. It was and still is a long and
winding road, but the effort has brought about many philosophical in-
sights. To confront the act of killing a life is actually to confront one’s
self. To confront the issue of selective abortion and discrimination
against those with disabilities meant confronting the future of society.
Neither an individual nor a movement can mature without facing them-
selves, instead of merely blaming the social surroundings or merely se-
curing access to abortion without inquiring about its social/historical
meanings.
To conclude, I vindicate rights because they are a device that a social
movement cannot give up. A ‘right’ can be a tool to break through the
isolation of individuals with problems. To withdraw the term ‘right’ is
equal to a public concession of defeat, and I refuse to be defeated. But
the right I vindicate includes the meaning that actively asks for changes
of consciousness in the ‘self’ and ‘others’, as well as in the surround-
ings, or society.
The Western traditional concept of ‘rights’ is crucial, that is, ‘rights’
inherent in a strong individual to be able to say no to unreasonable
authority. This concept of ‘rights’ is necessary to make a citizen politi-
cally conscious. But to eliminate discrimination, this notion is not suffi-
cient. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in chapter 6, international organi-
sations such as the WHO and medical associations tend to conceive of
‘rights’ in the individualist way, that is, as ‘a right inheres in an indivi-
dual, and that’s all.’ It seems that the more authority individuals and or-
ganisations have, the more individualistic the view they tend to have
about the concept. Perhaps this is because they have less motivation to
demand social reform than do more oppressed people, who really need
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rights and social reform. Moreover, ironically, those with more power
have more influence in defining what ‘rights’ are in official documents
and so on. Furthermore, the notion of ‘rights’ used by the powerful is
often based on Western conventional political philosophy. This book
about the Japanese women’s and disabled people’s positions on the con-
cept of ‘rights’ was written in the hope of breaking through shortcom-
ings of how rights are perceived, by contributing an analysis from one
non-Western area.
There is no magic short cut to construct a concept of ‘rights’ that is
more comprehensive, widely acknowledged, and practised on a daily ba-
sis. It will be a long process. But considering that the concept of human
rights, which is well known to the contemporary world, for example,
was not known a hundred years ago, probably this small effort to broad-
en the concept of rights can make a difference to the future world in a
hundred years. Those who do not give up win in the end. This book
was written with such a conviction.
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Appendix 1
Crimes of abortion (Chapter 29 of the Japanese Penal Code)
Article 212 [Abortion] When a pregnant woman who procures an abor-
tion for herself by the use of drugs or otherwise, she shall be punished
with penal servitude for not more than one year.
Article 213 [Abortion with consent and same resulting in death or in-
jury] A person who at the request of a woman or with her consent
causes her abortion shall be punished with penal servitude for not
more than two years. A person who thereby causes death or injury to a
woman shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than three
months nor more than five years.
Article 214 [Abortion through professional conduct and same resulting
in death or injury] A doctor, midwife, pharmacist, or druggist who, at
the request of a woman or with her consent, causes her abortion shall
be punished with penal servitude for not less than three months nor
more than five years. Those who thereby cause death or injury to a wo-
man shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than six
months nor more than seven years.
Article 215 [Abortion without consent] (1) A person who causes the
abortion of a woman without her request or consent shall be punished
with penal servitude for not less than six months nor more than seven
years. (2) Attempts of the crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph
shall be punished.
Article 216 [Abortion without consent resulting in death or injury] A
person who commits the crime mentioned in the preceding article and
thereby causes death or injure to a woman shall be punished with a
grave penalty as composed with the penalty for the crime of inflicting
injury.
(Source: A Compendium of Laws: Japan, 1994:. 2591, translated by the
author.)
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Chapter 1 General provisions
(Object of this law)
Article 1. The objects of this Law are to prevent birth of inferior descen-
dants from the eugenic point of view, and to the protect life and health
of mother, as well.
(Definitions)
Article 2. The ‘eugenic operation’ used in this Law shall mean the sur-
gical operation which incapacitates a person to reproduce without re-
moval of the reproduction glands, as prescribed by Order.
2. The ‘artificial interruption of pregnancy’ used in this Law shall
mean the artificial discharge of a fetus and its appendages from the
body of mother at the period when a fetus is unable to keep its life out-
side the body of mother.
Chapter 2 Eugenic Operation
(Eugenic operation by discretion of physician) (2) (4)
Article 3. A physician may exercise the eugenic operation at his discre-
tion, on a person falling under any of the following respective items, in
obtaining the consent of the person in question and the spouse thereof
(including a person under actually matrimonial relation, though not
being legally married; hereinafter the same) if any: provided that this
shall not apply to minors, mental patients, and feeble-minded persons:
(1) The person in question or the spouse thereof has hereditary psycho-
pathia, hereditary bodily disease or the spouse thereof has mental
disease of feeble-mindedness;
(2) A relative in blood within fourth degree of kinship of the person in
question or the spouse thereof, who has hereditary mental disease,
hereditary feeble-mindedness, hereditary psychopathia, hereditary
bodily disease or hereditary malformation;
(3) The person in question or, the spouse thereof who is suffering from
leprosy, which is liable to carry infection to the descendants;
(4) The mother whose life is endangered by conception or by delivery;
(5) The mother actually having several children whose health condition
is feared to be seriously affected by each occasion of delivery.
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2. In the cases mentioned in item (4) and item (5) of the preceding
paragraph, the eugenic operation under said paragraph may also be exe-
cuted on the spouse thereof.
3. With respect to the consent under paragraph 1, the sole consent of
the person in question shall suffice, if the spouse thereof is unknown
or can not express his or her intention.
(Application for eugenic operation for which examination is required)
(1) (2) (4)
Article 4. A physician must, if, in the case where he has confirmed that
the result of this examination evidently shows that a person is suffer-
ing from the disease mentioned in The Annexed List, he has found
that the eugenic operation is necessary for the public interests in order
to prevent hereditary transmission of the disease, apply to the To, Do,
Fu or Prefectural Eugenic Protection Commission for examination as
to the propriety of performing the eugenic operation.
(Examination for eugenic operation) (1)
Article 5. The Metropolitan, Hokkaido or Prefectural Eugenic Protec-
tion Commission shall, on receiving the application under the provi-
sion of the preceding Article, notify the person who shall undergo the
eugenic operation to that effect, and further shall, on examining
whether or not the case meets the requirements provided for in said
Article, decide the propriety for performing the eugenic operation, and
notify the applicant and the person who shall undergo the eugenic op-
eration of the result.
2. If the Metropolitan, Hokkaido or Prefectural Eugenic Protection
Commission has decided that the performance of the eugenic operation
is appropriate, said Commission shall, on hearing the opinions of the
applicant and the concerned persons, designate the physician who shall
perform the operation, and notify the applicant, person who shall un-
dergo the eugenic operation, and said physician thereof.
(Application for reviewal) (1) (5) (16)
Article 6. If the person who has been decided to undergo the eugenic
operation in accordance with the provision of paragraph 1 of the pre-
ceding Article may, if he has objection to such decision, apply for the
reviewal thereof to the Public Health Council within two weeks from
the day on which he received the notification under said paragraph of
said Article.
2. The spouse, person having parental power, guardian, or the curator
of the person for whom the decision was made to undergo the eugenic
operation of the preceding paragraph may also apply for reviewal there-
of.
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3. The application for reviewal under the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs must be made through the Metropolitan, Hokkaido or
Prefectural Eugenic Protection Commission which has made the deci-
sion that the eugenic operation is to be performed. In this case, the Me-
tropolitan, Hokkaido, or Prefectural Eugenic Protection Commission,
and the physician who is to perform the operation of the result thereof.
(Reviewal of eugenic operation) (1) (16)
Article 7. The Public Health Council shall, if it has received the applica-
tion for reviewal under the provision of the preceding Article, notify
the physician who is to perform the operation to that effect, and
further shall judge anew upon examination the propriety of perfor-
mance of eugenic operation, and notify the applicant for reviewal, the
person who is to undergo the eugenic operation, the Metropolitan,
Hokkaido, or Prefectural Eugenic Protection Commission, and the phy-
sician who is to perform the operation of the result thereof.
(Presentation of opinion in connection with examination) (1) (16)
Article 8. The applicant under the provision of Article 4, the person to
undergo eugenic operation, and the spouse, the person in parental
power, the guardian or the mentor thereof may, by means of written or
verbal statement, present the facts or the opinions to the Prefectural
Eugenic Protection Commission or the Public Health Council in con-
nection with the examination under Article 5 paragraph 1 or the revie-
wal under the preceding Article.
(Institution of lawsuit) (1) (9) (16)
Article 9. A person who was aggrieved by the decision of the Public
Health Council may institute a lawsuit for rescission thereof.
(Formalities of litigation) (9)
2. A person who was aggrieved by the decision to the effect of being
subject to the eugenic operation under the provision of Article 5 para-
graph 1 may dispute only in accordance with the provisions of Article 6
and the preceding Article.
(Performance of eugenic operation)
Article 10. If there is no objection to the decision to the effect that the
performance of eugenic operation is appropriate, or if the decision or
the judgment relating thereto has become conclusive, the physician of
Article 5 paragraph 2 shall perform the eugenic operation.
(Burden of expenses) (7)
Article 11. The expenses relating to the eugenic operation performed in
accordance with the provision of the preceding Article shall be borne
by the relevant Metropolis, Hokkaido, or Prefecture, as prescribed by
Cabinet Order.
2. The expenses of the preceding paragraph shall be borne by the Na-
tional Treasury.
(Eugenic Operation to mental patients, etc.) (4) (18)
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Article 12. A physician may, if, in the case where, with respect to a per-
son suffering from psychosis or mental deficiency other than the her-
editary ones mentioned in item 1 or item 2 of the Annexed List, the
consent of the protection obligatory person under the provision of Arti-
cle 20 (the case where the guardian, spouse, person exercising parental
power or the person under obligation to sustain becomes the protec-
tion obligatory person) of the Mental Health Law (Law No. 123 of 1950)
or Article 21 (the case where the mayor of city or the headman of town
of village becomes the protection obligatory person) of said Law has
been obtained, apply for investigation concerning reasonableness of
performing eugenic operation to the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, or Pre-
fectural Eugenic Protection Commission.
(Ditto) (4)
Article 13. The Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Prefectural Eugenic Protection
Commission shall, if the application under the provision of the preced-
ing Article has been made, investigate whether or not said person is
suffering from the psychosis or mental deficiency under said Articles
and whether or not the performance of eugenic operation is necessary
for protecting said person, and thus decide the reasonableness of per-
forming the eugenic operation, and inform the applicant and the con-
senter under the preceding Article of the decision.
2. The Physician shall, if there has been made the decision to the effect
that the performance of the eugenic operation is reasonable in accor-
dance with the provision of the preceding paragraph, be authorized to
perform the eugenic operation.
Chapter 3 Protection of Mother’s Life and Health
(Artificial interruption of pregnancy at physician’s discretion) (4) (18)
Article 14. A physician designated by the Medical Association being a
shadan-hojin (incorporated association) incorporated in the Metropolis,
Hokkaido, Fu or Prefectural district as a unit (hereinafter referred to as
a ‘designated physician’) shall be authorised to perform artificial inter-
ruption of pregnancy to a person falling under any of the following re-
spective items, in obtaining the consents of a person in question and
the spouse thereof:
(1) A person in question or the spouse thereof having psychosis, men-
tal deficiency, psychopathies, hereditary bodily disease, or hereditary
malformation;
(2) A relative in blood within the 4th degree of consanguinity of a per-
son in question or the spouse thereof having hereditary psychopa-
thies, hereditary bodily disease, or hereditary malformation;
(3) A person in question or the spouse thereof suffering from leprosy;
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(4) A mother whose health may be affected seriously by continuation
of pregnancy or by delivery due to physical or economical view-
point;
(5) A person in question having been conceived due to being fornicated
by violence or threat or while incapacitated to resist or refuse.
2. With reference to the consents under the preceding paragraph, the
sole consent of the person in question shall suffice if the spouse is un-
ascertainable, or if the spouse fails to declare the intention, or if no
spouse remains after conception.
3. If the person in question who undergoes the operation for artificial
interruption of pregnancy is insane or feeble-minded, the consent un-
der obligation to protect another under the provisions of Article 20 of
the Mental Health Law (the cases where the guardian, spouse, person
having parental power, or the person under obligation to sustain an-
other becomes the person under obligation to protect another) or of Ar-
ticle 21 of said Law (the cases where the mayor of city, town, or village
becomes the person under obligation to protect another) may be
deemed to provide the consent of the person in question.
(Practical guidance in contraception) (4) (5)
Article 15. Practical guidance in contraception by means of contracep-
tive instruments designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare for
the use of women shall not be given as vocation by a person other than
a physician, unless he is designated by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu
or Prefectural Governor. Provided that, the act of inserting a contracep-
tive instrument in the cavity of the uterus shall not be performed by
any person other than a physician.
2. A person who may obtain the designation of the Metropolitan,
Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural Governor under the preceding paragraph
shall be a midwife, public health nurse, or a nurse, who has completed
the course sanctioned by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural
Governor in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Minister
of Health and Welfare.
3. In addition to those provided for in the preceding two paragraphs,
necessary matters in connection with the designation or the sanction by
the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural Governor shall be pre-
scribed by Cabinet Order.
Chapter 4 Metropolitan, Hokkaido, or Prefectural Eugenic
Protection Commission (16)
(Metropolitan, Hokkaido or Prefectural Eugenic Protection Commis-
sion) (1) (4) (16)
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Article 16. The Metropolitan, Hokkaido, or Prefectural Eugenic Protec-
tion Commission belonging to control of the Metropolitan, Hokkaido
or Prefectural Governor (hereinafter referred to as “The Commission”)
shall be established in order to investigate reasonableness concerning
eugenic operation.
Article 17. Deleted (16)
(Composition) (1) (3) (4) (16)
Article 18. The Commission shall be composed of not more than ten
members.
2. The Commission may have extraordinary members in case of spe-
cial necessity.
3. The members and the extraordinary members shall be appointed
among physicians, welfare commissioners, judges, public procurators,
officials of relevant governmental and municipal offices, or persons of
knowledge and experience by mutual votes of the members.
4. The Commission shall have a chairman selected by mutual votes
of the members.
5. The provision of Article 203 (Remuneration and reimbursement of
expenses) of the Local Autonomy Law (Law No. 67 of 1947) shall apply
mutatis mutandis to the remuneration and reimbursement of expenses
of the members of the Commission.
(Delegated matters) (1) (16)
Article 19. Except those as provided for this Law, the term of office of
the Commission members, functions of the chairman, and other ne-
cessary matters concerning the management of the Commission shall
be prescribed by Order and Ordinance.
Chapter 5 Eugenic Protection Consultation Office
(Eugenic Protection Consultation Office) (2)
Article 20. The Eugenic Protection Consultation Commission shall be
established in order to popularise and coach the adequate method con-
cerning contraception, together with giving advice in response to con-
sultation on marriage affairs from the viewpoint of eugenic protection,
and ensuring dissemination and improvement of the essential knowl-
edge on hereditary and other aspects of eugenic protection.
(Establishment) (4) (11)
Article 21. The Metropolis, Hokkaido, Fu, and Prefecture, as well as a
city setting up a Health Center shall respectively establish a Eugenic
Protection Consultation Office.
2. The Eugenic Protection Consultation Office under the preceding
paragraph may be attached to the Health Center.
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3. The State may, as prescribed by Cabinet Order, grant subsidies for
a part of the expenditures, with respect to the expenses needed for es-
tablishment and operation of the Eugenic Protection Consultation Of-
fice under Paragraph 1.
(Approval of establishment) (3) (4)
Article 22. A person other than the State, Metropolis, Hokkaido, Fu, or
Prefecture, as well as a city establishing a Health Center must obtain
the approval of the Minister of Health and Welfare, if it intends to es-
tablish a Eugenic Protection Consultation Office.
2. The Eugenic Protection Consultation Office under the preceding
paragraph must have a physician in accordance with the standards pre-
scribed by the Minister of Health and Welfare, and have the equip-
ments necessary for examination and other matters.
3. The Minister of Health and Welfare may cancel the approval, if the
Eugenic Protection Consultation Office under paragraph 1 has become
not to conform with the standards under the preceding paragraph. In
such case, the Minister of Health and Welfare must for affording the
establisher of the Eugenic Protection Consultation Office an opportu-
nity for explaining the case, cause his competent official to make in-
quiry and hearing in respect of said establisher.
(Exclusive use of name) (4)
Article 23. No one other than the office under this Law shall use in its
name any letters representing Eugenic Protection Consultation Office
or letters similar to thereto.
(Delegated matters) (4)
Article 24. Excepting those provided for by this Law, necessary matters
concerning the Eugenic Protection Consultation Office shall be pre-
scribed by Order or Ordinance.
Chapter 6 Notification, prohibition, and others
(Notification) (4)
Article 25. A physician or a designated physician shall, if he has carried
out the eugenic operation or artificial interruption of pregnancy in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 3 paragraph 1, Article 10, Article
13 paragraph 2, or Article 14 paragraph 1, notify the Metropolitan, Hok-
kaido, Fu or Prefectural Governor of the duly arranged records of such
operations for the month stating the reasons therefore by the 10th of
the next month.
(notice)
Article 26. A person who has undergone the eugenic operation must,
if intending to get married, notify the other party to the effect of having
undergone the eugenic operation.
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(Keeping secrets) (1) (4) (16)
Article 27. Any person who engaged in examination of a eugenic op-
eration or its business, or any person who actually engaged in a eu-
genic operation of effective business of artificial interruption of preg-
nancy, and any personnel of the Eugenic Protection Consultation Of-
fice shall not divulge another’s secrets having been known in the
performance of duties thereof. The same shall also apply in the case
after retirement from office.
(Prohibition) (2)
Article 28. The operation or the Ro¨ntgen ray radiation in order to inca-
pacitate a person for reproduction shall not be conducted without ap-
propriate reason, except in the cases falling under the provisions of this
Law.
Chapter 7 Penal Provisions
(Contravention of Article 15 paragraph 1) (4) (16)
Article 29. A person who has contravened the provision of Article 15
paragraph 1 shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hun-
dred thousand yen (¥ 500,000).
(Contravention of Article 22) (4) (16)
Article 30. A person who has, in contravention of the provision of Arti-
cle 22, established a Eugenic Protection Consultation Office without
the approval of the Minister of Health and Welfare shall be punished
with a fine of not more than three hundred thousand yen (¥ 300,000).
(Contravention of Article 23) (4) (16)
Article 31. A person who has, in contravention of the provision of Arti-
cle 23, used the letters presenting the Eugenic Protection Consultation
Office or similar letters as the appellation shall be punished with a
non-penal fine of not more than one hundred thousand yen
(¥ 100,000).
(Contravention of Article 25) (4) (16)
Article 32. A person who has, in contravention of the provision of Arti-
cle 25, failed to make the notification, or has made a false notification
shall be punished with a fine of not more than one hundred thousand
yen (¥ 100,000).
(Contravention of Article 27) (4) (16)
Article 33. A person who has, in contravention of the provision of Arti-
cle 27, divulged another’s secrets without appropriate reasons shall be
punished with penal servitude for not more than six months or a fine
of not more than three hundred thousand yen (¥ 300,000).
(Contravention of Article 28) (4) (16)
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Article 34. A person who has contravened the provision of Article 28
shall be punished with penal servitude of Article 28 shall be punished
with penal servitude for not more than one year or a fine of not more
than five hundred thousand yen (¥ 500,000). If the person has thereby
caused death to another, such person shall be punished with penal ser-
vitude for not more than three years.
Supplementary provisions
(Enforcement date) (4)
Article 35. This law shall come into force as from the day elapsing sixty
days counting from the day of its promulgation.
(Abrogation of relevant laws) (4)
Article 36. the National Eugenic Law (Law No. 107 of 1940) shall here-
by by abrogated.
(Continuation of effectiveness of penal provisions) (4)
Article 37. With respect to application of penal provisions to the viola-
tive acts done before the enforcement of this Law, the Law under the
preceding Article shall still be effective even after the enforcement of
this Law.
(Exception to notification) (4)
Article 38. The provision of Article 25 shall not, in the case where the
notification under the provision of the Ministry of Health and Welfare
Ordinance No. 42 of 1946 (Regulation concerning notification of still-
birth) was made, apply in the scope thereof.
(Medicines necessary for giving guidance in contraception) (6) (8) (12)
(13) (14) (17) (19)
Article 39. A person having obtained the designation of the Metropoli-
tan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural Governor in accordance with the pro-
vision of Article 15 paragraph 1 may, limited until July 31, 1995, sell, re-
gardless of the provision of Article 24 paragraph 1 of the Pharmaceuti-
cal Affairs Law (Law No. 145 of 1960), solely such medicines necessary
for contraception as designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare
to a person who shall undergo practical guidance thereof.
2. The Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural Governor in accor-
dance with the provision of Article 15 paragraph 1 has come under any
one of the following respective items, cancel the designation under said
paragraph of said Article:
(1) If, in the case where the provision of Article 43 of the Pharmaceuti-
cal Affairs Law shall apply with respect to the medicines as desig-
nated by the Minister of Health and Welfare in accordance with the
provision of the preceding paragraph, said medicines having failed
to pass a test under said Article are sold;
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(2) If medicines other than the medicines as designated by the Minis-
ter of Health and Welfare in accordance with the provision of the
preceding paragraph are sold as business;
(3) In addition to those under the preceding respective items, if medi-
cines have been sold as business to a person other than those un-
dergoing practical guidance in contraception.
3. The Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural governor shall, if
he intends to make the disposition under the provision of the preceding
paragraph, notice the person subject to such disposition of the grounds
of such disposition as well as the date and place of the hearing at least
one week in advance of the date, and further shall make hearing in re-
questing the presence of the person or the agent thereof. Provided that,
the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu, or Prefectural governor may, if the per-
son subject to the disposition or the agent thereof has failed to attend
the hearing without justifiable reasons, make the disposition under the
preceding paragraph without holding the hearing.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 154, May 31, 1949): (1) This Law
shall come into force as from June 1, 1949.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 216, Jun. 24, 1949): (2) This Law
shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 174, Jun. 1, 1951): (3)
1. This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 141, May 17, 1952): (4)
1. This Law shall come into force as from the day elapsing ten days
counting from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 213, Aug. 15, 1953): (5)
1. This Law shall be come into force as from September 1, 1953.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 127, Aug. 8, 1955): (6)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 55, Apr. 21, 1960): (7)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 145, Aug. 10, 1960): (8)
(Enforcement date)
Article 1. This Law shall come into force as from the day prescribed
by Cabinet Order within the scope not exceeding sic months counting
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from the day of promulgation (enforced as from February 1, 1961 by Ca-
binet Order No. 10 of 1961).
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 140, May 16, 1962): (9)
1. This Law shall come into force as from October 1, 1962.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 128, June 11, 1965): (10)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 120, Aug 1, 1967): (11)
(Enforcement date)
1. This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 64, May 18, 1970): (12)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 44, June 25, 1975): (13)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 83, Nov. 6, 1980): (14)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 51, May 25, 1981): (15)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 80, Aug. 17, 1982): (16)
(Enforcement date)
Article 1. This Law shall come into force as from the day prescribed by
Cabinet Order within the scope not exceeding one year and six months
counting from the day of its promulgation. Provided that… (enforced
as from Aug. 30, 1982 by Cabinet Order No. 226 of 1982).
(Transitional measure as to partially amendment of Eugenic Protection
Law)
Article 39. With respect to application of the penal provisions for the
act made before the enforcement of Eugenic Protection Law, the for-
mer examples shall still be followed.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 72, June 25, 1985): (17)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 98, Sept. 26, 1987): (18)
(Enforcement date)
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Article 1 This Law shall come into force as from the day prescribed by
Cabinet Order within the scope not exceeding one year counting from
the day of its promulgation.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Law No. 56, June 29, 1990): (19)
This Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.
Annexed List (Related to Article 4 and Article 12) (2) (15)
1. Hereditary psychosis
Schizophrenia
Manic Depressive psychosis
Epilepsy
2. Hereditary mental deficiency
3. Remarkable mental psychopathia
Remarkable abnormal sexual desire
Remarkable criminal inclination
4. Remarkable bodily illness
Huntington’s chorea progressive
Hereditary spinal staxia
Hereditary cerebellar staxia
Progressive muscular atrophy
Dystrophia musculorum progressive
Myotonia
Congenital musculorum astonia
Congenial cartilaginous malgrowth
Leukosis
Ichthyosis
Multiple soft neurofibroma
Selerosis nodosum
Epidermolysis bullosa hereditaria
Congenital porphyrin urin
Keratoma palmara et plantare hereditarium
Atrophia nervi optici hereditarium
Pigmentdegenetation of retine
Achromatopsia
Congenital nystagmus
Blue sclera
Hereditary dysacousia or deaf
Hemophilia
5. Intense hereditary malformation
Rupture of hand, rupture of foot
Congenital defect of bone
(The Roppoˆ Zensho, the Diet Library)
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Appendix 3
The Law to Protect the Mother’s Body
(Enforced on 13 July 1948, revised on 26 June 1996)
Chapter 1
General Provisions
(Object of this Law)
Article 1. The objects of this Law are to articulate provisions concerning
sterilization operation and artificial interruption of pregnancy to pro-
tect mother’s life and health.
(Definitions)
1. The ‘sterilization operation’ used in this Law shall mean the surgi-
cal operation which incapacitates a person to reproduce without remov-
ing reproduction glands, as prescribed by Order.
2. The ‘artificial interruption of pregnancy’ used in this Law shall
mean the artificial discharge of a fetus and its appendages from the
body of mother at the period when a fetus is unable to keep is life out-
side the body of mother.
Chapter 2
Sterilization Operation
(Sterilization operation by discretion of physician)
Article 3. A physician may exercise the sterilization operation at his dis-
cretion, on a person falling under any of the following respective items,
in obtaining the consent of the person in question and the spouse
thereof (including a person under actually matrimonial relation,
though not being legally married; hereinafter the same) if any; pro-
vided that this shall not apply to minors:
(1) The mother whose life is endangered by conception or by delivery;
(2) The mother actually having several children whose health condition
is feared to be seriously affected by each occasion of delivery.
2. In the cases mentioned in the items of the previous paragraph, the
sterilization operation under said paragraph may also be executed on
the spouse thereof.
3. With respect to the consent under paragraph 1, the sole consent of
the person in question shall suffice, if the spouse thereof is unknown
or cannot express his or her intention.
(Article 4 to Article 13 were eliminated in the newly enacted law en-
forced on 16 June 1996)
Chapter 3
Protection of mother’s life and health
(Artificial interruption of pregnancy or physician’s discretion)
Article 14. A physician designated by the Medical Association being a
shadan-hojin ( incorporated or Prefectural district as a unit, hereafter re-
ferred to as a ‘designated physician’) shall be authorized to perform ar-
tificial interruption of pregnancy to a person falling under any of the
following respective items, in obtaining the consents of a person in
question and the spouse thereof:
(1) A mother whose health may be affected seriously by continuation
of pregnancy or by delivery due to physical or economical view-
point;
(2) A person in question having been conceived due to being fornicated
by violence or threat or while incapacitated to resist or refuse.
2. With reference to the consents under the preceding paragraph, the
sole consent of the person in question shall suffice if the spouse is un-
ascertainable, or if the spouse fails to declare the intention, or if no
spouse remains after conception.
Article 15. Practical guidance in contraception by means of contracep-
tive instruments designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare for
the use of women shall not be given as vocation by a person other than
a physician, unless he is designated by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido,
Fu, or Prefectural Governor. Provided that, the act of inserting a contra-
ceptive instrument in the cavity of uterus shall not be performed by
any person other than a physician.
2. A person who may obtain the designation of the Metropolitan,
Hokkaido, Fu or Prefectural Governor under the preceding paragraph
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shall be a midwife, public health nurse or a nurse, who has completed
the course sanctioned by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu or Prefectual
Governor in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Minister
of Health and Welfare.
3. In addition to those provided for in the preceding two paragraphs,
necessary matters in connection with the designation or the sanction by
the Metropolitan, Hokkaido, Fu or Prefectural Governor shall be pre-
scribed by Cabinet Order.
(Chapters 5 and 6 were eliminated in the newly enacted law.)
[Author’s own translation]
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Appendix 4
A demand letter from Osaka Aoi shiba no kai to the Hyôgo
Prefecture
The first part is composed of the list of facts.
1. Facts
The policy affected us as people with a handicap. This policy is evi-
dently based on the current Eugenic Protection Law.
A. We have requested participation in the prefectural meeting to prevent
unhappiness in birth, but were refused. What do you plan to do for us?
B. The prefectural administration is trying to systematise the measures
to prevent unhappiness in birth, to abandon the effort to eliminate the
cause that marginalization of people with handicaps into the term ‘un-
happiness’.
C. The prefecture made a campaign film, in a prefectural institute,
with children with handicaps and shamelessly aired it on television de-
spite opposition to doing so.
D. Amniotic fluid checks are being carried out in prefectural institutes
as a matter of fact.
2. Our basic point of view
Currently Japan is a capitalist society. What is required is a highly pro-
ductive labour force, and it can be said that the administration is orga-
nising this. Japan introduced the Eugenic Protection Law, based on Ger-
man Nazism, and, with it completed today’s modern rationalism.
Namely, the society is organised into the position of being useless to
the people with handicaps, who cannot do productive labour. The Eu-
genic Protection Law expresses it in terms of nation-state, and the law…
This is a systematisation of the easy judgement that life with a handicap
is unhappy. People with a handicap are not unhappy, but are made to
be unhappy.
Welfare is referred to often, and it seems as if people with a handicap
have been saved, but it is in fact the elimination of handicapped people,
covered with a veil named ‘love’ and ‘justice’ by non-handicapped people.
We have to remove the veil of falsehood to make our lives ‘unhappy’.
3. Our determination
The prefecture must not regard this letter as merely a piece of paper.
This paper contains the feelings of our brothers (members). We hereby
express that we are prepared to take action, if there is no sincere reply
to our questions.
4. Questions
1. On what basis and ideas is the movement implemented to prevent
unhappiness in birth?
2. Why were we denied participation in the prefectural meeting last
year?
3. On what grounds are we regarded as unhappy?
4. How do you explain the Eugenic Protection Law?
5. How do you explain the attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection
Law, to introduce the selective abortion clause?
6. Do you have any intention to abolish the department which is
aimed at preventing unhappiness in births?
We demand a responsible reply from the prefecture. This letter is made
to be public. We intend to make this letter public. Please give us a writ-
ten answer by 10 March.
(Source: Osaka “Shogaisha” Kyoiku-kenkyu-kai, in Daishoken, no. 1, pp.
25-27, February 1974, cited by Matsunaga, pp. 118-119, translated by
the author)
Matsunaga (2001: 118-119) summarized the issues problematised by
Osaka Aoi shiba no kai about the Hyogo Prefectural policy as expressed
in the letter above as follows:
1. The movement to prevent unhappiness in birth is an attempt to
systematise the eugenic law at the administrative level.
2. The movement defined ideas that ‘it is a pity, and (we feel) sorry for
handicapped people’, ‘(I) want my child to be born without a handi-
cap, (I) want to give birth to a healthy child’ are expressions of dis-
crimination, and are hereby refuted from the standpoint of handi-
capped people.
3. The movement asserted that the movement to prevent the unhappi-
ness in birth was a movement to eliminate people with disabilities
and is an attempt to deny handicapped people, who are already liv-
ing, by labeling them as beings who are not supposed to live.
4. Amniotic fluid checks that lead to the elimination of a handicapped
foetus is a challenge to handicapped people, and they thoroughly
oppose it.
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Appendix 5
A leaflet written and distributed by TANAKA Mitsu, on behalf of
the Women’s Liberation Movement (Tokyo, 1973)
I dare to propose, is abortion a vested right?
Holding a dead body for four days... A single mother killed her child
with cement
On the 5th of October, a single mother (27) was arrested for mur-
dering her one-month child with cement.1 She gave birth to the
child alone in an urban city, without being able to have an abor-
tion. But her lover stopped sending her money. She had not yet
paid 80,000 yen, the bill for delivery, but, with a baby, she could
not work to earn money – she finally committed the crime.
Ah! A voiceless voice. How cruel... I turned my eyes away from the
newspaper I was holding. Turning eyes away, a question came to my
mind, ‘why didn’t she have an abortion?’, with anger towards the stu-
pidity of this woman. But the very next moment, another new question
came to my mind; aborting a child from the belly is not a crime, while
killing a child after the birth is. If this woman had had an abortion
three months ago, she would be innocent.
There is an expression, ‘to give birth or not to give birth is women’s
right’. Does this mean that the child in the belly does not have a right
to live, when women use ‘right’ to have an abortion?! However, if a
child in the belly is a human-being, it should have the right to live.
Then, WHAT DOES A WOMAN HAVE when she is pregnant?
The other day, there was a ‘child-murder committed by an old father,
aged 76, of his child with heavy cerebral palsy, who was bedridden for
37 years. Aoi-shiba-no-kai, a group of people with cerebral palsy, states,
in their handbill titled ‘Is it taken for granted that handicapped people
are killed!! We oppose the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law’:
What we have witnessed after a searching investigation of mur-
der cases of handicapped children is “parents” who define the
birth of handicapped child as “negative”. Under the current diffi-
cult situation (a society where the value of a human-being is
decided according to their labour ability, where the search for
profit and rapid economic growth are to be the supreme princi-
ple), we ourselves know how hard it is to protect and raise handi-
capped children. However, the egoism of handicap-free people is
killing our existence, because this egoism is negative, and handi-
cap-free people even dare to say that happiness for handicapped
people would be to not exist. This egoism is represented by “par-
ents”, enhancing the conspiracy of the state authority and great
capitalism.
The logic of discarding nuisances and refusing to be dragged down – it
is easy for me to discuss how this logic is an authority’s way of think-
ing. The problem is how to find a meeting point between this saying
and practical ways of living.
A society of competition for survival exists under the logic of produc-
tivity. Automobiles have priority over pedestrian walkways, while elderly
people, children, sick people, and handicapped people are ignored.
The logic, that degrades the dignity of the lives of people according to
how useful the ‘workers’ are to capitalism company management, in-
deed penetrates into my life and my consciousness.
The draft bill to revise the Eugenic Protection Law (the law to prohi-
bit abortion) is intended to strengthen the principle and the value of
productivity in order to even deeper root it in women’s conscious-
nesses. The bill represents the state’s conspiracy to let women choose
to give birth to a handicapped foetus or not through prenatal screening.
In a reality where there are no satisfactory institutes for handicapped
people, women are forced to make decisions! In societies where only
women cannot be humanist, how can women and handicapped people
meet with each other?
No one wants to have an abortion. Do men imagine the fear and in-
sult of having a knife penetrating inside, between opened legs? Women
in the US sometimes say ‘let’s cut men into pieces’, but I can under-
stand the feeling behind the saying. How would we choose to experi-
ence such bad feelings, if we do not have to have an abortion, and the
thing grows up itself automatically (after the birth). When women have
to decide whether or not to give birth, the reality has always faced wo-
men, where women cannot give birth even when she wants to. This fact
is not confined only to the issue of handicapped children. The annual
number of abortion cases in Japan is between 2 and 3 million, and the
overwhelming majority of cases are by a group called housewives.
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Rising prices, salaries insufficient to live off of without both mem-
bers of a couple working, small apartments with thin walls (moreover,
most of the apartments do not even allow children), environmental pro-
blems contaminating mother’s milk, expensive education, etc. ‘How
can we give birth in such a society!’ – We can never raise our voice too
loud.
As a matter of fact, we have to keep criticising social problems as
such. However, is it at all acceptable to have a so-what attitude toward
having an abortion, just because of society’s conditions? Doesn’t such a
so-what attitude eventually lead to affirming positively the status quo of
the society? In rationalising ourselves by stating ‘of course I abort be-
cause of society’, isn’t it that women have been desensitised to the life
of the child and their own lives? Prenatal screening is a bad conspiracy,
making use of such unsharpened women’s senses, by letting women
decide whether or not to give birth. Such questions are coming to my
mind one after another.
The law to prohibit abortion – it is the attempt to strengthen the
guilty feeling about abortion. This is what I have been saying to others
and to myself about the idea to revise the law. However, has a woman,
as one person, ever questioned ‘abortion’ at all, by facing the fact that
the foetus has a new life? Has a woman ever felt any guilt towards the
fact that she lends her hands to eradicate a new life? Isn’t it just that
women have been hanging onto the sense of being a victim with regard
to their abortion experiences? Women have been giving birth to chil-
dren in order for men and society to acknowledge her existence. There
will be a number of women with the value of ‘to be a wife and a mother
is the proof of womanhood’, ‘marriage is the happiness of women’,
‘children are the purpose of life’, as long as society exists upon the prin-
ciple of protecting and inheriting private property, where women are to
give birth while being locked inside of a household, and where sexuality
and reproduction are divided from each other.
For women who have been proving their womanhood through giving
birth and nurturing children, abortion is nothing but a proof of her
‘non-existence’. The sense of loss of existence by having an abortion
sinks itself inside of the consciousness of women as a victim, and is
linked with a taboo about sexuality. The idea that sexual activity that is
not meant for reproduction is dirty, is indeed strongly deep rooted. Yet,
this taboo escapes men in Japan. For women, the idea is that ‘good
women do not have two men’, whereas for men: ‘having a mistress is a
virtue of a man of ability’. For women, the taboo of sexuality and the
sense of guilt have existed in combination with the sense of being a
victim.
[...]
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Let me repeat, in order to avoid misunderstanding. Social problems
must be criticised no matter what. However, there is something inside
of ourselves that cannot just affirm abortion with the logic of ‘society is
bad’, or ‘a foetus is not a human –being’. If we avoid approaching the
very core of this ‘something’, we cannot destroy the argument that re-
gards a foetus as something holy. This is a question about the meaning
of having life, which has nothing to do with ethics or fake humanism.
When the principle of productivity is to degrade the dignity of the lives
of human beings, we cannot confine ourselves merely to securing ac-
cess to abortion, as an argument against social problems, unless we also
approach the core of consciousness inherent in the act of abortion. It
should not be possible to press society, which exists on the sacrifice of
women’s wombs, while paradoxically affirming the society with the atti-
tude of ‘it is as a matter of course to abort because of how society is’.
The logic of Seicho-no-ie and Catholic medical groups, that accuses
only women’s subjectivity, without questioning the problematic of so-
ciety is nothing but nonsense (they claim that if abortion was illegal,
the practice of contraception would become more widespread and the
abortion rate would be decreased), but to call the entire debate ‘fake hu-
manism that tries to let the lives of the child and ourselves confront to
each other,’ is an absurd statement which contains a dangerous argu-
ment.
When I choose to have an abortion with my own subjectivity, in the
objective situation where I ‘am made’ to have an abortion, I want my-
self to become aware that I am a murderer. The child dies in reality,
and if somebody calls the woman a murderer, then, I dare to declare
that a woman who had an abortion is a murderer, and while doing so, I
would still choose to have an abortion. Declaring that I am a murderer
and staring at a foetus cut into pieces, now, I want to argue against a so-
ciety that makes women do so, giving society no way to avoid the argu-
ment.
A society that makes women murder her children does not let wo-
men live, either. Only those who have despair and anger against the
idea that they might be murdered at any moment, can orient their urge
to kill towards the outside.
Let’s never confine ourselves to self-defence by taking contraceptive
pills. Let’s never neutralise our anger towards the problems of society
by making abortion a ‘right’. Is the Eugenic Protection Law a woman’s
right at all?!?
In 1948, the Eugenic Protection Law was introduced in the chaotic si-
tuation after the war. The law’s purpose was to prevent the birth of ‘in-
ferior offspring’, as well as to protect the life and health of the mother.
But the real hidden reason was to prevent such problems as births of
mixed blood children by prostitutes who had no other choice but to sell
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sex to survive economic chaos, scarcity of food, and to earn precious
US dollars. The next year, in order to assist ordinary people who either
barely managed to eat, or could not eat at all, the economic reasons
clause was added to the conditions for legal abortion. However, this
treatment was nothing but an attempt to revive XXX,2 which was about
to be destroyed.
Precisely (?) speaking, (the introduction of the economic clause) was
for the purpose of sustaining common people’s life standard as it was,
and of securing cheap female labour, while the nation was in the pro-
cess of accumulation of capital after the war.
Women have been contributing their bloody wombs for the cause of
‘the second largest GNP’; this is ‘women’s post-war history’. Japan
merely changes its guise from ‘god state’ to ‘economic animal’, where
the spirit of ‘I do not hope for anything until we have a victory’3 is in-
herited in the post war period into ‘the apology by the whole nation of
one million.’4 Behind the prosperity of post-war Japan, women’s wombs
have been shedding blood and its foetuses have been cut into pieces.
We have to make sure! The fact is that we have never taken either the
right or freedom to have an abortion in our hands!
And moreover, we have to keep repeating the question concerning
whether or not abortion is an issue of a right. If it is a right, then in the
very process of this struggle against the law to prohibit abortion, we can
take one step forward to make abortion a rights issue in a true sense. A
right is not what is given, but something that is to be obtained.
Let’s formulate even stronger grounds for struggle inside of ourselves
through the task of deconstructing and constructing a logic, instead of
crystallising a logic. I would be grateful if this yet-to-be-completed pro-
posal is of any help to that sort of task. (The editor responsible for this
article: TANAKA Mitsu)
We will publish a brochure with materials about abortion. We want to
create a unique kind of leaflet in order to catch the solid interest of
readers. We appreciate your anticipation!
(? Chupiren, S.E.X., Group-tatakau-onna, Meigaku-kyoryoku-sakusen
(This author’s own translation)
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Notes
Introduction
1 When discussing unusual medical conditions of a foetus, three terms are often used:
ijoˆ, shoˆgai, and shikkan or anomaly, disability, and disorder. In this book, I mainly use
the terms disability or shoˆgai and anomaly or ijoˆ. The term shoˆgai is often used to
generally mention any unusual medical condition of people who are already born. In
the case of a foetus, mainly ijoˆ and shoˆgai are used in selective abortion debates in Ja-
pan. In this book, the term disability is used when discussing those who are born,
and both anomaly and disability are used in discussions of foetuses. For a discussion
on the term shoˆgai and its English translation, see Nagase 1999.
2 Amniocentesis (also referred to as amniotic fluid test or AFT), is a medical procedure
used in prenatal diagnosis of genetic abnormalities and fetal infections, in which a
small amount of amniotic fluid, which contains fetal tissues, is extracted from the
amnion or amniotic sac surrounding a developing fetus, and the fetal DNA is exam-
ined for genetic abnormalities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amniocentesis, down-
loaded on 20 August 2008).
3 The maternal serum screening test (MSS) is a blood test, available to pregnant wo-
men, that helps to determine the risk of certain abnormalities that may affect their
unborn child. The term ‘serum’ means the watery part of the blood. Maternal serum
screening can be done in the first trimester of pregnancy, when it is combined with
ultrasound. This is called a combined first trimester screening test. It can also be
done in the second trimester of pregnancy and is called the second trimester mater-
nal serum screening test.
4 It is reported that in 1999 in Japan, 10,516 amniocentesis were carried out, while
there were 1,177,669 births and 337,288 abortions (not necessarily selective abor-
tions). In 2000, there were 1,190,547 births, 10,627 amniocentesis carried out, and
there were 341,146 abortions (not necessarily selective abortions). Because there are
not always accurate numbers available from other countries for amniocentesis (some
countries do not compile data on this procedure), it is not certain if these figures for
Japan are relatively high or not (information and comments from an interview with
Satoko Nagaoki, a biologist and a member of Soshiren, on 11 May 2004).
5 See also Mies 1993; and Komatsu 1998 and 2000.
6 Kishore Mahbubani is a Singaporean diplomat. Criticising the fact that the intrinsic
worth of such originally Western concepts as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ are
hardly challenged but ‘are just aggressively promoted in non-Western areas by the
West, especially after the end of the Cold War (ibid)’. Mahbubani argues that he ‘dis-
covered that these values have become just virtual ‘sacred cows’ (ibid)’. This volume
is indeed aimed at challenging the sacredness of ‘rights’ and reviving it as an every-
day concept that can be applied to non-Western social contexts. To this end, the gen-
ealogy of its sacredness is examined, and the validity of this sacredness is ques-
tioned.
7 The term ‘academic nationalism’ is borrowed from the title of the book by the Dutch
anthropologist (Asian studies) Margaret Sleeboom (2001). With the original aim to
consider ‘how is scientific discourse used in the production of nationalist ideologies
that emphasise difference from the West and the “uniqueness” of Japan and China?’
(ibid: 7), Sleeboom argues for ‘an increase in awareness of the influence exerted by
“academic nationalism” in academic discourse by elucidating the role of the nation as
a framework and unit of research in academic policy and research in, potentially, all
nation-states’ (ibid: 1). The statement of Takeshi Umehara, the first director of Koku-
sai Nihon Bunka Kenkyuˆ Centre (International Research Institute of Japanese Studies:
Kyoto) shows what he called ‘academic nationalism’, for example. His statement goes;
‘(the aim of the centre’s research programme is) to identify the uniqueness of Japa-
nese culture and pass this on to the rest of humanity’. (Dale, Peter N., ‘Nichibunken
and Japan’s international cultural policy’, in Die Internationalisierung Japans im Span-
nungsfeld zwischen O¨konomischer und socialer Dynamik, Wener Pacha, Wolfgang Sei-
fert, Meinfried Striegnitz (Hrsg.): 115-132 (124) cited in Sleeboom ibid: 19). This Ph.
D. research of Sleeboom is very refined and her observation is noteworthy, because
‘academic nationalism’, including nationalist ‘categorisation’, is a tendency which so-
called non-western researchers tend to fall in, when challenging ‘western academic
dominance’. However, my research is not intended to show any uniqueness of Japan
that could be applied to the rest of humanity as such, nor is this intended to disprove
Western political philosophy.
8 English versions of articles about abortion law and women’s reproductive rights in Ja-
pan include: Nakatsu (1955), Suzumura & Kikuchi (1966), Muramatsu (1969), Hiroi
& Suzuki (1973), Kondoˆ (1983), Shiota & Nishimura (1984), Muramatsu (1988), Mar-
uyama (1995), and Ogino (1996). An article by Japanese scholars in German about
abortion in Japan is also available in Yamamoto, K., Y. Yamamoto & Hayase (1993).
9 For a medical analysis by non-Japanese writers of the practice of abortion in Japan
see Norgren (2001). For a psychological and religious analysis by non-Japanese about
women’s experiences in having an abortion, see: Oaks (1994), Rittner, Falke-White,
Hattori (1994), and Lafleur (1992). For a political analysis of Japanese abortion poli-
cies and law, see: Gelb (1996).
10 Fru¨hstu¨ck (2003) argues the Japanese history of hygenics, birth control, eugenics,
and state health policies. Robertson’s work discusses the concept of beautiful body
and eugenics in modern Japan (Robertson 2001).
11 I asked researchers in Japan, including those cited in the text, about the research by
foreign scholars, but all said that they did not know of any research that analyses the
term ‘right’ in connection with movements of women and disabled people in Japan.
It also turned out that no libraries of disabled people’s research institutes in Japan,
in the UK and the Netherlands, including De Chronisch zieken en Gehandicapten Raad
Nederland (The Council of Chronic Diseases and Handicaps, the Netherlands) in
Utrecht, have any articles about Japanese disabled people’s movement or its interac-
tion with women’s movement.
12 Vera Mackie’s Feminism in Modern Japan (2003) introduces comprehensively the re-
cent history of the Japanese women’s movements. As an overview of the Japanese wo-
men’s movement from the first wave to the second wave, this book is informative,
and based on original materials written in Japanese. However, her review of the wo-
men’s movement goes only up to the mid-1980s. Also, this book is not specifically
about abortion. Even in Japanese, there is more research on the period before the
mid-1980s than after the mid-1980s. It seems that the history of the feminist move-
ment after the mid-1980s has not yet been written.
13 For example, Oaks (1994).
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14 For an analysis of Western (feminist) scholars’ attitudes of observing non-Western
women, see the work of Chandra Mohanty. In her article ‘Under Western Eyes: Fem-
inist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses (1988)’, she analyses the production of the
‘Third World Woman’ as a singular monolithic subject in (Western) feminist texts,
with a special focus on the Zed Press ‘Women in the Third World’ series. Mohanty
states that ‘religious, domesticated, family-oriented, victimised, ignorant, poor, un-
educated, tradition bounded’ are often observed images of ‘the average third-world
woman (Mohanty: 65)’. I recognise similar inaccurate generalisations in some for-
eign scholars’ analyses of Japanese women.
15 Another example of scholarship that displays a bias is Gelb’s analysis of abortion and
contraceptive practices in Japan (1996). Pointing out the relatively high abortion rate
in Japan, along with Japanese women’s reluctance to use contraceptive pills, she con-
cludes that ‘women as a group and individually have been unenthusiastic about sup-
porting alternative means of contraception’ (Gelb 1996: 134). She also notes that ‘The
Family Planning Association of Japan is a strong supporter of abortion as woman’s
right’ and ‘abortion as a means of contraception’ (ibid: 134-135). Her conclusions are
not based on sufficient observation and understanding of debates surrounding the
use of contraceptive pills or relating to abortion in Japan made in Japan. Japanese
women in academia and social movements argue that the fundamental cause of un-
planned pregnancy is gender inequality and a lack of knowledge about their own
bodies. Therefore, some Japanese feminists argue that uncritical use of contraceptive
pills does not solve fundamental problems in the relationships between women and
men, that is, that men do not play a role in using contraceptives. Some Japanese
feminists also argue that women take pills partly because women’s sexuality is more
repressed than that of men, in other words, it is more difficult for women to talk
about sex and contraceptive practices and taking the pill is a form of contraception
they can use without discussing. In addition, women have argued that the use of oral
contraceptive pills is accompanied by negative side effects, and they question why
only women need to face such problems. For example, the Japanese feminist critic
and anthropologist Yayoi Aoki says, ‘since modern contraceptive pills have fewer side
effects than before, women in reproductive movements show more supportive atti-
tudes toward the usage of contraceptive pills, but many Japanese women continue to
believe that the use of contraceptive pills should not play a role in reducing the
awareness of men toward the practice of contraceptives’ (Aoki 1997: 16). These ques-
tions should be taken more seriously, instead of simply concluding that ‘women have
been unenthusiastic about supporting means of contraception’.
16 Secondly, Gelb says that the Japanese women’s reproductive health movement groups
are more interested in securing access to abortion than in seeking to increase the
forms of contraception available to Japanese women to include the contraceptive pill
(129; 131). However, an accurate analysis would reveal that Japanese women in the re-
productive health movement chose to focus on securing access to abortion because of
the political context, particularly in 1973 and 1982. Moreover, as mentioned, women’s
reproductive health movement groups are tackling the fundamental causes of un-
planned pregnancy, such as the lack of sex education, and that the pill does not come
to the foreground in their discussions does not mean that women are not interested
in increasing their options. Promotion of contraceptive pills is one of their activities,
but this promotion presents the pill as one of multiple alternative methods of contra-
ception.
17 In her study, Gelb expresses the criticism that Japanese women, unlike women in
the US, do not use contraceptive pills, but in this way she is using the US situation
as ‘the standard’. One cannot conclude, however, that contraceptive pills are the best
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contraceptive method because the pill is the most popular in the US. Moreover, she
does not explain why she needs to compare Japan with the US.
18 1 Koˆdoˆsurukai kiroku shuˆ henshuˆiinkai 1999: 176-183.
19 1 Soshiren news (1999) November 172: 4-5.
20 In fact, nobody knows what her real name was or who she was exactly. When she ap-
peared in the WLM meeting for the first time, she introduced herself as Ms. Kataya-
ma, a specialist in pharmacy (Akiyama 1993: 121-138). But in an interview article for
a women’s magazine, where she introduces herself as ‘Enoki Misako’, she explains
that her real name was Ms. Kiuchi Kimiko and her maiden name was Katayama.
(‘Enoki Misako, Kanojo o danseikokuhatsu ni karitateta genten wa nanika [Enoki
Misako: What is the motive behind her accusation of men?]’, in Josei-jishin, 12 June
1974). However, nobody knows to what extent she was telling the truth in the inter-
view, nor if she was a student or if she had a job at that time. In the late 1970s, she
suddenly disappeared from the public scene. There is a rumour that she had a con-
nection with a pharmaceutical company that wanted to sell contraceptive pills, and
she was hired by them. Another rumour is that her activity was an attempt carried
out in cooperation with her husband, Kiuchi Natsuo, a medical doctor, to promote
contraceptive pills. But nothing has been proven.
21 This was the only group that split off from the WLM. As will be recounted in chapter
2, the main reason for this split was not due to a difference in opinion on the term
‘right’, but was rather because Enoki used other women in the WLM to pursue her
own political interests. As a participant in the WLM, Akiyama recalls, ‘there was basi-
cally trust and an atmosphere of being able to discuss anything within the WLM,
although there were disagreements’ (Akiyama 1993: 135-136).
22 From an interview with the Japanese psychological counsellor Katsumi Yamamoto,
who has been involved in the movement for more than a generation. Interview 7
March 2003, Malta.
23 1 Aoi shiba no kai, Ayumi, no. 1, 1965, cited by Tateiwa 2000: 96.
24 Interview with Yokota, held on 19 July 2001, Kanagawa.
25 They argue that there are disabled people in the US who argue strongly against eu-
genics, for example, although, just like Aoi shiba, they are not a majority and are not
representative of the disabled people’s movement.
Chapter 1
1 It is actually not certain how far back the practice of abortion can be traced in Japan,
but poems dating back to the 8th century about abortion have been found. Before
the Meiji era, only records of recommendations by the local communities are pre-
sent, in times of famine, to reduce fertility and balance population with agricultural
production. Thus, abortion and infanticide were means to survive poverty, decided by
households and the community. Because the household family system during the
Edo period was based on an extended, not a nuclear, family all adults in a given
household were involved in the issues of pregnancy and abortion, and decisions had
to be made in the context of a delicate balance of labour and production in the family
household aimed at surviving poverty. Since in some poems expressions of sorrow
and regret about abortion and infanticide were found, the Japanese journalist Taniai
concludes that the moral aspects and responsibilities of abortion were shared by the
women and those in their surroundings (Taniai 1983b: 20). Taniai reports that in the
eastern part of Japan, such as in Ouu or Kantoˆ, infanticide was practised more than
abortion, while in the western part of Japan, such as in Chuˆgoku, Shikoku, and
Kyuˆshuˆ, abortion was practised more than infanticide (Taniai 1983b: 23). Common
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means of abortion during the Edo period were use of an internal medicine that
caused mercury poisoning of the woman’s entire body and abortion through the use
of plants (Ishii 1982: 118).
2 Information about the history of abortion law is from Ishii 1982: 119.
3 However, it has to be noted that because abortion, when performed by a qualified
doctor for urgent reasons, was accepted, there were hardly any arrests until the
1930s. As economic conditions grew worse, and especially after the worldwide eco-
nomic depression of 1929, access to abortion became extremely limited in order to
secure labour and military manpower, as Japan started walking the path of militarism
under Hirohito, the emperor of the Shoˆwa period (1925-1989) (Ishii 1982: 119).
4 Kanazumi 1983: 213. The figures between the years 1943 and 1948 are not recorded.
5 There are no estimates on how wide scale the practice of abortion was.
6 For example, in 1932, there was a sensational debate in reaction to a question raised
by a woman who became pregnant as a result of rape in a column for women’s coun-
selling in the Asahi Shimbun, one of the highest circulation newspapers in Japan
(The Asahi Shimbun July 30 1932).
7 The story goes: A burglar broke into Miss. T’s room at night when she was taking a
nap after coming back from taking care of her father in a hospital for three whole
days. The burglar not only stole her watch and jewellery, but he also raped her. She
told her mother and her lover about the break in and rape. The lover was understand-
ing and their tie became even stronger. However, it turned out that she had become
pregnant as a result of the rape. She found it too hard to tell her lover because he
would be hurt all the more because he was so understanding. At the same time,
although she did not feel any affection towards the child, since there was nobody
who loved the child and the child was not responsible for the manner in which it
was conceived, she questioned whether she should take responsibility for the child
and keep the child. She did not know what to do, and anonymously asked for advice
in a newspaper.
8 This incident drew public attention, which led to an active debate in newspapers and
also in lawyers’ academic journals because of its delicate nature. In the Asahi Shim-
bun, an answer was given by Waka Yamada, who had been in the women’s movement
since the beginning of the 1900s. She said, ‘so far, male seeds were considered to be
the stem of the line of the offspring, while women were a mere provider of the
womb. However, now believe that you, a woman, are the stem for the line of the off-
spring. If you think your child is an extension of your body, you would be able to ac-
cept the child. [...] If you confess everything to your lover, I believe he will understand
the situation and he will be the greatest collaborator in raising the child.’ The answer
might be surprising in that Yamada is encouraging her to give birth to a child even
the pregnancy was as a result of rape, considering the fact that Yamada is a woman
in the women’s movement. However, Naoyoshi Tsukazaki, a lawyer, said that whoever
answered this question, this answer would have been the best that a woman could
provide under the military government. Another opinion put forth at that time came
from Hiroshi Kikuchi, that ‘she should have an abortion. In this case, it is an error
in the law to punish her for abortion. Abortion in this case is neither ethical injustice
nor dishonour.’ According to Yonemine Takashima, ‘in general, as long as women in-
tend to resist violence seriously, they should be able to manage to do so no matter
what, but this case is considered to be unfortunate. There is no sin on the side of the
child, therefore she should raise it without telling the fact to the child even when it
grows up.’ Chika Hozumi insisted, ‘abortion is not allowed in the light of the law. In
this case, the judge would take the circumstances into consideration, although the
act of abortion itself is not good, no matter what. Moreover, if the law is revised be-
cause of this exceptional case, the law would be misused.’ Kainan Shimomura said,
NOTES 273
‘she should have an abortion and should be judged of her sin after turning herself in
to the police. Probably the sentence will be suspended. And if the law is revised be-
cause of this case, she would be consoled even if she is punished once.’ Kinuko Yo-
kunaga, the chairwoman of the board in an orphanage, said, ‘at the very moment she
sees the newly born child, affection replaces all the hatred. If the relationship with
the lover ends up in a worse situation, think of other examples of breaking up be-
cause of accidents and so on. There will be a day when she can centre her child in
her life. Then she will realise that the relationship with her lover is much weaker
than with her child’ (Asahi Shimbun, 1932).
9 I deduce implications of abortion from the whole debate. First, in this case, the wo-
man was scarcely blamed by any commentators for considering an abortion because
an abortion of the pregnancy resulted from rape. As one comment states, ‘if a wo-
man intends to resist the violence she should be able to manage no matter what,’
hence this commentator considers rape to be the woman’s fault. Yet, this case is un-
derstood as misfortune and unavoidable because the woman was tired from taking
care of her father, and she hadn’t slept. In my reckoning, public sympathy for the wo-
man is because the woman’s behaviour is aligned with the idea of motherhood and
care, that is, having a nap after taking care of her father for three days without sleep-
ing. A gender bias in the comments to the woman’s letter is expressed in the differ-
ent interpretations of the woman’s responsibility for sexual violence and other socially
expected roles of women at that time.
10 It is also noticeable that, although the commentators feel sympathy toward the wo-
man, they do not mention the cruelty of the abortion articles in the Criminal Code,
which force women to give birth in such a situation. It is inferred that state power
was absolute and it was difficult to criticise the abortion law, which articulates that
abortion is an act against the nation-state’s interest. Only one justification for legal
abortion is made for eugenic reasons: the rapist and his children are unfit for society.
11 Another story symbolising women’s reproductive life under the abortion articles in
the Criminal Code features a popular actress of the day, Akiko Shiga, who was ar-
rested for aborting a seven-month-old foetus, as was the midwife who performed the
abortion. A newspaper article of 19 July 1935 reports: Akiko Shiga, age 25, and a mid-
wife, Kikue Jinguˆji, age 35, are under close investigation at Ikebukuro police station.
It is suspected that Shiga was pregnant from a relationship with a director, Yutaka
Abe. Shiga has had relationships with several men during the past few years. She
could not manage to improve her conduct, and it turned out that she also aborted a
two-month-old foetus two years ago, as a result of a relationship with a foreigner, her
patron of the day. Jinguˆji confessed that, when Shiga visited her, Shiga had already
taken an abortion pill, and therefore she could not help but abort. The foetus was de-
livered, and it cried, but it was not in a viable condition. Since both Shiga and Jinguˆji
admit that the foetus cried, the case will be treated as murder (Tokyo Hibi Shimbun,
cited by Taniai 1983b: 42-44).
12 To this article the background of her life is added by Taniai. She lost her parents at a
young age, and therefore could not follow her dream of becoming a pianist. She
started running a bar in Tokyo, where she met Mr. K, a client of the bar, who gave
her financial support in running the bar. Shiga became pregnant by Mr. K. She could
not stand the idea of having a baby out of wedlock, and she had an abortion. After-
wards, she met Mr. Abe, the director of a movie company, and she was scouted as an
actress. Soon she became pregnant again. She tried to tell Mr. Abe about the preg-
nancy, but his attitude became very cool. Moreover, she learned that he had many
lovers. She had to struggle alone about what to do, and after much consideration,
she decided to have an abortion. Her note continues: ‘However, I, in fact, love chil-
dren. When I came to Tokyo, I even thought of working for an orphanage to live a
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life with children around me. I fainted and remained unconscious for four hours
when I had an abortion at Jinguˆji’s, but came back to consciousness because of the
cry of the baby. I held it and pressed my cheek against the baby’s. Now that I have
confessed all my sins, I am only praying to God. To contribute to cinema art, I will
come back to the cinema field, cutting off all relationships with dirty men’ (Taniai
1983b: 2-44).
13 The newspaper article reports that ‘although she was not acquitted of the abortion,
she was at least acquitted of infanticide because Shiga was awakened by motherhood
when she saw the baby, and the police investigators were touched by it’. The article
continues, ‘she gained consciousness, hearing the cry of the baby, and held it imme-
diately, and she even begged Jinguˆji, a midwife, to make warm water in which to
bathe the baby. The tearful confession touched police investigators and she was al-
lowed to go home for the time being’.
14 Thus, in Shiga’s case too, motherhood played an important role in the public debate.
At the same time, an image of promiscuity is attached to a woman who has an abor-
tion. Another notable fact is that the full name of Mr. K’s, the man with whom Shiga
became pregnant, was kept anonymous in a newspaper report to protect his privacy.
Five days after Shiga was arrested, Mr. Abe was called for questioning at a police sta-
tion, and he stated that he had gotten Shiga pregnant, but he did not know about the
abortion. Then he was considered to be unrelated to the abortion case by the police,
and was released on the same day after 13 hours of interrogation. Men related to Shi-
ga were not considered to be free from responsibility in this case (Taniai 1983b: 40-
49).
15 In the article, physical influence is emphasised in particular. So, contracts which af-
fect her health conditions, requiring sexual contacts, are included here.
16 Here is one actual story from this period:
17 The house of Suzuki has had no sons and has adopted sons [including muko-yoˆshi]
for four generations. When I gave birth to the first son, since this was the first male
child born into this house, Grandpa and Grandma [ father-in-law and mother-in-law]
rejoiced and wondered if he came from heaven or earth, and they took good care of
him. Joyously and jokingly, Grandpa said to me: ‘if you don’t want to stay in this
house, you may leave, since we have our heir now’ (Sugiyama-Lebra 1984: 159).
18 More examples of women’s experiences in the Ie household systemhousehold sys-
tem",4> are provided in Sugiyama-Lebra 1984.
19 About women’s sexuality during the Meiji period, see Takamune (1972b).
20 Kanoˆ argues that the emperor under Japanese militarism actually had the role of
both mother and father, in the process of nation-building. As a mother, he loves the
Japanese nation with an unconditional love while the nation expects to be protected,
and as a strict father, he punishes the rebellious, such as Communists. The doctrine
of colonialist expansion was formulated in terms of the strict love of the father and
unconditional love of the mother. The father’s strict love is in order to elevate undeve-
loped China forcefully, and the mother’s love is brought in, when freeing them from
the European invasion, and to welcome them under the umbrella of the imperial fa-
mily (Kanoˆ 1991: 66).
21 For the details of the birth control movement, see Oˆta 1967: 241-244.
22 The term eugenics means eu-genes or ‘born in superiority’ in Greek, that is trans-
lated as yuˆ-sei in Japanese. Yuˆ means superiority, and sei means birth.
23 Fukuzawa states in his book, Jiji-kogoto (1881), that there is a limitation to human
beings’ capacity according to innate genes, which is determined by the bloodline of
ancestors. This was eight years before Francis Galton, a pioneer of eugenic studies in
England, advocated the importance of eugenics. In his previous writing, Gakumon-
no-susume (Encouragement of learning: 1872), he discusses the egalitarian idea that no-
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body is either above or below anybody else in his/her innate ability, but through self-
effort, anyone can attain a certain capacity, regardless of any rank or birth back-
ground. Fukuzawa changed his opinion because he realised that although the rank
system of warrior, farmer, craftsman, and merchant was abolished in the Meiji Re-
storation, and although Fukuzawa expected to build up a more egalitarian and com-
petent society, he later believed that reform in social systems could not be the crucial
solution to fundamental social reform. Instead, he stated that it was more necessary
to have a ‘reform’ inside individuals, given the fact that some people did not even try
to develop themselves but did not live to their full potential (Suzuki 1983: 508-509,
summarised by the author).
24 Takahashi wrote Nihon jinshu kairyoˆ ron (Theory of Japanese racial improvement) in
1884. In this book, he argues for mixed marriages between European and Japanese
people (Saitoˆ 1993). The concept of ‘superior’ was closely connected to the concept of
‘evolution’ and ‘civilisation’, which was the image he had of Western Europe. But his
theory on mixed marriage also invited debates. In 1886, Hiroyuki Katoˆ, a scholar of
German law, wrote Jinshu kairyoˆ no ben (Speech on racial improvement), criticising Ta-
kahashi’s theory on mixed marriage. His criticism was as follows: Firstly, apart from
the improvement of the genes, there is still room for improvement in the environ-
ment. Secondly, more information is necessary about which if combination of mixed
marriage is preferable for the improvement of the genes. Third, it takes too long to
improve race through mixed marriage. And lastly, mixed marriage is not an improve-
ment but a transformation of the race. This will eventually invite domination of Ja-
pan by the West. Therefore for the improvement of the race, the purity of the Japa-
nese race preferably should be maintained (Suzuki 1983). Katoˆ’s argument became
more important after the beginning of the 20th century in the context of emerging
Japanese nationalism and militarism, brought about by the victories in the first inter-
national wars against China and Russia.
25 Theories from the UK and the US are based on social Darwinism. Social Darwinism
is ‘a theory which places the struggle for survival as the supreme and universal prin-
ciple in human society to eventually eliminate socially “unfit” people’ (Sekine 1994:
30-31). In Japan, Koˆtoˆku Kaino wrote Nihonjin-jinshukaizoˆron (Theory on the improve-
ment of the Japanese race) to argue that social Darwinism is no longer applicable be-
cause welfare policies protect relatively ‘incompetent’ people. Therefore, a society
would be composed of inferior people and human-beings would tend to head in the
direction of retrogression. In this situation, he claimed the necessity of having public
policies to enforce positive and/or negative eugenics, instead of having a welfare pol-
icy.
26 His theory had the guise of nationalism. He argued that there were three levels of vir-
tue about the quality of race, i.e. physical, mental, and social. He says that Japanese
people are inferior to Westerners in terms of the former two levels, but superior in
the last term as is apparent in the rapid social and economic achievements Japan
made in a short period, in addition to the fact that Japan won two international wars
only a quarter century after participating in colonialist competition. This apparent so-
cial superiority is caused by the combination of the spirit of ‘respect towards the royal
family as the descendants of God’ and ‘respect towards the ancestors’. Based on these
‘precious spirits’ Kaino argued that the Japanese race can be improved in terms of
the former two virtues (Suzuki 1983: 59).
27 Biologists active in eugenic research were Jiroˆ Asaoka, Seijiroˆ Ikeno, Shigeo Yamau-
chi, and Seitaroˆ Gotoˆ. Yuˆjiroˆ Motoyoshi was a psychologist, and Kenji Osawa and Hi-
somu Nagai were medical professionals. All are men.
28 For example, it was because of the influence of Gregor Mendel’s research, on the pat-
terns of inheritance of green beans, that the department of biology was established
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in Tokyo University in 1877. Lectures on eugenics were introduced in the curriculum
in 1917. Experiments were conducted actively in universities, too, such as the biolo-
gist Sotoyama Kametaroˆ’s experiment at Tokyo University, with Mendel’s discovery in
patterns of inheritance using silkworms (see Sotoyama, Jinrui no konponteki kaizoˆ
[The fundamental reform of humankind]).
29 For example, the physicist Shigeo Yamauchi mentions that ‘racial improvement, and
maintenance of the superior race, are the major ethical responsibility for each nation.
The limitation of freedom, and responsibility for an individual, are necessary for the
sake of society. [...] An individual’s freedom must be for racial prosperity. Evolution of
human beings is the biggest social project because an individual dies while society
remains for a much longer time’ (Yamauchi, Jinrui-no-iden [Heredity of humankind:
1917], cited by Suzuki 1983: 88-90).
30 For instance, Gotoˆ Ryuˆkichi tried to establish the Japan Eugenic Science Association,
but this was not achieved for financial reasons. In 1930, Kokuristu idengaku kenkyuˆjo
(the National Genetic Research Centre) was established. This is because of the insis-
tence of Tanaka Yoshimaro, a genetic scientist, that Japan should have a national re-
search centre on genetic research, just as the US and the UK did. The establishment
of this centre was the first national-level project involving eugenics.
31 In 1926 Ringi Ikeda established the Japan Eugenic Movement Association. He had
lived in Germany for four years after the First World War, working as a journalist
where his ideas on eugenics were influenced by his time in Germany. He propagated
eugenic thought with the idea of improving the mentality and physique of the Japa-
nese race, in order to make the Japanese one of the ‘first-class races’ of the world.
His primary concern was to build a nation-state totally synonymous with the imperial
family, and to maintain the purity of the divine nation. His activities were different
from the earlier attempts of others to promote eugenic concepts in that he tried to
popularise eugenics by putting it into practice amongst common people, and in his
emphasis on the unity of the emperor and the nation. Another new point in his activ-
ity was his stress on the importance of the social environment, in addition to good
genes, for the purposes of racial improvement. This approach, which pays attention
not only to genes but also to the environment, is called Oˆyoˆ-yuˆseigaku, or ‘applied eu-
genics’. Accordingly, he invented the term yuˆ-kyoˆ, to stand for ‘superior environment’.
The idea and practice of yuˆ-kyoˆ was also a trend in some Western countries. A eu-
genic scholar in the US, Paul Popenoe, used the term ‘applied eugenics’ in 1918, in-
fluenced by the German racial hygienic movement in 1914. Following the Wandervo-
gel movement in Germany and Sokol in Czechoslovakia as part of mental and physi-
cal training, Ikeda also established Ashi-no-kai or ‘group of feet’ (Suzuki 1983: 117).
32 For example, a magazine named Eugenics was published by Ryuˆkichi Gotoˆ.
33 A medical doctor, Nagai was active in writing as well. His major works are: Beautiful
Body (1907), A theory on the academic discipline of racial improvement (1915), Racial im-
provement studies (1913), and Heredity and genes of human beings (1915).
34 The debate in the Diet and the Ministry about the pros and cons of the 1940 law is
described in detail in Saitoˆ 1983 and in Matsubara 1997; 1998b.
35 The number of operations between 1941 and 1945 was 454. Considering that the
number was 360,000 in Germany during this period, the Japanese military govern-
ment’s reluctance to practice the law is apparent (Matsubara 1998b: 103).
36 For example, the aforementioned Ikeda states about Malthus and neo-Malthus: ‘Inter-
nationally, we often hear the concept of “coexistence of races”. However, to target
mere “coexistence” is not enough. A race has to exist in a superior way. If a popula-
tion is simply controlled in relation to the amount of resources, then mathematically
even a superior race could be destroyed.’ His statement is based on the fact that in
Europe the fertility rate decreased during the period after the First World War, and
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this was thought to be disadvantageous for international competition. Regarding neo-
Malthusianism, Ikeda states that a fertility control campaign is neither positive nor
negative, but it might be necessary in order to control the quality of the population,
if it is used properly (Suzuki 1983: 127-129).
37 Another medical eugenicist, Yoshio Furuya, expresses anxiety about neo-Malthusian-
ism, which attempts to save poor people ‘randomly’. He states that fertility control
was already being practised amongst people of relatively higher class, but not in the
poor, uneducated class, who are the real cause of exploding populations. He also
states that it is not problematic if higher class people produce more children (Suzuki
1983: 129-131).
38 In Nazi Germany, ‘selective abortion’ was legal. However, it was not practised by dis-
covering diseases in the foetus as it is today, instead selective abortions could take
place when either the mother-to-be or her spouse had genetic diseases on the list in-
cluded in the sterilisation law. Therefore, the practice of selective abortion was based
mainly on the physical condition of the parents. Abortion, as a result of rape, was
also legal in Nazi Germany, but it was for the reason of ‘the rapist gene’ more than
for protecting women’s well-being (Ichinokawa 1996: 188-189).
39 47 women and 47 men were sterilised in 1941, 106 and 83 in 1942, 90 and 62 in
1943, and no men and 18 women in 1944 (Isei-80nenshi [80 years’ history of medicine]:
828, cited by Tsuge, Ichinokawa, and Katoˆ, in Ehara 1996: 379).
40 The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) considered abolishing the
emperor system at the beginning of its occupation in Japan. However, GHQ even-
tually decided to perpetuate the system to keep order in Japan.
41 The economic growth was initiated by the Prime Minister at the time, Hayato Ikeda.
The target he presented was called shotoku-baizoˆ-keikaku or ‘double income policy,’
under which all the policies in agriculture, labour, and education were aimed at the
enlargement of gross national income.
42 According to Oˆta, an obstetrician, the main reasons for overpopulation are: demobili-
sation and repatriation of male soldiers to their home island in Japan, and insuffi-
ciency of contraceptive methods, both in terms of quantity and quality, as well as the
ineffective work of the family planning association (Oˆta 1967: 245-265). At the time
of the defeat, the number of Japanese troops overseas was approximately 3,500,000,
of whom 1,900,000 were in China, some 780,000 in ‘Manchuria’ and 1,600,000 in
the South Pacific area. In addition to these, there were 3,500,000 civilian residents
living overseas. All of these approximately 7 million Japanese were to be returned
home, and successive waves of former residents who had lost all their property, and
also former military personnel, were all to be repatriated to Japan’s home island. The
plight of civilians in the area of former Manchuria was particularly horrific, and
many of them died of starvation or disease. More than 500,000 military and civilian
people who surrendered to the Soviet Union were transferred to camps in Siberia,
where they performed forced labour for years in the bitter cold, with the loss of more
than 50,000 lives. Repatriation from the Soviet Union was a particularly slow pro-
cess. The final military survivors at home, some 2,500,000 men, were demobilised
in a short time directly after the defeat, while those who were overseas were dis-
armed on the spot, so that the Japanese army and navy completely ceased to exist (In-
ternational Society for Education and Information (ed.) 1995: 247).
43 Just prior to the beginning of the warand just after the war ended, the demand from
doctors to legalise abortion reached its peak. A number of women, coming back to Ja-
pan from ex-colonies, had been raped by Soviet soldiers, and became pregnant. Some
pregnant women jumped into the sea from the repatriation ship out of despair,
others died from an unhygienic abortion, and others killed their newly born babies.
Some doctors tried to help those women by performing abortions, but it was extre-
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mely dangerous under the illegal conditions, because there was no equipment and
no medicine. This motivated doctors’ urgent demand for the legalisation of abortion
(Taniai 1983b: 59-64).
44 According to the GHQ’s judgement, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was en-
trusted with the task of population control. In 1946, the population committee was
installed, and eugenic scientists from the pre-war period, such as the Nagai, Diet
members, and medical doctors, were appointed to participate. The committee con-
sisted of 56 members. Because, according to the committee, the intellectual class had
already been practising birth control properly, while the working class had not, the
committee showed more concern about degradation of the nation as compared to the
period before the war. GHQ was also in favour of promoting birth control and lega-
lised abortion (Matsubara 1998a: 118-122).
45 In January 1947, Ashida, the Minister of Health and Welfare, stated, ‘now we have to
construct a cultural and healthy nation-state, based on correct scientific knowledge,
to achieve the ideal of the revival of the nation.’ Ashida was also reluctant to accept
the promotion of birth control (cited in Matsubara 1998a: 118-119).
46 Ichinokawa and Tateiwa argue that eugenics appears more strongly when building
up a devastated state than it does in wartime. Indeed, eugenic research and policies
in European countries experienced their peak between the two world wars. Germany
was the most obvious case. In Japan, the number of eugenic operations experienced
its peak in 1952, because the government had been sceptical about putting the Na-
tional Eugenic Law into practice during the pre-war period (Ichinokawa & Tateiwa
1998: 258-285).
47 Katoˆ and Oˆta submitted a draft of the Eugenic Protection Law, with exceptions for le-
gal abortion, to the Diet in August 1947. The reasoning was, ‘by introducing a new
law, motherhood should be able to prevent children from growing into inferior
beings in poor surroundings, and to prevent the inheritance of bad genes’ (Matsubara
1998a: 119).
48 The Socialist Party, which opposed the idea of the National Eugenic Law in the
1930s, did not even raise questions about the draft of the law in 1948. Those with a
Catholic background opposed the law, but these people consisted of only a handful of
Diet members (Matsubara 1998a: 119-120). This fact also shows how urgent it was to
reconstruct the country after the war, and how much eugenics was accepted.
49 The meaning of the law is consistently understood in this way in the WLM in the
1970s and Soshiren since 1982. For research about the genealogy of the Eugenic Pro-
tection Law see: Ishii (1982), Saitoˆ (1983), Ogino (1991), Marumoto & Yamamoto
(1997), and Matsubara (1998).
50 Ogino reports that the condom was the method most often used, combined with the
rhythm method. On women’s fertile days men use condoms, with less use on the in-
fertile days. Other contraceptive methods, such as IUDs or sterilisation, are were sel-
dom used. With regard to the high rate of abortion, Ogino gives the following expla-
nations: abortion was and still is more or less considered to be the last resort of ‘con-
traceptives’. However, because it is women who become pregnant and go through the
process of abortion, and it is hardly likely that women simply regard abortion as con-
traception, it has to be noted that the fundamental cause of the high rate of abortion
is the ‘asymmetrical relationship between men and women with regard to exercise of
sexuality and contraceptives’ and ‘women’s ignorance about their bodies’ (Ogino
1991: 127-128). She continues: ‘condom or withdrawal are contraceptive methods in-
itiated by men, but if they do not use them correctly or not at all, it is women who
have to pay for the outcome. Men tend to be reluctant to use condoms for reasons of
losing sexual sensitivity or breaking the mood, or they tend to force women to have
sexual intercourse because men never become pregnant. And it is sometimes diffi-
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cult for women to refuse the demand of men when women are dependent on men
economically, or because of the idea that to gently accept men’s demands is to be
feminine’. She concludes, therefore, that it is dangerous for women to rely upon
men for the contraceptives, and it is necessary for women to take the initiative when
it comes to contraceptives. Some women find it dirty, shameful, or non-feminine to
discuss knowledge about sexual problems. Thus, abortion is sometimes an outcome
of women’s lack of knowledge in issues surrounding contraceptives and sexuality, as
well as the idea of being feminine (Ogino 1991: 128).
51 The Liberal Democratic Party was established in 1955, with ideas of ‘revising the Con-
stitution’ (especially the ninth article so that Japan could be rearmed again) and ‘pro-
motion of liberal capitalist economic development’. Its main supporters are the Japan
Agricultural Cooperative Association (Noˆkyoˆ), the Japan Medical Association (Nihon
Ishikai), and financiers (zaikai nin). Between 1955 and 1993, the LDP always secured
more than half the seats in the Diet, enjoying overwhelming dominance in Japanese
party politics. The second strongest political party, the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon
Shakai toˆ), had never been able to even secure one-third the number of seats that the
LDP held. There were other political parties such as the Japan Communist Party
(Kyoˆsantoˆ) and Koˆmei Party (Koˆmeitoˆ), but before 1993 they never succeeded in tak-
ing the ruling position. Therefore, during the 1970s and 1980s, the opinions and ac-
tions of the LDP were more influential than any other party, and social movement or-
ganisations also had to keep an eye on the LDP.
52 However, in 1993, the LDP’s dominance ended with some LDP members’ separation
from the party and the formation of new parties. This was mainly because of corrup-
tion and inflexibility within the party. Since then up until today, the LDP has only
been able to have a ruling position in coalition with other parties.
53 Information about Seichoˆ no ie, from Yoshiko Miya, in Buckley 1997: 177-178, and Ta-
niguchi 1981.
54 The aim of Diet members is often to become a minister. In order to be acknowledged
by bureaucrats in the ministries and to be recommended to become a minister, they
often try to become specialised in specific political matters, bringing forward unique
viewpoints. Murakami and some others’ alliance with anti-abortion groups and their
activities to limit women’s access to abortion were also aimed at bringing a political
speciality to the fore, and of course to secure votes from members of anti-abortion
groups.
55 A cup of coffee at a coffee shop in Tokyo cost 50 yen in 1955 and 60 yen in 1960
(http://homepage2.nifty.com/NG/sento/sento02.htm).
56 A disease similar to acute anterior poliomyelitis appeared between 1953 and 1960,
with a peak of 31 cases in 1956. Since cases centred in the city of Minamata, Kuma-
moto Prefecture, Kyuˆshuˆ, the illness was named Minamata disease. Symptoms of
Minamata disease include numbness of the extremities, perioral numbness, centripe-
tal constriction of the visual field, loss of hearing, clumsiness of minute movements,
articulation disorders, tremor, and ataxia; mental disorders are observed in serious
cases, and mentally retarded children are especially common in cases of congenital
Minamata disease. The pathology of this disease is characterised by the degeneration
of nerve cells in the cerebellum, visual field centre, and parietal lobe of the cerebrum
and by the degeneration of the medullary sheath and axons of the peripheral nerves.
By February 1971, there had been 121 confirmed cases, including 47 dead. The dis-
ease struck both men and women, and 22 cases of congenital Minamata disease were
observed in newborn infants. With progress in diagnostic methods later cases of Min-
amata disease were uncovered, and by December 1979 the number of officially desig-
nated patients had totalled 1,293, with another 305 dead. In addition, 6,009 patients
filed applications for recognition as Minamata disease patients. The pollutant path-
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way was identified as water pollution from the effluent waters of the acetaldehyde
synthesising plant of the Chisso Corporation (then Nippon Chisso Hiryoˆ) in the city
of Minamata (Koˆdansha 1983 6: 218).
57 In 1965, the Hyoˆgo Prefectural mayor Kanai (1966-1975), visited Biwako-gakuen, or a
school for children with mental and physical disabilities, in Shiga prefecture. He was
struck to see the children ‘who have forgotten how to laugh, play around, or feel joy’
(Matsunaga 2001: 110). The rector of the school told him that more care from the
parents or proper treatment by the doctor could have saved most of those children
from being disabled. Kanai considered how those children could be cured, and how
the birth of those children could be prevented. He launched ‘the movement to pre-
vent unhappy births’ in April 1966, with the base of activity in the Department of
Hygiene of the prefecture.
58 On 25 February 1974, the Oˆsaka Aoi shiba no kai submitted a letter to the ‘depart-
ment to provide guidelines to prevent unhappiness of births’. As a result, a lecture
meeting involving the chairperson of the department was cancelled, and in April Aoi
shiba no kai and the chairperson had a meeting to negotiate discuss the nature of the
movement. On 26 April, a demand was handed in by Oˆsaka Aoi shiba no kai to the
mayor of Koˆbe city, the chairperson of the department of hygiene, and the ‘depart-
ment to provide guidelines to prevent unhappiness of births’ (Matsunaga 2001: 118-
119).
59 The petition submitted by Aoi shiba no kai about this project to the prefecture is avail-
able in appendix 4. But the central problem in this project, according to Matsunaga,
is the existence of doctors who behave as if they were neutral. Matsunaga argues,
‘although the technology is implemented according to the demands of women, its
implementation carries a certain value already, that shows acknowledgement by the
medical doctors. However, only pregnant women are left with the decisions and their
responsibilities resulting from these decisions. This is due to the background that
there are myths and illusions that regard medical doctors as being infallible’ (Matsu-
naga 2001: 122).
60 As a result of Aoi shiba no kai’s activities, the name of the department was changed
to Boshi-hoken-ka, or the Department of Health of Mothers and Children. The name
of the movement was also changed to Yoiko o umi sukoyaka ni sodateru undoˆ, or the
‘movement for giving birth to and nurturing good children’.
61 In April 1964, an institute called Fuchuˆ ryoˆiku centre was established in the Tokyo
metro area, with a reputation of ‘the best in the East’ because of its modern equip-
ment. Its establishment was part of the governmental guideline on providing insti-
tutes for disabled people. However, despite the centre’s good reputation, criticism
and complaints were made by the people living at the institute. For instance, men
and women were divided into two big rooms respectively, and in between the two
rooms was only a simple sort of screen. They had to wake up at 6 a.m. and they had
to go to bed at 9 p.m. Even the toilet schedule was fixed. In order to save labour and
time, a bed pan was distributed to each person in the morning. They could have visi-
tors only once a month. They had to have permission to leave the institute. Residents
were not allowed to have long hair because it was more troublesome for the workers
to wash. Women were bathed by male workers because men had greater physical
strength. Moreover, a prerequisite of being admitted to the institute was agreeing to
undergo an autopsy at death (Mitsui 1978: 2-10).
62 To protest against these living conditions, some residents went on a hunger strike in
November 1970. This eventually ended without any visible results. However, another
protest arose in relation to the issue of transferring some residents to a different, pri-
vate institute. The protest came about in response to three things: first, because this
plan was made regardless of the wishes of the residents who might be transferred,
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and secondly, because the transfer would be coupled with the more strict categorisa-
tion and isolation of people with certain types and levels of disabilities. The target
groups were adults and children with severe physical disabilities as well as with se-
vere mental disabilities. Thirdly, the private institute was inconveniently located far
away from the centre of the city, and it was expected that treatment would increase
the isolation of residents from the city centre (Suda 1998: 125; Tateiwa 1995: 180-
181).
63 The negotiations with the institute did not proceed, and starting in September, 1972,
a sit-in strike started in front of the Tokyo Metropolitan building. After one year, ser-
ious negotiation finally started between the protesters and the mayor, and this led to
an agreement in April, 1974. However, problems still remained at the institutes, and
a number of protests were carried out by residents after the agreement was reached.
One example is a campaign by Kinuko Mitsui to refuse bathing, because male staff
bathed women (Mitsui, op. cit.: 19-61). A story about Mitsui’s campaign was also
picked up by a newspaper (The Mainichi Shimbun, 14 July 1974). Public opinion was
varied, and included criticism of the campaign, saying that disabled people should
appreciate the fact that somebody was at least bathing them, or that Mitsui should
see bathing by male workers as normal (Mitsui op. cit. 53-57).
64 Non-disabled people as well as people from other groups, such as Aoi shiba no kai,
joined these strikes, and the idea of life outside the institute, or independent living,
came to be a more broadly shared goal.
65 In addition to the different views on dependence and independence, another crucial
difference is the attitude towards ‘self-determination’. In Japan, there has been hesita-
tion toward the concept because it might eliminate those who ‘cannot self-determine’,
while in the US this concept was generally accepted. There are indeed reports that
the concept of independent living marginalised people with greater disabilities within
the movement in the US. Although there are also commonalities between the two
movements, such as seeking to live outside parents’ home or care institutions, but
live on their own with the help of assistance, if needed, there were thus crucial differ-
ences in their view of some key concepts in the disabled people’s movement (Tateiwa
1999: 90-91).
66 One woman who was a female student at the time recalls that ‘privilege, that helps
people live in this world more easily, is, in fact, oppressing many other people. I can-
not endure the situation. Therefore, first of all, let’s deny myself from enjoying the
privilege, and through fighting for decomposing the system that produces the privi-
lege, let’s look into the self, how it is constructed’ (Oˆta 1996: 78). Another woman re-
calls, ‘the problem that I propose about my life is exactly the problem that the Tokyo
University struggle is proposing – a question, “what is academia?” Another question
is, “what is university?” We, as graduates of Tokyo University, are provided with a
place in the social elite. And then, we are guaranteed a little bit more “cultural” life
than the average person, however, we are made to work to support the existing sys-
tem for our whole lives, being made to keep a distance from the consciousness of la-
bourers. We must not go to university, that produces such human beings’ (ibid: 77).
These statements show that the student movement arose because of the sense of
guilt regarding social privilege, and the sense of reluctance to contribute to the recon-
struction of the existing society. The concept of ‘self-questioning’ appealed to quite a
few students at the time. Another recalls, ‘I was so influenced by the term “Jiko-hitei”
[self-denial] which elite men made up, that I even thought it was criminal to have a
certain position in society due to my academic background. And therefore, I could
not attend the lectures in the university any more’ (Horie 1996: 119).
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67 One woman who was a student at the time recalls that ‘I never doubted that the most
meaningful way of living is to devote myself to revolutionary activities, denying my
way of living as an intellectual’ (Oˆta op. cit.: 78).
68 Protecting luggage was called pike´ from the English word ‘picket’ and street activities
were called gewalt from German, which means ‘violence.’
69 Women were certainly seen as inferior in intellectual work. For example, one phrase
of the movement was, ‘This university has been degraded so much that even ac-
tresses and women can enter.’ This is a quote from a billboard of the student move-
ment in Waseda University (Tokuyama 1996: 87-88). Female students participating
in the student movement at the university certainly felt something was wrong with
the idea of the movement with regard to the relations between men and women.
70 Another citation clearly demonstrates the sexual division of labour as practised in the
movement, as well as how male students evaluated women. ‘What is questioned in
Toˆdai-toˆsoˆ is not simply about political standpoints or political thought, but about the
way of being a human being as a whole. Then, why do I feel that something does
not match here? Something is not apparent from inside of myself – probably the clue
to answer this question is the fact that I am a woman. [...] I think that we have to
construct a movement group to overcome the fundamental split among women, with
a clear perspective and energetic activity. And this should be instead of the total of
“prominent women like men,” or a crowd of women demanding interests within the
existing system, or more rights that men are already enjoying. [...] Washing dishes is
an example of boring work... and it is the end of the story if I am trapped by the
small joy that even washing dishes can provide. Nowadays, women are cooking food
for the male movement students, but why do women do it? [...] Is that a characteristic
of women? I say NO! [...] Consciously or unconsciously, women are trying to show
womanliness by doing so. Oh! How disgusting it is to flatter men! And I am about to
be trapped by it!’ (Oˆta op. cit. 78-79).
71 A specific example:
72 ‘I felt clearly the penetration of the penis. I felt that it was against my will, then a
feeling of insult followed it, and I was hit by the shock that a comrade betrayed me.
Then, I also felt a sense of responsibility that “now that he committed such a big in-
justice, he cannot be active in the movement any more.” In reality, there was no at-
mosphere to make accusations of sex discrimination in the movement... In general,
the male position was always thought to be important, and when a problem hap-
pened, women always blamed themselves. Then, women’s self-evaluation was made
to be very low, and there was huge pressure on women to live with pride or to get an-
gry. Afterwards, I came to know this structure in the Women’s Liberation Movement.
However, at that moment, I thought that I should not betray my comrade to let him
be in the hands of the authorities, but I should protect the organisation. Additionally,
I was so afraid of insults against and stigma of being a raped woman, that I could
not bring the issue to the police station’ (Watanabe 1996: 131-133).
73 There are more stories of this kind, e.g. that men took pictures of body parts of wo-
men after intercourse without their knowledge or consent, and women’s accusations
about these acts was simply ignored by those they had sex with. (Machino 1996:
125).
74 For example, there was a seven-hour meeting on 14 November 1970, entitled ‘Kaihoˆ
no tameno toˆron’ (A discussion for liberation). The meeting brought together young
women and women from the earlier women’s movement. All the discussions were re-
corded in a book Seisabetsu-eno-kokuhatsu (Aki Shoboˆ Henshuˆbu, 1971).
75 This group was established on the initiative of Mitsu Tanaka, Mari Asakawa, and Kar-
ido. Tanaka, with her prominent leadership and skill in debate, played a central role
in constructing arguments in the 1970s women’s movement.
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76 The first appearance of the term, ‘the Women’s Liberation Movement’ in media, was
probably in an article in Asahi Shimbun on 4 October 1970, with the headline, ‘The
Women’s Liberation Movement arrived at men’s paradise’. Indeed, since around the
spring of 1970, women’s activities in the US had appeared in the Japanese media,
and therefore the use of the word ‘arrived’ in the headline. The article was also about
women’s demonstrations, but around this time the Japanese women themselves did
not use ‘the Women’s Liberation Movement’ because it was an English phrase. In-
stead, they used ‘josei-kaihoˆ’, which means ‘women’s liberation’ in Japanese. After 21
October, they started using the term ‘lib’ (Akiyama 1993: 35-36).
77 After the general meeting of the WLM in May 1972, the idea of having the centre
was proposed, with calls for financial donations. When some one million yen in do-
nations was collected, the women rented a flat, which was ten minutes walk from
the Shinjuku train station, and the centre was opened. The centre was named Lib
Shijuku Centre, instead of Lib Tokyo Centre because of the wish that there would be
more Lib Centres around the country, so that Tokyo would not be the central spotlight
for the Women’s Liberation Movement’s activities. At the time it was opened, the cen-
tre was composed of five groups: Group tatakau onna, S. E. X, Tokyo komu-unu, Hi-
monji, and Tatakau josei doˆmei. Seven women from Group tatakau onna and S. E. X.,
started living there together as full-time activists along with four cats. More than 20
women commuted to the office from their residences. The average age of the activists
was 25. Some women had full-time jobs, including beauty advising and working in a
company office, and others without full-time jobs had part-time jobs, including as
models and truck drivers. The centre required 300,000 yen per month to operate,
and this was raised through contributions from each of the woman’s salaries, as well
as monthly donations from other women. Some women connected to the centre
chose to work in the sex industry part time, but there were disagreements amongst
the women in the movement about some of the women engaging in sex work (Mizo-
guchi, Saeki & Miki (eds.) 1992 1: 209).
78 ‘S. E. X.’ was ‘a thought group’ composed of four women. They distributed leaflets
and publications. Akai Rokugatsu or ‘Red June’ was a group composed of relatively
older women with secure jobs. Tokyo komu-unu was a women’s group that tried to
run a collective which was staffed by women with children. The group criticised the
socially accepted belief that if a woman has a child, she is somehow positively af-
firmed and admired, saying having a child is not a supreme mission in life of a wo-
man. They also criticised the attitude of people who tried to protect their own chil-
dren. They believed that such an attitude was based on blood relationships, which is
one of the fundamental factors in maintaining sex discrimination, as it is considered
women’s mission to transmit their husband’s blood to a son to maintain the family
line. Therefore, within the community, they tried to raise and take care of children
communally and not based on blood ties. Tokyo komu-unu also acknowledged that
the environment in which boys are raised is crucial for the future. The name, Komu-
unu: ‘ko’ in Japanese means a child, and ‘umu’ is a verb that stands for ‘give birth.’
So, Komu-unu means the action of giving birth to a child. It also sounds similar to
the word ‘commune.’ Therefore, ‘komu-unu’ was a conjunction of two words. There
were also women’s movement organisations, which did not come from the Women’s
Liberation Movement, but which collaborated together with the original groups in-
volved in the WLM, sharing certain political ideas, such as opposing the attempt to lim-
it women’s access to abortion (Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki 1992: 169-187; 1994: 26-46).
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Chapter 2
1 A bill to revise, abolish, or introduce a law can be submitted both by a minister and a
Diet member. When a bill is submitted by a minister, its draft is made at the related
ministry. Then the bill is submitted to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Naikaku hoˆsei
kyoku) to be examined to determine: (1) whether the bill is consistent and valid in re-
lation to pre-existing laws, (2) whether the purpose of the bill is clear, and (3) whether
there are no mistakes in spelling and vocabulary. Then, the bill is submitted to a Ca-
binet meeting (Kakugi) to be examined in the form of a question and answer session
among ministers. Once its validity is acknowledged by voting at the Cabinet meeting,
the bill is brought into the related committee (Iinkai) in the Diet. With the accord of
the related committee regarding the validity of the bill, it is brought into a plenary
session (Honkaigi) in the Diet, and after being discussed in the Diet plenary session
the bill finally comes to a vote.
In order for a bill to be submitted by a Diet member, the bill has to have the support
of at least more than 20 members in the House of Representatives (480 in total) and
more than 10 in the House of Councillors (242 in total). With sufficient support, the
bill is submitted to the related committee within the Diet, and the rest of the proce-
dure is the same with the bill submitted by a minister. In 1972, the draft was sub-
mitted by a minister, and in 1982, the draft was submitted by a Diet member, Masa-
kuni Murakami, as will be discussed in chapter 4.
2 A positive argument for the introduction of the selective abortion clause is not found
in their documents in the 1960s or 1970s, but they even argued that ‘disabled people
should be admired because their soul is of a higher quality’ (Seichoˆ no ie 1974: 13).
Even so, in arguments at the political level during the 1970s Seichoˆ no ie agreed to
the introduction of the selective abortion clause in order to maintain their alliance
with the Ministry and in order to be successful in their attempt to have the economic
reasons clause deleted (YKKD 1970: 5). In the 1980s, the group actively opposed the
introduction of the selective abortion clause.
3 In the 1970s, the number of women with paid jobs, including part-time jobs, ex-
ceeded that of housewives without jobs. Amongst female paid workers, married wo-
men accounted for more than 50% of women with paid jobs (Akiyama 1993: 191).
4 This association, called Nichibo, was established in 1949, with doctors licensed under
the Eugenic Protection Law. It currently has a 37-member board of directors with
13,000 obstetricians and gynaecologists as members, and 47 prefecture branches. In
May 1994, the organisation’s name was changed from Japan Association for Maternal
Welfare to Japan Association of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (JAOG). For more
information, see http://www.jaog.or.jp/.
5 In YKKD, op. cit. 1969. Nichibo and Seiseiren engaged in a debate about the pros and
cons of the deletion of the economic reasons clause. Seiseiren wanted to get rid of the
economic reasons clause, Nichibo did not. In this debate, it became clear that the
aim of Nichibo was to maintain medical authority to judge whether a woman needed
an abortion or not. The Ministry agreed that doctors should maintain control. Seichoˆ
no ie was against this, as they believed that doctors would never consider a particular
client’s economic conditions. The contrast amongst the parties’ points of view is de-
scribed in Josei-kaihoˆ’ henshuˆbu 1972.
6 To describe the loss of motherhood, the expressions ‘low self-awareness in nurturing
children’ and ‘mental disorder’ are used (YKKD 1970: 2, 7).
7 For instance, ‘if the total fertility rate keeps decreasing in this way, the Japanese na-
tion will become a small minority just like the Ainu tribe, and immigrants from
other Asian countries will flow into Japan to dominate us’ (SCR & SJGTK 1970: 35).
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8 For example, ‘the level of consumption is crucial for the national economy, but smal-
ler populations would discourage the country’s competitiveness’ (SCR & SJGTK
1970: 35), ‘we will have a serious shortage of labourers in the future, [...] and there-
fore, we need to regulate abortion’ (YKKD 1970: 40).
9 In this article, it is postulated that marriage should be based on the free will of a
man and a woman.
10 Seichoˆ no ie criticised the post-war Democratic Constitution emphasizing that mar-
riage based on ‘free choice’ of two individuals is equal to ‘free love’. According to its
religious doctrine, marriage is not the mere consent of two people, but a matching of
their spiritual waves. In this teaching, virginity of (only) women is considered to be a
pillar of the marital relationship.
11 The emperor system was also criticised as a symbol of nationalism. For more details,
see: Group tatakau onna, Himonji, Tatakau josei doˆmei, S. E. X. (eds), 1973, leaflet.
Women in the 1970s critiqued the former women’s movement argument in the end
of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, because the early move-
ment had not raised the issue of sexuality. As a result, the sexuality debate in the
1970s women’s movement is based on their criticism of the former feminist move-
ment. To confront the issue of sexuality was quite revolutionary even in the 1970s.
12 For example, in ‘kaihoˆ no tameno toˆronkai’ (a meeting for liberation), held on 14 No-
vember 1970, women at the meeting defined abortion as ‘women’s basic minimum
right’, Aki-Shoboˆ-Henshuˆ (ed), 1971: 112-114).
13 From an interview with Yokota, a male member from Aoi shiba no kai, 19 July 2001.
14 The argument from the Ministry of Health and Welfare is described in Aoi shiba no
kai, 1973.
15 These points are shared by the Women’s Liberation Movement as well.
16 Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre-iten-soshi-toˆsoˆ-shien-iinkai, Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre-zaishosei-yuˆshi-shien-
group ‘Shien-iinkai-no-bila-ni-danko-kougisuru!’ [A committee to stop transferring the
Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre and a voluntary group of residents in Fuchuˆ-ryoˆiku-centre, We
stubbornly reject the leaflet distributed by the committee]. This handbill is a counterargu-
ment against a leaflet distributed on 30 June 1973.
17 A woman in the movement recalled that criticism of the given social system even ex-
tended to the reluctance to cast a vote in elections, which is not so unusual among
anarchists in the West, either.
18 For example, a description of tension in one meeting of women and disabled people
is in Onna kara onna tachi e, June, July 1973: 5-6.
19 Tanaka 1973. The original leaflet consists of three sheets of B4 size paper. The argu-
ment is handwritten. Reprinted in Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki 1992: 61-64. For English
translation of the whole text, see appendix 5.
20 Murakami, ‘How to Chuˆzetsu’ [How to abort], 1972, cited in Akiyama 1993: 253-259.
21 Yuˆseihogohoˆ kaiaku soshi jikkoˆ iinkai, 1973, reprinted in Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki
1992: 176-178.
22 In the context of this argument, the meaning of the political struggle ‘to oppose the
revision of the Eugenic Protection Law’ was also questioned. Opposing the proposal
to eliminate the economic reasons clause was intended to maintain the law as it was.
The total abolition of the law was proposed in order to make abortion a ‘women’s
rights’ issue too. However, as it was too radical to put on the agenda, women in the
liberation movement at that time agreed that their political target, for the time being,
was to oppose the revision. The proposition is recounted in Tanaka 1973.
23 Murakami, op cit. Yuˆseihogohoˆ kaiaku soshi jikkoˆ iinkai, 1973, reprinted in Mizoguchi,
Saeki & Miki 1992: 176-178.
24 This phrase is also included in a leaflet distributed in 1973, and is often referred to
as representing the abortion debate in the Women’s Liberation Movement, explaining
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what women eventually wanted to express by using the term ‘right’. In other words,
because at that time it was not easy for women to openly use the term ‘right’ in the
women’s liberation movement, they invented this phrase as a substitute for ‘right’.
The argument developed in this leaflet includes the above-mentioned argument as
well. Hence, it requires taking a close look, as this reveals the position of the wo-
men’s movement in the 1970s. The original was written by Yuˆseihogohoˆ kaiaku soshi
jikko iinkai in 1973. The entire argument is available in Mizoguchi, Saeki & Miki
1992: 176-179.
25 Ibid.
26 This is the first question raised by Tanaka to construct her argument, in Tanaka
1973.
27 Chuˆpiren clearly mentioned that contraceptive pills are the easiest method, that side
effects are unavoidable in almost every method, and that the side effects of contracep-
tive pills are less than the pain of having an abortion, while the women in the WLM
were reluctant to weigh the side effects of contraceptive pills against the pain of hav-
ing an abortion. In the WLM, the contraceptive pill was not very welcome. Firstly,
this was because of its side effects and the position that it was unfair that only wo-
men had to deal with the risk of side effects. Some of the women in the movement
experimented with taking contraceptive pills for a while, and reported on the effects.
Secondly, they did not think that contraceptive pills solved the problem between men
and women. Women might take contraceptive pills in order to prevent pregnancy,
but it did not solve the problem of men taking less responsibility for birth control.
Thus, the WLM took the position that, ‘the pill is one method, but it is not the best’.
In this situation, Enoki distributed a brochure about the promotion of the pill in the
name of the Women’s Liberation Movement, but without any prior discussion.
28 In describing the incident involving Enoki’s distribution of brochures, Akiyama re-
calls that ‘although women in the WLM sometimes took extreme actions which sur-
prised the mass media, the women were responsible and honest within the group.
Women in the WLM could not accept the attitude of Enoki because she broke the sin-
cere bond amongst women, not really because of the political standpoint of the view
itself’ (Akiyama 1993: 135-136). Another anonymous woman interviewed, who was
also in the 1970s movement, recalls that ‘there was a trust amongst the women in
the WLM to discuss disagreement or doubts, so the difference of opinion could not
be a reason for splitting the unity.’
Enoki’s actions collided with the ideal of a leaderless movement, which was an im-
portant element of the organisational ideology of the new feminism of the late 1960s
and 1970s. This ideology was found not only in Japan, but also in the WLM of many
other countries. For instance, ‘no stars!’ was the slogan of the women’s movement at
that time in the Netherlands.
Chapter 3
1 The Magna Carta was submitted to Parliament in order to stop King John’s abuse of
power, as well as to impose a more ordered form of political management, in order
to protect the rights of aristocrats. The Magna Carta is important as it was the first
written document with a list of rights as the basis of constitutionalism.
2 But rights indicated in the Magna Carta were limited to a handful of citizens accord-
ing to their social class, and the Magna Carta was not a systematised theorisation of
rights in itself. The nature/rights of men in this period were discussed within the
realm of theology (Hamabayashi 1999: 32-33).
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3 In Europe before the 17th century, it was the Christian church which articulated and
defined the essence of men. The Catholic Church subordinated men’s natural law un-
der God, and Christian natural law was developed, different from Ancient natural
law discussed by Cicero or Seneca during the Roman period. According to this sys-
tem of thought, there was a law of God as the supreme principle that rules the entire
universe; what relates to men was called natural law. In fact, the concept of rights be-
fore the 17th century was formulated in a Christian context, i.e., freedom to practice
one’s belief in the area of another Christian school. The Dutch war against Spain, in
1568, led by Willem of Orange, was one example of struggles for individual religious
freedom. The war ended with a Dutch victory (Hamabayashi 1999: 32-33).
4 Since this period also saw a number of discoveries in the field of natural sciences, by
Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), and Newton (1642-1727), the new natural
philosophy was beginning to render the naturalistic foundations of the former world
view untenable. Hobbes, who had personal contact with Galileo, applied a mechanis-
tic way of viewing phenomena to analyse politics. Hobbes’s thoughts on the nature
of men and the social contract, for example, were based on natural science, in which
he applied methods of analysis from geometry. He also applied theories of the mo-
tion of bodies to establish a general principle of psychology, which he called the
ethics of men (Edwards: 40-41).
5 Yet it also has to be mentioned that difficulties remained (as they did in the general
philosophy of the age) over how to interpret ‘reason’; an explicit definition was not
found. Reason was sometimes equated with intuition, sometimes with the cool obser-
vation of nature, and sometimes with the decisions of the law of non-contradiction
(Edwards 1967 vol. 5, 6: 452).
6 For a detailed discussion of conditions in nature and the competition of individuals,
see Wolin, vol. 4, chapter 9, 1975.
7 From Locke’s Second Treatise. For a detailed analysis of Locke’s notion of the relation
between nature and men, see W. von Leyden (1954) (ed) Essays on the law of nature,
Clarendon Press, Oxford; Lord King, Essays on the law of nature, vol. 1: 162; and J. W.
Lenz, Philosophy and phenomenological research (1955-1956) vol. 16: 105-114.
8 For example, in the Declaration of Independence (1776):
9 ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’ And in the Declaration of the Rights of Man
(1789):
10 ‘1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights; social distinctions may be
based only upon general usefulness.
11 2. The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and inalien-
able rights of man; these rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to op-
pression.’
12 To say interdependence necessarily presupposes dependence and inequality, Rous-
seau says: ‘From the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of an-
other… equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable,
and vast forests became smiling fields, in which man had to water with the sweat of
his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon to germinate and grow up with
the crops’ (quoted in Wolin 1960: 370, 496).
13 Some historians argue that the US war of independence should not be categorised as
a civil revolution because the resistance against Great Britain was intended to protect
colonialists’ privileges in the new land (Kinoshita, Kimura and Yoshida 2000: 321).
But because the declaration proclaims the concepts of natural rights against the mon-
archy and class system, I refer to this war of independence as a civil revolution. The
works of Thomas Paine, for example, such as Common Sense, and Men’s Right, were
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used as theories for the US independence movement and are based on natural
rights.
14 In 1619, 20 African slaves were transferred to Virginia to work in the cultivation of
tobacco. Three hundred more were taken during the next 40 years, but by the 18th
century, more than 60,000 slaves were taken to the northern part of the US every 10
years. Some Americans opposed the slave trade, but they were often suppressed by
those who benefited from the trade (Kinoshita, Kimura and Yoshida 2000: 317).
15 In the Glorious Revolution, King James II (ruling between 1685-88) was sent back to
France by the unanimous agreement of Parliament because of his abuse of power,
and Mary II and William III from the Netherlands were welcomed as sovereigns.
The new king accepted ‘A Bill of Rights’ proposed by Parliament, and a form of con-
stitutionalism, based on the concept of a contract, was achieved.
16 According to the ‘Bill of Rights,’ the king cannot remove or introduce laws, cannot
expend the budget, use the military, or prevent Parliament members from being
elected, without the permission of the Parliament.
17 For more details about utilitarianism, see Edwards, vol. 7, 8, 1967: 206-212.
18 Arguments by Smith and Malthus also show this characteristic (Wolin 1960: 317).
19 Arnold’s lines are also appropriate here: ‘Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood… Nat-
ure and man can never be fast friends’ (quoted in Wolin 1960: 486).
20 For more details about natural rights of men and women in Hobbes’s state of nature,
see Pateman 1988: 44-45.
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Scientia
Verlag Aalen, 1966, ch. 15: 87.
22 Rousseau, Emile, tr. A Bloom, New York, Basic Books 1979: 370, 404, cited by Pate-
man 1988: 54.
23 McWilliams, Idea of fraternity: 12-13, cited by Pateman 1988: 80. Pateman continues;
‘fraternity and politics are intimately connected. Political life, exemplified in the an-
cient polis, presupposes ‘an idea of justice’, or a law common to all, which transcends
blood ties and applies alike to men of different kinship groups’ (ibid).
24 Pateman also relates that in the polis, only Athens-born males could be citizens of
Athens (ibid). This means that the question of ‘who becomes equal and liberal to
each other’ depended on who qualified to be brothers. As will be argued, practices
and theories of ‘rights’ have been about how to define who is entitled to exercise
rights, where there are always those who are excluded from the scope of rights.
25 With the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 the meaning of ‘rights’ was
further developed. The declaration was motivated by a determination not to repeat
the tragedy of genocide and war, which are often based on national, ethnic, cultural,
and racial difference. Here, the concept of ‘rights’ was intended to be applied to
everybody, and included not only freedom from interference of various kinds but also
positive benefits such as education, a decent standard of living, and health care.
There were a number of groups that were not mentioned in 1948, such as homosex-
uals and disabled people. Gradually, a number of these social groups came to be in-
cluded within the concept of ‘human rights’, following lobbying from social political
movements, such as the patients’ rights movement in the 1960s. With the concept of
human rights, a person with rights has no reason to be grateful to benefactors; they
are inherent in the person. Human rights are canons by which social, economic, and
political arrangements can be criticised and are politically significant as grounds of
protest and justification for reforming policies (Edwards, 1967: vol. 7, 8, 198-199).
26 The Meiji Restoration, also known as the Meiji Ishin, Meiji Revolution, or Renewal,
describes a chain of events that led to a change in Japan’s political and social struc-
ture; it occurred from 1866-1869, a period that transverses both the late Edo (often
called late Tokugawa shogunate) and beginning of the Meiji Era.
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27 1 On liberty by Mill was published with the title of Jiyuˆ-no-kotowari in 1875, and Du
contrat social by Rousseau was published with the title of Minyaku-yakkai in 1882,
translated by Choˆmin Nakae. There were other translations such as Smile’s Self-help,
published as Jijo-ron, in 1871. Hobbes and Locke were not published in Japanese dur-
ing this period, but were translated in later periods.
28 A tradition of Chinese origin said to have been known in Japan since the 5th century
A.D. Confucianism has religious aspects, but is mainly a philosophical, ethical, and
political teaching. Confucianism owes its basic orientation largely to Kong Qiu
(K’ung Ch’iu), a teacher and philosopher of the Zhou (Chou) dynasty (1027-256 B.
C.). In Japan Confucianism has exercised a formative influence in the areas of educa-
tion and ethical and political thought and conduct especially. It assumed particular
importance during the 6th to 9th centuries and during the Edo (1600-1868), Meiji
(1868-1912), Taishoˆ (1912-26), and early Shoˆwa (1926-ca1945) periods (Koˆdan-
sha1983,1: 352).
29 A general name in Japan for the so-called Neo-Confucianism that developed in Song
(Sung) dynasty (960-1279) China. This, the most fully developed philosophical sys-
tem of premodern China, was established by Zhu Xi (1130-1200), also known by the
honorific appellation Zhuzi or Chu-tzu (Shushi in Japanese, hence Shushi-gaku).
Whereas the already established exegetical studies of the Han (202 B.C.–A.D. 220)
and Tang (T’ang; 618-907) dynasties were concerned with practical ethics (i.e., proper
forms of conduct, especially in terms of social and familial relationships) and based
this concern on the ethically oriented ‘Five Classics’ of Confucianism, the Zhu Xi
School was, in addition, concerned with abstract metaphysical principles. It devel-
oped an interpretation of nature and society based on the more philosophically or-
iented ‘Four Books’ of the Confucian tradition and, influenced by Buddhist and Tao-
ist ideas, formed a philosophy integrating the metaphysical and the physical. It influ-
enced not only China but also Japan, Korea, and Annam (now Vietnam) from the
12th to the 19th centuries (Koˆdansha, Encyclopaedia of Japan 1983, 7: 190).
30 This overview is based on Hamabayashi 1999: 139-173. The ideas of the following
philosophers are mainstream in the sense that they appear in Japanese history books
authorised by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, to
be used at high schools. Sokoˆ Yamaga (1622-85) a military statistician, criticised the
feudal system where a ruler enjoys excessive power over his subjects. Based on the
teachings of Confucius and Moˆshi, he argued that at the very beginning of human
history there was no inequality or class system, but in the course of time those who
had talents to govern the land were entitled to rule the land, and the ruled performed
activities according to the division of labour. This is the fundamental function of a
state (ibid: 146). The relationship between the ruler and the ruled ought to be based
on yakusoku, or a promise and appreciation, because ‘the ruled can earn, so that he
can nurture his family, parents, and give support even to his friends’ (ibid 145). And
‘the ruler also ought to appreciate his subjects, because it is due to them that the ru-
ler can exist.’ Yakusoku can be likened to Western social contract theory, but Yakusoku
is based more on faithfulness, sincerity, and trustworthiness than on the mechanical
idea of a contract. Appreciation is also an invisible form of emotional feeling. Thus,
unlike Western ideas about rights and the power of the state, it draws attention to
the effect that political philosophy, before rights, was based on trust in the innate
ethics and morality of human beings.
31 Jinsai Itoˆ (1627-1705) and Sorai Ogyuˆ (1666-1728), both political philosophers, based
the core of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled on Jin or thoughtfulness
to others, one of the ethical concepts in ancient Chinese political thought. Itoˆ argued
that Jin is, in the end, Ai, or love. He argued that the five basic political ethics of jin,
gi, rei, chi, and shin (thoughtfulness, rightness, respect, wisdom, and trust) become
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genuine when they are based on Ai. Ai consists of four categories: the spirits of sym-
pathy, self-reflection, giving to others, and good judgement (ibid: 148-150).
32 Ogyuˆ argues that Ai is one aspect of Jin, and a more comprehensive concept of jin is
explained as ‘the principle of the morality of the ruler to make an effort to let the
people in the land live in peace and ease.’ Morality is required not only from the ru-
ler, but from all the people, in the form of taking care: of parents, giving them ease
(Koˆ), of brothers and sisters (Tei), of the ruler (chuˆ), and of friends (shin). These prin-
ciples, according to him, have their roots ‘in the path which the saints paved’ (Ibid:
151-152). Amongst historians, it is understood that his philosophies considered moral-
ity and ethics in history, based on his statement that ‘rulers need to train themselves,
[...] and there is no use in doing so if the ruler does not know how to rule the land so
that people can live in ease and peace. [...] No matter what, the ruler ought to stick to
agricultural principles in ease and peace’ (ibid: 152-153).
33 In the 18th century, criticism of the feudal system became strong. Shoˆeki Ando even
went so far as to say that a country owes its existence to the farmers’ hard work, and
the farmers are the centre of a country. It is understood that he intended to say that
the hardest working people should get the most appreciation, and the ruling system
where a handful of people exploit others, should get the rest. His view has, according
to Hamabayashi, some commonality with communist thought, as he insists that the
land property system should be abolished. He also argued that the rulers are not ne-
cessary if each individual in society eliminates evil morality. According to him, crim-
inal acts are often a result of the class system and of inequality in social opportu-
nities, hence, he idealised the state of nature before the emergence of the state. On
this point, today’s thinkers liken his ideas to those of Rousseau.
34 Koˆkan Shiba (1747-1818) argues that, ‘all the people, from Shoˆgun, craft makers,
farmers, merchants, and beggars, are equal and are human-beings.’ People should be
equal in that ‘everybody ought to suffer equally for their living, instead of one having
an easier life at the cost of others.’ Based on this egalitarian thought, he criticises the
rank system in both the feudal system and the emperor system. The social rank sys-
tem was criticised, because, ‘with this system, if one is born with a certain talent in a
non-warrior family, the person cannot make use of the talent for the good governance
of the land.’
35 For example, instead of contractual theory, yakusoku, or ‘promise,’ was emphasised in
order to maintain good governance. The concept of civil law in the West is also based
on trust, but yakusoku is based more on invisible emotional factors, such as honesty
and expectation that the other will not betray, than upon a visible and more mechani-
cal contract. Nakane, a social anthropologist who majored in Eastern history at Tokyo
University, concludes that Japanese society is more based on emotional ties, such as
faithfulness and sincerity, than the Western style of contracts (Nakane 1967: 37, 54).
According to her, this emotional principle is observable amongst members of groups,
and between group leaders and regular members. The leaders are supposed to pro-
vide protection to the members and the members are supposed to be faithful to the
leaders (ibid: 139). Her work is also available in English and French: Nakane Chie,
Kinship and economic organisation in rural Japan, London, Athlone Press, 1967; Japa-
nese society, Penguin Books, London, 1973; La socie´te´ Japonaise, Paris, Armand Colin,
1974 (translated by L. Ratier).
36 The term ‘civilisation’ came into general use in Europe toward the end of the 18th
century, being preceded by ‘civility’, and it expressed ‘a particular stage of European
history, sometimes the final or ultimate stage.’ The idea of civilisation ‘celebrated the
associated sense of modernity: an achieved condition of refinement and order.’ In
short, ‘civilisation’ refers to a historically and culturally specific form of social life,
and the concept is closely bound up with the emergence of the idea of ‘civil society’,
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the society created through the original contract in Western political theory (Pateman
op. cit.: 25).
37 He was born into an academic family and was absorbed in studies from childhood.
In his early days, he studied Chinese philosophers and political theories, but with the
opening up of Japan in the late 1850s, he switched to Rangaku or European studies,
which were mainly texts from the Netherlands in the Dutch language because of the
trade relationship between Japan and the Netherlands at the time. He studied the
Dutch language but later found that Dutch was not an international language any
more and so he oriented himself to Anglo-American studies, learning the English
language. In his early days, he worked for the government, and from 1867 on he de-
voted himself to scholarly work and education. Keioˆgijuku, which he established in
1858, is now Keioˆ University. True to his background, his analysis and theories were
often from the point of view of those in power. But, for his time, his theories were
progressive, and his method of analysis is worth paying attention to because of its
comprehensiveness.
38 A group composed of 10 intellectuals called meirokusha, established in 1874, is an ex-
ample of a group that raised public awareness of modernising the nation state of the
day. Fukuzawa was a member of the group.
39 For example, in Fukuzawa’s political philosophy, the quality and morality of the ru-
lers were also emphasised, i.e., Toku (the ability of a person with character to follow
justice) like Confucius, and knowledge discovered by a strict method, like that of
Newton.
40 However, current women’s research in Japan categorises their movement as ‘being
confined to the liberalist political struggle’ because their demand was for more politi-
cal participation, equal to what men had, within the given male-centred system (Kanoˆ
1990: 62-64).
41 Under the 1925 law, all men over 25 had the right to vote, and all men over 30 had
the right to be elected.
42 See, for example, ‘Josei-undoˆ-shi – Meiji-kara-women-lib-made’ (The history of women’s
movement: From the Meiji to the WLM) written by Metropalichen, one group of wo-
men in the WLM. Also reprinted in Mizoguchi, Saeki and Miki (1992, 1: 152-154).
43 See for example, Thomas Paine. His ideas are marked by the concept of ‘voluntary
interdependence’ (The Rights of Man, Chapter 1).
44 Cogito, ergo sum" (Latin: "I think, therefore I am"), sometimes misquoted as Dubito,
ergo cogito, ergo sum (Latin: "I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am"), is a philoso-
phical statement used by Rene´ Descartes, which became a foundational element of
Western philosophy. The simple meaning of the phrase is that if someone is wonder-
ing whether or not he exists, that is in and of itself proof that he does exist. Descar-
tes’s original statement was "Je pense donc je suis," from his Discourse on Method
(1637). He uses the Latin "Cogito ergo sum" in the later Principles of Philosophy
(1644), Part 1, article 7: "Ac proinde hæc cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium
prima & certissima, quæ cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat.", by which time it
had become popularly known as ’the "Cogito Ergo Sum" argument’ (http://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum, downloaded on 26 August 2008).
45 Hasegawa, 2001: cover.
46 For more explanations about differences in political philosophy in the West and in Ja-
pan in terms of the relationship between nature and people, see Aida 1966; Hasega-
wa 2001: 171-17; Nishio 1977; Maruyama 1996; 1998.
47 To provide better insight, the way in which the practitioner of rights and social citi-
zens are conceptualised philosophically, is explained here. The Japanese and Chinese
character which corresponds to ‘an individual’ is ningen or hito, which means the in-
dividual practitioner of a political instrument. Linguistically, ningen consists of two
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Chinese characters, nin/hito and gen. Nin and hito are the same Chinese character.
According to one dictionary, this character means, ‘an animal with high intellect with
a command of language’, ‘human beings, or each individual human being’, and gen
means ‘among, together with’ (Nishio et al. 1995: 3; 228; 350; 892; 985). Therefore,
in the Japanese language, ningen means ‘a being coexisting with others’ and ‘a person
is significant only when in relationships with others’. So, ningen implies that a per-
son does not exist when he/she is alone. The shape of the Chinese character of nin/
hito consists of two strokes, showing a picture that one is supported and is support-
ing the other. Hence, it shows that the concept of human beings is understood to be
mutual support and coexistence with the other, and cannot be seen apart from each
other.
48 For example, a man in his 40s, with a physical disability, discusses the issue of priv-
acy, family, and residential institutes as follows: ‘In my 30s and 40s, I was terribly
afraid and lonely, thinking that I would not be able to experience sex in my life. [...]
However, since I became acquainted with a person who brings me to a soap land
(sex brothel), I came to be able to experience what it is like. For people with disabil-
ities, being cared for by parents or workers in the institutes, there is no freedom to
see pornography or to masturbate. If one falls in love with somebody, first of all, it is
very difficult to be alone with the person because there are always other people, such
as family members or working staff, who are close by. If one can be alone with the
person with whom one is in love, because of a heavy inferiority complex, it is almost
impossible to express the feeling sexually. [...] For me, the experience in soap land is
just like medical nursing. I noticed that people with a disability are living close to
“sex,” through everyday nursing or rehabilitation, however, due to a thick wall of so-
cial norms, we are prevented from thinking about, or of actually experiencing, sex. If
a person with a disability writes a beautiful poem or draws beautiful pictures, they
are admired. However, society in general does not even think that people with dis-
abilities also have sexual desires. This is especially so in the case of women with dis-
abilities. If women with disabilities are struggling to survive in a society, they are ad-
mired as a “clean, innocent, and beautiful example.” We, people with disabilities,
have to fight against these constructed ideas’ (Asai 1997: 226-228). His story points
to not only the problematic life led by people with disabilities, either in residential in-
stitutes or at home with family, but also ideas about sexuality, and ideal images that
are imposed on disabled people, as well as gender issues.
49 Kurenai-kan, ‘Aoi-shiba-no-renchuˆ-ga-kurenai-kan-ni-yattekita (Guys from Aoi-shiba
visited us in Kurenai-kan),’ in Majo (Witches), no. 4, December 1973. Reprinted in
Mizoguchi, Saeki and Miki 1992: 129. Kurenai-kan is a women’s group located in
Kyuˆshuˆ, which fought against the attempt to outlaw abortion, as part of the WLM in
the beginning of the 1970s.
50 Yokotsuka, a man with CP in Aoi shiba no kai, published a book with this title (Yokot-
suka, 1975).
51 The term oku generally means ‘innermost space’. In the 14th century, the household
system emerged in Japan, replacing the clan system, where a man became a boss of
the household family, and women’s rights to inheritance were taken away. Prior to
that time, a husband and wife did not live together, but only visited each other at
night. The 14th century, with the emerging patriarchal household system, was the be-
ginning of women’s subordination in Japan. During this period, among the socially
higher class, there emerged a habit of locking women inside a room so that they
could not see men other than their husbands; this space was called oku, because it
was located deep inside the house. This was so that husbands could monopolise ‘wo-
men’s sexual organs,’ according to Takamune. The term oku-san for ‘wife’ originated
in this usage. In China, the space was called kei, in India, purdah. Oku is hence the
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same concept as hiding the figure of women, using obscuring clothing, or hiding a
women’s face with a veil. The habit of calling male household heads shujin (master)
also emerged around the 14th century, when the household system took over from
the clan system (ibid).
52 Shuˆdan kunoichi ‘CP sha tono deai’ (Group kunoichi, ‘An encounter with people
with CP’), June 1972. Reprinted in Mizoguchi, Saeki and Miki 1992: 149-150. Shuˆ-
dan kunoichi was a students’ group at the University of Chiba, and was part of the
WLM.
53 Its activities range widely, from supporting women going through divorces to challen-
ging the mass media for sexually discriminatory language in TV commercials. For a
detailed introduction to their activities, see Koˆdoˆ suru kai kirokushuˆ henshuˆiinkai:
1999.
Chapter 4
1 The 1978 proposal intended to leave out ‘the article to protect motherhood’ that de-
crees ‘women are not to work at midnight’ and ‘women can have menstruation
leave.’ This was in the name of ‘achieving equality between men and women’ by giv-
ing men and women the same working conditions. Yet women in the women’s lib-
eration movement analysed it as an attempt to confine women to the realm of the
household, because it was not advantageous for women to lose the article about men-
struation leave, and it would not be possible for women to work after midnight given
the fact that women were responsible for household affairs. The draft went so far as
to even propose cutting off social security for single mothers. The reason given by
the cabinet was that single fathers did not receive special social security benefits. For
details, see Koˆdoˆ suru kai kirokushuˆ henshuˆ iinkai 1999: 184-187.
On these attempts by policymakers, there were debates about ‘equality and differ-
ence’ amongst women in the movement. According to the policymakers, the draft
policy was necessary to consolidate the ‘home base’. Policymakers argued, as the
home is the most basic unit of society and one of the fundamental institutions that
compose the state, it is necessary to clarify the division of roles of the state and local
governments, and of the workplace and home, respectively. It was then underlined
by the administration that the home should take up more responsibilities, such as
caring for elderly people and nurturing children (ibid: 220-221).
The content of the main policies proposed was as follows: (1) Culture, education:
Consolidate the educational curriculum on home education in primary, junior high,
and high schools. Support research on family issues. Set up a national holiday
named ‘a day for the family’. (2) Family environment: promote ownership of homes
instead of renting. Build up more parks for play. (3) Welfare: Improve pension sys-
tems for widows, and set up special pensions for people nursing elderly people. Es-
tablish the Japanese management of welfare, taking advantage of Japan’s characteris-
tics, such as high rate of saving, high rate of cohabitation with elderly parents, high
rate of health insurance coverage, etc. (4) Improve the maternity leave system and
improve nursery schools (ibid).
2 After the Second World War, the fertility rate has been decreasing, but the rate of de-
crease in the 1980s was markedly faster than in other decades. This is mainly be-
cause an increasing number of women started postponing marriage in order to con-
tinue their careers. Already in 1974, women were 40 percent of all paid workers, in-
cluding part-time jobs. At the same time, in the mid-1970s, the number of women
with paid jobs exceeded that of women without paid jobs for the first time.
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3 During the 1970s, Masakuni Murakami was a secretary to Kazuo Tamaki, an anti-
abortion Diet member from the LDP, who was supported by Seichoˆ no ie. In the
1980s, Tamaki resigned as a Diet member, and Murakami took over his role to voice
Seichoˆ no ie’s anti-abortion point of view.
4 Text by Masami Ogura, cited in Murakami: 4-6. The title of this text, ‘The 212 Article
in the Criminal Code’, is the name of the article outlawing abortion. Author’s transla-
tion.
5 Statements by Murakami, in the House of Councillors, The minutes from the budget
committee in the House of Councillors, 15 March 1982, 1982: 4.
6 This statement was made during a televised debate on abortion.
7 In addition to Sono, Katsuta, for example, a professor at Kyoˆto University, was active
in constructing the anti-abortion argument. He stated, ‘Oh, how is it possible? Wo-
men’s right to abortion is exactly equivalent to saying “to kill or not to kill a foetus is
women’s right.” What an abnormal era, that women’s right to murder is pronounced
so loudly. Women are killing foetuses as if they are pimples’ (Katsuta, in Seiseiren
1983: 16). A statement by Kinko Satoˆ, a female lawyer, also made this point, saying,
‘Women in the women’s rights movement appeal for the right to abortion, pretend-
ing as if women have no other choices than an abortion to deal with an unwanted
pregnancy. By doing so, women are shifting their responsibility to others by blaming
their surroundings. Women are trapped by short-sighted interests without consider-
ing what is more important than themselves, that is, the foetus. The characteristics
of the opposition to the revision of the law (protecting foetus’ lives) are “egoism” and
“shifting responsibility”’ (Seiseiren 1983: 18-20).
8 According to statistics, the abortion rate is the highest among women aged 30 to 34,
the second highest among women aged 25 to 29, and the third is among women
aged 35 and 39 (Taniai 1983a: 155).
9 However, Seichoˆ no ie takes the standpoint that ‘if a woman became pregnant by sex-
ual intercourse before marriage, which itself is always referred to as a mistake, then
she ought to give birth rather than aborting it. Because, for example, giving birth to a
baby might push for the woman and the father of the child to get married’ (Tanigu-
chi, in Seigakuren-chuˆoˆ-riron-kyoku and Seigakuren-joshi-gakusei-taisaku-kyoku 1970:
60-65).
10 For example, Katsuta states, ‘given the fact that men make women pregnant, men
should also seriously think about contraceptive methods. ...Yet because abortion is le-
gal, men do not take the issue seriously’ (quoted in Seiseiren 1983: 18). Sato, a fe-
male lawyer states, ‘because of easy access to abortion, men avoid careful use of con-
traceptives. [...] I have to conclude that the enemies of women are women in the
movement’ (Satoˆ, in Seiseiren 1983: 19-20).
11 He cites a statistic that more than 90 percent feel ‘negative’ about the experience of
abortion, either feeling that abortion is not a good thing to do, or feeling sorry for
the foetus, and therefore abortion should be prohibited.
12 Seiseiren news, a statement from Soˆichi Moriyama, a male judge in a family court,
also cited in Murakami 1982: 21-22.
13 An anti-abortion activist published a book entitled Taiji-wa-ningen-dewa-nanoka—yuˆ-
seihogohoˆ-no-gimonten [Is a foetus not a human being? Questions about the Eugenic
Protection Law], Nihon-kyoˆbunsha (ed.) 1983, Tokyo. The book consists of experi-
ences related by popular actors and actresses as well as well-known intellectuals.
Many of the stories are about how wonderful it is to have children as a result of fa-
mily planning. Mother Teresa also contributed an article to this book.
14 On the back of the front page are her words. She says, ‘a termination of pregnancy is
destroying world peace. It is the greatest enemy to peace. If a mother dares to kill
her own child, how can we stop people killing each other? Japan is a rich country,
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and there is nobody begging for a piece of bread for survival. But if termination of
pregnancy is permitted, I must say that Japan is poor in heart, starving for love’
(Mother Teresa, in Murakami 1982: 2; Mother Teresa 1983: 92-93).
15 The former Prime Minister Fukuda, cited by Murakami op. cit: 2.
16 Taniai introduces some stories from her visits to school festivals. When she asked
one female student if she, being a single mother, would give birth, the student an-
swered her, saying, ‘I would never do such a promiscuous act!’ ‘Promiscuous act’
here means having sexual intercourse. It shows high school students’ view that to be
a good student means not to have sexual intercourse. Taniai also notes that all the
high school students at the anti-abortion exhibition argued the same position; wo-
men struggle in reproductive decision-making. However, if abortion is outlawed, they
do not have to suffer because they have to give birth. Therefore, outlawing abortion
is for the benefit of women. For high school students’ anti-abortion activities, see Ta-
niai 1983c: 199-202.
17 Here is the view and purpose of Soshiren’s establishment, in it’s the group’s own
words:
‘From the standpoint of women, the conditions for legal abortion in the current Eu-
genic Protection Law are not a guarantee for women’s right to self-determination.
Since abortion was criminalised at the beginning of the Meiji era, pregnancy and giv-
ing birth have been controlled by the state, beyond our will. The conditions for legal
abortion were in order to settle the chaos after the war, leaving the abortion articles
in the Criminal Code intact – under these two laws, at one time women were made
to give birth, while at other times they were made to have an abortion. Moreover, the
Eugenic Protection Law is based on the National Eugenic Law, modelled on the Steri-
lisation Law under Nazism, and its purpose is ‘to eradicate inferior genes’, and to
produce people who are needed by the state. Here, to delete one of the conditions
from the Eugenic Protection Law means, (1) to deny the existence of ‘people with dis-
ability’ in order to strengthen eugenic thought, (2) to make it more difficult for wo-
men to choose the timing to give birth, (3) to restrict women’s right to self-determina-
tion by the state.
The attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law is in the context of the attempt to
revise the constitution, in order to support rearmament. Therefore, the state’s con-
trolling pregnancy and giving birth is nothing but the process of strengthening the
new family system to support militarism. Thus the following points have been con-
firmed as being shared in common in our liaison committee. 1. To prevent the at-
tempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law, and 2. To delete the abortion articles
from the Criminal Code and to repeal the Eugenic Protection Law’ (Koˆdoˆ suru onna-
tachi no kai kirokushuˆ henshuˆ iinkai 1999: 178-179).
18 Women pointed out that the anti-abortionists’ argument is based on bias about sexu-
ality. Anti-abortionists’ ideas about sexuality of both male and female are closely con-
nected to their ways of conceptualising marriage, household, and the image of the
ideal life of both men and women. As the attempt to introduce a number of policies
and laws during the late 1970s shows, anti-abortionists had the idea of maintaining
economic growth by consolidating the household system. Outlawing abortion, accord-
ing to them, would tie women to the traditional sexual division of labour (Yuˆseihogo-
hoˆkaiaku = kenpoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai 1982: 16-21; Miyako op. cit.: 126-
154).
19 For example, a woman writer, Seiko Tanabe, notes,
‘Men’s promotion of limiting women’s access to abortion is just as easy as grown-ups’
attitudes toward children. They regard women as children. But we, women, are actu-
ally grown-ups, and we cannot take this seriously. Moreover, our sexuality is not to be
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controlled by men’ (Seiko Tanabe, The Asahi Shimbun, 11, July, 1982, cited in Yuˆseiho-
gohoˆkaiaku = kenpoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai op. cit.: 5).
20 In asserting this point, women in the reproductive health movement often cited
statements by Murakami expressing worry about society’s greying and the decline of
national economic power, saying that ‘anti-abortionists’ concern is not actually about
one’s life, but a life used with a holistic view for the purpose of the state’s interest.’
Women were consistent in their reading of the meaning of the attempt, that it aimed
at controlling women in order to achieve the dreams of nationalists, and seeing ‘re-
spect for life’ as a rhetoric intended to cause a sense of guilt amongst women who
have had the experience of abortion (Yuˆseihogohoˆkaiaku = kenpoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-
onna-no-kai 1982: 11).
There were/are also anti-abortion activists in Japan who base their arguments on
Catholic teachings, for example, who are ‘pro-life’ without being nationalists. But
they were/are not politically strong. The strongest anti-abortion movement after the
Second World War was the alliance of Seichoˆ no ie and the LDP, who employed na-
tionalist rhetoric in their arguments. Movements of women and disabled people cam-
paigned against this alliance.
21 Yuˆseihogohoˆkaiaku = kenpoˆ-kaiaku-to-tatakau-onna-no-kai, Yuseihogohoˆ-t-otatakau-ta-
meni 1982. ‘A human woman, being treated in this way, would not be silent. I want
to push away this hand operating me from behind, and become a live woman’ – This
phrase appears on the front page of a booklet entitled Yuseihogohoˆ kaiaku to tatakau
tameni [In order to fight against the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law], pub-
lished by Soshiren. This 48-page booklet contains an explanation and analysis of the
situation, a historical background, as well as guidelines about how to organise a pro-
test that could even be done by one person without any experience. More than
20,000 copies of the booklet were sold, and this helped the organisation to campaign
around the country. This phrase is cited because it clearly shows the claim made by
women in the movement. The hand operating the puppet girl is men’s, or the state’s.
22 Soshiren Kinkyuˆ news (1) 1983: 5. When they held a symposium on 23 January, some
110 students gathered.
23 Both figures are from Soshiren Kinkyuˆ news 1983 (6): 3.
24 Taniai explains that if she talked with a housewife for more than 30 minutes, they
would start talking about their experience of abortion, and about how difficult it was.
She explains that, by building up a dialogue with housewives these women also
agreed with the position of the women’s reproductive health movement (Taniai
1983a: 172-173).
25 For example, an article about the attempt to outlaw abortion that appeared in The
Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s major daily newspapers, was headlined ‘violation of
human rights’ (29 January 1983).
It should also be noted that when the term ‘reproductive rights’ appeared in the Eng-
lish language, women in the Women’s Liberation Movement in Japan did not employ
it immediately. Rather, they used ‘self-determination’, for which there was already a
Japanese term. The task of translating ‘reproductive rights’ into Japanese, both lin-
guistically and conceptually, was to be done in a later period, between 1984 and
1995. See Soshiren News No. 1 and No. 4 1984, for the minutes of discussions about
translating and conceptualising ‘reproductive rights’.
26 It should be noted, however, that Japanese women in these conferences were also at-
tacked by women from the ‘Third World’ about the Japanese government’s develop-
mental aid policies. For many of the women in the Third World, the problem is that
they are not able to decide for themselves about reproduction. The situation in some
other countries might be far away from claiming for rights to decide, and Japanese
Official Development Aid (ODA) might be sometimes even hindrance for women in
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the ‘Third World’, as ODA policies initially focused on population quantity control
rather than women’s reproductive health rights. Although it was, and still is, difficult
for non-disabled Japanese women to build real trust with disabled women in Japan
and with women in the Third World, Japanese women in reproductive movements
believe that ‘self-determination’ is a crucial term that provides an opportunity to unite
women from various backgrounds. For reports from women who participated in the
conferences, see Soshiren news, from No. 2 to 9, 1984.
27 For the history of disabled people’s independent living movement and their struggle
to secure benefits through the social security system, see Tateiwa 1995.
28 The International Year of Disabled People (1981) changed the attitude of the govern-
ment towards support for disabled people’s independent living: as the theme of the
year was ‘complete participation and equality’, the government started providing
more subsidies with disabled people. Until the International Year of Disabled People,
the policies of Japanese government on disabled people were separation, but in Janu-
ary 1980, the term ‘normalisation’ was mentioned for the first time in the Diet. Nor-
malisation principle means making available to all people with disabilities patterns of
life and conditions of everyday living which are as close as possible to the regular cir-
cumstances and ways of life or society (from Wikipedia, downloaded on 15 July 15,
2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalisation_%28people_with_disabilities%29)
In March 1980, ‘the Head Office to Promote the Year of Disabled People’ was in-
stalled in the Prime Minister’s Office, for the purpose of ‘securing communication
amongst the related administrative offices’ and of ‘comprehensively and effectively
promoting the policies concerning the International Year’. However, because there
was nobody ‘personally concerned’ and no one person in the office who was disabled,
‘a special committee for the International Year of Disabled People’ was organised as
well, in which representatives from disabled people’s groups participated. In 1982,
this committee handed in a report entitled ‘On the management of affairs of the In-
ternational Year of Disabled People,’ which was addressed to the Prime Minister.
After receiving this report, ‘the Head Office to Promote Measures for Disabled Peo-
ple’ was established in the Prime Minister’s Office, taking over the former head of-
fice, and ‘a long term plan concerning the measures for disabled people’ was pro-
posed. This series of developments was based on the declarations by the United Na-
tions, where the term ‘independent living’ was used: the management of institutes
was evaluated, and the necessity to support the lives of disabled people outside resi-
dential institutes was addressed. It was also agreed that even when a disabled person
required 24-hour assistance, his/her life in local communities, not in an institute,
should be supported and guaranteed (Tateiwa 1995: 205-211).
29 The very term self-determination, or jiko-kettei in Japanese, was not often used in the
1960s or 1970s in the disabled people’s movement for independent living, although
this concept was central to their arguments (Tateiwa 1998: 226; 231). Referring to
this concept, such terms as jiristu or dokuristu were and still are used. The Chinese
character of ji of ji-ritsu or jiko stands for ‘self’ and ‘on one’s own’, and ritsu of ji-ritsu
and doku-ritsu stands for ‘stand’ and ‘have a clear position’. ‘Independent living’ in Ja-
panese is jiritsu seikatsu. The term self-determination, or jiko-ketteri, started being
used during the 1980s in both the women’s reproductive health movements and that
of disabled people. In the 1990s, it was frequently used as the core of the rhetoric of
both groups.
30 Hori explains that Seichoˆ no ie is a right-wing religious group whose target is to re-es-
tablish an emperor system in Japan. Hori relates this fact to Murakami’s statements
saying:
Murakami says, ‘I am here in this world because my mother and father met
each other with mystic purpose, and so did my grandparents. ...If even one
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of them had not been alive, I would not be here either. Abortion is to cut off
such a mystic relationship of people. [...] Legal abortion will destroy such ba-
sic unity of blood relationship. [...] Every individual would be isolated from
each other, and the Japanese nation would be destroyed.’ (Hori 1983: 87-88)
As is clear from his statement, the anti-abortionists’ attempt is nothing but a ‘right-
wing trend’ of politics under the guise of respect for life.
As I analyse the link among ‘blood’, ‘eugenics’, and ‘the emperor’ made by Hori:
‘Unity of blood’ connotes ‘there is a selected or superior blood to be protected’, which
is a category of eugenic thought. In effect, Japanese militarism during the Second
World War was based on the idea that the rule of the emperor’s family should spread
because of its ‘superior blood’. At the same time, the existence of the emperor (mon-
archy) connotes ‘there are people who are superior or inferior from birth’. For this lo-
gic, Hori argues that the discussion by Murakami using ‘blood’ and ‘country’ con-
notes the revival of the emperor state, composed of citizens with superior blood,
which eventually implies that disabled people are inferior.
31 This is a statement from Hasegawa, a member of Aoi shiba no kai. It shows the trans-
formation of one disabled man’s consciousness, so it is cited despite its length. The
title of the paragraph is ‘Chuˆzetsu-ga-josei-ni-motarasumono-to-jibun-no-sonzai’ [What
abortion does to women and my existence].
It is my own experience, but it happened twice, that my ex-girlfriends be-
came pregnant. The first girlfriend had a miscarriage during the fifth month
of pregnancy. In those days, there were not so many helpers, so she had to
take care of me. She was carried by an ambulance, but she had a miscarriage
in a toilet at the hospital. Moreover, we were told by a doctor that it seemed
the foetus’s heart had not been working any more, and the foetus probably
had been dead already for a few months. I felt strange to hear that. When I
was watching her sleeping, after her womb was washed, I could finally con-
front my feelings. After she left the hospital, we consoled the soul of the
aborted foetus.
When the second girlfriend became pregnant, the doctor diagnosed that the
foetus was outside the womb. We could not believe what the doctor said, and
for a few days we waited without proceeding with any available treatment.
But then her condition became so much worse that she almost lost her life.
When I saw an aborted foetus of finger-nail-size, rather than feeling shocked,
I thought ‘this is what human action produces.’ My girlfriend was still asleep
so she did not see the aborted foetus.
Those were my experiences, to be able to know that women experience pains
by miscarriage and abortion. However, I also understand more about my ten-
dency to more easily sympathise with disabled women: to give birth to a
child, exposing their life to the possibility of death, then I understand the
abortion experiences of disability-free women, because I am also disabled.
Anyway, what I want to say is that abortion, under whatever circumstances,
brings pain to women, and women never joyfully choose to have an abortion
(Hasegawa 1996: 18-20).
32 From the interview with Kinuko Mitsui, Kunitachi, Tokyo, June 2001.
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Chapter 5
1 He adds that ‘however, legal studies also emphasise the importance of seeing
through the nature of the source of the authenticity of the law, whether the law is
created out of ratio or not’ (It is understood that the meaning of reason is the condi-
tion of non-biased or objective treatment for any parties involved under the law.)
2 There are some success stories of women all over the world in obtaining their rights
by using international treaties. See, for instance, Plata 1994: 526-527.
3 See, for example, speech by Yonezu, in Aoi shiba no kai (19) 1973: 27-29.
4 In Japan, the term ‘feminist’ or ‘feminism’ is found more in academic writings than
in either movement publications or in movement discussions. Today, the terms ‘fem-
inism’ and ‘feminist’ are to be found in movement newsletters, but not very fre-
quently. Articles written by women with some professional-level academic back-
ground would contain the word ‘feminism’. Women in the women’s movement, espe-
cially those from the Women’s Liberation Movement in the 1970s, call themselves
‘onna’ or women. During my informal conversations with some women active since
the 1970s within women’s movements they used the term ‘feminist’ to connote being
either focused on strategies for reform, or focused on how women use the pre-exist-
ing society to create better conditions for women, rather than questioning the funda-
ment of the society or values internalised within people, including women (I spoke
with women ranging in from late 40s to early 50s; each had participated in the stu-
dent movement in the 1970s and all were still active today in improving social condi-
tions in such areas as reproductive health rights, environmental issues, labour condi-
tions). The interests of the women I spoke to who have been active in women’s move-
ments since the 1970s are personal change, liberation of their consciousness from
oppression, or the awakening of ‘ego,’ by deconstructing conventional values. Women
I spoke with prefer the term onna (women) to feminist as they are women, instead of
a term ending with ‘ism,’ which seems to confine their political position. Calling
themselves onna they could project that the movements they were a part of had a
wider appeal: the movement is for all women, and it is not necessary to be a feminist
to join. Additionally, there seems to be a reluctance to import foreign words, such as
‘feminist’ or ‘feminism’ too readily.
5 Oˆhashi’s statement during the interview with Yonezu, in Yonezu 1998: 240.
6 Yonezu recalls her surprise, in 1983, when she saw other women discussing how to
use CEDAW to oppose anti-abortion arguments. She recalls the moment, saying, ‘my
first reaction was, “do we use treaties concluded by the authority?” Other women
were surprised by my statements to the contrary, saying, “of course, why don’t we
take advantage of CEDAW for our movement’s sake, even though the treaties were
concluded by the authority?”. I thought afterwards that if the treaty could play a posi-
tive role, we should indeed take advantage of it. Maybe the times have changed’ (Yo-
nezu 1998: 236).
7 Hardacre emphasises that ‘Western writers frequently create the impression that Mi-
zuko-kuyoˆ dates from time immemorial, that it exists only in a Buddhist forum, that
Mizuko simply means the spirits of aborted foetuses, and that there is widespread so-
cial approbation of the ritual – that it is not the object of sophisticated critical dis-
course’ (Hardacre 1997: 7). I would add that even many Japanese perceive the Mizuio
rites as such. Defining Mizuko-kuyoˆ as a contemporary phenomenon, however, her
book elaborates an account of the historical, political, economic, and social back-
ground of its emergence, and shows gendered power relations around the issue. In
her chapter 1, she also discusses that the majority of religious institutions surveyed
reject Mizuko-kuyoˆ and explains the reasons why.
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8 The report is based on her analysis of 712 interviews with women in one area of Ja-
pan. Most women in the sample completed high school, then went to work, and after
a few years, got married. The area is rather conservative, so the samples are not re-
presentative for the whole of Japan. The women interviewed ranged in age from teen-
agers to women in their 80s.
9 It is important to note that in the reproductive decision-making process, too many
women tend to argue their decisions in terms of ‘for the sake of others’. In the atti-
tude of ‘the abortion was for you, my child’ there is no mention of the woman her-
self. Sanekawa also comments that most of her interviewees talked about their part-
ners, parents, and foetus, but not about themselves. Anti-abortion activists take ad-
vantage of this point for their business of consoling the souls of aborted foetuses. In
my reckoning, it is very important that this problem – that women think of their
abortion experiences in terms of others – should not be mixed with the incomplete-
ness of rights. Rights are oriented to the powerful, not the foetus, so a woman’s grie-
vance about abortion cannot be dealt with in terms of a rights-based discourse. And
even if women become more assertive, no political term would erase the women’s
pain from having had an abortion. For a Japanese woman, the target has been to
have a stronger self and subjectivity, knowing why she is living in the way she lives,
instead of being swayed by the dominant surroundings. ‘Awakening of ego’ was al-
ways a topic of the Japanese women’s movement, including the WLM. To this end,
‘rights’ should not be done away with.
10 Finrrage, groups of women with infertility problems, the DPI network of disabled
women, and the Japan Family Planning Federation undertook joint actions.
11 See, for example, the fax sent by Soshiren to the ministries and Diet members, in
Soshiren news (132): 9.
12 On 4 June, women’s reproductive movement groups got together and proposed their
objections to the LDP draft as follows: (1) the name must be ‘the law on contracep-
tives, sterilisation surgery and abortion’ instead of ‘the law to protect motherhood’;
(2) deletion of the consent of the spouse from the conditions for sterilisation and
abortion, and; (3) a supplementary rule to be attached to the law in order for the Diet
members to continue making an effort to establish the reproductive rights of women
(Soshiren news (132) 2 July 1996: 7).
13 Female Diet members from the Social Democratic and the New Sakigake parties
played the central role in creating unity amongst female members. They submitted
opinions on the revision of the law, on 11 June, criticising the name of the new law
and its content, just as women in the social movements had done.
14 On 10 June, for example, the Social Democratic Party opened a committee to exam-
ine the revision of the Eugenic Protection Law. They concluded that they would not
agree to the name of the law ‘to Protect Motherhood’. The ruling parties opened a
session about policies for health and welfare. The Social Democratic Party and the
New Sakigake proposed a correction to the draft by the LDP, i.e., the name of the law
should be either ‘the Law on the Health of Women Relating to Pregnancy’ or ‘the
Law on Conditions for Sterilisation and Abortion’ (Ninshin-ni-kansuru-josei-no-kenkoˆ-
ni-kansuru-hoˆritsu or Funin-shujutsu, jinkoˆ-ninshin-chuˆzetsu-no-tekiseika-toˆ-ni-kansuru-
hoˆritsu). However, there was no agreement, but a new draft was made during the dis-
cussion in the committee. The points in the draft was (1) this time, only deleting the
eugenic part from the Eugenic Protection Law is to be proposed; (2) however, urgent
and comprehensive examination on further improvement of the law for women’s re-
productive rights is to be made in the new law. This is because there are many issues
to be discussed on the health of women, protection of life, and so on; (3) deletion of
the consent of the male spouse is to be discussed; (4) abolish eugenic counselling
clinics; (5) the name should be either ‘the law to protect mothers’ or ‘the law on the
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protection of life and health of motherhood’; and (6) examination and overview
should be made urgently after the revision. On this day, women in the movement vis-
ited more than 30 Diet members (Soshiren news (132) 2 July 1996: 9).
15 Yokota, a member of Aoi shiba no kai, cited in Soshiren news (132) 2 July 1996: 10, in
an oral presentation during the meeting of nakusou-kaeyou-no-kai (a group to abolish
and change the law), held on 10 June 1996.
16 This is a statement by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, cited in Soshiren kinkyuˆ
news (3) 1996: 8.
17 This was distributed during the 4th Women’s Conference in Beijing. The session was
held on 1 September. It was reported that sometimes the whole womb was removed.
I have corrected the English in the original text of the leaflet. The original text is as
follows.
What is the Eugenic Protection Law?: Sexual abuse to women with disabilities.
Eugenic Protection Law is to prevent the increase of the inferior descendants. In this
case, the inferior descendants mean people with disabilities. If we have diseases or
disabilities which affect our children, a doctor is allowed to give us eugenic operation
without permission (of women). In Japan, there have been some cases which doctors
exercised eugenic operations to women with disabilities. (They removed wombs of
women with intellectual disabilities)
This happened because women with disabilities are not supposed to have their own
children in our society. Staff in institutions also say that it is too much trouble for
them to take care of women with intellectual disability when they have period.
Taiwan, Korea and China followed Japan and they now have similar laws. We are
afraid this eugenic ideology is spreading around Asia with the Japanese leadership.
Every life is equally valuable. Everybody has the right to enjoy her life. We are hoping
to have a good discussion on this issue.
18 Finrrage-no-kai, the Friends of Finrrage, Network for Infertile Women in Japan, is a
non-profit support group for infertile women that was established in 1991. Since its
foundation, more than 6,000 women have participated in the group. During the
1995 UN Beijing Conference, the group had some 1,500 members, but as of August
2008, they have around 250 members. Most members are women (at the time of
publicationthere was just one male member). Members include people who are un-
dergoing infertility treatment, some who have had treatment but have stopped, some
who have decided not to have children, and many other people with diverse back-
grounds. They consider multiple pregnancy and selective reduction as one of the big
problems in the context of fertility treatment. For more information, see http://
www5c.biglobe.ne.jp/~finrrage/.
19 A disabled woman from the DPI network of disabled women recalls ‘we introduced
this fact in the conference so actively that it was picked up by the local newspapers
in Egypt, and this eventually had an effect on the Japanese government,’ from ‘After
Beijing,’ in Soshiren news (131) 1996: 24.
20 The statement by the Minister of Health and Welfare, cited in Soshiren news (132) July
1996: 10, Soshiren kinkyu news (3) June 1996: 9.
21 A letter to Diet members, 13 June 1996, on behalf of Yoshito Nakayama from Aoi shi-
ba no kai.
22 Additionally, on the photocopy of the aforementioned letter from Aoi shiba no kai to
the Diet, there is the following note by a woman from Soshiren. It seems that the wo-
man from Soshiren and a disabled man from Aoi shiba no kai had a talk on the tele-
phone about the letter and their statement about ‘women’s right to self-determina-
tion’. The handwritten memo states:
‘[Male] disabled people say they were aware that this letter would invite
strong criticism from women’s movement groups, but the deletion of the eu-
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genic part from the law was the disabled people’s long years’ target of strug-
gle and they could not compromise, no matter what. They [disabled men]
say that they want to establish more collaboration with the women’s move-
ment in the future.’
Thus disabled men were aware of the importance and sensitivity of ‘women’s right to
self-determination’ for the women’s movement. Two points can be raised here. First,
to be sure, as has long been the case, ‘women’s right to self-determination’ is the cen-
tral core of the recent disagreement between the movements of women and disabled
people. Secondly, by ‘women’, disabled people do not mean women in the reproduc-
tive health movement, surmising from the note above. By ‘women’s consciousness is
not ripe’ they mean women in general, beyond the women’s movement. These obser-
vations lead to a question: ‘which women are represented by the phrase “women’s
right to self-determination”?’ In the most recent debates on this question, this ques-
tion is linked to the ethical questions connected to the use of reproductive technology
in the medical field: ‘doctors are dealing with individual women, not all women.’
This question continues to be a prominent question both within the women’s move-
ment and among the public today.
Chapter 6
1 Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) is a form of prenatal diagnosis to determine chro-
mosomal or genetic disorders in the fetus. It entails getting a sample of the chorionic
villus (placental tissue) and testing it. The advantage of CVS is that it can be carried
out 10-13 weeks after the last period, earlier than amniocentesis, which is carried out
at 15-18 weeks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chorionic_villus_sampling, downloaded
on 20 August 2008).
2 In medicine and (clinical) genetics preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) (or also
known as Embryo Screening) refers to procedures that are performed on embryos
prior to implantation, sometimes even on oocytes prior to fertilization. PGD is con-
sidered an alternative to prenatal diagnosis. Its main advantage is that it avoids selec-
tive pregnancy termination as the method makes it highly likely that the baby will be
free of the disease under consideration. PGD thus is an adjunct to assisted reproduc-
tive technology, and requires in vitro fertilization (IVF) to obtain oocytes or embryos
for evaluation. The term preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) is used to denote
procedures that do not look for a specific disease but use PGD techniques to identify
embryos at risk. PGD is a poorly chosen phrase because, in medicine, to ‘diagnose’
means to identify an illness or determine its cause. An oocyte or early-stage embryo
has no symptoms of disease. They are not ill. Rather, they may have a genetic condi-
tion that could lead to disease. To ‘screen’ means to test for anatomical, physiological,
or genetic conditions in the absence of symptoms of disease. So, both PGD and PGS
should, be referred to as types of embryo screening (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Preimplantation_genetic_diagnosis, downloaded on 20 August 2008).
3 This society was established in 1949. It currently has 15,900 members, all of whom
are not doctors. There are branch offices in all the prefectures of Japan. For more in-
formation, see http://www.jsog.or.jp/.
4 See Soshiren news (163) February 1999; ibid (164) March 1999.
5 Major worries around the issue of human cloning are that the practice of the technol-
ogy requires intervention in women’s bodies, i.e., ovum extraction. There is also a
suspicion that the surplus of fertilised eggs for infertility treatment might be used
for cloning experiments. See ‘Letter of Protest’ by Soshiren in Soshiren news Oct.
1998: 3.
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6 A group of people with chromosome abnormalities, such as Down’s syndrome, and
their families. The group was established in June 1995, out of two groups, kohato-kai
and koyagi-no-kai, which were composed of parents of Down’s syndrome children;
the group has been active for more than 30 years. There are 44 chapters in the coun-
try, with 5,500 members, as of August 2008. Especially since 1997, when triple mar-
ker test started to be done more widely, the group has been active in petitioning the
Ministry of Health and to Welfare and academic societies to reject attempts to pro-
mote prenatal screening and selection abortion legislations. Together with other dis-
abled people’s groups, they are trying to prevent the introduction of the selective
abortion clause (Cited in Soshiren news (172) 9 November 1999: 4; Sakai 1999: 103).
7 The idea from Nichibo was mainly to adjust the law to be able to legally cope with
the situation caused by new technologies, i.e., for women to be able to have the abor-
tion of a multiple pregnancy as a result of infertility treatment, etc. Multiple preg-
nancy is often caused by infertility treatment, and in the event that a woman devel-
ops more than one foetus, there is no legal possibility for her to have an abortion of
the multiple pregnancy, because neither the economic reasons clause nor the
mother’s physical mental conditions can be applied. For the opponents to prenatal
screening, the draft was far from satisfactory, and therefore the alliance was formed.
8 Yonezu reports that she could discover a number of crucial points by holding meet-
ings of alliances of SMOs whose work focused on different problems. For example,
she discovered that it is important to keep in mind what certain key vocabulary im-
plies to people from different groups. On hearing the term ‘abortion,’ women from
women’s reproductive movement organisations think of ‘a choice to give up preg-
nancy.’ When women refer to ‘selective abortion’ they would specifically state ‘selec-
tive abortion’, distinguishing it from abortion in general, while disabled people as-
sociate the term ‘abortion’ immediately with ‘selective abortion of deformed foetuses’.
With the term ‘the operation of multiple pregnancy’ women with infertility problems
would think of ‘a consequence of infertility treatment’, while disabled people would
think of ‘one of the means to select foetuses’. By ‘reproductive technology’ women
with infertility problems would think of ‘technology for infertility treatment’, while
disabled people would think of ‘technology to select foetuses’. She goes on to say that
it is very dangerous to proceed with a discussion without knowing these different
views. It could happen that while women say ‘a right to abortion’, not referring to a
‘right to selective abortion’, disabled people would understand it as ‘a right to selec-
tive abortion.’
Because SMOs in alliances have different experiences of oppression, it is possible
that one movement person could react angrily to certain statements, due to pain ex-
perienced in the past, those this meaning might not have been the intention of the
person who made the statement.
Yonezu concludes that this misunderstanding, confusion, and division arise because
of the pain and anxiety these people experience in society. And the anxiety is caused
by oppression. Acknowledging the fact that SMOs ironically have been divided by dis-
crimination, she emphasises the importance of listening to each other carefully and
continuing dialogue in order not to perpetuate these divisions (Soshiren news (179)
July 2000: 2-3).
9 The full statement by Murakami was: ‘A fundamental problem exists of “dignity of
life” in combination with the low total fertility rate. Under the Eugenic Protection
Law, around 50 million lives were ended. Here lies the very cause for the lack of re-
spect for life in society. Now, on the eve of the 21st century, we have to delete the eco-
nomic reasons clause in order to become a truly international, human nation-state.’
Prime Minister Obuchi answered, ‘Of course dignity of life is a fundamental issue
and it is important to raise consciousness about the issue. But as for the deletion of
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the economic reasons clause, there are various points of view in the nation.’ Women
in the reproductive health movement at the time suspected that the anti-abortion
movement and the Ministry of Health and Welfare might collaborate on the issue of
Japan’s low fertility rate, so women agreed to monitor this issue. Soshiren sent a letter
to the Ministry of Health and Welfare saying that they opposed the idea of deleting
the economic reasons clause. Cited in Soshiren kinkyuˆ news (Soshiren urgent news), 2
February 2000, and in Soshiren news (175) 07 March 2000: 2-3.
10 Seimei Sonchoˆ Centre, Seimei sonchoˆ news, 14 (154) November 1997. This special edi-
tion honoured Mother Teresa.
11 Since the late 1980s, the low fertility rate has been a hot topic of discussion amongst
the Diet and the ministries. In 2006, the rate was 1.4 and in 2008 it is 1.22 (from
Index Mundi: http://indexmundi.com/japan/total_fertility_rate.html, downloaded on
20 August 2008). To note some points, the ministries and some of the Diet mem-
bers are trying to stabilise the birth rate, so work is progressing on providing mea-
sures to motivate women to have more children. The content of the measures seem,
at first glance, agreeable, because the measures touch upon the problems of the sex-
ual division of labour, male participation in child-rearing, the lack of nursing homes
for the elderly, and so on. But as long as the motivation is based on the aim to in-
crease the number of children, women in the movement sceptically call it ‘population
control using women’s bodies’, arguing that it contradicts women’s right to self-deter-
mination, as well as their sexual and reproductive health and rights. Moreover, the
measures might possibly lead to limiting access to abortion.
12 One might argue that selective abortion is justifiable under the economic reasons
clause because raising a disabled child costs more money than a non-disabled child.
Yet, the clause was initially intended to legitimatise abortion for those whose ability
to cover their basic life needs, such as food and shelter, would be threatened if an-
other child would be born. This clause was introduced in 1952 when Japanese society
was devastated after the end of the Second World War. Currently in Japan subsidies,
though insufficient, are provided to assist disabled people, and the result is that hav-
ing one disabled child is not likely to cause a mother to have an economic crisis, as
was the implication under the clause when it was initially introduced.
13 On the practice of embryo biopsy, a statement by the Japan Academic Society of Gy-
naecologists and Obstetricians on 30 September 1998, cited in Soshiren news 160: 16.
Comments have to be made about the term ‘couple’. In Japan, criticisms are often
made that women’s bodies are often a target of commodification under the practice
of reproductive technology, where ‘men’ are absent. Therefore, using the term ‘cou-
ple’ in reproductive issues can be considered as progress, whereas in Europe, some
women argue that the term ‘couple’ hides the different positions of men and women
in reproductive issues. The trend to use the term ‘couple’ is sometimes derided as
‘couplism’. For the position of men and women in reproductive issues, see Ehara
2002: 48.
14 This statement is made by the Japan Academic Society of Gynaecologists and Obste-
tricians on 30 September 1998, as a reply to the comment by the women’s movement
that women have to bear the burden of reproductive technology, both physically and
psychologically. Cited in Soshiren news (160): 18.
15 For the analysis of women’s desire to have children, medical doctors’ motivation to
fulfill women’s desire, and feminist discourse, see Tsuge 1997; 1999.
16 ‘On Embryo Biopsy’ by the Japan Academic Society of Gynaecologists and Obstetri-
cians, presented on 30 September 1998. Artificial fertilisation had been limited to in-
fertile couples until then, but on 27 June 1998 the academic society enlarged its prac-
tice to encompass fertile couples as well, so that doctors could check for abnormal-
NOTES 305
ities in an embryo before implanting it inside a woman’s body. Cited in Soshiren news
(160): 17.
17 See, for example, the quote of the statement by Nichibo in Soshiren news, No. 169.
18 This proposal from Nichibo was reported in major newspapers on 29 March 1999,
and this is how movement groups of women and disabled people came to know
about it. Movement groups analysed this draft as follows: the first part, needless to
say, is assuming the case that the foetus has a fatal disease or disability, and the latter
part is the operation of multiple pregnancy, in the case of multiple pregnancy as a re-
sult of infertility treatment. In newspapers reactions from movement groups of wo-
men and disabled people were also covered. For example, Keiko Yano, a representa-
tive of Yuseishisoˆ-o-tou-network (a network to question eugenic thoughts) said, ‘An in-
troduction of the selective abortion clause implies that the nation-state acknowledges
that children with disabilities should not be born. This matter cannot be judged only
among medical doctors. Why do we have to go backwards, after the repeal of the Eu-
genic Protection Law? Both women and disabled people’s groups have been opposing
the attempt to introduce the selective abortion clause, although they carry subtly dif-
ferent meanings in their argumentation’ (The Mainichi Shimbun 29 March 1999).
Some doctors even opposed the proposal, saying ‘there are unavoidable aspects in the
practice of prenatal screening, but the law should not be revised for the convenience
of medical doctors’ (The Yomiuri Shimbun 29 March 1999).
19 Soshiren news, No. 169, August 1999. It should be noted that the explanation for Ni-
chibo’s proposal was: (1) Women’s self-determination with regard to reproduction is
guaranteed in the 16th article in CEDAW, which was adopted in 1979. (2) In order to
guarantee the health of women, a motion was adopted in the 1994 Cairo conference,
and an action guideline in Beijing in 1995. Since Japan agreed with them, there is an
urgency to organise the domestic system quickly to implement these guidelines. (3)
To give birth or not is one of women’s basic human rights, or women’s right to priv-
acy. In many foreign countries, abortion within the first 12 weeks is considered to be
an issue of a mother’s right to self-determination, and specific indications for abor-
tion are not applied. In Japan, stillbirth is reported after 12 weeks of pregnancy, and
taking into account the safety and technical problems, 12 weeks seems to be a proper
place to draw a line (Soshiren news (169): 4). The full copy of the letters of protest
from social movement groups, such as the DPI network of women with disabilities,
Aoi shiba no kai, the women’s group seeking a law on bodily integrity and sexuality,
and the network to question eugenic thoughts are also mentioned in Soshiren news
(169).
20 This field work was conducted in 2006 and 2007, in Japan, as a sub-research of the
Socio-genetic Marginalization in Asia Programme (SMAP) at the International Insti-
tute for Asian Studies, Leiden. For the details of SMAP, see Sleeboom-Faulkner,
2004.
21 To cite portions of some letters from groups of the opponents to prenatal screening,
‘the practice of reproductive technology implies being against the attributes of people
with disabilities’ and ‘the practice of the technology of embryo biopsy might strength-
en the false idea that to be ill or to be disabled is unhappy for the person, the family,
and for society’ (From ‘a letter from Soshiren to the Kagoshima University medical
team, on the clinical experiment of embryo biopsy’ sent on 14 January 1999, in Soshi-
ren news (163) February 1999: 3).
For example, when a medical association explained that D type muscular dystrophy
was a target, the DPI network of women with disabilities stated that, ‘D type muscu-
lar dystrophy was listed as a disease to be discovered by genetic diagnosis of a foetus.
[...] We are a nationwide group of women with disabilities. The purpose of the net-
work is to empower women with disabilities to have a say about our position in the
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local communities, in order to enrich our independence. We are disappointed to hear
that D type muscular dystrophy was listed as a disease to be scanned for. The fact is
that we, people with disabilities, are trying to accept and love our bodies as they are,
in order to live our lives as we are. None of us think that we are unhappy because we
have been born with a disability. Each one of us lives our own lives, cherishing our
lives. And to encounter friends with the disease of D type muscular dystrophy is as
important as encountering any other people. They are not beings who should not
have been born, and it is not an issue whereby a third person should judge who is
happy and unhappy’ (From ‘A protest letter from DPI network for disabled women,’
to the Kagoshima University medical group ethics committee’ sent on 3 February
1999, cited in Soshiren news (164) March 1999).
‘(Upon learning about your perspectives on the introduction of the selective
abortion clause), we sensed danger as if it was a revival of the ghost of eu-
genics. [...] We have been appealing to your point repeatedly, that our life is
happy and wonderful because of our disability. Your group’s ignorance of
our voice, an attitude devoid of democracy, and arrogance to judge that life
with a disability is unhappy – all those increase our disappointment’ (From
‘Letter of Protest and request from DPI network of disabled women regard-
ing Nichibo’s draft of the proposal to revise the Law to Protect the Mother’s
Body,’ cited in Soshiren news (165) 6 April 1999: 4-5).
The Network to Question Eugenic Thoughts argues, ‘according to the newspaper re-
port, the reason for the necessity to introduce the selective abortion clause is to guar-
antee a mother’s right to seek happiness. But indeed there are a number of mothers
who live happily with heavily disabled children. Somebody’s happiness cannot be
judged by a third person. [...] If a pregnant woman is having trouble with continuing
her pregnancy, it is because only women are expected to bring up children. Hence, it
is important to get rid of as much difficulty as possible, for disabled people to live in
society, as well as to lessen the sexual division of labour’ (‘A letter of protest and re-
quest to Nichibo’, sent on 23 March 1999, cited in Soshiren news (165) 6 April 1999:
9-11).
Aoi shiba no kai argues, ‘Whatever explanations are given by Nichibo, they represent
an attempt to deny the existence of us, people with a disability. Hence, we strongly
request that you withdraw your draft to introduce the selective abortion clause’ (‘A let-
ter of protest and perspective to Nichibo’s draft to proposal to revise the Law to Pro-
tect the Mother’s Body’, cited in Soshiren news (165) 6 April 1999: 12-13).
22 Karada-to-sei-no-hoˆritsu-o-tsuku-onnano-kai (Women for an Alternative Law for Contra-
ception and Abortion), ‘a letter of opinion to oppose the perspective given about the
introduction of the selective abortion clause’, cited in Soshiren news (165) 6 April
1999: 7-8.
23 Yuˆseishisoˆ-o-tou-network (The Network to Question Eugenic Thoughts), ‘a letter of pro-
test and request to Nichibo’, sent on 23 March 1999, in order to protest Nichibo’s
idea to introduce the selective abortion clause, cited in Soshiren news (165) 6 April
1999: 9-11.
24 Yokota and Yonezu 2004: 89. This is called ‘the slippery slope argument’ in Western
debates.
25 Attitudes toward technology are diverse among disabled people, too (Ishiakawa 1999:
64). The debate is continuing. For example, Yokota and Yonezu argue that although
they would not agree with the idea assuming that a disability is a cause of unhappi-
ness, they do think wars or environmental problems should be prevented, and this
creates more disabled people. Those who do not have to become disabled, do not
have to be disabled. However, at the same time, they would not agree totally with ar-
guments that ‘wars or environmental problems must be prevented because they create
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more disabled people.’ This argument is based on the assumption that disability is
negative. There is a subtle difference between these two logics – ‘one does not have
to become disabled’ and ‘however, disabilities should not be regarded as something
that is negative.’ Yokota believes that this is an ongoing question to be discussed (Yo-
kota & Yonezu op. cit.: 69).
26 Yonezu states, ‘the academic society emphasises that medical doctors should give suf-
ficient explanation while practising the technology, while also saying that doctors
should not recommend the technology to the pregnant women or her spouse. How-
ever, this reasoning implies that doctors’ concern is to avoid accusation (by behaving
passively), because currently a number of women are aware that there is the possibi-
lity of reproductive technology, and many women ask for the technology themselves’
(Soshiren news (162) 5 January 1999: 2-5, brackets are added by the present author).
27 DPI network of disabled women, ‘an opinion and request to Nichibo’, cited in Soshi-
ren news (165) 6 April 1999: 4-5. In the letter, medical doctors in Nichibo are invited
to try ‘peer counselling’, through which the disabled women in the network turned
the negative ideas they had of themselves because of their disabilities into positive ac-
ceptance.
28 Some SMOs themselves are active in eliminating discrimination against those with
disabilities. For example, some women from women’s movements are also involved
in activities to promote co-education of children with and without disabilities, as the
educational system in Japan with generally segregates disabled and non-disabled stu-
dents. For parents, the primary concern will be that the child can get an education
and a job.
29 To show this logic, he cites Modell:
Generally, genetic diseases are neither avoidable nor curable. And when they
are, treatment is usually troublesome and costly. Medical science can never
solve all of the problems of genetic diseases. Therefore, there is a huge possi-
bility that prenatal screening and selective abortion will be practised for a
long time. Firstly, [in order to spread the practice of prenatal screening and
selective abortion] it is necessary to stress that, unlike under Nazism, prena-
tal screening is not promoted nationally [but is based on individual decision-
making]. Children should learn at school that everyone has a genetic risk [so
society should accept the practice of prenatal screening and selective abor-
tion]. Secondly, to refute the argument that prenatal screening leads to the
discrimination of disabled people, we can stress that the practices of prenatal
screening and selective abortion are actually signs of increasing medical and
social interest in the welfare of disabled people.
In this way, Modell justifies the practices of prenatal screening and selective abortion,
and this is the basis for the guidelines proposed by the WHO to be applied to the
European situation (Modell 1990, cited by Satoˆ 1999: 58f, brackets by Satoˆ for clarifi-
cation).
30 To summarise some of the other countries’ arguments: in the UK, abortion was lega-
lised in 1967. A selective abortion clause exists in the law. There are 23 counselling
centres in the UK, engaging in activities such as publishing brochures about prenatal
screening. In 1976, the Congenital Disability Act was introduced, which enabled par-
ents of a disabled child to bring a doctor into a lawsuit when a child is disabled be-
cause of inaction by the doctor. Consequently, in the UK, blood tests, amniotic fluid
checks, and hair checks are routine in the course of pregnancy, and more than half
of all pregnancies that have a possibility of Down’s syndrome are terminated. Other
European countries, such as France, Norway, and Luxemburg, permit abortion for
reasons of disabilities (Satoˆ 1999: 116).
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31 This reasoning is not found only in Japan. See, for example, Geerinck-Vercammen
2001; Visser 2006, for the Dutch debate.
32 A woman from Soshiren, reflecting upon her experience in talking with women in
the process of decision-making, reports that, even though a woman might not
actually discriminate against disabled people, most women’s concerns are more prac-
tical and concrete, such as ‘do I have to have an extra medical treatment for the baby
if I give birth in case this baby has an anomaly? For how long does it need an extra
treatment? Who teaches me how to cope with this? Where should I go?’ In this way
the woman demonstrated that sufficient social support was a factor in the decision-
making process.
33 During field research conducted for Socio-genetic Marginalisation in Asia Pro-
gramme (2006, 2007), 7 out of 12 mothers with children with Downs syndrome ex-
pressed that they had ever had an experience of being told by others, ‘why didn’t you
check your child when you were pregnant?’
34 Yonezu, in Soshiren news (157) 28 July 1998: 4-6.
During the aforementioned meeting of the evaluation committee, Kiyoko Kinjoˆ, a
lawyer, stated that the social system should be constructed in such a way that women
bear less of the psychological burden in the process of decision-making, for example,
the counselling system should be constructed to alleviate the psychological burden
that women are disproportionately saddled with. On this point, Yonezu believes that
organising a counselling system is not enough, instead reconsideration of the social
system at the fundamental level is needed. This is probably based on the worry that a
solid counselling system would become a process for locating and persuading wo-
men who have a deformed foetus to have an abortion (Soshiren News (157) 28 July
1998: 4-6).
35 See Jaggar 1998, for a discussion about the state’s responsibility and abortion rights.
The danger of limiting the concept of self-determination, or autonomy, in medical
health to merely the principle of informed consent is also pointed out by Dodds
(2000: 214). To cite one sentence, ‘the identification of respect for autonomy with in-
formed consent presupposes that in the absence of pathology or extreme youth, all
patients can be assumed to be fully autonomous agents; thus, those patients found
not to be autonomous are presumed to be pathological or infantile and are treated ap-
propriately in a paternalistic manner. Furthermore, identifying respect for autonomy
with informed consent presupposes that ethical concern should be directed to the ac-
tions of the physician in obtaining consent and not to the decision-making of the pa-
tient’ (ibid).
Chapter 7
1 ‘Reproductive rights’ has also been in frequent usage since the 1980s. Since ‘repro-
ductive rights’ stands for ‘rights on the issues of reproduction’ the two phrases ‘repro-
ductive rights’ and ‘women’s right to self-determination’ can even be combined and
formulated into a form of ‘women’s right to self-determination on the issues of repro-
duction.’ Out of the two phrases, the focus here is on ‘right to self-determination’ be-
cause this implies more of the philosophical and political content of rights, in order
to address the question of this chapter, i.e., why do rights tend to be linked with liber-
alist ideas?
2 The decision made in the case of Roe v. Wade in the US in 1973 was one example,
where a judgement about the ethical status of a foetus in the first trimester was en-
trusted to an individual women’s moral standard and belief. Here, abortion was made
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into an issue of ‘women’s right to privacy’. With regard to the legal reform, abortion
rights, social justice, and individual women’s moral authority, see Jaggar, 1998.
3 For arguments on this point from Japanese SMOs see chapter 6. Note that there
were a number of statements to be found, not only in Japan, but also in other coun-
tries, so this link is not specific to Japan. See, for example, Ann Finger. She is a nove-
list, and she is also disabled. Another example is, during the 4th International Wo-
men’s Health Meeting held in Amsterdam, a woman in a wheelchair from the Neth-
erlands who made a speech in this regard, expressing the fear that, ‘I would have
been eradicated by the technology’ (Women’s Global Network on Reproductive Rights
1986: 57-58).
4 A dialogue between Yokota and Yonezu shows this point. Both are disabled: Yokota:
‘As a poet, I am often told by senior people that my poetry should go beyond my not
being able to walk, wheelchairs, or being disabled. They tell me that a poem is some-
thing to describe a being, who has overcome all the hardship. I do not intend to con-
fine myself to “disability”, but probably I am indeed confining myself to the fact of
my being disabled. Maybe my world is small…
Yonezu: I do not think that it means that your world is small. This body is the world
itself, isn’t it? Both for me, and for you.
Yokota: Yes, yes, I agree.
Yonezu: Yes. We might be able to escape from prison, we might run away from a
country if we do not like the country any more. We could even abandon our parents
or children, although it would not be easy. But this body we can never abandon. We
can never escape from our bodies’ (Yokota & Yonezu 2004: 103-104).
5 Keiko Higuchi a woman in the DPI network of women with disabilities, for example,
argues that disability is not a cause of unhappiness, but on the contrary, many dis-
abled people live their lives fully, cherishing their disabilities as their uniqueness (In
‘Letter of Protest to the Practice of Embryo Biopsy,’ in Soshiren news (164) March
1999: 4). Quite a few other disabled people make similar comments, that disability
is not a cause of unhappiness, but it gives them something positive in their life that
one would not have without a disability. See, for example, Ototake 1998, Matsunaga
2001. Moreover, these comments are not found only in Japan. See, for example, Wen-
dell 1996: 82-84.
6 Ehara argues that the increasing possibility of discovering disabilities in a foetus
might lead to a situation where the birth of disabled children is seen as ‘mothers’
failure to discharge her responsibility’ (2002: 21). The psychology of women who
gave birth to disabled children, despite advancement of reproductive technology, is
also reported. They often have a guilty conscience and express self-denial, saying that
‘I am not a complete woman because I could not give birth to a healthy child’.
7 Ibid: 20-21.
8 To cite a statement from the independent living movement: ‘Technical assistance is
often referred to, but more than this, what is lacking among us is relationships with
human beings, opportunities for trial and error in human relationships. If we try to
do something when we are with parents or family members, they would tell us not
to do it because it is dangerous to do so, and tell us to be quiet. Those opportunities
have been taken away from us.
In institutions, the staff tells us not to take risks because if something happens, they
would be held responsible. We do a number of things during the rehabilitation pro-
gram, but if we try to make use in the outside world of what we have learned
through the program, we are under the restriction of a number of rules. This is how
our lives have been. This problem should be solved before rehabilitation programs
are provided’ (A statement from Jun’ichi TERADA, in Aoi shiba no kai, Ayumi, March
1976, cited in Tateiwa 1999: 87).
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9 Both sentences are from Yonezu 1998: 236-237. Brackets are mine.
10 This interview took place in July 2001. This woman has CP, requires daily assistance,
and she has been active in the disabled people’s movement to oppose the institutio-
nalisation of disabled people since the 1970s. She has had almost no involvement in
the women’s movement, such as the Women’s Liberation Movement, or Soshiren. She
is now lives outside an institution and has a daughter.
11 My personal experiences of generalisations include dealing with the two rough binary
opposites of ‘East’ and ‘West’, for example. The reality is that, being Japanese, I often
do not know how to fit into this category myself. I am not Western, but when the to-
pic is about international politics, or economic management, my background is more
closely identified with ‘West’. However, racially and philosophically, I am ‘East’. Ob-
viously, my background is more complex than the simple categorisation of ‘East’ or
‘West’. Within ‘East’ there is a huge diversity, while I hear from a lot of ‘Western’ peo-
ple such comments as ‘I do not know if they are from Pakistan or India because they
are from the East’ and vice-versa; but being from the ‘East’ I do not know the answer
either. It is a problem that sometimes it is assumed that those from the so-called East
and West cannot identify with each other and that those within the category ‘East’
will know all about the East. I find that this is too rough a way of dealing with diver-
sity. Moreover, there are always people who cannot fit in either of the two categories.
Why is this category used? One reason is that the powerful – in this case, more often,
the so-called ‘West’ – desire that it should be as it is. Why should it be as it is? Be-
cause of the comfort in satisfying the desire to be dominant, they do not have to
question it. The oppressed are often more sensitive about diversity, because of their
difference. On the other hand, when those who are so-called ‘Easter’ use this category
of East/West generalisations, I often observe that it is based on the belief – in my
view, a false belief because it creates another Orientalism – that ‘the East’ is superior
to the West and the rest of the world. Of course there are some occasions when such
terms as ‘West’ and ‘East’ need to be used, such as the use of alphabets associated
with the linguistic commonality of Western Europe, for example. And it also happens
that sometimes those who are ‘Western’ will refer to themselves as ‘Westerners’, for
example in order to declare that they are on the side of a history of colonialism. But
then, it would be more honest to use the distinction ‘West and the rest of the world,’
as Edward Said sometimes did, to show the mechanisms of power imbalance, and in-
deed some other people use this distinction, too.
Another example is also a categorisation, ‘men/women’. This also eliminates diversity
by making invisible trans-gender or hermaphrodite people. These categories are not
questioned because the majorities are satisfied and comfortable with them, and being
in the majority means to be privileged. I think generalisation is sometimes a violent
act in order to eradicate the existence of those with relatively oppressed backgrounds.
Conclusion
1 Dualism results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a subordinated other.
This relationship of denied dependency determines a certain kind of logical struc-
ture, in which the denial and the relation of domination/subordination shape the
identity of both the relata. Dualism can also be seen as an alienated form of differen-
tiation, in which power construes and constructs difference in terms of an inferior
and alien realm. In systematised forms of power, power is normally institutionalised
and ‘naturalised’ by latching onto existing forms of difference. Dualisms are not just
free floating systems of ideas; they are closely associated with domination and accu-
mulation (Plumwood 1993: 41-42). A dualism is an intense, established, and devel-
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oped cultural expression of such a hierarchic relationship, constructing control on
different cultural concepts and identities so as to make equality and mutuality lit-
erally unthinkable. Dualism is a relation of separation and domination inscribed and
naturalised in culture and characterised by radical exclusion, distancing and [sic] op-
position between orders constructed as systematically higher and lower, as inferior
and superior, as ruler and ruled, which treats the division as part of the natures of
beings constructed not merely as different but as belonging to radically different or-
ders or kinds, and hence as not open to change. Some familiar examples of dualisms
are, culture/nature, reason/nature, universal/particular, subject/object, self/other, rea-
son/emotion (ibid: 47-48).
2 For a discussion about the status of an embryo, a foetus, medical science, and wo-
men’s subjectivity, see Sevenhuijsen 1997.
Appendices
1 In the original material, of which I have a photocopy, the woman’s name was deleted.
Therefore, it seems that the real name of the woman was stated in the very original,
but later on it was deleted in order to protect her privacy.
2 ‘XXX’ indicates a word or words that were deleted in the original leaflet.
3 ‘Hoshigarimasen Katsumadewa’ in Japanese. This was a saying amongst common peo-
ple during the war.
4 After the Second World War, the government announced that the whole nation of
one million people must apologise for the war, ‘Ichioku-so-zange’ in Japanese. In my
opinion, although the nation was forced to endure the war, and indeed suffered from
it under the leadership of the military government, the attitude of the government is
to unfairly avoid their own responsibilities.
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